


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THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE HINDUS.

TRANSLATED BY VARIOUS SANSKRIT SCHOLARS.

EDITED BY

MAJOR B. D, BASU, I.M.S-*Retd.*

VOL. VI.—THE VAIŚEṢIKA SÛTRAS OF KAṆÂDA



TRANSLATED BY

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PREFACE.

The *Vaiśeṣika Sûtras* of Kaṇâda, with the Commentary of Śaṅkara Miśra and extracts from the gloss of Jayanârâyaṇa and the Bhâṣya of Chandrakânta, was first published in the years 1910 and 1911. Inspite of the numerous imperfections of the work, it appears to have awakened a lively interest in the study and propagation of one of the oldest systems of Hindu Philosophy. For, its publication has been followed by a number of very valuable contributions to the literature of the subject from the pen of some eminent scholars. First and foremost amongst them is the *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* by Dr. Brajendranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. (1915). Dr. Seal observes that "Hindu scientific ideas and methodology (e. g. the inductive method or methods of algebraic analysis) have deeply influenced the course of natural philosophy in Asia—in the East as well as in the West—in China and Japan, as well as in the Saracen Empirec', and enters into "a comparative estimate of Greek and Hindu scence". He gives very lucid expositions of the Nyâya-Vaiśeṣika Themical Theory, of the conception of Molecular Motion (Parispanda), and of the ideas of Mechanics (Kinetics) and Acoustics, and deals very fully with the Doctrine of Scientific Method. In the following year (1916y, that accomplished scholar, Dr. Ganganatha Jha, M. A., D. Litt., came out with an English translation of the *Padârtha-Dharma-Saṁgraha*,—the *Magnum Opus* of the Vaiśeṣikas—, that is, Praśastpâda's Bhâṣya on the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras of Kaṇâda, with Śrîdhara's Commentary (Nyayakandali) on the Bhâṣya. In tho Introduction he explains the Vaiśeṣika conception of Bhûta ('element'), and points out that "what the Vaiśeṣika means by saying that these are the 'five bhûtas', is that there are five states of matter: *solid* (Earth), *liquid* (Water), *gaseous* (Air), *luminous* (Fire), and *etheric* (Akâśa)." The notes he has added in the body of the book are very illuminating, and clear up many obscure points in he text. In the year 1917, was published the *Daśa-Padârtha-Śâstra*: Chinese Text (translation), with Introduction, Translation and Notes, by H. Ui, Professor in the Sotoshu College, Tokyo, under the editorship of F. W. Thomas Esquire. It is a remarkable publication in many ways. In the first place, it presents us with a Chinese version of the tenets of Kaṇâda in the form of Kwei-ci's quotations, probably from a commentary on the treatise. The author tells us that the treatise was composed by a follower of the Vaiśeṣika, named Mati Chandra, and translated into Chinese by Yuan Chwang in 648 A. D. It is in the form of a cateciism, and, as a catechism of the doctrines of the later school of the Vaiśeṣkas, it is almost unsurpassed. In the second place, the author has compiled from Chinese records an account of the traditions current among Chinese scholars respecting Kaṇâda, his work, and his school. His researches fully confirm our view of the great antiquity and popularity of the Vaiśeṣika-Sûtras. Last but not least is *Indian Logic and Atomism* (1921) which is an exposition of the Nyâya and Vaiśeṣika Systems, by A. B. Keith, D. C. L., D. Litt., a well-known orientalist. He regards them "as able and earnest efforts to solve the problems of knowledge and being on the basis of reasoned argument". He has attempted "to set out the

fundamental doctrines of the systems with due regard to their history and their relations to Buddhist philosophy". It is gratifying to find that, as in the ancient past, even so at the present day, the Vaiśeṣika has engaged the attention of earnest students all over the world.

Now, what is the Vaiśeṣika Darśana ? We do not know when or by whom the name 'Vaisesika' was first applied to the teachings of Kaṇâda. In the Sûtras the word appears only once (in X. ii. 7) where it means 'characteristic', 'distinguishing'. According to the rule of Pâṇini, IV. iii. 87, the word is derived from the word 'Viśeṣa', meaning 'a treatise on Viśeṣa'. The word 'viśeṣa' has various meanings ; e. g. species, distinction, difference, excellence, superiority. Accordingly the word 'Vaiśeṣika' also has been variously interpreted. "The origin of the name", in one view, "is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sâmkhya". In another view, "the work was named the Vaiśeṣika sâstra, since it excelled other works in all respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence". A third view is that it is called Vaiśeṣika, because it particularly or specifically treats of Genus, Species, and Combination which have not been dealt with in any other treatise and though they are included in the predicables Substance, etc. In a fourth view, it is distinguished from the Sâmkhya in its theory of Buddhi (understanding), namely that Buddhi is an attribute of the Soul, and not its instrument of knowledge. In another view, it is distinguished from the System of Jaimini in so far as it declares that the highest good is to be achieved by the renunciation of the things of the world and by the contemplation of Truth, and not by positive performances. Lastly, it is explained that Kaṇâda's system has come to be called "Vaiśeṣika" from his theory of 'viśeṣa' inhering in the ultimate atoms (I. ii. 6). His atoms are 'mathematical points', without parts, and possessing the same attribute and activity in their respective classes of 'Earth', 'Water', 'Fire', and 'Air'. It is by means of their 'visesas' or individual characteristics that they are distinguished from one another, and account for the variety of things in nature. This last explanation appears to be preferable to all the others.

The Vaiśeṣika is a *Mokṣa-śâstra*: it teaches a doctrine of release, release from the coil of mortality. According to Kaṇâda, man must work out his own salvation. It is given to him, if he will, to hear the Truth from the Scriptures or from a preceptor, on high or here below, to think over it in his mind, and to meditate upon it in the recesses of his heart. He can control his sensory and motor organs, and, by eliminating superficial psychic states, make the mind steady in the Soul. Steadiness of the mind in the Soul is called Yoga. Yoga is neither a mystery nor is it mysticism. It is the realisation of the freedom of will, of the free Self. He then becomes master of time and space. For him there is no distinction of past, present, and future ; no distinction of here, there, and elsewhere. The mind being at rest, pleasure and pain do not arise, activity ceases, and the law of Karma is cancelled for all time to come. The accumulated Karma of the past, however, remains. Having realised the fundamental freedom of the Self, he sees what experiences are in store for him, and lives out those experiences in appropriate forms and surroundings brought about by the

creative power of will. In this way he cancels the past as well. Thereafter, when death takes place, and the soul finally quits its temporal abode, it does not pass into other forms of finite life, but remains free for ever till the end of Time. That freedom is called Mokṣa, the supreme good, the be-all and end-all of existence.

Self-knowledge, Self-realisation, Âtma-sâkṣâtkâra, is then the only means of attaining Mokṣa. The fundamental teaching of Kaṇâda, therefore, is "tattva-jñânât niḥśreyasam", the supreme good results from the knowledge of the truth about the Soul. It is a translation of the Vedic text, "Tarati śokam Âtma-vit", the knower of the Self overcomes Evil.

The Soul is therefore to be known. Kaṇâda shows how it is to be known. Hence the Vaiśeṣika Śâstra is also called *Adhyâtma Śâstra*, a treatise respecting the Soul. It was not necessary for him to call attention to the nature of the Soul in itself, the pure Soul as it was in the beginning and as it will be in the end. It was enough for his purpose to demonstrate the nature of the Soul in the interval of Time, the suffering Soul, the Soul revolving on the wheel of births and deaths and re-births under the Law of Karma. The universal experience of Suffering ("Duḥkha") compels an enquiry as to the means of its removal, namely, realisation of the truth about the Soul ; and Kaṇâda's view is that the Soul can be known by means of the Not-Soul.

The Soul and the Not-Soul make up Reality. The Real is that which is knowable and nameable-Reality therefore consists of Padârthas, nameables or predicables. They are not merely categorie of Teought, in the sense that they have no existence outside and independent of thought. They are classes of entities which have an existence antecedent to, and independent of, our thought. They become objects of our thought, they are knowable and nameable, because they exist. "In pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition "(Bergson). Tattva-sâkśâtkâra, immediate intuition of reality, is the aim of Kaṇâda's philosophy.

By a subtle process of analysis and synthesis, Kaṇâda divides all nameable things into six classes: *viz.* substance, attribute, action, genus, species, and combination. He then shows, that attrribute and action exist by combinaton with substance. Without substance, there were no attribute and action. Similarly, genus and species are correlative, and are not absolute, except in the case of the highest genus which is existence, and the lowest species which is the viśosas or individual characteristics appertaining to, inhering in the eternal substances. Genus and species therefore exist by combiuation with substances. Without substance, there where were no genus and species. Similarly, combination is " the intimate connection in the inseparably connected things " ; *e. g.* of parts and wholes, of substances and their attributes, of action and the sent of action, of genus and soecies and substances in which they reside, and of eternal substances and their ultimate differences. Without substance, then, there were no combination. Substance, therefore, is the fundamental reality.

By analysis, substance is resolved into nine kinds : *viz.* Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind. Of these Earth,

Water, Fire, and Air are, as effects, i. e., wholes made up of parts, non-eternal. Their ultimate atoms which are without parts, are eternal. On the other hand, Ether, Time, Space, Soul, and Mind are without parts, and therefore eternal. Ether is held to be "nothing other than the cosmic vacuum (?) which contains all objects, and gives room for their activities". Time and Space are complementary to Ether. The three substances are in reality one only (Praśastapâda and Chandrakânta). Mind, again, is entirely material, and yet capable of coming into intimate relation with the Soul ; it is as it were a sort of *camera obscura* to the Soul. In another view, the ultimate atoms are subject to change ; they produce effects, and themselves undergo changes, but do not initiate changes, except in so far as they reflect themselves in the Mind. Mind also suffers change ; it modifies in the form of every object it comes in contact with ; otherwise it is absolutely inactive. The Soul, on the other hand, does not suffer change of states. It is the initiator of change in everything else. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression are its attributes, and not its essence. They are determinations of Will, and prove a state of "indetermination of Will" in which the Soul is truly free and eternal. It follows that Atoms, Minds, and Souls are the ultimate units in Creation. The highest Soul, the Supreme Person, is God.

Atoms and Minds do not exist for themselves. They exist for the Souls, for their bhoga and apavarga, transmigration and emancipation. In the beginning of Creation, activity is induced in them—they are set in motion,—by Adriṣṭam, the resultant energy abiding in the Souls as a consequence of their previous activities. It causes the combination of atoms to form the body and the world. "The sphere of transmigration is the common result of the individual *adriṣṭa*, and every one's body and other personal circumstances are the special results of the individual *adriṣṭa*". It has no activity during the time of the world's dissolution. At the end of the period of dissolution, it is set free by the will of God. It then starts the process of Creation, and maintains it ; it is the sustaining energy from the beginning to the end of Creation. It can be neutralised,—its force can be exhausted,—only by the action of the Soul (Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, V. ii. 16).

In this view the interesting references that are met with here and there in the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, to cosmology, geology, mineralogy, botany and plant-physiology, zoology, physiology, mechanics, acoustics, and other positive sciences, become explained. The doctrine of *adriṣṭa* carries the enquiry further into the field of ethics and sociology, on the one hand, and logic and epistemology as well as psychology and philology, on the other. For, the Soul is at the core of reality, that is, the real which is knowable and nameable. Every individual Soul is the centre of a separate world of its own, which is evolved to suit its *adriṣṭa*. To know the Soul,—to have immediate intuition of it, therefore, it is necessary to know the Not-Soul. "For we do not obtain an intuition from reality, that is, an intellectual sympathy with the most intimate part of it,—unless we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with its superficial manifestations. (Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics).

Kaṇâda accordingly elaborates a process of thinking consideration of things. As Dr. Deussen rightly observes, "Indian Philosophy did

not start, as, for the most part, the Grecian did, from an investigation free of assumptions into the existent; but rather like modern philosophy from the critical analysis and testing of a complex of knowledge handed down (through the Veda). " Hence the Vaiśeṣika is also called *Manana śâstra*, treatise based on reasoning, rational or critical system. The starting point of the system is the observation and analysis of objects, with a view to their strict definition and a correct appreciation of their place and function in the world of bhoga and apavarga, probation and perfection, bondage and freedom. And tattva-jnâna, knowledge of truth, is its end and aim. To accomplish this result, it evolves a doctrine of Scientific Method, which, however, is " only a subsidiary discipline, being comprehended under the wider conception of Methodology," which proceeds by way of " (1) the proposition (or enumeration) of the subject-matter (Uddeśa), (2) the ascertainment of the essential characters or marks, by Perception, Inference, the Inductive Methods, etc. —resulting in definitions (by lakśana) or descriptions (by upalakṣana) ; and (3) examination and verification (parikṣâ and nirṇaya)" (Seal). In this method, logic is not pure reasoning or inference ; the reasoning is also proof. And the Methodology evolved by Kaṇâda and Gotama has been carried almost to perfection in the later Nyâya, " which, inspite of its arid dialectics, possesses a threefold significane in the history of thought: (1) logical, in its conceptions of Avachchhedaka and Pratiyogî, being an attempt to introduce quantification on a connotative basis, in other words,to introdnce quantitative notions of Universal and Particular, in both an affirmative and a negative aspect, into the Hindu theory of Inference and Proposition regarded connotatively as the establishment of relations among attributes or marks ; (2) scientific, in its investigation of the varieties of Vyâpti and Upâdhi (and of Anyathâsiddha), being an elaboration of Scientific Method, in the attempt to eliminate the irrelevant ; and (3) ontological and epistemological, in its classification and precise determination of the various relations of Knowledge and Being, with even greater rigidity and minuteness than in Hegel's Logic of Being and Essence" (Seal).

The criterion of truth, in the Vaiśeṣika Sûtras, is the correspondence of thought with things and *vice versa* Truth and reality are, in this system, convertible terms. "* * * the existence of the concept of an object, subjective as well as objective, is the logical reason for and the real consequence of the existence of the object" (Ui). Existence pervades the world of reality: to be real, is to be existent: and to be existent is to be knowable and nameable ; that is, there must be in it "an immediately intuitable element, which is determined by the function of one or more of our senses, or by inner perception" (Sigwart), or, as we should say, by the 'mind', and all, by meditation and transcendental or pure perception (tattva-sâkṣâtkâra). Hence the Vaiśeṣika is called a realism, and, —a dualism.

A characteristic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is its Kriyâ-vâda. This is the doctrine which holds that self is active, or that self is affected by pleasure or desire etc, in other words, that it is a kartri or an agent, in the course of the evolution, or more correctly, revolution of its transmigratory existence.

Another characteristic doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika is its Ârambha-vâda: the doctrine, namely, that the world as an effect, is not a mere appearnace (vivarta) of the cause, nor an evolution (pariṇâma) of the cause, but is produced by aggregation of the cause which is the ultimate atoms. And this leads to the doctrine of Aśat-kârya-vâda, that is, that an effect has only a temporary existence, and that, before its production, and, after its destruction, it is non-existent.

Before we close this short notice of the scope and character of the Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, it is our pleasant duty to acknowledge our obligations to the distinguished authors cited above. Our special thanks are due to Dr. Seal and Professor Ui whom we have freely quoted.

Translator.

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
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THE VAIŚEṢIKA SÛTRAS OF KAṆÂDA

WITH THE

COMMENTARY OF ŚAṄKARA MIŚRA

AND

EXTRACTS FROM THE GLOSS OF JAYANÂRÂYAṆA.

AND

THE BHÂṢYA OF CHANDRAKÂNTA.

Śaṅkara Miśra's Introduction.

Salutation to Śrî Gaṇeśa !

I bow to Hara who has the Heavenly River playing on the lap of His untied matted locks, and whose forehead is adorned with the Embellisher of the Night.

My Salutations constantly reach those two, Kaṇâda and Bhavanâtha, by whom I have been thoroughly enlightened in the Vaiśeṣika System.

Note.—Kaṇâda here does not refer to the author of the Vaiśeṣika-Sûtram, but to a well-known Vaiśeṣika teacher of a recent date.

Bhavanâtha was the father of Śaṅkara Miśra.

May success attend this venture of mine who, like a funambulist in the air, walk here without any support, with the only help of the Sûtram.

Note.—Sûtram—a piece of rope ; an aphorism ; just as a rope-dancer walks in the air with the help of a Sûtram (rope), so the commentator traverses the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣikas with the help of the Sûtram (aphorisms) of Kaṇâda.

Human existence is subject to threefold afflictions. These afflictions are partly âdhyâtmika, i.e., bodily and mental. They are partly âdhibhautika, i.e., caused by natural agencies, e. g. man, beast, bird, reptile and the immobile. And they are partly âdhidaivika, i.e., caused by supernatural powers, such as Yakṣa, Râkṣasa, Vinâyaka, etc. Discriminative men, struck with the threefold afflictions, looked for the root-cause of the cessation of the threefold afflictions. They gathered from the various Srutis (Revelations), Smritis (Recollections), Itihâsas (Histories), and Purâṇas (Cosmogonies), that it is the immediate intuition or direct vision of the principle of the self, or simply, self-realization, which is that cause. They then desired to know the path also which led to the attainment of self-realization. Accordingly they approached the very kind sage (muni) Kaṇâda.

Now, the Muni Kaṇâda had accomplished the knowledge of the principles (tattvas), dispassion, and lordliness. He thought within himself that the knowledge of the principles of the six padârthas (predicables), by means of their resemblances and differences, is the only royal road to the attainment of self-realization, and that that would be easily accomplished by the disciples through the dharma (Merit or Worth) of renunciation. He therefore resolved first to teach them dharma alone with reference to its essential form and with reference to its characteristics, and then to teach them also the six padârthas by means of their enumeration, definition, and demonstration.

Note.—Dharma of renunciation.—The indirect method of Self-realization is Pravṛitti Mârga, i. e. through and by means of wordly experience. The direct method of Self-realization is Nivṛitti Mârga, i. e. through and by means of abandonment of worldly experience.

Hence, to invite their attention, he proposes.

Jayanârâyaṇa's Introduction.

He who of His own will spreads out the production, preservation, and destruction of the universe; He who, even though shining forth in suppression of all these, still is not known by other than wise men; He, by knowing whom as He is in Himself, men are saved from further immersion into the waves of the stream of transmigration; the same is Bhava (i.e., the Lord of Creation), and He is easy of access by the path of communion with Him in constant devotion.* May† He be pleased to give you prosperity.

I adore Bhavânî (the consort of Bhava), Mâheśî (the consort of Maheśa, the Great Lord), who, Herself bearing limbs as dark as the cloud, still dispels the mass of darkness by myriads of collected rays; who while cutting asunder the bond of re-birth of Her devotees, is Herself bound by love to Bhava and is His constant delighter; who, although She is born of the Immobile (the Himâlaya), still moves from place to place; and who while being the consort of the Pure (Śiva), is seated on a corpse.

After bowing to his good preceptor, the fortunate twice-born Jayanârâyaṇa is writing out the *vivṛiti* (explanation or elaboration) of the aphorisms of Kaṇâda for the pleasure of Îśvara.

Here, indeed, one and all of the disciples, desiring to throw off the multitude of afflictions arising from birth, decrepitude, death, and the like, *hear* from the various Śrutis, Smṛitis, Itihâsas, Purâṇas, etc., that the vision of the reality of the Self is the fundamental means of escaping them. Thus, there is the Śruti: "Verily, verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard about, to be thought over, and meditated upon. Verily, O verily, this is (the measure of) immortality" (Bṛihadâraṇyaka 2, 4, 5); also, "When the Puruṣa (the in-dweller) will know himself—the Self—as "I am," then wishing what, for which desire, will he pursue the course of transmigration?" And the Smṛiti also: "By elaborating his understanding in three ways, namely by sacred writings, inference, and habitual flow of contemplation, a person attains to laudable communion."

* Cf. Nârada Bhakti Sûtram, aphorism 58 p. 23, S. B. H., Vol. VII.
† Cf' Śâṇḍilya-Sutram, III, 1, 7, page 71, S. B. H., Vol. VII.

Now, some disciples, who were unenvious and who had properly studied the Vedas and the Vedaṅgas, (i.e., treatises regarded as so many limbs as it were of the Vedas) and had also achieved the *Śravaṇa* (i.e., the stage of self-culture known by the name, *audition*, in other words, the mere acquisition of knowledge or information as referred to in the preceding paragraph), with due rites approached the great and mighty sage Kaṇâda for the purpose of *manana* or *intellection* (the second stage of self-culture, i.e., that of discriminative understanding). Thereupon that sage, full of great compassion, taught them a system (of self-culture) in Ten Books. There in the First Book he has stated the entire group of *padârthas* (Predicables); in the Second Book he has ascertained Substance; in the Third Book he has described the Soul and the Inner Sense; in the Fourth Book he has discussed the body and its constituents; in the Fifth Book he has established *Karma* (Action); in the Sixth Book he has considered *Dharma* (piety) according to Śruti; in the Seventh Book he has established Attribute and *Samavâya* (co-inherence or combination); in the Eighth Book he has ascertained the manifestation of knowledge, its source, and so on; in the Ninth Book he has established particular or concrete understanding; and in the Tenth Book he has established the differences of the attributes of the Soul.

The operation of this treatise (towards teaching) is three-fold: Enumeration, Definition, and Examination or Demonstration. Classification or Division is a particular form of Enumeration; and hence it does not constitute an additional method.

Although this system is mainly concerned with the determination of the Predicables, still, inasmuch as *Dharma*, being at the root of the knowledge of the essence of the Predicables, possesses a prominence of its own, therefore he (Kaṇâda) proposes to ascertain that (*Dharma*) first of all.

Dharma *is to be explained.*

अथातो धर्म्मं व्याख्यास्यामः ॥ १ । १ । १ ॥

अथ Atha, now. अतः Ataḥ, therefore. धर्म्मम् Dharmmam, piety, religion. व्याख्यास्यामः Vyâkhyâsyâmaḥ, (We) shall explain.

1. Now, therefore, we shall explain *Dharma*.—1.

Upaskâra.—'Atha' indicates sequence to the desire of the disciples. 'Ataḥ'—Because disciples, skilful in *Śravaṇa* (audition), etc., and unenvious, approached (him), therefore. Or the word 'atha' has the sense of auspiciousness. For it has been said: "*Omkâra* (aum) and the word *atha*—these two came out, at the beginning, by breaking through the throat of Brahmâ; hence both of them are auspicious." And it is as it should be. How, otherwise, is it possible on the part of the great sage, while composing the Vaiśeṣika system of self-culture, not to observe the auspicious ceremony, which has acquired the obligatory nature of a duty, by a succession of observances by pious men? It cannot be said, on the other side, that the non-observance might be due to the experience of the non-appearance of fruit even where the auspicious ceremony has been observed and of the appearance of fruit even where it has not been observed; since a wise man does not engage in a useless pursuit. For its usefulness becomes certain on the supposition of its observance in another birth in the case of the above non-observance where the fruit still appears, and of defect in some part (of the ceremony) in the case of the above observance, where the fruit does not still appear.

Again, there need be also no apprehension of its uselessness merely on account of the non-appearance, for the time being, of the fruit of that, the obligatory nature of which has been taught in the Sruti and can be inferred from the conduct of the elect or polite. Nor is it that there can be no supposition of something in another birth since an act must produce its fruit in this (one) life only; because, as in the case of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, so in every act the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life is not proved to exist. Whereas the characteristic of producing fruit in one and the same life belongs to *Kârîrî* (sacrifice for rain) and other sacrifices, because these are performed with that desire alone. Here the agent is desirous of completion, as the agent in a sacrifice is desirous of heaven. The difference is that there the object (of the observance) is a new entrance in the shape of *adṛiṣtam*, while here it is the annihilation of hindrances, since the undertaking is with the desire that what has been begun may be safely completed.

It cannot be said that the fruit of the observance is the mere annihilation of hindrances while completion will follow from its own cause. For, the mere annihilation of obstacles is not in itself an object of volition, whereas completion as the means of happiness is an object of volition, and it is also uppermost in the mind. Moreover, the mere destruction of demerits is not the fruit, for that being otherwise capable of accomplishment by propitiation, singing the name of God, crossing the river Karmanâśâ, etc., there will be plurality of causes, i.e., a violation of the rule (that only the observance of the omen will produce the result). If it is held that the destruction of demerits is the end, as the destruction of the particular demerits which obstruct the fulfilment of the undertaking, then the fulfilment itself properly becomes the end. Here too there will be a violation of the rule, since such destruction of particular demerits is producible by gift of gold, bathing (at the confluence (of the Gaṅgâ and Yamunâ) at Prayâga (Allahabad), etc.; and it will be rash to speak of them as so many good omens.

Again, the causality of the good omen consists in this that it being observed, the completion must necessarily follow. So it has been said: "Because of the rule that the fruit necessarily results from an act, complete in all its parts, according to the Veda." Hence an alternative cause also is certainly a cause, for the idea of a cause in the Veda refers only to the uniformity of immediateness or to the immediate sequence of the effect. It is perverse to suppose a difference in kind in the effects, in the case of a plurality of causes. Where causality has to be deduced from agreement and difference, there the rule of antecedence to the effect should be observed, but not in the Veda also, where the appearance of difference does not figure as a weighty consideration. Thus it is not a violation of the rule to say that the omen being observed in all its parts, the completion necessarily follows.

Now, completion or fulfilment is that on the performance of which arises the belief that this act has been completed. In the case of writings it consists in the writing of the last sentence; in the case of a sacrifice, etc., in the final oblation; in the case of a cloth, etc., in the addition of the last thread; in the case of going to a village, etc., in the final contact of the feet with the village: and it should be similarly understood in all other cases. Therefore in the case of completion produced by an auspicious observance, even if we suppose a difference in kind in the effect, still there is no violation of the rule of agreement and difference.

An auspicious observance is an act which brings about fulfilment as its fruit by the path of the annihilation of obstacles, and that is really of the form of salutation to the deity, etc. Even where obstacles do not exist of themselves, although the commonly attributed (as above) charactersitic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles is absent there, still the idea of the auspicious observance is not too narrow, because the salutation, etc., as such, possess the incidence of the characteristic of issuing by the path of the annihilation of obstacles This is the point.—1.

The *Vṛtti* adds: Others again say that the non-existence of any hindrance having been insured by the virtue born of concentration (*Yoga*), the sage did not attend to the auspicious observance, or that if he did, he has not inserted that at the beginning of the book. Later thinkers, on the other hand, say that, as in the treatise of Gautama (*i.e.*, Nyâya Sûtra), in the recital of the word *pramâṇa* (Proof) which falls within the group of the names of God, so too in this treatise, the auspicious ceremony has been observed, in the form of reciting the word *dharma*, which also is a synonym of God.

It should be understood here that *dharma* leads up to knowledge by the way of the purification of the mind (*chitta*), thirst after knowledge, and so on. For the Veda says: "They come to thirst after knowledge by the performance of sacrifices," etc. And says the Smṛiti also, "Knowledge is produced after demerits or dark deeds have been destroyed by good acts."

Chandrakânta :—The classification of *Dharma* is not shown by *Kaṇâda*, as it does not fall within the scope of his philosophy ; for, he has undertaken the *Śâstra* with the object of teaching *Tattva-Jñânam*, knowledge of the essences or principles, only.

Definition of Dharma.

यतोऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयससिद्धिः स धर्म्मः ॥ १ । १ । २ ॥

यतः Yataḥ, whence. अभ्युदय-निःश्रेयस-सिद्धिः Abhyudaya-niḥsreyasa-siddhiḥ, Exaltation, Supreme Good, Accomplishment. सः Saḥ, that. धर्मः Dharmaḥ, Piety, Religion.

2. *Dharma* (is) that from which (results) the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good.—2.

Upaskâra.—Now he describes the subject proposed :

'Abhyudaya' means knowledge of the essences. 'Niḥśreyasam' is final cessation of pain. That from which both of them result is *dharma*. The compound of the two words, rendered as 'niḥśreyasa' by the path of 'abhyudaya,' belongs to that class of compounds which are formed by the elision of the middle term: or it is a *Tat-puruṣa* compound ablatively formed.

This *dharma* will be later on described as being characterised by forbearance. If it is the effect of constant contemplation and other practices of *Yoga* and is the same as *adṛiṣṭam* (the invisible, potential after effects of actions, or Merit and Demerit), then it is producible by positive performances.

The Vṛittikâra, however, says: "'Abhyudaya' is happiness, and 'niḥṣreyasam' the simultaneous annihilation of all the particular attributes (*i.e.*, modifications) of the Soul. The proof is that in the case of *dharma*, the body, etc., of Devadatta are made up of elements so directed by the particular attributes of the enjoyer or sufferer, and as they are products or effects, they are, as the means of his enjoyment or experience, like a garland made by himself." Now, this explanation has been discarded by superficial readers as being not wide enough to apply to each and all (*a*). Whereas in fact "what is *dharma*? and what its characteristic?"—the enquiry of the disciples being of such a general nature, the answer comes, "That from which (results) the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good."

Thus, that which leads to the attainment of Exaltation, and also that which leads to the attainment of the Supreme Good, both of them are *dharma*. Thus that the invariable cause of the object of volition is *dharma*, being the matter to be expressed, the expression "the accomplishment of Exaltation and of the Supreme Good" has been used with the object of specially introducing the two great objects of volition, *viz.*, happiness and absence of pain. Because paradise and emancipation are the only great objects of volition, being the objects of desire which is not dependent upon desire for ulterior objects. And it will be shown that the absence of pain also is an object of volition.—2.

[*Note.*—(*a*) "Not wide enough to apply to each and all."—The separate characteristics are that it produces pleasure and that it produces the Supreme Good. The former does not include the dharma of nivṛitti and the latter does not include the dharma of pravṛitti. The collective characteristic is that it produces both pleasure and the Supreme Good. And this does not include that which produces pleasure only, nor that which produces the Supreme Good only. Thus the definition of *dharma* as explained by the Vṛittikâra is in either case too narrow. This is, according to Upaskâra, the view of superficial readers.]

Chandrakânta:—Wherefrom does the production of the good and of the ultimate good result? The production of the good and of the ultimate good results from *Pravṛitti*, activity or employment, that is (observed in the world, or) exertion of the speech, the mind, and the body. Therein, it is said, that a person cultivates *Dharma* with the speech, by telling agreeable and wholesome truths and by studying the sacred writings; with the mind, by showing compassion, contentment, and faith; with the body, by practising charity and by relieving the poor and the distressed and those who are in danger. यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त देवास्तानि धर्माणि—This text of the Veda also shows that *Dharma* is the designate of the word, "yajati," to perform (sacrifices, etc.)

And this *Dharma* is subsidiary, because it subserves *tattvajñânam*, knowledge of the principles; which is the principal *Dharma*, because it is the means of the supreme good.

Authority of the Veda.

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यम् ॥ १ । १ । ३ ॥

तद्वचनात् Tad-vachanât, being His Word or declaration, or its (of *dharma*) exposition. आम्नायस्य Âmnâyasya, of the Veda. प्रामाण्यम् Prâmâṇyam, authoritativeness.

3. The authoritativeness of the Veda (arises from its) being the Word of God [or being an exposition of *dharma*].—3.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected, " Well, the Veda is the authority for this that *dharma* characterised by nivritti is the source of the Supreme Good by means of the knowledge of the essence or reality. But we are doubtful about the authoritativeness of the Veda itself, on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition. Falsity is shown by the non-production of the son, even after the sacrifice for a son has been performed. The *homa* (oblation to fire) after sun-rise, etc., actually prescribed in the ordinances ' He offers oblation unto fire after sunrise, he offers oblation unto fire before runrise, he offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,' is counteracted by such texts as ' Śyáva (a dog of Yama) eats up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire after sunrise, Savala (the other dog of Yama) eats up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire before sunrise, Śyava and Savala eat up the oblation of him who offers oblation unto fire at a belated hour,' etc. And repetition surely appears from the mention of the thrice recital of the first and the last *Sâmidheni* (the Rik III. 27. 1-11, directed to kindle fire) in ' He will recite the first for three times, he will recite the last for three times.' Beside there is nothing to establish the authoritativeness of the Veda. Its eternality being uncertain, its eternal freedom from defect also becomes doubtful. On the other hand, if it is the product of a human brain, then by the possibility of mistake, oversight, uncertainty, want of skill in the author, etc., its characteristic of being the infallible testimony of a great and good (*âpta*) man, certainly becomes doubtful. Thus there is no Supreme Good, nor is knowledge of reality its means, nor again is *dharma*. Thus all this remains uncertain."

To meet this objection he says :

' Tat ' alludes to God whose existence is well-known, although the word does not appear in the context ; as in the aphorism of Gautama, " That is unauthoritative on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," the Veda is alluded to by the word 'tat,' although it does not appear in the context. Thus 'tadvachanât,' means being the composition of Him, Îsvara ; ' âmnâyasya,' of the Veda ; 'prâmâṇyam.' Or,' 'tat' refers to *dharma* only which is close by *i. e.*, in the context. Thus, of *dharma* ; ' vachanât,' being the exposition ; âmnâyasya, of the Veda ; 'prâmâṇyam ;' since that statement is really proof which establishes something which is authoritative. God and the quality of His being an *âpta* (*i. e.*, a great and good person) will be established later on.

Now, with reference to what has been said, namely, " on account of the faults of falsity, contradiction, and repetition," there in the case of falsity, the explanation lies in the supposition of producing result in another existence or the supposition of defect in the act, the agent, and the instrument, since there is the rule that the result necessarily follows from an act, complete in all its parts, prescribed in the Veda. Moreover, it is not the case that the result must appear in this and only this life, as in the case of *Kârîrî*. (*i. e.*, sacrifice for rain.) There the occupation is that of one who desires a revival of crops which are getting dry. In the case of the sacrifice for a son, the occupation is that of one who desires a son only. This is the difference. There is also no contradiction, because the condemnatory passages such as " Śyâva eats up his oblations," etc., have reference only to cases where after having particularly vowed oblations after sunrise, etc., one perfoms such *homas* at other times. Nor is there the fault of repetition, because the repetition has this justification that eleven *mantras* for kindling fire having been as a matter of fact recited, fifteen such *mantras* as required by the text, " By the means of the fifteen word-thunders he opposed that enemy who is here," cannot be obtained without reciting the first and the last *mantra* for three times each.—3.

Vivṛiti.—Or here the word 'tat' itself denotes Îśvara, on the strength of the saying: "*Om, Tat, Sat*—this has been remembered to be the three-fold reference to Brahman."

Knowledge of Predicables is the means of attaining the Supreme Good.

धर्म्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्माभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ॥ १ । १ । ४॥

धर्म्मविशेषप्रसूतात् Dharmma-viśeṣa-prasûtât, Produced by a particular *dharma*. द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां Dravya-guṇa-karmma-sâmânya-viśeṣa-samavâyânâm, of Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination. पदार्थनाम् Padârthânâm, of the *padârthas* or predicables. साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां Sâdharmmya-vaidharmmyâbhyâm, By means of resemblance and difference. तत्त्वज्ञानात् Tattvajñânât, From knowledge of the essence. निःश्रेयसम् Niḥśreyasam, The Supreme Good.

4. The Supreme Good (results) from the knowledge, produced by a particular *dharma*, of the essence of the Predicables, Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, Species, and Combination, by means of their resemblances and differences.—4.

Upaskâra.—Having described the nature and characteristic of *dharma* in accordance with the desire of the disciples, he lays down the following aphorism for ascertaining the subject-matter and the "relation".—

Such knowledge of the essences is dependent upon the Vaiśeṣika System; therefore it goes without saying that it too is a source of the Supreme Good. If, through its derivation in an instrumental sense, namely, that the essence is known by it, the word 'tattvajñâna' refers to the treatise, then it will not have apposition to the word 'dharma-viśeṣa-prasûtât.' In 'dravya-guṇa, etc., the compound is a 'copulative compound' wherein all the words are prominent, because the knowledge of the essence of *all* the Predicables is the source of the Supreme Good.

Now, here the 'relation' is understood to be: between the Doctrine and the Supreme Good, that of the means and the end or motive; between the Doctrine and the knowledge of the essences, that of form and matter; between the Supreme Good and the knowledge of the essences, that of effect and cause; between the Predicables, Substance, etc., and the Doctrine, that of the demostrable and that which demonstrates. And from the knowledge of these relations, those who seek the Supreme Good apply themselves to this Doctrine, and those who desire salvation apply to it only when they realize that the sage is an *âpta* or trustworthy person.

"Niḥśreyasam" is final cessation of pain; and the finality of the cessation of pain consists in its non-simultaneousness with the antecedent non-existence of pain in the same substratum, or in its simultaneousness, in the same substratum, with the simultaneous annihilations of the special attributes of the Soul, *viz.*, adriṣṭam and saṃskâra. Or, Salvation is the antecedent non-existence of pain upto the moment of the annihilation, without leaving any trace, of these special attributes.

Note —" Antecedent non-existence": Non-existence is fourfold, viz.
(*a*) antecedent, *e.g.* of the pot before it is produced.
(*b*) emergent, *e.g.* of the pot after it is destroyed.
(*c*) reciprocal, *e.g.* of the characteristic of the pot in a picture and *vice versa.*
(*d*) absolute, *e.g.* of the pot in a room where there is no pot.

It will be noticed that antecedent non-existence has no beginning ; emergent non-existence has no end ; and reciprocal non-existence and absolute non-existence have neither beginning nor end.

The thing of which there is non-existence, is said to be the opposite or counter-opposite (*pratiyogî*) of that non-existence. In the above illustration the counter-opposite is the pot.

One kind of non-existence (*e.g.* of the pot) is differentiated from another kind of non-existence (*e.g.* of the picture), by means of the characteristics of their counter-opposites. These characteristics are therefore called determinants or differentiators (*avachchhedaka*).

Now, mere cessation of pain is not Salvation ; because there remains the possibility of pain in future and there remains also the memory of the pain that has then passed into non-being. The cause of the possibility of pain is *adṛiṣṭam* or *karma* (merit and demerit) ; and the cause of the memory of pain is *saṃskâra* (the imprint of the experience of pain left in the soul). Salvation will result only when there is not merely the cessation of the pain actually experienced, but also the neutralisation of the causes of possible pain viz. *adṛiṣṭam* and *saṃskâra*.

Not that it is not an object of volition, being incapable of achievement, because even antecedent non-existence can be brought about by the neutralisation of the cause. Nor does it thereby lose in the characteristic of being antecedent non-existence, because such characteristic remains as the characteristic of the non-existence of the producer of the opposite (*i.e.*, the existence of pain) ; and to be the producer is merely its essential or general fitness to be the cause. Again, antecedent non-existence is not the last member or element, so that, it existing, the effect must necessarily appear ; for if it were so, then it would follow that an effect also has no beginning. Thus, as in the absence of a contributory cause it did not produce the effect so long, so also in future it will not produce it without the co-operation of a contributory cause, the person operating to the eradication of the cause. Therefore this aphorism too upholds antecedent non-existence. Hence in the second aphorism of Gautama, " Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notion—on the successive removal of these in turn, there is the removal of the one next preceding and thereafter salvation," (Nyâya Sûtram, 1, i, 2), the statement of the non-existence of the effect on the non-existence of the cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antecedent non-existence of pain. Removal of activity on the removal of faults, removal of birth on the removal of activity, of pain on the removal of birth—here removal does not mean annihilation but non-production, and that is nothing but antecedent non-existence. It is not that the opposite is not known, for the opposite is surely known in the form of pain in general. As in the case of propitiation, there too only the non-production of pain is expected through the annihilation of faults. In the world also it is seen that the removal of the snake, thorn, etc. is for the purpose of the non-production of pain. So the activity of the wise is directed only towards removing the causes of pain.

Some however say : " Only the absolute non-existence of pain is salvation. If it is not seated in the Soul, yet, as seated in the stone, etc., it is connected with the Soul ; and its connection lies in the annihilation of pain which does not accompany the prior non-existence (or potential existence) of pain ; as it is found in connection with such annihilation of pain, seeing that such annihilation taking place, there arises the consciousness of the absolute non-existence of pain in that

place. This being so, such texts of the Veda as "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," also become explained." We reply that it is not so. Absolute non-existence of pain, being incapable of accomplishment, is not an object of voluntary activity. Nor has annihilation of pain any connection to that, since this would entail a technicality.

Note.—Absolute non-existence has neither beginning nor end. It does not therefore depend upon human will or effort. Hence it cannot be pursued as an object of desire. You may say that, as long as it is not accomplished in the Soul, as the connection of that which is not connected with it,—such connection taking the form of the annihilation of pain which does not coexist with the antecedent non-existence of pain—so long surely it is an object of desire. But to this also there is an objection; *viz.*, that the annihilation of pain does not form such a connection, as it is not co-extensive with the soul. To hold otherwise, would be to put a new interpretation upon the word "connection" (*Sambandha*).

The text of the Veda "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain" implies that, by way of the neutralization of causes, prior non-existence of pain may be reduced into a condition similar to that of the absolute non-existence of pain.

It may be said, "This is not an object of the will, as it is not an object of desire which is not subject to another desire, because those only who seek pleasure, become active in the removal of pain, seeing that pleasure is not produced at the time of pain." But this is not so; because it is equally easy to say the contrary also. Will not desire for pleasure also be subject to the desire for the absence of pain? seeing that men overwhelmed with grief as well as those who turn their faces away from pleasure, having in view only the absence of pain, are inclined to swallowing poison, hanging themselves, etc..

Neither can it be said, "Even if it is an object of the will, it is so only because it is an object of cognition. But salvation as absence of pain is not even an object of cognition. Otherwise (*i.e.*, if to be an object of cognition were not a necessary condition of being an object of the will) men would be inclined to bring about the state of swoon, etc." For that which is capable of being known from the Veda and by inference cannot be reasonably said to be unknowable. For there are the texts of the Veda: "He moves about being absolutely relieved of pain," "By knowing Him only one transcends death," etc. There is inference also: The series of pain is finally or absolutely rooted out, because it is a series like a series of lamps; and so on. It can be known by perception also, since final annihilation of pain for a moment becomes the subject-matter of thought in the realization of pain in consciousness (in the moment prior to death) and (if you do not admit this), also because the *yogins* perceive the future annihilation of pain by virtue of the power born of concentration (*yoga*).

It cannot be said, "Still, the loss and gain being the same, it is not the object of the will, since with pain, pleasure is also removed, the removel of both being due to the same set of causes"; for men naturally dispassionate and fearful of dark days of suffering and who overestimate every glow-worm of pleasure, are active to that end.

It cannot again be said, "Cessation of pain is still not the object of the will; because cessation of pain which is yet to come, is impossible, pain which is past is in the past, and pain which is present will cease even without an effort of the person"; for the activity of the person is towards the eradication of causes, as in penances. Thus,

false knowledge attended with desire, is the cause of *Saṃsâra*, *i.e.*, succession of mortal existences ; it is rooted out by the knowledge of the truth about the Self ; and knowledge of the truth about the Self is producible by the practice of *Yoga* ; hence activity in this direction is justified.

It cannot be said that only the manifestation of permanent pleasure is salvation, and not the absence of pain ; for there is no proof that pleasure can be permanent ; if there were such proof then the manifestation of pleasure being constant, there would be no difference between a worldly and an other-worldly or liberated man, and also manifestation being a product or effect, on its termination there will again follow *Saṃsâra* or stream of mortal existence.

It cannot be said that salvation consists in the *laya* or disappearance of the *Jîvâtmâ* or embodied Self into the *Brahmâtmâ* or un-embodied or universal Self ; for if *laya* means amalgamation, then there is an obstacle, as two do not become one. It cannot be explained that *laya* means the removal of the subtle embodiment composed of the senses and of the physical organism ; for hereby the absence of the causes of pain being implied, it follows that the absence of pain alone is salvation.

Hereby the doctrine of the *Ekadaṇḍins* (a sect who carry staffs consisting of single sticks) that salvation means the remaining of the pure Self after the cessation of Nescience or false knowledge and that Self is by nature true knowledge and happiness, is also refuted, because there is no evidence that the Self is knowledge and happiness. The text of the Veda "Brahman is eternal, knowledge, and bliss," is no evidence, because it proves possession of knowledge and possession of bliss. For we have the perceptions "I know," and "I am happy," but not the perceptions "I am knowledge" and "I am happiness." Moreover, Brahman being even now existent, it would follow that there is no distinction between a liberated and a worldly man. The cessation of Avidyâ or false knowledge is also not an object of the will. Brahman also, being eternal, is not a *sâdhya* or what has to be accomplished. The realization of Brahman within the Self, having Him as the object, is not a *sâdhya* or what has to be accomplished. Similarly bliss also, having Him as its essence or object, is not a *sâdhya*. For these reasons activity directed towards Him is not justified.

It cannot be said that salvation lies in the purity or unimpeded flow of the stream of consciousness. For if by purity is meant the removal of such impediments as pain, etc., then this much alone being the object of the will, there is no reason for or proof of the survival of the stream of consciousness. Moreover, the retention or survival of the stream of consciousness can be possible only by means of the body, etc., and hence in this view the retention of *saṃsâra* or the stream of mortal existence also would be necessary.

It is therefore proved that cessation of pain as described above is alone the Supreme Good.

In 'knowledge of the essence' the genitive has been used in the place of the accusative. The third case-ending in Sâdharmmya-Vaidharmmyâ-bhyâm' shows the mode (of knowledge). Of these 'Sâdharmmya' means recurrent property and 'Vaidharmmya', divergent property.

Although a property which is recurrent in one place is divergent in another, and *vice versa*, still knowledge in the shape of recurrent and divergent properties, is here intended.

Here the enumeration itself of the Predicables, Substance, etc., has come to be their division, which has the effect of excluding a more or less number. Therefore it follows that as a rule Predicables are only six in number. And this is not proved. If any other Predicable which requires to be excluded is known then the rule does not stand good; if it is not known, then the exclusion is invalid. It cannot be said that this is not the exclusion of the addition of something else but the exclusion of non-application; in other words, that the non-application of the characteristics of the six to all predicables or things is excluded. For all known predicables having been included by the word 'Predicable,' there is here then the fault of proving over again, and also that something else is not known. Moreover, which is to be excluded, non-application of the characteristics jointly or their non-application severally? In the first alternative, joint non-application prevails everywhere, so that there can be no exclusion. It cannot be said that in the second alternative also there can be no exclusion as with reference to one another their individual non-application prevails everywhere; for the purpose of the rule is to exclude the non-application of the characteristics of the six, when, according to others, they do not apply to Energy, Number, Similarity, and other Predicables recognised by them. Therefore the meaning of the rule that Predicables are *only* six in number is that in all perceptible objects, there is application of one or other of the characteristics of the six, and not that there is non-application. Now, 'only,' if it goes with the noun, it means exclusion of the addition of something else; if it goes with the adjective, it means exclusion of non-application; and if it goes with the verb, it means exclusion of absolute non-application. Here according to some "only" has all this three-fold significance; while others say that its force lies in mere exclusion and that non-application, addition of something else, etc., are things to be excluded, which are derived by association.

"Produced by a particular *dharma*" is the adjective of "knowledge of the essence." Here "particular *dharma*" means piety characterised by forbearance or withdrawal from the world. If by "tattvajñâna" explained as "by this essence is known," the treatise (*i. e.*, the Aphorisms of Kaṇâda) is meant, in that case it should be said that "particular *dharma*" means the grace of and appointment from God, for it is heard that the great sage Kaṇâda composed this System by obtaining the grace of and appointment from God. In the aphorism by "knowledge of the essence" the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding is intended, because such relization alone is competent to root out false knowledge attended with desire. "By knowing Him only one transcends death, no other road is known (*vidyate*) for travelling," "Two Brahmans have to be known (*veditavye*)," "Having no eyes He yet sees, etc."—in all these passages the word *vedana* has the sense of realization in the understanding, and the use of the fifth case-ending in the causal sense in the word 'tattvajñânât' indicates that such realization of the Self comes in the progressive

career of hearing from the *Śâstras*, thinking within oneself, meditation, etc.,—4.

Vivṛiti.—'Dharmmaviśeṣaprasûtât' means producded by a particular (good conduct, virtue or) merit, acquired in this life or in previous births. It is the qualification of 'tattvajñânât' (knowledge of essence). As pointed out by the author of Muktâvalî, 'Sâdharmmya' means common property, and 'Vaidharmmya' means opposing (*i. e.*, distinguishing) property. The use of the third case-ending indicates manner. The fifth case-ending in 'tattvajñânât' has the sense of applicability. Thus the meaning is: By particular virtue knowledge of essence is produced by means of the generic and specific properties of the Predicables, Substance and others; thereafter is produced 'intellectual conception' of the Self, and next comes the realization of the Self in the understanding by constant meditation; after this liberation follows in the train of the removal of false knowledge, etc., (*Vide* Nyâya Sûtram, I. i. 2.)

The author of the Upaskâra has however said: The word 'tattvajñâna' in the aphorism conveys the principal idea of the realization of the Self in the understanding; or, if it is interpreted in the instrumental sense, it refers to the treatise which is the (instrument or) means of such realization. In the first of these cases, the word 'dharmmaviśeṣa' will mean that dharma the characteristic of which is forbearance (*nivṛitti*); and in the latter case it will mean a particular virtue or merit in the form of the grace of and appointment from God, according to the tradition that the great sage Kaṇâda composed this treatise under the grace and appointment of God. And as the causal use of the fifth case-ending bears the sense of applicability, the realization of the Self in the understanding will follow from the treatise through the chain of intellection, constant meditation, and so on, for the word *knowing* in such texts of the Veda as "By knowing Him only one transcends death," "Two Brahmans have to be known," etc., denotes realization in the understanding (*i. e.*, spiritual intuition), and alone is competent to root out false knowledge together with desires.

This should be considered. If the word 'tattvajñâna' in the aphorism denotes the realization of one's Self in the understanding which counteracts false knowledge together with desires, then it would follow that the expression 'by means of generic and specific properties' as well as the term, 'of the Predicables,' bearing the sense of the sixth case-ending, have no syntactical connexion. For in the matter of the realization of the Self in the understanding there is neither the modality of the generic and specific properties, nor the materiality or substantiveness of the six Predicables; because they do not exist there, as they are distinct form the body, etc., whereas the realization of the Self in the understanding is only competent to root out desires, etc., which are not distinct from the body, etc. It cannot be said that in the state of the representation of separateness from the other (*i. e.*, the Not-Self) in the Self by the virtue born of *Yoga* (concentration), knowledge of the six Predicables, namely Substance, etc., by means of their generic and specific properties, is also produced through their temporary contiguity, inasmuch as the subject-matter of such knowledge

(*i. e.*, the Predicables, etc.) appears there for the time being. For notwithstanding that such representation contains such indifferent generic property, etc., within itself, since it is not necessary for the real purpose in view, the description of it by the revered sage will mean so much mad talk on his part.

Again, the venerable author of the Upaskâra has brought forward the texts " By knowing Him alone, etc. " as being evidence that the realization of the Self in the understanding is the cause of liberation. That too has been improper. For the Supreme Self alone being implied by the text, " I know Him, the Great Person, of the colour of the Sun, beyond the reach of darkness, " the word ' tat ' (that) has reference to the Supreme Self, and therefore it cannot refer to the *Jîvâtmâ* (Subordinate or Embodied Self) which has not been so implied. So much for the sake of brevity.

Here the enumeration of six Predicables has been made under the view of Existence or Being. In fact Non-Existence or Non-Being also has been intended by the sage to be another Predicable. Hence there is no impropriety either in the aphorism " Non-existence of effect, from non-existence of cause " (I. ii. 1) of the second chapter or in such aphorisms as " From non-existence of qualification by Action and Attribute" (IX. i. 1) of the Ninth Book. Accordingly in the *Nyâya-Lîlâvati*, it has been said : " Non-existence also should be stated as conducive to the Supreme Good, like the modifications of Existence. This conduciveness is proved by the fact that the non-existence of the effect follows from the non-existence of the cause in all cases. In the *Dravyakiraṇâvalî* also, Nyâya teachers have admitted that Non-Existence is the seventh Predicable, in the passage ending thus : " And these Predicables have been mentioned as being the principal ones. Non-Existence, however, although it possesses a form of its own, has not been mentioned, not that it is something negligible, but because its ascertainment is dependent upon the ascertainment of its opposite." Thus the knowledge of the generic and specific properties of the seven (and not six only) Predicables is conducive to the Supreme Good ; and that conduciveness, it should be observed, lies in the mode of knowledge of marks (liñga), etc., in the matter of the establishmemt of separateness from the Not-Self in the Self.

The Supreme Good, according to the views of the Nyâya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sâñkhya philosophies, consists in the permanent cessation of pain, and results as the annihilation of pain, which is not synchronous with pain co-existent with itself. In fact, annihilation of ultimate pain is non-synchronus with pain co-existent with itself, since no pain can at that moment arise in the liberated Soul. With a section of the Nyâya thinkers, salvation means permanent cessation of demerit only, because, in their view, this only can be directly accomplished by the realization of the Self in the understanding, as the Veda says, " And his actions wear off when he sees that High-and-Low (Muṅḍaka 2, 2, 8)." In the opinion of the one-staffed Vedântin, salvation lies in the cessation of nescience, and nescience is (with him) a different Predicable. In the opinion of the three-staffed Vedântin, salvation means the disappearance of the Embodied or finite Self in the Great Self, and results as the cessation

of the *Upâdhi* or external condition of the *Jîva* (Embodied Soul), and of the causal body. Causal body again has been proved to be "the organic combination of the five life-breaths, mind, understanding, and ten senses, arising from the elements which have not been compounded (*i. e.*, redintegrated), possessing subtle limbs, and being the means of experience (*i. e.*, *bhoga*)". The Bhaṭṭas however say that salvation consists in the mainfestation of eternal happiness, and that eternal happiness, though evidenced by the Veda and penetrating all living beings (*Jîvas*), is unmanifest in the state of transmigration (*Saṃsâra*), and becomes manifest to the sense, immediately after the realization of the truth about the Self in the understanding. The possible defects in these views are not shown here for fear of increasing the volume of the book. But in all the views the permanent cessation of pain in the state of salvation remains uncontradicted. And that is our point.

Now, it may be contended, "There are additional Predicables such as Energy, Similarity, etc. How else can it be explained that in the vicinity of the jewel, etc., burning is not caused by that which causes burning and is caused when it is not in the vicinity? Therefore it must be imagined that the jewel, etc., counteract the burning energy of that which causes burns, and that the inciting removal of them revivifies it. In like manner, Similarity also is a different Predicable. For it does not fall within the six forms of existence, as it equally applies to them all, since such similarity as in "As bovine-ness is eternal, so also is horseness," is perceived. Nor is it a non-existence, as it appears in the form of an existence." But our reply is that reconciliation being possible by the mere suppostion of the self-activity of fire, etc., existing away from the jewel, etc., or the supposition of the absence, etc., of jewel, as the cause of burning, etc., it is not proper to imagine infinite Energy, its prior non-existence, and its annihilation. It should not be asked again how there can be burning even in the close presence of apowerful jewel, because that supposition has been made only of the absence of jewels in genaral, which are powerful but remote. In the same way, Similarity also is not a different Predicable, but denotes that, while one thing is quite distinct from another thing, the one possesses the majority or the chief of the attributes belonging to the other; as the Similarity of the moon in the face, means that the face which is quite distinct from the moon, possesses the cheerfulness, and other attributes belonging to the moon. This in brief.

Chandrakânta. (1) *Dharma* presents two aspects, that is, under the characteristic of *Pravṛitti* or wordly activity, and the characteristic of *Nivṛitti* or withdrawal from wordly activity. Of these, *Dharma*, characterised by *Nivṛitti*, brings forth *tattva-jñâna* or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes.

(2) Here the separate enumeration of *Sâmânya*, etc., is unnecessary, on account of their non-divergence; for, *Sâmânya*, etc., falling, as they do, within Substance, etc., do not differ from the latter. Their separate mention, however, is justified on the possibility of difference in the mode of treatment adopted by the author. Systems, differing in their methods, are taught for the benefit of embodied souls, differing from one another. This is, then, the *Vaiśeṣika* System, of which the distinctive features are *Sâmânya*, etc., as are, in the other (*Nyâya*)

System, Doubt, etc., although they are included in the Proof and the Provable, respectively. Accordingly, this System is enabled to stand apart by mens of *Sâmânya* and the other Predicables; and so it is called the *Vaiśeṣika* System. Otherwise it would be merely an *Upaniṣat* teaching *Ádhyâtma-vidyâ*, Philosophy of the Embodied Self. * * * * * 'Sāmânyaṃ' means possession of similarity. * * * Doubt and Error arise from (observation of) *Sâmânyaṃ* and from non-observation of *Viśeṣa* (or distinctive) peculiarity. Observing the common properties, altitude and extension, of a pillar and a person, and remaining ignorant of their differentia, one feels the doubt whether it be a pillar or a person; error also arises in this way: observing the common property only and in consequence of fault or imperfection, one mistakes a pillar for a person or a mother of pearl for a piece of silver. False cognition, again, is the root of all suffering. It is for this reason that 'Sâmânyam' has been separately mentioned, notwithstanding that it is included in Substance, etc. 'Viśeṣa' is that by which a thing is reduced to itself. False cognition which springs from (observation of only) the common property is corrected by the observation of the distinctive property: whence arises correct knowledge, which is called *tattva-jñânam*. * * * For this reason 'Viśeṣa' is separately mentioned, although it is included in Substance, etc. If, again, it is a single reality that, being determined in particuiar ways, comes to be used as 'Sâmânyam' and 'Viśeṣa,' then it falls within (the class of) Attributes. Or, if these are mere technical names, then they are not additional Predicables. 'Samavâya' means complete approximation, *i. e.*, indentification: as it has been said, 'Samavâya' is inseparable existence. * * * 'Samavâya' is an attribute, which is the counter-opposite of Separateness, either characterised as pluarlity or characterised as difference in kind. It inheres in Substance, and does not possess Attribute; nor is it a form of Action. Now, birth means a particular conjunction (of the Self) with the body, the senses, and the feelings. Thereafter the *Jîva* errs that the Self has no separate existence from the body, etc., in consequence of which a person transmigrates and suffers a multitude of pains, and on the cessation of which he is liberated, the stream of his sufferings being dried up. Hence 'Samavâya', though included in Attributes, is separately mentioned.

(3) There are other Predicables also, *viz.*, *pramâṇa*, Proof; *prameya*, Provable; *saṃśaya*, Doubt; *prayojana*, Purpose; *dṛiṣṭânta*, Instance; *siddhânta*, Tenet; *avayava*, Member (of a syllogism); *tarka*, Confutation (or Reasoning); *nirṇaya*, Ascertainment; *vâda*, Discussion; *jalpa*, Wrangling; *vitaṇḍâ*, Cavilling; *hetvâbhâsa*, Fallacy; *chhala*, Equivocation; *jâti*, Showing the futility of the mark of inference; and *nigraha-sthâna*, Ground of Defeat or Opponent's Error. These too come under the Predicables of *Kaṇâda*.

(4) The Supreme Good results from knowledge of truth about the Self, etc., while knowledge of truth about the rest is auxiliary to it. False knowledge about the Self, etc., is of various kinds, *e.g.*, the sense of Non-Ego in the Ego, the sense of Ego in the Non-Ego.

Enumeration of Substances.

Upaskâra.—Because as the soul)it participates in salvation and is the support of all the

Predicables, therefore he now says by way of giving the division and particular reference of the first mentioned Predicable, Substance.

पृथिव्यापस्तेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति द्रव्याणि ॥ १ । १ । ५ ॥

पृथिवी Prithivî, earth. आप: Âpas, waters. तेज: Tejas, fire. वायु: Vâyuḥ, air. आकाशं Âkâsam, Ether. काल: Kâlaḥ, time. दिक् Dik, direction, space. आत्मा Âtmâ, Self. मन: Manas, mind. इति Iti, only. द्रव्याणि Dravyâṇi, substances.

5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and Mind (are) the only Substances.—5.

'Iti' has tha sense of determination. Thereby the meaning is that Substances are nine only, neither more nor less. If it is doubted that the exclusion of a greater or less number having been secured by the force of the division itself, there was no need for the word 'iti,' then it should be understood that it being possible to take the aphorism in a merely denotative, indicatory or enumerative sense, the word 'Iti' is used to indicate that it has the object of division also, and that the word is used also to indicate that gold, etc., as well as God are included in them, and also that Darkness which may be apprehended to be an additional substance is a non-being. The fact that the words have not been compounded goes to show that they are all equally prominent. And the author of the aphorisms himself will point out their definitions or differentiæ while treating of 'difference.'

It cannot be said that gold is neither Earth as it has no smell, nor Water as it has no wetness and natural fluidity, nor Fire as it has weight and on the last account, nor Air, nor again Time, etc.; therefore it is something over and above the nine. For, in the first two cases, there can be no comparison; in the third case, that which has to be proved is something imaginary (*i. e.*, that gold is not a transformation of Fire). After that there has been analogous argument, although there is no doubt about that which has to be proved, and also the mark of inference is fallacious. He will prove afterwards that gold is a transformation of fire—5.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected, "The writer of the Kandalî and the Sâṃkhya teachers have held that Darkness is a Substance. And it is right. For otherwise how can people have the perception of quality and action in it, *viz.*, 'Dark Darkness moves'? Now, being devoid of Smell, Darkness is not Earth; as it possess dark colour it cannot be included in Water, etc. Therefore how is it right to say that the substances are nine only?" We reply, "It is not so, because it is illogical to imagine another Substance, when it can be produced by the absence of necessary Light. The perception of dark colour is, like the perception of the vault of heaven, erroneous. The perception of movement is also an error, occasioned by the departure of light, as the perception of movement by the passengers of a boat in respect of the trees, etc., standing on the bank of the river, is occasioned by the movement of the boat, etc. The supposition that Darkness is a substance will entail

the supposition of the antecedent non-existence and annihilation of an infinite number of its parts. In the opinion of the writer of the Kandali Darkness is included in Earth. So that according to him there is no impropriety in the exclusion of a greater number."

Among these nine divisions of Substance, Ether, Time, and Space do not form any class, since they have only a single individual existence, but the rest form classes.

Chandrakânta. The separate mention of Time and Space is intended to indicate the difference in the uses of these terms according to the difference of the effects. *Âkâśa*, though it is one, still admits of a variety of names and uses, according to the difference of effect. It is not that Time and Space are essentially different objects from *Âkâśa*, Ether.

Enumeration of Attributes.

Upaskâra.—He gives the enumeration and division of Attributes immediately after substance, because Attributes as such reside in all substances which become their substrate, are manifested by substances, and themselves also manifest substances.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः ॥ १ । १ । ६ ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः Rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśâḥ, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. संख्याः Saṃkhyâḥ, Numbers. परिमाणानि Parimâṇâni, Measures, Extensions. पृथक्त्वम् Prithaktvam, Separateness. संयोगविभागौ Saṃyoga-vibhâgau, Conjunction and Disjunction. परत्वापरत्वे Paratvâparatve, Priority and Posteriority. बुद्धयः Buddhayaḥ, Understandings. सुखदुःखे Sukha-duḥkhe, Pleasure and pain. इच्छाद्वेषौ Ichchhâ-dveṣau, Desire and Aversion. प्रयत्नाः Prayatnâḥ, Volitions. च Cha, And. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, Attributes.

6. Atrributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.—6.

The word 'cha' gathers up Weight, Fluidity, Liquidity, Impression, Virtue, Vice and Sound; they are well-known Attributes, it is hence that they have not been verbally stated. Their attributeness, he will, in their proper places, explain with respect to their nature and mark. The words Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are compounded into a *Samâsa* in order to show that they do not co-exist with contemporaneous Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. But Numbers and Measures are not so compounded and are stated in the plural number, to show that they co-exist with contemporaneous Numbers and Measures. Although that which co-exists with unity is not another unity or that which co-exists with largeness or length not another largeness or length, still there is in fact co-existence of duality, etc., amongst themselves and also of largeness, length, etc., with largeness, length, etc., of a different kind. Although separateness is co-existent with the separatenes of Two, etc., and therefore should be specified in the plural, like numbers, still its

specification in the singular goes to indicate its difference from Numbers, namely, to be known or shown by its limits. Conjunction and Disjunction are stated in the dual number to show that both of them are the effects of one and the same act. Priority and Posteriority are stated in the dual number to show that they are to be known in relation to each other and that they are equally marks of Space and Time. The plural number in 'understandings' indicates the refutation of the theory of one and only one understanding held by the Sâṃkhya thinkers, on the ground of its division into knowledge, etc. The dual number in Pleasure and Pain is intended to point out that both of them are causes of one effect which is distinguished as experience (*bhoga*) and that they are equally instrumental to the inference of *adristam*, and also that even Pleasure resolves into Pain. The dual number in Desire and Aversion indicates that both of them are causes of Activity. The plural in Volitions is meant to show that ten kinds of volitions which comprise both permitted and prohibited acts, are causes of Virtue and that ten other kinds are causes of Vice.

Or, Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch have been shown in a *samâsa* form to teach that they are the means of the disposition of the elemental senses or sense-organs or to establish the operation or changes due to heat. Number is mentioned in the plural number to indicate a refutation of this that there is a contrariety in numbers, such as duality, plurality, etc. Separateness is separately mentioned to indicate that it is also plural on account of the plurality of Numbers, and also that its difference from Numbers lies in its being revealed by the knowledge of limits. In Measures or Extensions the plural number is meant to remove the contradiction of length, shortness, etc. The dual number in Conjunction and Disjunction points out their mutual opposition. Priority and Posteriority are mentioned also in the dual number lest it might be doubted that the division of Attributes is too narrow, because Priority and Posteriority may be four-fold by the possibility of their being different in kind by their difference as relating to Space and as relating to Time.

He will give their definition as he proceeds.—6.

Enumeration of Actions.

Upaskâra.—Actions become the object of the sense by reason of their production by Substances and Attributes as well as of their Combination with Substances having colour. Therefore, immediately after the statement of Substances and Attributes, he states the enumeration and division of Actions.

उत्क्षेपणमवक्षेपणमाकुञ्चनं प्रसारणं गमनमिति कर्म्माणि ॥ १ । १ । ७ ॥

उत्क्षेपणम् Utkṣepaṇam, throwing upwards. अवक्षेपणम् Avakṣepaṇam, throwing downwards. आकुञ्चनम् Âkuñchanam, contraction. प्रसारणम् Prasâraṇam, expansion. गमनम् Gamanam, going, motion. इति Iti, namely. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, action ?

7. Throwing upwards, Throwing downwards, Contraction Expansion, and Motion are Actions.—7.

Throwing upwards, Throwing, downwards. Contraction, Expansion, and Motion are Actions. 'Iti' has the force of determination, as Rotation etc, are included in Motion. Here then there are five 'classes' directly pervaded by Action-ness, namely, the quality of throwing upwards, the quality of throwing downwards, the quality of contraction, the quality of expansion, and the quality of motion (or throwing-upward-ness ,throwing-downward-ness, contraction-ness, expansion-ness, and motion-ness).

Well, but this is disproved by the fact that Motion is a synonym of Action, because the consciousness of Going is experienced in all cases. The four classes, throwing-upward-ness, etc, which have the co-extension or common field of the absolute non-existence of each in the others, are not known to be co-existent; therefore the classes pervaded by Action-ness are only four. (To this objection we reply): It is true that Motion is another name for Action. But it is separately mentioned with the object of collecting under one word Rotation, Evacuation, Percolation, Flaming upward, Bending, Uplifting, etc; which produce different states of consciousness and are known by different names. Or Going-ness also is really a fifth class pervaded by Action-ness. So that the application of Motion to Rotation, Evacuation, etc., alone is primary and if there is the application of Going to throwing upwards, throwing downwards, etc., then it is secondary or analogous. The common property of the primary and analogous instances is only this that they are the non-combinative causes (*i. e.*, conditions) of Conjunction with and Disjunction from constantly changing places and directions, and this belongs to Rotation and others, so that by the inclusion of Going these too have been included.

The states of egress, ingress, etc. however, are not classes; for, in respect of one and the same Action, *e. g.*, a person going from one room to another, one observer will have the consciousness, 'he enters'; while another, 'he comes out'; and thus there will result an intermixture of classes. So also in the case of Rotation, etc., on entering one water-course after coming out by another, there will arise two states of consciousness, 'he comes out' and 'he enters'; therefore these should be resolved into relativity in general.

In the case of throwing upwards, etc., however, the action of throwing upwards is caused in the hand by the volition produced by the desire 'I throw up the pestle,' through the non-combinative cause of conjunction with the soul exercising volition; then from the non-combinative cause of motion in the hand thrown up, there appears the action of throwing upwards in the pestle also; or, these two actions take place simultaneously. Then through the conjunction of the soul exercising volition produced by the desire to throw down the hand and pestle which have been thrown up, and also through the motion of the hand there is produced in the hand and the pestle simultaneously the action of throwing downwards favourable to the fall of the pestle within the mortar. Then towards the sudden going upwards of the pestle after conjunction with a harder substance, neither desire nor volition is the cause, but the springing up of the pestle is due only to Re-action; and this is only going and not throwing upwards; the application of throwing upwards to it is only secondary. Similarly is the application

of the name of Throwing upwards to two bodies of Air as well as to grass, cotton, etc., carried by them, going upwards by the force of the collision of two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions. So also in the case of the going up of water under the collision of two currents. Thus the usə of throwing upwards and throwing downwards is primary, only in the case of the body, its limbs and pestles, clubs, etc. in contact with them ; for there are such perceptions as he throws up the pestle, he throws up the club ; as also, he throws down.

Contraction is action which produoes flexion in cloth and other things made up of parts and non-initial conjunctions of parts among themselves even while there exist the initial conjunctions of those parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the lotus contracts, the cloth contracts, the leather contracts. Similarly, Expansion is action destructive of the non-initial conjunctions already produced, of parts ; whence arise such perceptions as the cloth expands, the leather expands, the lotus expands. Actions which are different from these four are forms of Going. Therein Rotation is action, favorable to oblique conjunctions, appearing in the hand, from conjunction with soul exercising volition, and in the wheel, etc., from revolving and from conjunction called *nodana* (molecular motion) with the hand possessing Action. Evacuation, etc., should be similarly explained. He will also make them clear as he proceeds.

Now it should be understood that in the case of prescribed sacrifices, baths, gifts, etc., these Actions are the products of conjunction with the soul exercising volition favourable towards the production of Virtue ; and in the case of going to a forbidden place, slaughter, eating tobacco, etc., they are the products of conjunction with the soul exercising volition tending towards the production of Vice.—7

Resemblances of Substance, Attribute, and Action.

Upaskâra.—After the enumeration of Substance, etc., he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three. He states the Resemblance of the three even before the enumeration of the other three Predicables, Genus, etc., inasmueh as it is expected first of all by the diseiples, because the Resemblance of the three, Substance, etc., is favourable to the knowledge of reality.

सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत् कार्य्यं कारणं सामान्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणामविशेषः ॥ १ । १ । ८ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. अनित्यं Anityam, non-eternal. द्रव्यवत् Dravyavat, containing substance. कार्य्यं Kâryyam, effect. कारणम् Kâraṇam, cause. सामान्यविशेषवत् Sâmânya-viśeṣavat, being both Genus and Species. इति Iti, this. द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणाम् Dravya-guṇa-karmmaṇâm, of Substance, Attribute, and Action. अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ, resemblance.

8. The Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action lies in this that they are existent and non-eternal, have Substance as their combinative cause, are effect as well as cause, and are both Genus and Species.—8.

In the presence of the word 'viśeṣa' the word 'aviśeṣa' denotes Resemblance. 'Sat' connotes the quality of being the object of the per-

ception and name in the form of that which is existent, because all the three have fitness for existence. 'Anityam' connotes the quality of that which tends towards annihilation. Although it is not common to the ultimate atoms, etc., still it is intended to denote the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function or nature of that which tends towards annihilation. 'Dravyavat' means that which contains substance as its combinative cause. This too is not present in the ultimate atoms, etc. Therefore the intention is to denote the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which contains substance as its combinative cause. 'Kâryyam' is intended to denote the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which is the counter-opposite of antecedent non-existence (or potential existence). 'Kâranam' indicates the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which belongs to the class of constant (Mill's invariable and unconditional) antecedents of all effects except knowledge. Thus the definition is not too wide so as to include the Soul which is the object of Self-intuition, as a cause of Self-intuition, or to extend to the generic quality of being a cow, etc ; nor is it too narrow so as to exclude the ultimate atoms (*lit.* perfect spheres) which are not causes. 'Sâmânayaviśeṣavat,' means the possession of those characteristics which though they are genera, still are species inasmuch as they serve to differentiate themselves severally, *e.g.*, Substanceness, Attributeness, Actionness, etc. It cannot be said that causality is too wide, because from "Give a cow." "A cow should not be touched with the feet" and other texts of the Veda it appears that class or kind (जाति) also is a cause of virtue and vice ; for a class has the sole use of limitation.

This aphorism is illustrative. It should be observed that the Resemblance of the three lies also in their being capable of being denoted by words having the meaning inherent in them.

If it is said that the characteristics of being effects and non-eternality belong to those only which have causes, and that this is their Resemblance as laid down by Professor Praśastadeva in "And causality (appears) elsewhere than in the perfect spheres (ultimate atoms)." then according to the aphorism it cannot be specified by the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables.

The characteristics of being the causes of Attributes and also the effects of Attributes belong to the three except the eternal Substances.—8.

Resemblance of Substance and Attribute.

Upaskâra.—He now points out the Resemblance of Substance and Attribute only.

द्रव्यगुणयोः सजातीयारम्भकत्वं साधर्म्यम् ॥ १ । १ । ६ ॥

द्रव्यगुणयोः Dravya-guṇayoḥ, of Substance and Attribute. **सजातीयारम्भकत्वं** Sajâtîyârambhakatvam, the characteristic of being the originator of congeners. **साधर्म्यं** Sâdharmmyam, Resemblance.

9. The Resemblance of Substance and Attribute is the characteristic of being the originators of their congeners.—9.

He makes clear this very aphorism in the following one.—9.

Explanation of the foregoing aphorism.

द्रव्याणि द्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाश्च गुणान्तरम् ॥१।१।१०॥

द्रव्याणि Dravyâṇi, Substances. द्रव्यान्तरं Dravyântaram, another Substance. आरभन्त Arabhante, originate. गुणाः Guṇâḥ. Attributes. च Cha. and. गुणान्तरम् Guṇântaram, another Attribute.

10. Substances originate another Substance, and Attributes another Attribute.—10.

Upaskâra.—The Resemblance in respect of the characteristic of being the originators of congeners should be understood or observed with the exclusion of universal Substances composed of final parts, the Attributes of what are composed of final parts, and also the Attributes of Duality, the Separateness of Duals, Priority, Posteriority, etc. Or the author means to indicate the possession of the *upâdhi* or condition which distinguishes predicables having the function of that which originates its congener, whereby Substances and individuals which are not causes, are also included.—10.

Actions do not originate Actions.

Upaskâra.—But it may be asked: Why do not Actions originate other Actions? So he says:

कर्म्म कर्म्मसाध्यं न विद्यते ॥ १ । १ । ११ ॥

कर्म्म Karmma, action. कर्म्मसाध्यं Karmmasâdhyam, producible by action. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, is known.

11. Action, producible by Action, is not known.—11.

Here the root ' vid ' has the sense of knowledge, and not existence. The meaning is that there is no proof of the existence of Action which is producible by Action, as in the case of Substance and Attribute originated by their congeners.

Here the idea is this: If Action is to produce Action, then it will, like Sound, produce it immediately after its own production. Therefore Disjunction from substances in Conjunction having been completely caused by the first Action itself, from what will the second Action cause Disjunction? For Disjunction must be preceded by Conjunction, and a new Conjunction has not also been produced in the subject in question. But the definition of Action suffers if there is non-production of Disjunction. It cannot be said that a new Action will be produced at another moment; because a patency cannot be delayed and because there is nothing to be waited for. In the case of the production (of Conjunction) at the very moment of the destruction of the previous Conjunction, the production of Disjunction (by Action) will be surely not proved. The same also will be the result in the case of its production of the subsequent Conjunction. And after the subsequent Conjunction there is really destruction of Action. Therefore it has been well said that Action producible by Action is not known.—11.

Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action.

Upaskâra.—He mentions the Difference of Substance from Attribute and Action:

न द्रव्यं कार्य्यं कारणञ्च बधति ॥ १ । १। १२ ॥

न Na, not. द्रव्यं Dravyam, substance. कार्य्यं Kâryyam, effect. कारणं Kâraṇam, cause. च Cha, and. बधति Badhati, opposes ; annihilates.

12. Substance is not annihilated either by effect or by cause.—12.

Substance is not destroyed either by its own effect or by its own cause. The meaning is that the relation of the destroyer and the destroyed does not exist between two Substances which have entered into the relation of effect and cause, because, (and this is the purport), Substance is destroyed only by the destruction of the support or substratum and the destruction of the originative Conjunction.

The form 'badhati' (instead of the correct from 'hanti) is found in aphorisms.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He says that Attributes are capable of being destroyed by effect and cause.

उभयथा गुणाः ॥ १ । १ । १३ ॥

उभयथा Ubhayathâ, in both ways. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes.

13. Attributes (are destroyed) in both ways.—13

The meaning is (that they are) capable of being destroyed by effect as well as by cause. The initial Sound, etc., (in a series) are destroyed by their effects, but the last is destroyed by its cause, for the last but one destroys the last.—13.

Bhâṣya :—An attribute sometimes destroys its cause (*e. g.*, in chemical compounds), and sometimes does not destroy it (*e. g.* in physical compounds or masses).

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—After stating that Attributes are opposed by (and so cannot co-exist with) both their effects and causes, he mentions the opposition of effect to Action.

कार्य्यविरोधि कर्म्म ॥ १ । १ । १४ ॥

कार्य्यविरोधि Kâryya-virodhi, whereof the effect is the opposite or contradictory. कर्म्म Karmma, action.

14. Action is opposed by its effect.—14.

'Kâryyavirodhi' is *Bahuvrîhi* or adjective compound meaning that of which the opposite is effect, because Action is destructible by subsequent Conjunction produced by itself.

The non-opposition of effects and causes is uniform in the case of Substances only. But it is not the rule in the case of Attribute and Action. For what the author desires to say is that those Attributes destroy, which are the opposites of the destruction due to the destruction of the non-combinative cause of the destruction of the substratum.—14.

Characteristics of Substance.

Upaskâra.—After describing the Resemblance of the three according to the wish of the disciples, he now goes on to state their marks.

क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति द्रव्यलक्षणम् ॥१।१।१५॥

क्रियागुणवत् Kriyâ-guṇa-vat, possessing Action and Attribute. समवायिकारणं Samavâyi-kâraṇam, combinative cause. इति Iti, such. द्रव्यलक्षणं Dravyalakṣaṇam, mark of substance.

15. It possesses Action and Attribute, it is a combinative cause—such (is) the mark of Substance.—15.

'Kriyâguṇavat' means wherein Actions and Attributes exist. The word 'lakṣaṇa,' by the force of its derivation, *viz.* 'By this it is marked out,' denotes a mark as well as a particular differetiating mark or sign which divides off objects of like and unlike kinds. Therein by Action it is marked out that this is a substance. And by the possession of Attributes, Substance, excluded from objects of like and unlike kinds, is marked out. Of these the like kinds, *i. e.*, objects which resemble one another in being existent, are five, *viz.*, Attributes, etc. The unlike kind however is Non-Existence. Therefore Substance is different from Attribute, etc., because it possess Attribute. That which is not different from Attribute, etc., does not possess Attribute, *e.g.*, Attribute, etc. Although the possession of Attribute is not found in a substance made up of parts at the moment of its origin, still the possession of the opposite of the absolute non-existence of Attribute is meant to be stated, because the antecedent and the subsequent non-existence of Attribute are also opposites of the absolute non-existence of Attribuse. Similarly, the being the combinative cause also, which divides the six Predicables, is a mark of the Predicable, Substance.

Here the *Sâdhya*, *i. e.*, that which has to be proved, does not suffer from the fault of being unknown, for difference from Attribute, etc., is proved by perception in the water-pot, etc. Nor is here the fault of proving that which has been already proved, for although the difference of the water-pot as such from others has been proved, yet such difference remains to be proved in respect of it considered as a Substance. Some say that in the case of the difference of that which defines the *pakṣa* (*i. e.*, the object in which the existence of the *Sâdhya* is sought to be proved, *e. g.*, the mountain when the existence of fire is sought to be proved in it), there can be no proving of that which has already been proved, as, for instance, in "Word and Mind are eternal." But this is not so, for that which has to be proved being proved in anything whatever determined by that which determines the characteristic of being a *pakṣa*, the *pakṣa* suffers in its essential, and hence that which has to be proved in such cases, must be proved as such, *i. e.*, independntly.

The word 'it,' means 'others', Therefore the possessoin of Number, the possession of Measure, the possession of Separateness, the possession of Conjunction, and the possession of Disjunction also are brought together.—15.

Bhâṣya :—Although the soul is void of action, *i. e.* change, still it appears to possess action by the action of the mind or internal organ

of sense, in the state of its phenomenal existence; and hence it is called a Substance.

Characteristics of Attribute.

Upaskâra.—Attributes having been enumerated after Substances, he gives their mark.

द्रव्याश्रय्यगुणवान् संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष इति गुणलक्षणम् ॥ १ । १ । १६ ॥

द्रव्याश्रयी Dravyâśrayî, inhering in substance. अगुणवान् Agunavân, not possessing Attribute. संयोगविभागेषु Saṃyoga-vibhâgeṣu, in Conjunctions and Disjunctions. अकारणम् Akâraṇam, not a cause. अनपेक्षः Anapekṣaḥ, independent. इति Iti, such. गुण-लक्षणम् Guṇa-lakṣaṇam, mark of Attribute.

16. Inhering in Substance, not possessing Attribute, not an independent cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions,—such is the mark of Attribute.—16.

'Dravyâśrayî' means that of which the nature is to reside in Substance. This however pervades Substance also. Therefore he says 'Aguṇavân' or Attributeless. Still it over-extends to Action; so he adds 'not a cause in Conjunctions and Disjunctions.' Yet it does not include Conjunction, Disjunction, Merit, Demerit, knowledge of God, etc.; so he adds 'independent.' After 'independent,' 'Attribute' should be supplied. The meaning therefore is that Attribute is that which is not an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions. Conjunctions and Disjunctions, etc., are depended upon by Conjunction and Disjunction. Attributeness is the characteristic of possessing the genus pervaded by existence and residing in the eternals with eternal functions. The revealer of Attributeness is the causality present in something possessing genus and devoid of combinative causality and non-combinative causality towards Conjunction and Disjunction combined. Conjunction and Disjunction are severally caused by Conjunction and Disjunction, but not jointly. Merit, Demerit, knowledge of God, etc., have been included, because they are only occasional or conditional causes of both and are not their combinative causes or non-combinative causes. Or the revealer of Attributeness is the characteristic, co-extensive with genus, of being devoid of combinative and non-combinative causality towards Conjunction and Disjunction. Or the mark of Attribute is simply the characteristic of not possessing Attribute along with the possession of Genus and of difference from Action.—16.

Characteristics of Action.

Upaskâra.—He states the mark of Action which has been mentioned after Attribute:

एकद्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणमिति कर्म्मलक्षणम् ॥ १ । १ । १७ ॥

एकद्रव्यं Ekadravyam, resting or residing in one substance only. अगुणं Aguṇam, devoid of Attribute. संयोगविभागेषु Saṃyoga-vibhâgeṣu, in Conjunc-

-tions and Disjunctions. अनपेक्षकारणं Anapekṣa-kâraṇam, independent cause. इति Iti, such. कर्म्मलक्षणं Karmma-lakṣaṇam, Mark of Action.

17. Residing in one Substance only, not possessing Attribute, an independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions—such is the mark of Action.—17.

'Ekadravyam' means that of which only one Substance is the substratum. 'Aguṇam' is that in which no Attribute exists. 'Saṃyoga etc.' means independent of something in the form of positive existence which comes to appear after its own production; so that it is not unestablished where there is necessity for or dependence upon the combinative cause and also where there is dependence upon absence of antecedent conjunction. Or independence of that which has its production after the production of Action itself, is meant, because the annihilation of the antecedent conjunction also has its production after the production of Action itself, and because as a non-existence it does not bear relation to its first moment.

Action-ness is the possession of the genus directly pervaded by existence other than that residing in the eternals, or the possession of the genus determinative of the uncommon or specific causality which produces the perception that someting moves, or the possession of the genus residing only in what is devoid of Attribute and not being an Attribute, or the possession of the genus determinative of the causality towards Disjunction present at the moment immediately subsequent to the production of Action itself.

And this again is a Predicable evidenced by the perception that something moves, which cannot be demonstrated by its production, etc., at places having no interval between each other, because the breaking up of a moment will be refuted later on.

The manner in which the mark serves to distinguish it from others is the same as has been already described.—17.

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute, and Action.

Upaskâra.—Now he begins the topic of the Resemblance of the three only by way of their cause :

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणां द्रव्यं कारणं सामान्यम् ॥ १ । १ । १८ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मणां Dravya-guṇa-karmmaṇâm, Of Substance, Attribute, and Action. द्रव्यं Dravyam, Substance. कारणं Kâraṇam, cause. सामान्यं Sâmânyam, Common, Uniform.

18. Substance is the one and the same cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action.—18.

'Sâmânyam' (common) means the same one, as in 'These two have a *common* mother.' The meaning is that Substance, Attribute and Action exist in one and the same Substance which is their combinative cause.

The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus having the function of that which has Substance as its combinative cause.—18.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He states the Resemblance of the three as having Attribute as their non-combinative cause :

तथा गुणः ॥ १ । १ । १६ ॥

तथा Tathâ, Similarly. गुणः Guṇaḥ, Attribute.

19. Similarly Attribute (is the common cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action).—19

The Resemblance of the three lies in the possession of the genus residing in that which has Attribute as its non-combinative cause. Conjunction is the non-combinative cause of substance. The possession as their non-combinative cause, of Attributes which are the causes of their congeners, belongs to the Attributes of effects, *e.g.*, Colour, Taste. Smell, Touch, Number, Extension or Magnitude, Separateness, etc. The Attributes of the ulimate atoms of Earth have Conjunction with Fire as their non-combinative cause. The non-combinative cause of Actions, however, are Fire etc., internal vibration, impact, weight. fluidity, impression, conjunction with soul possessing invisible consequences of Actions (*adṛiṣṭam*), conjunction with Soul exercising Volition, etc. These should be respectively understood by the reader. Sometimes even one Attribute gives rise to all the three Substance, Attribute and Action ; for instance, Conjunction with a ball of cotton possessed of Impetus, produces Action in another ball of cotton, originates a Substance, *viz.*, an aggregate of two balls of cotton, and the Extension of that aggregate also. Sometimes a single Attribute originates a Substance and an Attribute ; *e. g.*, Conjunction which may be described as an aggregation independent of Impetus, with a ball of cotton as well as its Extension.—19.

Bhâṣya : *reads* I. i. 19, as *Ubhayathâ guṇâh* and, *interprets* it to mean that Attributes sometimes become the cause of Substance, Attribute, and Action, and sometimes do not.

Effects of Action.

Upaskâra.—He says that sometimes a single Action is productive of a multitude of effects :

संयोगविभागवेगानां कर्म्म समानम् ॥ १ । १ । २० ॥

संयोगविभागवेगानां Saṁyoga-vibâga-vegânâm, Of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus. कर्म्म Karmma, Action. समानं Samânam, Common.

20. Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus.—20.

The word 'kâraṇam' should be supplied. Producing as many Disjunctions as the number of Substances in conjunction with the Subs-

stance in which Action is produced, it (Action) also produces an equal number of Conjunctions elsewhere. And the same Action again produces Impetus in its own substratum.

The word Impetus indicates Elasticity also.—20.

Difference between Substance and Action.

Upaskâra.—But it may be argued that originative Conjunction having been brought about by substance possessed of Action ; the substance which is originated thereby, is surely produced by Action since Action has been its antecedent as a rule. Hence he says :

न द्रव्याणां कर्म्म ॥ १ । १ । २१ ॥

न Na, not. द्रव्याणां Dravyâṇâm, Of Substances. कर्म्म Karmma. Action.

21. Action is not the cause of Substances.—21.

The meaning is that Action is not the cause of substances.—21.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He points out why it is so :

व्यतिरेकात् ॥ १ । १ । २२ ॥

व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekât, because of cessation.

22. (Action is not the cause of Substance) because of its cessation.—22.

'Vyatirekât' means on account of cessation. Substance is produced, on the cessation of Action by the ultimate Conjunction ; therefore Action is not the cause of Substance. Neither is Action which has ceased to exist, a cause of Substance. Moreover if Action be such a cause, it must be either the non-combinative cause of Substance or its conditional cause. It cannot be the first, because then it will follow that Substance will be destroyed, even on the destruction of the Action of the parts, inasmuch as Substance is capable of being destroyed by the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Nor can it be the second, for in that case there will be a violation of the rule, since small pieces of cloth being produced just from the Conjunctions still existinig after the destruction of a large piece of cloth, it is seen that even parts which are devoid of Action, originate Substance.—22.

Bhâsya reads I, i. 21 and 22 as one aphorism, and *interprets* it thus : Action does not become the immediate cause of substances. Why ? In consequence of its cessation. For, when a Substance becomes what it is, at that moment cessation of Action takes place. Action in the constituent parts of a Substance ceases on conjunction, and the Substance becomes what it is. Action, therefore, is not an immediate cause in the production of Substances. What the author means to say is, as the expression shows, that the mediate causality of Action in the production of Substance is not refuted.

Difference between Substance and Action.

Upaskâra.—Having stated that one may be the originator of many, he now states that of one effect there may be many originators :

द्रव्याणां द्रव्यं कार्य्यं सामान्यम् ॥ १ । १ । २३ ॥

द्रव्याणां, Dravyâṇâm, of many substances. द्रव्यं, Dravyam, a single substance. कार्य्यं, kâryyam, effect. सामान्यं, Sâmânyam, common.

23. A single Substance may be the common effect of more than one Substance.—23.

Of Substances, *i.e.*, of two Substances as well as of more than two Substances. Thus by two threads a piece of cloth consisting of two threads is originated, so also by many threads one piece of cloth is originated. It cannot be said that a piece of cloth consisting of one thread is seen where the warp and woof are supplied by one and the same thread, for owing to the non-existence of the Conjunction of a single object there is no non-combinative cause here. Nor again can it be said that the Conjunction of the thread and the fibres is the non-combinative cause, because the relation of such parts and whole being naturally established there can be no Conjunction between them, also because the relation of that which is to be originated and the originated is not perceived, and also because of the impenetrability of condensed bodies. It cannot be said that this is commonly observed. For here, as a matter of fact, cloth is produced by the mutual conjunction of many small pieces of thread, produced on the destruction of a long thread by the impact of the loom, etc., whereas from the nature of things there arises the false notion of unity in respect of threads which are really many in number.—23.

Above continued

Upaskâra.—Well, it may be asked, as a single Substance is the effect of many Substances, as also a single Attribute of many Attributes, so is a single Action the effect of many Actions? Hence he says :

गुणवैधर्म्म्यान्न कर्म्मणां कर्म्म ॥ १ । १ । २४ ॥

गुणवैधर्म्म्यात्, Guṇa-vaidharmmyât, on account of the difference of Attributes. न Na, Not. कर्म्मणां, Karmmaṇâm, of Actions. कर्म्म Karmma, Action.

24. Action is not the joint effect of many Actions, on account of the difference of their Attributes.—24.

'Kâryyam' is the complement. It has been already stated that the resemblance of Substance and Attribute is that they originate their congeners. Also it has been already denied that Actions are productive of Action, in the aphorism "Action producible by Action is not known" (I. i. 11). This is here repeated. This is the idea.—24.

Difference between Attribnte and Action.

Upaskâra.—Now, pointing out that Attributes which reside in aggregation are originated by many Substances, he says :

द्वित्वप्रभृतयः संख्याः पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाश्च ॥ १ । १ । २५ ॥

द्वित्वप्रभृतयः, Dvitva-prabhṛitayaḥ, Duality, etc. संख्याः Saṁkhyâḥ,

Numbers. पृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागाः Prithaktva-saṃyoga-vibhâgâḥ, Separateness, Conjunction, and Disjunction. च Cha, And.

25. Duality and other Numbers, Separateness, Conjunction, and Disjunction (are originated by more than one Substance).—25.

"Originated by more than one substance"—This is the complement. The word Separateness appearing together with Duality, etc., also denotes Separateness of two, etc. Thus Numbers beginning with Duality and ending with the highest arithmetical figure, Separateness of two, etc., Conjunctions, and Disjunctions are originated by two as well as by more than two Substances. So that the characteristic of residing in more Substances than one belongs to them. And this characteristic again is the same as co-extension with the mutual non-existence of combinative causes.—25.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Well, it may be asked, as Substances which are made up of parts, as well as Attributes already mentioned, have the characteristic of aggregation, so does not that characteristic belong to Actions also? So he says:

असमवायात् सामान्यकार्य्यं कर्म्म न विद्यते । १ । १ । २६॥

असमवायात्,, Asamavâyât, on account of non-combination. सामान्यकार्य्यं, Sâmânya-kâryyam, common effect. कर्म, Karmma, action. न, Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, is known.

26. Action which is the joint result (of an aggregate of two or more substances,) is not known, as it is not found in combination with them.—26.

'On account of non-combination' should be joined with 'in two substances,' and 'in more than two substances.' Thus a single Action does not combine in two substances; nor does a single Action combine in more than two substances; so that Action which is the effect of an aggregate, is not known. Here too the root 'vid' in 'vidyate' has the sense of knowledge and does not denote existence. If Action resided in aggregation, then one substance moving, there would arise the consciousness 'It moves,' in respect of two substances and more than two substances; but it is not so; therefore Action does not reside in aggregation. This is the meaning.

It cannot be argued, "The Action of the body and its parts are certainly originated by many substances, namely, the body and its parts; otherwise, the body moving, how can there be the consciousness, 'It moves', in respect of the hands, feet, etc.? Similarly in the case of other objects made up of parts." For such consciousness is due to the fact that the quantity of the Action of the parts is pervaded by the quantity of the Action of the whole made up of these parts. The contrary is not the case, because the part moving there does not arise the consciousness, 'It moves,' in respect of the entire whole made up of the parts. Otherwise from the conjunction of cause and not-cause, the conjunction of effect and not-effect also will not follow, since there can be conjunction of an effect also, only with the Action of the cause.—26

Resemblance of Substance, Attribute and Action.

Upaskára.—He again mentions a single effect of many (causes) :

संयोगानां द्रव्यम् ॥ १ । १ । २७ ॥

संयोगानां, Saṁyogânâm, of Conjunctions. द्रव्यम, Dravyam, substance.

27. Substance is the joint effect of many Conjunctions.—27.

The meaning is that substance is the single effect of many Conjunctions. It should be observed that here ' Conjunctions ' should be taken to the exclusion of the conjunctions of touch-less substances, substances made up of final parts or ultimate formations, and heterogeneous substances.—27.

Above continued.

Upaskára.—Now he says that many Attributes produce one Attribute as their effect :

रूपाणां रूपम् ॥ । १ । १ । २८ ॥

रूपाणां, Rûpâṇâm, Of colours. रूपं, Rûpam, colour.

28. Colour (is the joint effect) of many colours.—28.

' Colour is the single effect '—this is the connection. The word ' colour ' in both the instances are indicatory, and its indicative power is such that it does not abandon its own meaning. And the common property of the intrinsic and the indicatory significance is dependence upon the relation of the product and producer by means of the proximity known as combination with an object which is one and the same as the cause. Hence Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Liquidity, Natural Fluidity, Unity, and Separateness of one are brought together. For these, being present in the cause, originate in the effects only one Attribute of the same kind. In fact the operation of non-combinative causes is two-fold. Some produce their effects by proximity to the object which is one and the same as the cause. Here the cause is the combiaative causo and it is the cause of the effect, namely colour, etc., which have to be produced. Thus Colour which is present in the potsherd originates the Colour of the pot by means of the combination, known as combination with the object which is one and the same as the cause, with the combinative cause, namely pot, etc., of the effect such as Colour, etc. Similarly Taste, etc. In some places, however, there is an operation of non-combinative causality by means of proximity to the object which is one and the same as the effect. For instance, Sound, although it is a cause, originates in the sky another Sound, although it is an effect. In the sky itself Colour, etc., also are produced by Conjunction of Fire with the ultimate atoms of Earth by means of the proximity in the form of combination with the object which is one and the same as the effect.—28.

Above continued.

Upaskára.—He says that a single Action may be the effect of many causes :

गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंयोगानामुत्क्षेपणम् ॥ १ । १ । २९ ॥

गुरुत्वप्रयत्नसंयोगानां Gurutva-prayatna-samyogânâm, of Gravity, Volition, and Conjuction. उत्क्षेपणं Utksepaṇam, Throwig upwards.

29. Throwing upwards (is the joint product) of Gravity, Volition, and Conjunction.—29.

The meaning is that Throwing upwards is their single effect. Here Weight residing in the hand, stone, etc., is the conditional cause and Conjunction of the Soul exercising Volition is the non-combinative cause, of the Throwing upwards seated in the hand, whereas the non-combinaive cause of the Throwing upwards seated in the stone is the internal movement or vibration of the hand.

Here also the term Throwing upwards is indicatory of Throwing dowawards, etc.—29.

Causality of Action upheld.

Upaskâra.—But it has been said that Attributes which have taken a shape, (*i. e.*, by appearing in some Substance) are, as effects, preceded (and so caused) by the Attributes of the causes ; it has also been said tnat they are preceded by the Attributes of that in which they reside ; therefore it follows that Action produces no effect whatever. That being so, even the inference of ultrasensual phenomena such as the movements of the Sun, etc., becomes impossible in the absence of any mark of inference. For this reason, merely reminding the reader of what has already been said in the aphorism " Action is the common cause of Conjunction, Disjunction, and Impetus," he says :

संयोगविभागाश्च कर्म्मणाम् ॥ १ । १ । ३० ॥

संयोगविभागाः Samyoga-vibhâgâḥ, Conjunctions and Disjunctions. च Cha, and. कर्म्मणां Karmmaṇâm, of Actions.

30. Conjunctions and Disjunctions also (are individually the products) of Actions.—30.

'Products' is the complement. The plural number is for the purpose of individual reference. 'Imprerssion' also should be taken as indicated.—

Vivriti.—The word ' cha ' implies Impetus and Elasticity in addition (to Conjunctions and Disjunctions).

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But it has been already said that Substance and Action are not the effects of Action. Conjunction and Disjunction again are the effects of Conjunction and Disjunction alone. So that the affirmation of the Causality of Action here seems to be self-contradictory. So he says :

कारणसामान्ये द्रव्यकर्म्मणांकर्म्माकारणमुक्तम् ॥ १ । १ । ३१॥

कारणसामान्ये Kâraṇa-sâmânye, under the topic of causes in general. द्रव्यकर्म्मणां Dravya-karmmaṇâm, of Substances and Action. कर्म्म Karmma, Action. अकारणं Akâraṇam, not cause. उक्तं Uktam, said.

31. Under the topic of causes in general, Action has been stated to be not a cause of Substances and Actions.—31.

The word 'Kâraṇasâmânya' denotes the topic of causes in general. Thus in the topic of the statement of causes in general, Action has been said to be not a cause of Substance and Action, and not that it is altogether a not-cause only, whereby the aphorism "Conjunctions and Disjunctions also are individually the products of Actions" might be destroyed.—31.

Here ends the first chapter lesson of the First Book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara on the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms.

BOOK FIRST. CHAPTER SECOND.

Causation.

Upaskâra.—Well, in the previous section the Resemblance of the three Predicables has been stated as constituted by the identity or sameness of their effects and causes. But this is not established as the relation of effect and cause itself has not been proved. Therefore the author says :

कारणाभावात् कार्य्याभावः ॥ १ । २ । १ ॥

कारणाभावात् Kâraṇâbhâvât, from the non-existence of cause कार्य्याभावः Kâryyâbhâvaḥ, non-existence of effect.

1. Non-existence of effect (follows) from the non-existence of cause.—32.

Whereas it is seen that in spite of earth, wheel, water, potter, thread, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the pot, if there is non-existence of the potter's staff, and that in spite of earth, water, etc., being brought together, there is non-existence of the shoot if there is non-existence of the seed ; it (*i. e.*, non-existence) cannot be explained without the relation of effect and cause between the potter's staff and the pot or between the seed and the shoot. Otherwise there will be non-existence of the pot even on the non-existence of the loom, etc., and there will be non-existence of the shoot even on the non existence of pieces of stone, etc. Moreover it is seen that the pot, a piece of cloth, etc, exist for a time only. That even cannot be explained without the relation of cause and effect. For they being non-existent at one time, their temporariness in the form of existence at another time is not possible but by the dependence of existences upon causes. For if there were no dependence upon causes, then a thing could only be or not be; but could not be for a time only; since an existing thing cannot be non-existent, nor can it come into existence from that which is not its cause, nor can it come into existence from one knows not what, nor can it come into existence from unreal things such as the horn of a hare, etc., but from a really existing limit or beginning like the potter's staff, the loom, etc., as is seen in such effects as a pot, a piece of cloth, etc. Now the limit or beginning is nothing but the cause.

Thus if the relation of effect and cause did not exist, there would be no inclination or disinclination to activity. Then the world would become desireless, inert. For there can be no activity without the knowledge that this is the means of attaining that which is desired ; nor can there be forbearance without the knowledge that this is the means of avoiding that which is not desired.—1.

Vivriti—The Sâṅkhya thinkers argue as follows : " A water-jar, etc., existing in an enveloped state in earth, etc., from before, develop into visible existence, and again by being struck with a cudgel, etc., are enveloped therein and exist. So that production and destruction are not real, but merely development and envelopment. This being so, why should not a water-jar be produced from yarns ? It cannot be said that the existence of effect in causes prior to their production is without evi-

dence, for the proof is supplied by such texts of Veda as 'Only the existent, O Dear One, was at the beginning,' (Chandogya 6, 2, 1,) etc."

This view should be considered. The admission of the development of development will entail non-finality. If on the other hand, development be previously non-existent, then it will be necessary to admit production from the non-existent, and hence the supposition of the prior existence of the water-pot, etc., will become groundless. Thus causality is the belonging to the class of invariable and unconditional antecedents which cannot be otherwise accounted for, or the quality of that which fails to produce an effect on account of defect in the contributories, or an additional Predicable, being a particular relation arising out of its own nature.

Bhāṣya.—Predicables called Substance, Attribute, and Action have been mentioned. Their *Sāmānya* or common characteristic has been stated. Their *Viśeṣa* or distinctive characteristic, again, follows from its contrariety to the common characteristic. All this is sufficient for the production of *tattva-jñāna*. The Supreme Good results from *tattva-jñāna*. This is *apavarga*, Salvation. But what is its characteristic form? How does it appear?—All this is now here described.

Non-existence of the effect, *e. g.*, the *faults* (namely, desire, aversion, and infatuation), etc., (results) from non-existence of the cause, *e.g.*, false knowledge (*e. g.*, the idea of the Self in the Not-Self), etc. "Thus, Pain, birth, activity, faults, and false knowledge,—on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next before the other," (*Nyāya Sūtram*, I. i. 2), the ultimate consequence being Emancipation, the return of the Self into its own nature.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—It may be objected that only the existent is produced, and not the non-existent, according to the authority of the Veda, *e. g.*, "Verily the existent was at the beginning, O calm one!," etc. Otherwise in the case of undifferentiated non-existence there will be no such uniformity that a piece of cloth is produced from threads only and not from potsherds. If it is so then, we reply, this uniformity must be accepted by the advocates of the doctrine of transformation (परिणामवादः) who admit the theory of causes; otherwise how it happens that the manifestation of the pot is only in the potsherds, and not in thread? Moreover if the manifestation or development also really existed from before, then that too being eternal, it comes to this that production and destruction are merely development and envelopment. Now, development and envelopment depend upon causes. Therefore it results that a pot, a piece of cloth, etc., also surely depend upon causes and also that there is production of that which was not before. The objection that there is no proof of the uniformity towards the cause is answered by the uniformity of the nature of the cause, and this uniformity of the nature of the cause (to produce the effect) becomes known by the method of agreement and difference. For it is a universal experience that no pot is produced without a potter's staff and that a pot is produced when there is the potter's staff. Thus causality is the quality of that which belongs to the class of invariable and unconditional antecedents, which cannot be otherwise established or explained, or the characteristic of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause. Although there is no invariable antecedence in such places as "one should perform sacrifice with barley or with paddy," etc., because the sacrifice with paddy is not an antecedent of the result producible by the sacrifice with barley, still a cause ordained in the alternative is truly a cause, as causality is proved in the case of both even though the results are similar in kind. Thus the characteristic of being attended with the non-production of the effect due to defect in some contributory cause, forms the causality which is common to both secular and scriptural practices; whereas invariable antecedence known by the method of agreement and difference is the causality which is secular only. For in such

cases as "He who desires heaven should perform sacrifice," etc., the difference or negative side is not required, because knowledge of the agreement or positive side alone is sufficient to induce activity. For this reason also, if the alternative is assumed, then both lose their significance in the code, for the result of the same kind being secured by one alone, the performance of the other becomes futile. Hence also it has been rightly said: "The result necessarily follows from practices taught in the Veda, if performed in all their parts." When the Âchâryya (preceptor) says "And this object proceeding from the Veda, breach of uniformity is no fault," he only means to refer to ordinary objects. In the case of grass, igniting wood, and jewel, however, heterogeneity of effect is necessary; because there causality being inferred by agreement and difference, non-existence of the effect is necessary from non-existence of the cause. If heterogeneity of effect is supposed in alternative cases, causality will be in the alternative in Râjasûya, Vâjapeya, and other sacrifices. For these reasons he goes on establishing the same law of the relation of effect and cause.

न तु कार्य्याभावात् कारणाभावः ॥ १ । २ । २ ॥

न Na, not. तु Tu, but. कार्य्याभावात् Kâryyâbhâvât, from non-existence of effect. कारणाभावः Kâraṇâbhâvaḥ, non-existence of causes.

2. But non-existence of cause (does) not (follow) from the non-existence of the effect.—33.

If the law of the relation of effect and cause do not exist, the non-existence of cause will follow also from non-existence of effect. Non-existence of effect is not instrumental towards the non-existence of cause; but non-existence of cause instrumental towards non-existence of effect. Thus the application of this introductory section of two aphorisms is that persons desirous of *mokṣa* (salvation) are concerned in non-existence of birth for the sake of non-existence of pain, in non-existence of activity for the sake of non-existence of birth in, non-existence of faults for the sake of non-existence of activity, in prevention of false knowledge for the sake of non-existence of faults, and in spiritual intuition of the Self for the sake of prevention of false knowledge.—2.

Bhâṣya: The aphorism is meant for them who think that *apavarga* is mere absence of pain.

Non-existence of the cause, *viz.*, birth, etc., does not follow from non-existence of the effect, *viz.*, pain. Birth, etc., therefore, may still take place even when no pain exists. If birth, etc., are thus possible, then there is possibility of pain also, in consequence of the appearance of the causes of pain. *Apavarga*, accordingly, does not lie in the mere absence of pain, but in the permanent impossibility of pain, resulting in the order of the successive non-existence of false knowledge, etc.

Genus and Species relative to understanding.

Upaskâra.—After the marks of the three Predicables in the order of their enumeration, he now states the mark of the Predicables, Genus, which has also been mentioned:

सामान्यं विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् ॥ १ । २ । ३ ॥

सामान्यं Sâmânyam, Genus. विशेषः Viśeṣaḥ, Species. इति Iti, these. बुद्ध्यपेक्षं Buddhyapekṣam, relative to understanding.

3. The notions, Genus and Species, are relative to the Understanding.—34.

Genus is two-fold, high and low, of which the first is Existence and the second is Substanceness, etc., pervaded by Existence. The Understanding itself is the mark of Genus and its Species: the cognition of re-appearance or recurrence, of Genus, and the cognition of disappearance or reversion, of species. The word '*iti*' takes them singly, and hence the word 'buddhyapekṣam' has been used in the neuter gender. The writer of the *vṛitti* however applies it to species only and explains its use in the singular number and neuter gender by the rule. "A word in the neuter gender used with a word not in the neuter gender optionally entails neuter gender and singlar number." 'Buddhyapekṣam' means that of which the understanding or cognition is the mark or the definition. 'Genus' in the aphorism means that which is external and resides in more individuals than one. Or, Genus, whether high or low, is, while it is eternal, co-existent in the same substratum with the mutual non-existence of its own situation or foundation. Moreover Genus also takes the name of Species, as for example, at the same time that there is the cognition of re-appearance or recurrance, namely, 'This is Substance,' 'This is Substance,' and so on, there is the particular cognition that it is not Attribute, that it it not Action, etc. So that the nature of species belongs to the genera themselves, *e. g.*, substanceness, etc.

It may be objected, "Genus (*i. e.*, the Universal), as an objective reality, is a non-entity, since the consciousness of recognition can be explained (without it) by the absence of reversion or divergence. For the object of the cognition. "It is a cow," is that it is not different from a cow. Even the advocate of the doctrine of kinds (*jâti*) admits that this is the subject-matter of the concrete cognitions of bovineness, etc.; for concreteness or particularity is not something other than absence of difference from itself; it is the absence of divergence from a cow, etc., which is also the occasion of the use of the words cow, etc. Moreover, where does the Genus of bovineness reside? Not surely in the bovine animal, because the animal is non-existent prior to the appearance of bovineness. Nor in a non-bovine animal, because there will be then contradiction. Whence does bovineness come to reside in the body of a bovine animal when such a body is produced? It did not surely remain in that locality, for that place also will then possess bovineness. Nor is bovineness even produced then and there, for it (a Genus) has been observed to be eternal. Nor can it come from elsewhere, for it (a Genus) possesses no activity. Nor again does one eternal possess the characteristic of appearing in many individuals, for there is no proof that it (a Genus) optionally appears in part and as a whole. For the whole does not appear in a single place, since then it would follow that there would be no concrete cognition of it in other places. Nor does it appear in part for a 'class' is not confined to one part. So it has been said. "It does not move, nor was it there. Nor is it produced, nor has it parts. Nor does it leave its former residence. Alas! the succession of difficulties." Genus exists and that is manifested by situation or organisation only like bovineness, potness, etc. But it

does not belong to Attribute and Action also." Such is the quarrel of kindred thinkers.

To this it is said, "Genus is eternal and pervasive ; and pervasiveness consists in being related to all place by its own form. It does not arise that places should be treated in the terms of bovineness, for the use of bovineness is obtained by the relation known as combination; as 'Time possesses form or colour'—such cognition and use do not arise, because Time does not possesses form or colour, etc. Nor can it be said that Time verily does not exist, since it is found that it is only a different name for the "five heads " (*i. e.*, of the Bauddhas, *e.g.*, Perception, Feeling, Conception with Naming, and Impression) ; because Time will be established later on. Thus bovineness which pervades (a particular spot, combines with the organism which is produced in that very place, as it is found that 'it is produced' and "it is combined (with bovineness)," refer to the same moment of Time. Hereby "where does it reside ? " is answered by "where it is perceived ; " "where is it perceived ?" by "where it resides ;" and "what sort of a body it was prior to the appearance of bovineness ?" by "It did not exist at all." Similarly "It does not move, nor was it there, etc.," is so much cry of despair. The Genus of bovineness is nothing but non-divergence of cognition from what it has been,—this is obstructed or contradicted by the real or positive cognition "It is a cow or ox." For the cognition also is not explained, as it has been said that the cognition of a real existence does not help the understanding of negation, nor does divergence from a cow or ox come to light in the cognition "It is a cow or ox." The option of whole and part can arise only if a single Genus appear as a whole or as a part. Wholeness means multitude and infinity, and it is not proved in an individual. " 'This is a cow or ox'—such cognitions arise in respect of non-entities and are not capable of establishing entities "—to this the reply will be given afterwards.

The followers of *Prabhâkara* (a thinker of the Mimâṁsâ School) however say that Genus is manifested by its situation (*i. e.*, the organism where it resides). If it is evidenced by recognitive understanding, then what offence has been committed by Genera belonging to Attibute and Action ? For there arises consciousness of recognition or knowing again in respect of Colour., Taste, etc. ; and this consciousness surely establishes a 'class ' (*jâti*), since there is no obstruction. As it is in the case of Ether-ness, identity of the individual is not the obstruction in the class attributes of Colour, etc. Nor is co-extension the obstruction here as it is in the case of Understanding and Knowledge or in the case of the classes of water-pots and water-jars, because of the multiplicity of individual Colours, Tastes, etc. For co-extension is denotation of neither more nor less individuals ; and the class attributes of colour, etc., have a narrower denotation than Attribute-ness, and have a wider denotation than blue-ness, etc. For this reason also, there is no overlapping or intermixture (which is also an obstruction to the existence of Genus), as there is in the case of the characteristics of being material and ponderable substances, because although their mutual absolute non-existences co-exist in the same substratum, yet there is no co-existence with any other class. Nor is here instability or infinite regression, because other Genera included in Colourness, etc., are not

recognised. Nor is here loss of form or transformation as in the case of species. If species, while residing in substances, possess classes or *jâti* then they will become either Attributes or Action ; if while appearing in Universals (*e. g.*, Time, Space, Ether, and Soul) they possess classes or *jâti*, then they will become Attributes. The transformation which thus takes place in the case of the Predicable, Species, is absent in the case of the subject under enquiry. Nor is here non-relation, as in the case of Combination. Let there be non-relation in the case of Combination, seeing that the supposition of Combination of Combination will entail infinite regression ; but in the case of the subject under enquiry the relation of Combination itself is recognised. Although identity of the individual itself is an obstruction to Combination being a Genus, yet the view of those also should be considered, who hold that Combinations are many in number and undergo production and destruction. Or it (absence of combination or identity of the individual) is the obstruction to Non-existence, etc., being Genera.

The learned writer of the *Vritti* has said : "The point in dispute, namely, recognitive understanding, because it is an unobstructed, recurrent consciousness, is explained by a recurrent property, as the consciousness, 'garland-flowers' (covers all the flowers making up a particular garland and is explained by the common property of belonging to that garland, which recurs in every one of those flowers)." This requires consideration.—3.

Vivriti :—The Nyâya teachers have recited the obstructions to Genus : "Identity of the Individual, Similarity or Co-extension, Overlapping or Intermixture, Instability or Infinite Regression. Transformation, and Non-relation,—this is the collection of the obstructions to Genus." Now, Ether-ness is not a Genus, as it denotes only one individual. Pot-ness and Jar-ness are not two genera, because the individuals denoted by the one are neither more nor less than by the other. Material-ness and ponderableness are not genera, because, by appearing in the same individual, the substrata of their respective absolute non-existence would then intermix. Genus-ness is not a Genus, on account of infinite regression. The transformation of Species which is by nature exclusive, is an obstruction to its being a Genus. If Particularity be a Genus, then, itself possessing Genus, it will not be possible for it to distinguish itself and therefore its special property of self-distinction will suffer. Therefore Particularity or Species is not a Genus. Or transformation may mean change of nature. So that if Species, while appearing in ponderable things, possess Genera, then they would be either Attributes or Actions. If while appearing in the universals (*e. g.*, Ether, Space, Time, and Soul) they possess Genera, then they would be Attributes. In this way change of nature of the Species is the obstruction to Species possessing the characteristic of Genus. Combination or Co-inherence is not a Genus, as the relation of combination does not exist in it, since the admission of combination into combination would entail infinite regression. This applies to the view that combinations are many in number and undergo production and destruction. Otherwise from the identity of the individual also Combination cannot be a Genus. Similarly the absence of the relation of Combination is an obstruction

to Non-existence being a Genus; and other instances should be understood.

Existence is Genus only.

Upaskâra.—Proving the two-foldness which has been stated above of Genus and Species, he says:

भावोऽनुवृत्तेरेव हेतुत्वात् सामान्यमेव ॥ १ । २ । ४ ॥

भावः Bhâvaḥ, existence, being. अनुवृत्तेः Anuvṛitteḥ, of recurrence, assimilation or extensive denotation. एव Eva, only. हेतुत्वात् Hetutvât, being the cause. सामान्यं Sâmânyam, Genus. एव Eva, only.

4. Existence, being the cause of assimilation only, is only a Genus.—35.

'Bhâvaḥ,' *i.e.*, existence, is the cause of assimilation only, and not of differentiation also. Therefore it does not take the name Species.—4,

Genera-Species.

Upaskâra.—What Genera take the name of Species? To meet this expectancy he says:

द्रव्यत्वं गुणत्वं कर्म्मत्वञ्च सामान्यानि विशेषाश्च ॥ १ । २ । ५ ॥

द्रव्यत्व Dravyatvam, substance-ness. गुणत्वं Guṇatvam, attributeness. कर्म्मत्वं, Karmmatvam, action-ness. च Cha, and. सामान्यानि Sâmânyâni, Genera. विशेषाः Viśeṣaḥ, species. च Cha, also.

5. Substance-ness, and Attribute-ness and Action-ness are both Genera and Species.—36.

The word 'cha' collects Earth-ness, and other genera belonging to Substance, Colour-ness, and other genera belonging to Attribute, Throwing-up-ness, and other genera belonging to Action. 'Substance-ness, etc.,' have been left uncompounded in order to indicate the absence of the relation of that which pervades and that which is pervaded, from amongst them. 'Genera and Species have not been compounded so that it may be understood that these are Species also even while they possess the characteritics of Genera. Otherwise (if the words were compounded) there might be a mistake that the compound was a genitive one and then the being Species would not have been perceived in the presence of Genus-ness.

It might be objected, "Substance-ness cannot be something which penetrates into or inheres in the forms of substance and is beyond the cognizance of the senses, because if it somehow exists in Earth, etc., its existence is impossible in the case of Ari, Ether, etc. It cannot be established as something which constitues the combinative cause of an effect

determined by Attribute-ness, because Attribute-ness, as it appears in eternal and non-eternal objects, is not the determinant of being an effect. The rejoinder that it is required for the sake of Attribute-ness does not improve the situation." The objection however does not arise, for Substance-ness is established by the way of constituting the combinative causlity of an effect determined by the characteristic of Conjunction. This causality cannot be constituted by the class attribute of Earth-ness, which is of a narrower comprehension, nor by Existence which has a wider denotation; and there must be something to constitute or define it, as otherwise suddenness or chance would be the result. Now Conjunction must necessarily be recognized in the case of ultimate atoms, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of two atoms; in the case of molecules of two atoms each, as supplying the non-combinative cause of a molecule of three atoms; in the case of the four universals (*e.g.*, Time, Space, Ether, and Soul), through their being its conjunction with all ponderable things; in the case of Mind; as the ground for the conjunction of Mind and the Senses; in the case of Air, as the support for the movement of grass, etc.; in the case of perceptible Substances, through their very perceptibility. On the other hand, there is no un-originated Conjunction so that it could be said that the quality of Conjunction even, appearing in effects and not-effects, could not be the determinant of being an effect. In like manner, it is easily demonstrable that substance-ness is established also by the way of constituting the combinative causality of Disjunction also. Attribute-ness again, it has been already said, is proved by its being the determinat of the causality which exists in a thing possessing Genus and not containing the non-combinative causality of the combinative causality of Conjunction and Disjunction. The class attribute of Actions also, is, in the case of perceptible Substances, cognizable by the cognition, 'It moves,' but in other places can be inferred from Conjunction and Disjunction, for Action-ness is required to be established also by its being the determinant of the non-combinative causality of both Conjunction and Disjunction. For this reason also it is possible to infer the movement of the sun from its reaching another place. Here although the other place, *e.g.*, of Sky, etc., is beyond the reach of the senses, yet the Conjunction and Disjunction of the solar rays are perceptible by the solar zone, and it is from these Conjunctions and Disjunctions that the inference of the movement of the sun can be drawn. The learned *Uddyotakâra* has said: "The inference of the movement of the sun is by its reaching a different place, which again is also a matter of inference in the following way: The sun which is perceived by a man when facing eastwards, is also perceived by him when facing the west, and is recognised by him. This fact together with the fact that the sun is a substance and is not destroyed and produced again at every moment, is proof that the sun has reached a different place from where it was before."—5.

Final Species excluded.

Upaskâra.—But is it the same Species which has been enumerated as a Predicable, which is here described as both Genus and Species? Removing this curiosity of the disciples he says:

अन्यत्रान्त्येभ्यो विशेषेभ्यः ॥ १ । २ । ६ ॥

अन्यत्र Anyatra, elsewhere. अन्त्येभ्यः Antyebhyaḥ, final. विशेषेभ्यः Viśeṣebhyḥ, than species.

6. (The statement of Genus and Species has been made) with the exception of the final Species.—37.

The meaning is that the statement of Genus and Species is to the exclusion of these final Species* residing in eternal substances, which have been mentioned above. 'Antyaḥ,' *i. e.* 'final,' means those which exist or appear at the end (of the division or dissolution of compounds.) The teachers say that they are 'final,' because after them there is no other principle of differentiation. According to the *Vrittikâra* they are 'final Species,' because they exist in enternal Substances, *i. e.* Substances which exist at the end of production and destruction. They are really Species only, the causes of the consciousness of differentiation, and not of the form of Genus also.—6.

Existence defined.

Upaskâra.—A good many men doubt that Existence is a Genus.. So he gives its proof :

सदिति यतो द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसु सा सत्ता ॥ १ । २ । ७ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. इति Iti, thus. यतः Yataḥ, whence. द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसु Dravyaguṇa-karmasu, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. सा Sâ, that. सत्ता Sattâ, existence.

7, Existence is that to which are due the belief and usage, namely '(It is) existent,' in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action.—38.

By the word 'iti' he teaches the mode of belief and usage. Thus Existence is that which causes the belief in this way that this is existent, that that is existent, in the case of the triad of Substance, etc., or on which depends the application of the words in the from of 'it is existent,' 'it is existent.'—7.

Existence not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.

Upaskâra.—But Existence is not perceived as being separate from Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore Existence is nothing else than one or other of Substance, etc. Because that which is diflerent from something else is perceived by means of its difference from that, as a water-pot from a piece of cloth. But Existence is not perceived by means of its difference from them. Therefore it is identical with them. To meet this objection he says :

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मभ्योऽर्थान्तरं सत्ता ॥ १ । २ । ८ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मभ्यः Dravya-guṇa-karmmabhyaḥ, from Substance, Attribute, and Action. अर्थान्तरं Arthântaram, a different object. सत्ता Sattâ, existence.

* It is the introduction of these "final species," which is the reason why the system of Kaṇâda is called the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy of final species.

8. Existence is a different object from Substance. Attribute, and Action.—39.

Substance, etc., are non-assimilative but Existence is assimilative. Thus ' Existence is a different, etc.,' because its difference from them is established by the consideration of the opposite properties characterised by assimilativeness and non-assimilativeness. That, however, it is not perceived elsewhere than in them, is due to the virtue of their primary or natural inter-relation, whereas the relation of a pot and a piece of cloth is derivative or artificial.

The intrinsic form of the individual is not Existence, for individuals do not assimilate themselves or form themselves into classes. If the inner nature be assimilative, then the same is nothing but Existence. If non-assimilative inner natures or essences be the means of classification, then the class attributes of bovineness, etc., are also gone. This consideration also dismisses the objection, "When the practice of classification is established by those very objects in which as substrata Existence inheres, then what is the use of Existence ?" For the same reason also it is not valid to hold that Existence is the property which makes an object and its action possible, or that Existence is reasonableness or reliability ; for the cognition ' It is existent,' arises even in the absence of any enquiry in those respects.—8.

Bhaṣya:—Existence is a different 'object' from Substance, Attribute, anb Action Substance, Attribute, and Action are called objects (VIII. ii. 3). Existence is, therefore, included amongst them. But it is not contained in the ascertained classes of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Hence it is said to be a different object from them known classes).

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He points out another differentia:

गुणकर्म्मसु च भावान्न कर्म्म न गुणः ॥ १ । २ । ९ ॥

गुणकर्म्मसु Guṇa-karmmasu, in Attributes and Actions च Cha, and. भावात् Bhâvât, from Existence. न Na, not कर्म्म Karmma, Action. न Na, not गुणः Guṇaḥ Attribute.

9. And as it exists in Attributes and Actions, therefore it is neither Attribute nor Action.—40.

" Neither Attribute nor Action"—this being the matter to be expressed, their individual mention (*i. e.*, the words being not compounded) indicates that Existence is not Substance also. For an Action does not exist in Actions, nor an Attribute in Attributes, nor does Substance exist in an Attribute or Action. Existence however resides in Attribute and Action. Therefore on account of its Difference from Substance, Attribute, and Action, Existence is really different from them.—9.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He mentions another differentia:

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १० ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sâmânya-viśeṣâbhâvena, by reason of the absence of Genus-Species च Cha, and.

10. (Existence is different fom Substance, Attribute, and Action), also by reason of the absence of Genus-Species in it.—41.

If Existence be Substance, Attribute, or Action, then it would contain in it Genera which are Species also. But in Existence these Genera-Species, namely, Substance-ness, etc., are not perceived. For nobody ever has the perception that Existence is Substance, Attribute, or Action.—10.

Substance-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

Upaskâra.—Having thus stated the distinction of Existence from Substance, Attribute, and Action, he states the distinction of Substance-ness from them.

अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । ११ ॥

अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वेन Aneka-dravya-vattvena, by means of its containing more than one Substance. द्रव्यत्वं Dravyatvam, Substance-ness. उक्तं Uktam, explained.

11. Substance-ness has been explained by means of its containing more than one Substance.—42.

'Anekadravyavat' means that to which belong more than one Substance as its combinative causes. The term 'more than one' here denotes all. Hence it is distinguished from Earth-ness, etc. Its 'eternality' is obtained simply from its being a Genus; hence its distinction from wholes made up of parts. And 'anekdravyavattvam' means the being combined with more than one Substance in general; hence its distinction from Existence. Therefore Substance-ness is eternal and combined with more than one Substance in general, Hence it is implied that conjunction is not desired. And Substance-ness also has been verily establshed. 'Substance-ness explained', means that Substance-ness also has been explained in the very same way as Existence.—11.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But Substance-ness is also a 'class,' and can be quite non-distinct from its own ground. What is the fault here? So he says.

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १२ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sâmânya-viśeṣbhâvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. च Cha, and.

12. (Substance-ness is distinct fyom Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—43.

If the 'class' of Substance-ness be really identical with Substance,

etc., then in it will exist Earthness, Waterness, Fireness, and other Genera which are also Species. The sense is that nobody has the perception that Substance-ness is Earth, Water, or Fire. Hence it is distinct, etc.—12.

Attribute-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute or Action.

Upaskâra.—He states Attributeness.

तथा गुणेषु भावाद् गुणत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । १३ ।

तथा Tathâ, in like manner. गुणेषु Guṇeṣu, in Attributes. भावात् Bhâvât, from its existence. गुणत्वं Guṇatvam, Attribute-ness. उक्तं Uktam, explained.

13. (That Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Attributes.—44.

The meaning is that in the very same way as Existence, Attributeness is explained to be distinct from Substance. Attribute, and Action, from its existence in (*i. e.*, combination with) Attributes only.—13.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He points out another differentia :

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १४ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sâmânya-viśeṣâbhâvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. च Cha, and.

14. (Attribute-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—45.

If Attributeness be not something over and above Substance, Attribute, and Action, then it should be perceived as containing Substance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness, and their sub-classes. This is the meaning.—14.

Action-ness not identical with Substance, Attribute, or Action.

Upaskâra.—He points out that which distinguishes Action-ness from Substance, Attribute and Action :

कर्म्मसु भावात् कर्म्मत्वमुक्तम् ॥ १ । २ । १५ ॥

कर्म्मसु Karmmasu, in Actions. भावात् Bhâvât, from its existence. कर्म्मत्वं Karmmatvam, action-ness. उक्तं Uktam, explained.

15. (That) Action-ness (is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action is) explained from its existence in Actions.—46.

Like Existence, Action-ness also, which is another 'class,' is explained as distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action from its existence in (*i. e.*, combination with) Action only.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He mentions another differentia :

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन च ॥ १ । २ । १६ ॥

सामान्यविशेषाभावेन Sâmânya-viśeṣâbhâvena, by reason of the absence of Genera-Species. च Cha, and.

16. (Action-ness is distinct from Substance, Attribute, and Action) also by reason of the absence of Genera-Species in it.—47.

The meaning is that if Action-ness be identical with Substance, etc., then the Genus-Species of Substanceness, etc., will combine in it.

It should be noted that these four aphorisms identical in form, are, stated so as to form one section for explaining the distiction from Substance, Attribute, and Action, of the four classes Existence, Substance-ness, Attributeness, and Action-ness.—16.

Exitence is one.

Upaskâra.—But why should not Existence which is present in Substance, Attribute and Action, be rendered different by the difference of the determinants of Substance-ness, etc.? So he says :

सदिति लिङ्गाविशेषाद् विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्चैको भावः ॥१।२।१७॥

सत् Sat, existent. इति Iti, this. लिङ्गाविशेषात् Liṅgâviśeṣât, from the non-particularity or uniformity of the mark. विशेषलिङ्गाभावात् Viśeṣa-liṅgâbhâvât, from the absence of a particular or distinctive mark. च Cha, and. एकः Ekaḥ, One. भावः Bhâvaḥ, Existence.

17. Existence is one, because of the uniformity of the mark *viz.*, that it is existent and because of the absence of any distinguishing mark.—48.

The knowledge or the use of words in this form that it is existent, is the mark of Existence. And it is the same, *i.e.*, non-particularized, in respect of Substance, Attribute, and Action. Therefore one and the same Existence resides in them. Otherwise, Existence having the same denotation or manifestation as Substance-ness, etc, either it whould not exist or they would not exist. 'Viśeṣâliṅgâbhâvât Cha,'—means that there is no diference, as inference which is the mark of *viśeṣa, i. e.* difference, does not here exist. As in the judgment, 'This lamp is verily that,' the mark of distinction is the difference of measure such as length, shortness, etc., so here there is no such mark of distinction. This is the idea.—17.

Bhâṣya.—*reads* I, ii, 17, with the omission of the word *liṅga* in *viśeṣa-liṅgâ-abhâvât*.

Here ends the second chapter of the First Book in the Commentary by Śaṅkara, on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇâda of great powers

BOOK SECOND—CHAPTER FIRST.

Characteristics of Earth.

Upaskâra.—The subject-matter of the First chapter of the Second Book is the description of the nine Substances. Herein there are three sections: description of Earth, Water, and Fire; proof of God; and inference of Ether. Of these the auther states the characteristic of Earth which has been mentioned first of all.

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी ॥ २ । १ । १ ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती Rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśavatî, Possessed of Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch. पृथिवी Prithivî, Earth.

1. Earth possesses Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch.—49.

Manifold Colour such as blue, yellow, etc., belongs to Earth alone. Thus the characteristic is the possossion of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with blue colour. Similarly manifold Taste such as bitter, sour, etc., resides in Earth alone. Thus the (second) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with bitter Taste. In like manner other characteristics should be understood by the substitution or interpolation of the words 'sour,' etc. Smell is of two kinds, fragrant and non-fragrant. Thus the (third) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Smell. It will be therefore seen that Earth is a Substance which is the substratum or location of 'class' which is co-extensive with Smell but not co-extensive with an Attribute which is not co-extensive with Smell. It must not be objected that as Smell and Taste are not perceived in a stone, etc., therefore both of them fall short of being universal here. For, though Smell and Taste are not perceived there in the first instance, still they are found to be present in their ashes; and the very same parts which originate the stone do also originate its ashes. Hence there is no want of universality. How then is there such perception as "The air is fragrant," "Water mixed with '*Kâravella*' (*Momardica Charantia*, Hairy Mordica) is bitter?" The question does not arise, because that Smell and Taste are due to the external condition formed by (particles of) Earth. Touch also which is neither hot nor cold and which is produced by the action of heat, belongs to Earth only. Thus the (fourth) characteristic is the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness and co-extensive with Touch produced by the action of heat. And the quality of being produced by the action of heat, which is revealed by a distinctive peculiarity, belongs to the Touch of Earth alone; and 'a distinctive peculiarity' is very manifest in the peculiar Touch of the flowers of *Śirîṣa* (*Acacia Lebbec*) and *Lavangî* (clove-creeper); but it is not so in the Touch of Water, etc. Although in a whole made up of parts Touch, etc., are not produced directly through the conjunction of Fire, from heating, yet there too a particular heterogeneity should be recognised by the way of its being the product of a series of parts and wholes.

"But," it may be objected, "this mark or characteristic is what is called a mark of disagreement or a negative mark which is the proof of its difference from others or of the mode of its treatment. Now, Earth is distinguished from others because it has Smell. That which is not

different from others, does not possess Smell, *e. g.*, Water, etc. And Earth is what has Smell which is the counter-opposite of the non-existence of the pervader of the non-existence of the difference from others than itself. Therefore it is different from others than itself. Here supposing that the major term, the quæsitum, namely, difference from others, is a well known object, if the mark of inference disagree with it, then the inference will have the fault of incommensurability, as the minor term will in that case fall outside the class of ascertained similar objects and of un-ascertained objects ; and if it does not disagree, then the mark will be what is called a mark of agreement or a positive mark. On the other hand, if the major term is not well known, then the minor term will contain an unknown major term. In that case there can be no expectation, nor any desire for inference, nor again any inference in the shape of knowledge in particular about it. Moreover, absence of the mark or the middle term and absence of the quæsitum or major term are universally related by agreement. Thus there will arise the contradiction that the absence of the major term will not have the characteristic of being the mark nor will the mark have the characteristic of being the absence of the major term. By this alone the futility of the minor premiss is explained, but not the object, the universal relation of which has not been obtained. So it has been said : " The faults of an inference by disagreement or by the method of difference, are ignorance of the major term, contradiction, futility of the minor premiss, and proof by the method of agreement." So also if the mark is intended to establish usage. Here the usage consists in being the object of reference of the word Earth, and that belongs also to the class of Earth-ness and therein the mark Earthness does not exist. Although therefore incommensurability may appear to exist here, yet there is no incommensurability, the quæsitum or major term being the characteristic of being the object of reference of the word Earth, which is the occasion of the significance of Earth-ness. Or again Earth-ness being, as a class, proved in a general way, like pot-ness, to be the occasion of the significance of an accidental word, the word Earth contains the occasion of the significance of Earthness. If it contains the occasion of not signifying others—not-Earth-ness,—then as it appears together with that which is the occasion of the significance, it should be proved in the way, *viz.*, ' That which is not so, is not so.' Thus here too there is surely the fault of ignorance of the quæsitum, etc."

It is not so, the author replies, difference of others such as Water, etc., being manifest in the pot itself, because the difference, *i. e.*, the mutual non-existence of Air, and other super-sensuous objects also is proved by sense-perception itself in the pot, etc., in as much as only the fitness for the location or ground or substratum governs the apprehension of mutual non-existence, as is seen in cases like "The column is not a *piśâcha* (a ghost-like being)."

It should not be said, " This is not the case. Let then the pot only be the analogue or example. What is the use of a negative mark ? Who will prove in a roundabout fashion a conclusion arrived at in a straight way ? " If the non-negative mark be not a mere simulacrum,

then this path too is unobstructed to him who is described as arguing in a round-about way; because with the removal of the fault of ignorance of the quæsitum, all other faults which arise out of it, are also removed. There is no contradiction, because the positive pervasion or the relation in agreement is apprehended along with the negative relation or because the positive pervasion is inferred by the negative pervasion. Nor is there futility of the minor premiss, because the very mark of which the pervasion has been obtained, is proved in the minor term; as has been said: "Whatever relation of the determinable and the determinant subsists between two existences, just the reverse of it is to be understood in the case of the corresponding non-existences." Usage again follows from the teaching "Earth possesses Smell," in the same way as what possesses a narrow, twisted neck, etc., is the object of reference of the word 'pot.' Thus that by which, anywhere and everywhere, in the case of clarified butter, etc., clay, etc., the being the occasion of the force of the word Earth is derived, from the above teaching, in Earth-ness by means of the indication, namely, the possession of Smell, also operates as a negative mark in this way that that which is not this, is not this, because everything which possessess Smell is the object of reference of the word Earth, through its possession of Smell, by means of Earth-ness which is the occasion of the force of the word.

The objector cannot say "In the case of the negative mark or pervasion which will prove difference, the difference must be either difference in property, or difference in nature, *i. e.*, otherness, or mutual non-existence. Now it cannot be the first two, because they are known by sense perception itself. Nor can it be the third, because when the difference of non-existence also comes to be the quæsitum, its mutual non-existence is not present there, and therefore the difference of that which is other than non-existence coming to be the quæsitum the quæsitum is not found." For mutual non-existence, of which the counter-opposite is non-existence, is also a quæsitum. So that if it is something additional then it verily exists; if not then being reduced to itself, it is in reality something different, because its difference in property is pervaded by its mutual non-existence. And here there is unsteadiness or want of no finality, because the non-finality remains only so long as there is perception or cognition, whereas in other cases finality is obtained by perception.

It is also said that thirteen kinds of mutual non-existence well known in thirteen cases are jointly proved in Earth. This is nonsense, because the knowledge of every one of them being not in point, the knowledge of them jointly disappears. Whereas mutual non-existence with counter-opposition determined by non-odorousness should be proved, because the difference of non-existence by means of the difference of that which determines counter-opposition is necessary and because it has been already said that this difference of non-existence is proved by sense-perception in the pot etc., also.

If it is asked "What is the solution in the case of Ether, etc., ?" the author replies that Ether is different from others than itself, by being

the seat of Sound. Although in "That which is not thus, is not thus," and cases like this, where the minor term is one-sided, the quæsitum, *i. e.*, the major term, is not well known, still that which possesses difference in property from something else, possesses the mutual non-existence of which that something is the counter-opposite. So that by virtue of the pervasion brought into play in this general way, the mutual non-existence the counter-opposite of which possesses the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound, having been already proved, here it is only shown as being connected with the minor term, like fire being connected with the mountain. This is our other conclusion, its difference in quality being pervaded by its mutual non-existence. If it is said that only the possession of the absolute non-existence of being the seat of Sound is not found in objects of the unascertained class, then the being the seat of Sound is neither the definition nor the description, because it is attacked with the fear of belonging to unascertained objects.—I.

Vivṛti.—The revered Śaṅkara Miśra himself knows what the necessity was of carrying the investigation here, leaving aside the possession of Smell, up to the possession of the 'class' pervaded by Substance-ness co-extensive with Smell.

Characteristics of Water.

Upaskâar.—He states the characteristic of Water mentioned after Earth :

रूपरसस्पर्शवत्य आपो द्रवाः स्निग्धाः ॥ २ । १ । २ ॥

रूपरसस्पर्शवत्यः Rûpa-rasa sparśavatyaḥ, possessed of Colour, Taste, and Touch. आपः Âpaḥ, Waters. द्रवाः Dravâḥ, Fluid. स्निग्धाः Snigdhâḥ, Liquid, viscid.

2. Waters possess Colour, Taste, and Touch, and are fluid and viscid.—50.

The Colour, Taste, and Touch are respectively White, Sweet, and Cool only. Fluidness is constitutional but Viscidity is by nature or essential.

Objection. But it is not correct to say that the Colour of Water is only White, because blueness is observed in the water of the river *Yamunâ*, etc. That the Taste is only the sweet is also not correct, because acidness, bitterness, etc., are observed in the juice of the blackberry, *karavîra*, etc. That the Touch is only the Cool one is also not proved, because at mid-day hotness also is observed. Constitutional Fluidity again is too limited, as it is absent in ice, hail-stone, etc. Viscidity also is not proved as essential and is too wide, as it is not perceived in Water, and is perceived in clarified butter and other terrene objects. Moreover Water-ness is not a class even, which may be the characteristic of Water, because it is not proved on account of the non-existence of that which will establish it. Nor is it proved by the characteristic of the determinant of its being the combinative cause of Viscidity, because the nature of Viscidity, appearing in both the effect and what is not the effect, is not the determinant of the state

of being the effect. Therefore in the absence of a differentia, Water is not differentiated.

Answer. All this objection cannot be raised. For non-luminous white colour alone is really the differentia of Water, the blueness in the Water of the river *Yamunā*, etc., is due to the condition or environment formed by the receptacle. and whiteness is observed in the Water of the *Yamunā* when thrown up in the sky. Hence the characteristic of Water is the possession of the class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness and which is present in colour which is not co-existent with-other than non-luminous white Colour. The Taste also is only the sweet one ; the bitterness, acidness, etc., in the juice of the blackberry, *kararîra*, etc.. are due to the condition or environment supplied by the presence of particles of Earth. It should not be said that sweetness is not at all perceived in Water, since it is revealed after the eating of some astringent substance. Nor does this sweetness belong to the yellow myrobalan itself and is capable of being revealed by Water, because only the astringent Taste is observed in it. As in *āmalakī* so in yellow myrobalan, only the astringent is the Taste, the same alone being perceived. Nor again is there non-production of Taste on account of the conflict of Attributes, because the parts also there possess astrignent Taste. The tradition of six Tastes is due to its producing the respective effects of those Tastes. Manifold Taste again is removed simply by the absence of proof. In the case of manifold clour however the observation of the canvas itself is the proof. The origination of fragrant and non-fragrant parts is removed by the conflict of Attributes. In the case of manifold Smell, there is absence of proof. Therefore the sweetness which is observed in Water immediately after the eating of yellow myrobalan, belongs to Water only. Its manifetation however depends upon the proximity of some particular Substance, as the manifestation of coolness in water arises from its association with sandalwood. The bitterness that is perceived immediately after the eating of *karkati* (a cucumber-like fruit) belongs to the *karkati* alone, because bitterness is observed in its parts even without the drinking of water, or it may be that the bitterness of the bilious Substance present at the tip of the tongue is felt there. Hence the second characteristic of water is the possession of the class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with Taste which is not co-existent with other than sweet Taste. In like manner the third characteristic of water is the possession of the class which is pervaded by Substance-ness and which is co-existent with cool Touch. The hotness that appears at mid-day is really of Fire, as it depends upon its presence and absence. Similarly constitutional Fluidity is by itself the fourth characteristic ; in other words, Water-ness is the possession of the class which is pervaded by Substance-ness and which is present in what possesses constitutional Fluidity. Liquidity or Viscidity, however, is a particular Attribute, and not a Genus which is also a Species, like milk-ness and curd-ness ; because the distinction of viscid, more viscid, and most viscid, is observed, but such distinction is not possible in the case of a class. It cannot be said "Let Viscidity be an Attribute. But what is the evidence that it is present in water ?" for it is inferred from the mixing or compounding of barley, sand, etc., by water. A compound is a particular combination or conjunction

caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. It is not due to Fluidity alone, because no compounding is established by the Fluidity of glass or gold; nor is it due to Viscidity alone, because no compounding is established by condensed clarified butter, etc. Therefore by the method of agreement and difference it is proved to be caused by Viscidity and Fluidity. And this compounding, being seen to take place in barley, sand, etc., by water, confirms Viscidity in Water. This argument is based upon wide experience itself, as Viscidity is an object of sense-perception. Viscidity which however is found in clarified butter, etc., is of the Water which is the occasional cause of that clarified butter, and it appears as though belonging to the clarified butter through combination with the conjoint. So also in the case of oil, juice, etc. And Water which is the occasional cause of clarified butter, contains a preponderance of Viscidity; therefore owing to this very preponderance of Viscidity, this Water does not counteract Fire. If Viscidity were a particular Attribute of Earth, then, like Smell, it would have been present in all terrene objects. Lastly, Water-ness is a class which is directly pervaded by Substance-ness, because it has been proved that a class which determines the being the combinative cause of the conjunction present only in objects possessing Viscidity, is common to the ultimate atoms.—2.

Characteristics of Fire.

Upaskára.—Following the order of enumeration, he states the characteristic of Fire:

तेजो रूपस्पर्शवत् ॥ २ । १ । ३ ॥

तेजः Tejas, fire. रूपस्पर्शवत् Rupa-sparśavat, possessed of Colour and Touch.

3. Fire possesses colour and Touch.—51.

The meaning is that Fire possesses Colour which is luminous, and Touch which is hot. If it be objected, "Luminousness is the being the illuminator of other bodies, and such Colour is not found in heat or in Fire as it exists in gold, in a frying-pan, or in Water. White Colour also is found nowhere in these, nor is hot Touch found in moonlight or in gold. How then is this so?" We reply that ther can be no such objection, because luminous Colour may be inferred in hotness, etc., by means of Fire-ness. If it be objected that Fire-ness itself is not proved there as such, we reply that it is inferred in them by their possessing hot Touch. If it be asked, "How is it proved in gold?", our reply is that the author desires to say that it is moved because, even in the absence of luminous Colonr in it, Fire-ness is inferred by the negative mark, *viz.*, the characteristic of being the substratum or ground of Fluidity which is produced but not destroyed by the closest Conjunction of fire. And in the case of Fire as existing in the frying-pan, etc., Fire-ness is inferred from their possession of hot Touch.

Fire is four-fold: that in which both Colour and Touch are partly developed, as the solar, etc.; that in which Colour is partly developed but Touch is undeveloped, as the lunar; that in which both Colour and Touch are altogether undeveloped, as the ocular; and that in which

Colour is undeveloped and Touch is developed, as of the summer season, and also Fire present in Water, frying-pan, etc. He will prove the ocular Fire later on.—3.

Characteristic of Air.

Upaskâra.—He states the characteristic of Air which is the next in order:

स्पर्शवान् वायुः ॥ २ । १ । ४ ॥

स्पर्शवान् Sparśavân, possessed of Touch. वायुः Vâyuḥ, air.

4. Air possesses Touch.—52.

The characteristic of Air is the possession of the 'class' co-existent with Touch which does not co-exist with Colour, or the possession of the 'class', co-existent with Touch which is neither hot nor cold and which does not co-exist with Taste, or the possession of the 'class' co-existent with Touch which is neither hot nor cold and which does not co-exist with Smell, or the possession of the 'class' co-existent with a distinctive Attribute which does not co-exist with any distinctive Attribute other than Touch.—4.

The above characteristics do not belong to Ether.

Upaskâra.—But why is not the possession of Colour, etc., the characteristic also of Ether, Time, Space and Soul? He replies.

त आकाशे न विद्यन्ते ॥ २ । १ । ५ ॥

ते Te, these. आकाशे Âkâśe, in Ether. न Na, not. विद्यन्ते Vidyante, are observed or found.

5. These (characteristics) are not in Ether.—53.

Here the root 'vid, in vidyante' means to perceive. The meaning then is that because they are not perceived therefore they do not exist, in Ether, and other substances, either uniformly or by nature, or collectively, or accidentally. If it be asked, "How does the perception arise that Ether is as white as curd?" we reply that it is due to the impression created by the perception of the white colours of the rays of the sun. If it be asked, "How then does the perception arise that Ether is blue?" we reply that it is due to the impression created in the minds of the observers who are looking at the radiance of the emerald peak lying largely extended over the south side of Sumeru mountain. It has been opined that it is due to the impression created by the eye when after travelling to a long distance it turns back and reaches its own pupil. This is not a sound opinion, because those who possess jaundiced eyes also have such impressions.

From the perception, "Here now there are Colour, etc.," it cannot be argued that Colour and the three other Attributes belong to Space and Time also, because they have been already stated to be the characteristics of Earth, etc., only by the relation of combination and not by any other relation also. "Here now there is absolute non-existence of

Colour"—from this perception again it follows that Space and Time are the substrata or grounds or foundations of all things.—5.

Objection to Fluidity being a characteristic of Water, answered.

Upaskâra.—If it be argued that it is not correct to say that Fluidity is the characteristic of Water, because Fluidity is observed even in Earth ; so he replies :

सर्पिर्जतुमधूच्छिष्टानामग्निसंयोगाद्द्रवत्वमद्भिः सामान्यम् ॥२।१।६॥

सर्पिर्जतुमधूच्छिष्टानां Sarpir-jjatu-madhûchchhiṣtânâm, of clarified buttor, lac, and wax. अग्निसंयोगात् Agni-saṁyogât, through conjunction of Fire. द्रवत्वं Dravatvam, Fluidity. अद्भिः Advih, with Waters. सामान्यम् Sâmânyam, similarity, Commonness.

6. The Fluidity of clarified butter, lac, and wax, through conjunction with Light is similar to that of Water.—54.

The Fluidity which belongs to clarified butter, etc., results from conjunction of Fire which is its occasion, and is not constitutional ; whereas constitutional Fluidity is the characteristic of Water. Therefore the similarity of Earth to Water is in respect of mere Fluidity, and not in respect of constitutional Fluidity also. Hence the characteristic or the definition is not too wide. This is the meaning.—6.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But still, because that condition, *i. e.*, Fluidity, appears in tin, lead, iron, and other modifications of Fire, therefore that condition itself is an instance that the definition is too wide. To this objection he replies :

त्रपुसीसलोहरजतसुवर्णानामग्निसंयोगाद् द्रवत्वमद्भिः सामान्यम् ॥ २ । १ । ७ ॥

त्रपुसीसलोहरजतसुवर्णानां Trapu-sîsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇânâm, of tin, lead, iron, silver, and gold. अग्निसंयोगात् Agnisaṁyogât, through Conjunction of Fire. द्रवत्वं Dravatvaṁ, Fluidity. अद्भिः Advih, with Waters. सामान्यम् Sâmânyam, similarity.

7. The Fluidity of tin, lead, iron, Silver, and gold, through conjunction with Fire, constitutes their similarity to Water,—55.

This is an indication ; bell-metal, copper, brass, etc., are also implied. The characteristic which is common to those which have been mentioned and those which are implied, is that they are the foundation of the Fluidity which is produced but is not destroyed by the closest Conjunction of Fire. Thus the Fluidity of gold, etc., also is only occasional, the occasion which is the Conjunction of Fire, being proved by the method of agreement and difference. Moreover there is this distinction ; in the last aphorism the word 'agni' denotes Light —*tejas*—possessing an excess or abundance of heat, but here it denotes fire.

If it be objected, "Gold, etc., also must be either modifications of Earth or different Substances ; because yellowness, weight, etc., establish

terreneness, and because the non-annihilation of Fluidity which constitutes their difference from Earth, is perceived in them, and because this is capable of establishing of Substance." We reply that gold is a modification of Fire, and its fieriness is proved in the negative way, namely, "That which is not thus, is not thus, as Earth," by the characteristic of its being the foundation of Fluidity which is not annihilated even at the closest Conjunction of Fire.

Again there is no contradiction in the ultimate atoms of Water, because Fluidity should be qualified as being non-eternal. Nor is there incommensurability, as the mark does not appear in the lamp and other objects of the ascertained class, because the fact which is to be proved is that gold is not a modification of Earth. Nor is there any obstacle to the receptacle of weight becoming the minor term here; the foundation or substratum will not be proved if something else were the minor term, as the minor term must be foundation of Fluidity. Nor is it hard to ascribe ultra-finality or absoluteness, because it is desired to be said that it is the foundation of temporary Fluidity which is not annihilated even at the closest Conjunction of Fire for three hours. If it be objected that the annihilation of Fluidity must be concluded from the destruction of the foundation and the perception of more and less; we reply that it is not so, because the mark of inference is the possession of the Fluidity containing the Genus of Fluidity which does not appear in the counter-opposite of the annihilation produced by that Conjunction of Fire which is not combined with the totality of non-existent Fluidity. Or the foundation of yellowness and weight, conjoined as it is with Fluid Substance which excludes all Colour different from yellow Colour, does not therefore become the foundation of any Colour different from yellow Colour even at the Conjunction of Fire for three hours, like a piece of yellow cloth placed inside Water which is conjoined with Fire. If it be objected, "The Colour of gold will then be visible in darkness as there will be nothing to cloud or overpower its Colour, because, overpowering means the non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object," we reply that overpowering denotes the mere relation with a like object which is more powerful by the power of the effect produced by it. So it has been said, "Other Colour does not at all shine under the influence of the association of the earth." This is our view.—7.

Use of Inference.

Upaskâra.—Having thus finished the section on the characteristic of the four Substances which possess Touch, the author, seeing that the characteristic of Air is not proved by its foundation or with a view to avoid this, at the outset introduces the method of proof by inference, and then first of all establishes the probative force or value of inference itself, according to experience, and thereby begins the section of demonstration of Air :

विषाणी ककुद्मान् प्रान्तेबालधिः सास्नावानिति गोत्वे दृष्टं लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । ८ ॥

विषाणी Viṣaṇî, possessing horns. ककुद्मान् Kakudvân, possessing a hump. प्रान्तेबालधिः Prânte-vâladhiḥ, with a tail hairy at the extremity. सास्नावान्

Sâsnâvân, possessing a dewlap. इति Iti, such. गोत्वे Gotve, in cow-ness, of being a cow. दृष्टं Dristam, observed admitted. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

8. That it has horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity, and a dewlap—such is the admitted mark of being a cow.—56.

The import is that as horns, etc. are the marks, the pervasion, or universal or invariable relation of which is well-known or recognised, towards the proof of cow-ness, so also the commonly-observed marks of the five super-sensuous Substances,, Air, etc., assume the form of proof. Here although the mere possession of horns is not the mark of cow-ness, since it is also found in the buffalo, etc. ; nor is the possession of the dew-lap, etc., the distinction or differentia, since in that case the name will become senseless ; still with them who can discern in the horn of the cow difference in characteristic in comparison with the horns of the buffalo, the sheep, etc., all those distinctions truly assume the nature of marks. And all those distinctions such as straightness, crookedness, hardness, softness, shortness, length, etc., which are capable of being known by observers of superior skill, do really exist in horns also. Thus in respect of the body of a cow at a distance standing by itself, the inference is altogether unobstructed that it is a cow because like the body of a cow which has been previously perceived, it possesses peculiar horns. Similarly, the possession of a hump also is a mark of being a cow. The possession of a tail hairy at the extremity, is also a truly independent mark of being a cow. 'Prântevâladhiḥ' means that in which hair are placed at the extremity, that is, a particular tail. From the use of the *aluk* compound (*i. e.*, that form of compound words in which the inflection of the first word is not elided), the tail of the cow only is denoted by the word 'Antevâladhiḥ.' For the characteristic of the tail hairy at the extremity, which is found in the tails of cows, does not belong to the tails of the horse, sheep, etc., as these tails are covered with hair all over. In the tail of the buffalo, etc., there is not so much prolongation. From this difference in characteristic, the possession of a tail hairy at the extremity is also a mark of being a cow. The dropping of the inflection conveying the sense of possession (*i. e.*, the use of the word tail only instead of tail-bearing) shows that only the body of the cow has been in view. Thus (the inference) "It is a cow" because, like the body of the cow which has been previously perceived, it possesses a tail which is hairy at the extremity. The possession of a dew-lap, again, is simply a well-known mark of being a cow.—8.

Touch infers Air.

Upaskâra.—Having thus pointed out, according to observation, the probative value of inference by which all human affairs are carried on, he, intending to begin the section of proof of Air, says:

स्पर्शश्च वायोः ॥ २ । १ । ९ ॥

स्पर्शः Sparśaḥ, Touch. च Cha, and वायोः Vâyoḥ, of air.

9. And Touch (is a mark) of Air.—57.

'Liṅgam,' mark, is the complement of the aphorism. By the word 'cha' Sound, upholding, and quivering are brought forward.

It cannot be said, "The Touch which is being perceived must be of Earth itself of which the Colour is not yet developed," because the developed Touch of Earth cannot be separated from developed Colour. Hence the Touch which is perceived, being Touch, must reside somewhere, like the Touch of Earth, etc. Some foundation of Touch being thus proved by inference, by analogy, (Sâmânyato driṣṭam), the foundation of Touch is not identical with the triad of Earth, etc., because it does not possess Colour, nor is it identical with the pentad of Ether, etc., as it possesses Touch. Therefore by the inference together with the exclusion of others a Substance over and above the eight Substances is proved. In like manner a particular Sound also is a mark of Air. Thus in the absence of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, the series of Sounds (arising in leaves, etc.) which is heard amongst leaves, etc., must be occasioned by the impact of substances possessing Touch and Impetus, like the series of sounds produced in a drum by the percussion of the drumstick, because it is a series of sounds which is in relation to a substance the parts of which are indivisible. The absence of the impact of Substances possessing Colour, is, again, known by the non-perception of what might be expected or the co-relative. And from exhaustion that Substance possessing Touch and Impetus is verily an addition to the group of the eight substances. Similarly, a particular upholding also is a mark of Air. Thus the steadiness or flotation of grass, cotton, cloud, and air-ship in the sky, is due to the conjunction of some substance possessing Touch and Impetus, since it is the flotation of substance which are not presided over by a conscious being, like the flotation of grass, wood, boat, etc., on a stream; whereas in the flotation of poison, etc., caused by thought directed towards it, human and other influence is without doubt present. So also in the upholding of the bird, the branch of a tree, etc. Nor is the distinctive mark not proved on account of its being influenced by God, because by the word 'conscious' all else except God is meant. Similarly, quivering too is a mark of the existence of Air. Thus this Action in grass, etc., without the impact of Substances possessing Colour, is due to the impact of some Substance possessing Touch and Impetus, because it is an Action which is not produced by Weight and Conjunction of Soul exercising Volition, like the Action of a cane-bush when struck by the waves of a river. The word 'weight' implies Conjunction of Soul attended with *adriṣṭam* (invisible after-effects of past acts), Fluidity and Impression; hence the being an action not produced by them is the mark.

r It cannot be said, "Air is only an object of sense-perception and that therefore there is no need of the investigation of its marks;" for, Aic is not perceptible; only its supersenusousness is proved by the inferenne: "Being a colourless external Substance, it is like Ether." It canot be replied "Its perceptibility is inferred in this way that being the seat of Touch Air is perceptible like the water-pot;" for the possession of developed Colour is here the condition, *upâdhi*. If it be objected, "In the case of Colour, etc., as well as Soul, it is not pervasive of the major term, since it pervades the major term when the latter is determined by the being the external substance which is the minor term

containing the middle term, or is determined by the middle term which is the means of inference. Nor does it govern a body's being an object of visual perception, because it is there that its presence and absence are observed as a rule. On the other hand, a body's being an object of tactual perception is governed by the mere possession of an adequate Touch." We reply, that both the presence and absence of Colour govern here; for perceptibility only by means of Touch proved by both positive and negative marks, has not been observed without the perception of Colour. Moreover, if Air were an object of sense-perception, then it would govern also the apprehension of general Attributes, *e.g.*, Number, etc. If it be objected, "Perceptibility does belong to Number in blowing by the mouth, etc., to Measure or Extension, *e. g.*, cubit, span, etc., and to Separateness as well as to Priority and Posteriority of two Airs existing on both sides. On the other hand, it is not the rule according to you also that they are perceptible by means of there being individual masses of Air, because they are not observed in the cloth, etc., lying on the back." We reply, that it is the rule that they are perceived by means of there being individual masses of Air. Number, etc., are obtained in the cloth, etc., fixed upon the back, if they lie straight; if they are not obtained, it is because of the defect that the latter do not lie straight. "Developed Colour and Touch govern the perceptibility of external substances, only when they operate jointly. Light, the yellow substance within the eye, and the radiation or heat of the moon are not perceptible because their Touch is undeveloped. Hotness as in summer, heat and Watery Substances the parts of which have been dispersed (steam) are not perceptible, because Colour is undeveloped there." This is the view of the commentator of Nyâya-Vârtikas. "But light, etc., are really perceptible although Touch is undeveloped. Therefore the Conjunction and Disjunction of the bird and the branch of the tree are really perceptible in the sky under moonlight." So say those who know the traditions of the system. Nor can it be said that the possession of developed Touch (universally) excites to the perceptibility of universally external Substances, for then the light of the emerald would be non-perceptible. Nor is only the possession of the developed distinctive Attribute the governing condition, for then Ether too would become perceptible. Nor again is the possession of the developed distinctive Attribute co-existent with the ensuant or resulting magnitude, such condition, for the bilious substance existing at the tip of the tongue is imperceptible in spite of the development or manifestation of bitterness. Therefore only the possession of developed or manifested Colour governs the perceptibility of all Substances except Soul. And this is not present in Air. Hence Air is not an object of sense-perception.—9.

Touch which infers Air, cannot be explained by visible objects.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected, "Here there is no mark which can be known by sense-perception. For here the pervasion or universal relation is not obtained by sense perception like that of fire and smoke. Moreover this will be also the Touch of one or other only f Earth etc." Therefore he says,

न च दृष्टानां स्पर्श इत्यदृष्टलिङ्गो वायुः ॥ २ । १ । १० ॥

न Na, not. च Cha, and. दृष्टानां Driṣtânâm, of the observed or visible

or seen. स्पर्शः Sparśaḥ, touch. इति Iti, hence. अदृष्टलिङ्गः A-driṣṭa-liṅgaḥ, not-containing-the-mark-of-the-visible वायुः Vâyuḥ, air.

10. And it is not the Touch of the visible (Substances); hence the mark (of the inference) of Air is not the mark of the visible (Substances).—58.

The Touch which is made the subject of enquiry does not belong to visible Substances, *viz.*, Earth, Water, and Fire, because it is not accompanied by Colour. Therefore the inference is that this Touch resides somewhere. Hence in virtue of the middle-term, *i. e.*, the mark of inference, being contained somewhere, we get Air although the mark is not the mark of the visible Substances, *i. e.*, although the mark is observed in analogous Substances. This is the meaning. Although only the quartet of observed Touch, etc., are the mark, yet because their relation with Air is not apprehended, therefore it is said that the mark of Air is not the mark of the visible Substances. For it is not possible to prove Air after first proposing that this which possesses this or that property is Air. Therefore the import is that the proof of Air is by inference from analogy together with the exclusion of (possible) others (*i. e.*, by hypothesis).—10.

Air is a Substance.

Upaskâra.—Having proved Air as a whole made up of parts, which is the foundation of Touch capable of being perceived, he says, with a view to prove Air characterised as ultimate atoms :

अद्रव्यवत्त्वेन द्रव्यम् ॥ २ । १ । ११ ॥

अद्रव्यवत्त्वेन A-dravya-vattvena, by not containing Substance (as its support). द्रव्यं Dravyam, Substance.

11. Air is a Substance, because it does not contain or reside in Substance.—59.

'Dravyavat' means that which has Substance as its support. 'Adravyat,' *i. e.*, not 'dravyavat,' means not resident in or suported by Substance. Thus like Ether, Air characterised as ultimate atom is a Substance, because the other Predicables reside in substances, because it has been stated that the being resident, *i. e.*, dependence, applies elsewhere than in eternal Substances, and because the origination of a large whole made up of parts is capable of being demonstrated by the evolution of dyads, etc., from the formation of a dyad by two ultimate atoms, and so on.—11.

Air is a Substance.—continued.

Upaskâra.—Bringing forward two (more) marks or grounds of establishing the Substanceness of the ultimate atoms of Air, he says :

क्रियावत्त्वात् गुणवत्त्वाच्च ॥ २ । १ । १२ ॥

क्रियावत्त्वात् Kriyâ-vattvât, because of possession of Action. गुणवत्त्वात् Guṇavattvât, because of possession of Attribute. च Cha, and.

12. (Air is a substance), also because it possesses Action and Attribute.—60.

'The ultimate atom of Air is a Substance'—this is the complement of the aphorism. Although there is this mutual dependence or correlation that Substance-ness being proved, the possession of Action and the possession of Attribute are also proved and in their proof the proof of Substanceness lies, yet the possession of Action is proved by this that the ultimate atom which is the constituent element of the composite whole which is the foundation of the Touch which is being perceived, cannot be established otherwise than by the Conjunction of the non-combinative cause ; and the possession of Attribute is proved by the rule that the Touch, Colour, etc., of the composite whole are preceded by like Attributes in its cause ; and by these two Substance-ness also is proved ; so that here there is no fault, namely repetition or vicious circle. Of these the possession of Action extends to a portion of the objects of the same ascertained class, while the possession of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class, which the possession of Attribute pervades all the objects of the same ascertained class. The word 'cha' brings forward the characteristic of being combinative cause, which proves Substance-ness.

If it be objected, "There is no proof (of the existence) of the ultimate atoms themselves. Then the Substance-ness of which is being proved ?," we reply that by the maxim of the division, etc., of the action of dense effects, a body which is being divided and sub-divided becoming smaller, smallest, etc., that than which no smaller unit can be obtained, the same is the ultimate atom. If the relation of part and whole were unlimited, then it would follow that the mountain Sumeru and a mustard seed, etc., will have the same Measure or Mass, because in that case they would resemble one another in possessing infinite parts, and because without the distinction of the number of causes (*i. e.*, constituent elements), measure and magnitude, mass and volume, do not rule the difference of Measure. It cannot be said that this relation of part and whole continues only up to the limit of destruction for that which remains at the end having no parts, its destruction is not possible ; and if it contains parts, then non-finality will be the result, and its defect has been already pointed out. If it is said, "*Truṭi* (*i. e.*, a minute part) is the limit, because it is visible and there is no reason for the supposition of something invisible," we rejoin that as it is a visible Substance it must possess extension or largeness and many Substances.

Hence as in the case of Earth, etc., so also in the case of Air, the part of the part of a combination of three atoms, is really the ultimate atom. Thus the ultimate atom of Air is proved.—12.

Air is eternal.

Upaskâra.—It may be said that because Air possesses Action and Attribute, therefore, like the water-pot, etc., it should be inferred to be non-eternal. Hence he says :

अद्रव्यत्वेन नित्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ २ । १ । १३ ॥

अद्रव्यत्वेन Adravyatvena, by not residing in or combininig with other Substances. नित्यत्वं Nityatvam, eternality. उक्तम् Uktam, said.

13. The eternality (of Air) is evident from its not combining with other Substances.—61.

" Of Air characterised as ultimate atom " this is the complement of the aphorism. A Substance is destroyed by the destruction of the one or the other of its combinative and non-combinative causes. But the ultimate atom containing no parts, both of these causes do not belong to it. Therefore there being nothing to destroy it, it is not liable to destruction. Where the possession of Action and Attribute is the cause of non-eternality, there the possession of parts is the condition, *upâdhi*, and this condition pervades the major term which is determined by the Substanceness of the minor term ; whereas the condition which is pervasive of the major term as such, is the charactertistic of being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence.—13.

Vivṛiti.—Some read the first word of the aphorism as 'adravyadravyatvena' (instead of ' adravyatvena '), (meaning " by its being a Substance which does not contain any other Substance)."

Air is manifold.

Upaskâra.—In order to prove, in a different manner also, the plurality of Air which has been already proved in the proof of its origination by the course of dyas etc., he says :

वायोर्वायुसंमूर्च्छनं नानात्वलिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । १४ ॥

वायोः Vâyoḥ, of Air. वायुसमूर्च्छनं Vâyusaṁmûrchchhanam, concurrence or collision with Air. नानात्वलिङ्गं Nânâtva-liṅgam, mark of diversity or plurality.

14. The collision of Air with Air is the mark of its plurality.—62.

' Vâyusaṁmûrchchanam ' means the collision, *i. e.*, a mode of conjunction, of two or more Airs. It is the co-incidence, the falling in together, of two Airs of equal Impetus, flowing in opposite directions and producing contrary Actions. And it is inferred from the flying upwards of grass, cotton, etc., because the flowing upwards and also the falling in together of two Airs, are beyond the reach of the senses, whereas the perceptible Action characterised as flying upwards of grass, etc., which are perceptible, is inferred to be produced either by the impact or the vibration (*i. e.*, the molar or the molecular movement) of Substances possessing Touch, and Impetus. Thus the flowing upwards of Air the nature of which is to flow obliquely, not being capable of proof or possible without mutual collision, proves the mutual collision, the same being observed in the case of the water and the wave of the river. Their going upwards also is to be inferred by the going upwards of grass, etc. For the going upwards of grass, etc., is not possible without either the collision or the internal vibration of Substances possessing Touch and Impetus.—14.

No visible mark of Air.

Upaskâra.—It has been stated that the mark of Air is not like the mark of the visible Substances. But how is it so ? Hence he says :

वायुसन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावाद् दृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ २।१।१५॥

वायुसन्निकर्षे Vâyu-sannikarṣe, in contact or association with Air. प्रत्यक्षाभावात् Pratyakṣâbhâvât, from the absence of perception. दृष्टं Driṣṭam' visible. लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

15, There being no preception of the association (*i. e.*, universal relation) with Air, there is no visible mark (of the existence of Air).—63.

There the mark is said to be visible where the universal relation is grasped by perception, as smoke is of fire. But in the case of association with Air, there is no perception of the appearance of the mark in accompaniment with Air. For Air itself not being an object of sense-perception, nobody can have the perception. "Things which give Touch, quivering, etc., are Air." Therefore the meaning is that no such mark exists the pervasion of which can be grasped by perception.—15.

Air is inferred not as such but as a Substance in general.

Upaskâra.—How then can there be any infernce at all of Air? Hence to strengthen what has been already stated, he says :

सामान्यतो दृष्टाच्चाविशेषः ॥ २ । १ । १६ ॥

सामान्यतोदृष्टात् Sâmânyato-driṣṭât, from the method of inference known as general inference or inference by analogy. च Cha, and अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ not in particular, General.

16. And, by inference by analogy, (Air is proved) not as a particular substance, (but as Substance only).—64.

Inference is three-fold : from cause to effect, from effect to cause, and from the commonly observed to the unobserved, or from analogy. Thus this Touch which is being felt, must reside somewhere, because it is a Touch or because it is an Attribute. From this analogy or common observation or experience, accompanied by the exclusion of other possibilities, its residence in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances, is proved. This is the meaning.

It cannot be said that the inference from effect to cause is then gone. For after the exclusion of other possibilities, where analogy prevails, there proceeding upon the proved qualification of the minor term that it does not reside in the eight Substances, the proposition that this) Touch which does not reside in the eight Substances must reside somewhere, does not result except on the assumption of its being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances. Therefore the proposed object being not explained otherwise, it is proved by inference from cause to effect alone. But where analogy arises from the appearance of exclusion at the very beginning, there the proposed object results at last and the mode of inference is found to be inference from effect to cause. It is not sound to hold that inference from effect to cause only shows the manner, for in the case of being accompanied by the exclusion of other possibilities, inference from cause to effect itself comes to show the manner. The rule also that inference merely shows the manner which determines the pervasiveness, is not valid, for the appearance of a different manner is possible from the association of particular materials.—16.

The name Air is derived from Scripture.

Upaskâra.—But if it is intended to be said that according to "not as a particular Substance" in the last aphorism, there is no inference in the form, "This is Air," but that Air is inferred by way of the mark being resident in a Substance in addition to the eight Substances, then what is the evidence of that Substance being called by the name of Air? So he says :

तस्मादागमिकम् ॥ २ । १ । १७ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore आगमिकं Âgamikam, proved by revelation, *i. e.*, the Veda.

17. Therefore the name, Air, is proved by the Veda.—65.

Because there is no inference in the particular form, therefore the name Air is proved by *âgama*, *i. e.*, the Veda. This is the meaning. "Air is the moving deity," "One should offer a white goat to Air," "And this Air is all colour, the carrier of all smells, and pure,"—from these and other recommendation, which have acquired the force of regulations, the name, Air, is obtained. As the name, heaven, is obtained from the recommendation "That which is not pierced with pain nor is clouded afterwards;" the name, barley, from the recommendation, "The leaves of all crop-plants fall off in spring. But the barley plants possessing ears of corn thrive in it as if with joy;" the name, cane, from the recommendation, "cane is born in water;" and the name, bear, from the recommendation, "cows run after the bear." Otherwies, in the case of such instructions as "He who desires heaven should perform sarifice," etc., in the non-appearance of the particular happiness for the time being, men desiring heaven will not be inclined towards the performance of sacrifice, etc. Nor will there be any arrest of activity according to the usage of the Mlechchhas, *i. e.* the impure, in respect of "His becomes a mess of barley." "He kindles the creative fire on a cane mat." "Shoe of bear-skin," etc., for the Mlechchhas apply the words barley, bear, and cane, to yellow paddy, crow, and black-berry (of jackal,) respectively. Thus there will be room for doubt without those recommendations. Therefore their respective meanings are known from the Veda only. This is the import. Only the name is proved by the Veda; the proof of the Substance, however, is really by analogy.—17.

Existence of God.

Upaskâra.—Having thus finished the section on Air, he establishes that the Veda is the revelation by the All-knower, in order to answer the objection, "Is then the name, Air, also, like the names, *dittha* and *davittha* (*i. e.*, the gibberish or abracadabra), uttered by a mad man?", and with a view to open the section on Iśvara or God, he says.

संज्ञा-कर्म्म त्वस्मद्विशिष्टानां लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । १८ ॥

संज्ञा-कर्म्म Saṁjñâ-karmma, name and effect. तु Tu, on the other hand. But. अस्मद्विशिष्टानां Asmad-viśiṣṭânâm, beings distinguished from, other than, or superior to ourselves. लिङ्ग Liṅgam, mark.

18. But name and effect are the mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves.—66.

The word 'tu' has the sense of differentiating from such other marks as Touch, etc. 'Smjñâ' *i.* ., name, '' karmma' effect, *e. g.*, Earth, etc.—both of them are the mark of the existence also of beings distinguished from ourselves, namely, Îśvara and great sages.—18.

Existence of God.—continued.

Upaskâra.—He explains how it is so :

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात् संज्ञाकर्म्मणः ॥ २ । १ । १९ ॥

प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तत्वात् Pratyakṣa-pravrittvât because they follow from perception, संज्ञाकर्म्मणः Saṃjñâ-karmmaṇaḥ, of name and effect.

19. Because name and effect follow from perception.—67.

Here also the singular form or the resolution into one, of 'name' and 'effect,' from the copulative compound meaning collection, is intended to indicate the indentity of the author of the name and the author of the universe. Thus he only is competent to give the names 'heaven,' *apûrva*' (*i.e.*, that which was not before, that is to say, *adṛṣṭam*), etc., with whom 'heaven,' '*apûrva*,' etc., are objects of sense-perception, as in the giving the names, 'Chaitra,' 'Maitra,' etc., to the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., which are perceptible, by their father and others. Similarly, the application of the names, pot,' cloth,' etc., is only under the direction of Îśvara. The word which has been directed by Îśvara in a particular place, the same is appropriate there ; *e. g.*, 'all those herbs which have been touched by the edge of the mongoose's tooth, counteract the venom of the snake.' Such direction is the mark. *i. e.*, the means of inference, of beings distinguished from ourselves. And the name, 'Maitra,' etc., which the father gives to the son, that also is surely directed by Îśvara by such rules as "The father should give a name (to the son) on the twelfth day."

Thus it is proved that naming is a mark of the existence of Îśvara.

In like manner action, *i. e.*, effect, also is a mark of the existence of Îśvara ; for, thus, Earth, etc., must have a creator, because they are effects like a pot, etc.

Here Earth, etc., do not mean a product producible by the body, nor a product producible by the volition of another product, nor a product which has become the subject-matter of dispute as to whether it has been produced by an agent or not, nor a product the production of which by an agent has been the subject of doubt, because Earth, etc., also are producible by the volition of another product by means of *adṛiṣta* (*i. e.*, invisible after-effects of voluntary acts), and because dispute and doubt, being too wide, do not determine the minor term. Moreover, if by the expression that they have a creator, it is meant that they are the products of an active principle, then production in question may be explained by reference to ourselves, etc., for the causality of ourselves also is productive of Earth, etc., by means of *adṛiṣta* (the invisible after-effects of past acts). It is the same also if the product be producible by an active principle operating upon given materials, for the acts or ourselves, etc., also are relative to some given

material. Then if the being effect, on the other hand, means the being the counter-opposite of prior non-existence (or potential existence), then it will include annihilation also. But notwithstanding all this, earth must have a creator because it is an effect. Here the having a creator means the being the product of an active principle independently of *adṛiṣṭa*, and being an effect means the being the counter-opposite of existence determined by prior non-existence. In the case of sprouts, etc., there is no fault of doubtfulness or multifariousness, for these faults arise where there is doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the middle term when the non-existence of the major term has to be ascertained; for otherwise all inference will have to be abandoned. Nor should it be said that this is the fault beyond the minor term, for it will entail the command of the king: for it is not the glory or a fault that it does not attack the minor term. Therefore at the stage of sprouting, the proof of the existence of) the major term (in the minor term) by the mark or middle term the universal relation of which is well ascertained, being unobstructed, where is the doubtfulness or multifariousness? And *a fortiori* at the stage of non-sprouting, those faults verily do not exist. Thus in brief.—19.

Marks of Ether, according to Sāṅkhya philosophy.

Upaskāra.—Having thus finished the section on Īśvara, by the last two aphorisms, and desiring to begin the section Ether, he says:

निष्क्रमणं प्रवेशनमित्याकाशस्य लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । १ । २० ॥

निष्क्रमणं Niṣkramaṇam, egress, प्रवेशनं Praveśanam, ingress. इति Iti, such. आकाशस्य Ākāśasya, of Ether लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark.

20. Egress and Ingress—such is the mark (of the existence) of Ether.—68.

The word 'iti' signifies manner and brings forward Actions, namely, Throwing upwards, etc., also. Egress and Ingress are the movement of Substances possessing Touch. That is the mark of the existence of Ether, which is not an effect. This is the view of the Sāṅkhya philosophers.—20.

The above are no marks.

Upaskāra.—To discredit this view he says:

तदलिङ्गमेकद्रव्यत्वात् कर्म्मणः ॥ २ । १ । २१ ॥

तत् Tat, that, *i. e.*, movement or egress and ingress. अलिङ्गं Aliṅgam, no mark एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravyatvāt, having but one Substance. कर्म्मणः Karmmaṇaḥ, of an action.

21. That is no mark, as an Action has but one Substance (as its combinative cause).—69.

Actions such as egress, ingress, etc., do not at all infer Ether as their combinative cause, because Action 'has but one Substance,' in other words, has only corporal Substance as its combinative cause.

Action also, it has been already stated, does not simultaneously appear in more than one place, nor does it appear in non-corporal Substances.—21.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Lest it might be said that egress, ingress, etc., will infer Ether as their non-combinative cause, so he says :

कारणान्तरानुक्लृप्तिवैधर्म्याच्च ॥ २ । १ । २२ ॥

कारणान्तरानुक्लृप्तिवैधर्म्यात् Kâraṇâ-ntarânu-klṛiptivaidharmyât, on account of difference from the characteristic or sign of another cause. च Cha, and.

22. And also because they differ in property from the characteristic of another (*i.e.*, the non-combinative) cause.—70.

'Anuklṛipti' means characteristic or sign, by the etymology 'that by which a thing is made known.' The meaning is : on account of difference from that which is the characteristic of another cause, *i. e.*, the non-combinative cause.

Substance does not surely at all become a non-combinative cause. Now non-combinative causality arises by proximity in the same object with the cause, or by proximity in the same object with the effect. The first is illustrated in the case of the colours of the yarns towards the colour of the cloth. And this non-combinative causality is called 'great,' as it produces a larger effect. The second is as that of the conjunction of Soul and Mind towards knowledge, or cognition, etc. And this non-combinative causality is called 'small,' as it produces a smaller effect. But Ether is neither the combinative cause nor, again, the non-combinative cause of egress, ingress, and other Actions. Hence Action is not a mark of the existence of Ether.—22.

Vivriti.—He says that Action does not infer Ether even as its non-combinative cause.

On the maxim that a verbal affix signifies an object, 'anuklṛipti' (agreement) means 'anuklṛipta,' *i. e.*, that which is agreed to by the opposite disputants ; and such a different caused is the non-combinative cause, *viz.*, Attribute and Action. Therefore the meaning is that egress, etc., do not warrant the inference of Ether as their non-combinative cause, because difference from Attribute and Action (which are non-combinative causes), in the form of Substance-ness, exists in Ether.

The above are no marks—continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be said, "Let Ether be the occasional cause of Action, for the movements of birds and arrows, etc., are seen in Ether." So he says :

संयोगादभावः कर्म्मणः ॥ २ । १ । २३ ॥

संयोगात् Samyogât, on account of Conjunction. अभावः Abhâvaḥ, non-production. कर्म्मणः Karmmaṇaḥ of Action.

23. Action is not produced on account of Conjunction.—71.

The non-production of Action is due to the obstruction of Impetus, Gravity, etc., which are the causes of Action, by Conjunction with corporal substances, and is not due to the non-existence of Ether which is all-pervasive. Therefore the meaning is that the presence of or agreement with Sky which should be really explained otherwise, does not prove that Ether is the occasional cause of Action.—23.

Inference of Ether by Sound.

Upaskâra.—Having thus discredited the Sânkhya view, and going to prove Sound as the mark of Ether he prepares the ground for inference by exhaustion, by saying :

कारणगुणपूर्व्वकः कार्य्यगुणो दृष्टः ॥ २ । १ । २४ ॥

कारणगुणपूर्व्वकः Kâraṇa-guṇâ-pûrvvakaḥ, preceded by the Attributes of the cause. कार्य्यगुणः Kâryya-guṇâḥ, Attribute of the effect. दृष्टः Dṛiṣṭaḥ, is seen or observed.

24. The Attribute of the effect is seen to be preceded by the Attribute of the cause.—72.

The particular Attributes such as colour, etc., which exist in the effect characterised as Earth, etc., are found to be preceded by like Attributes in their causes. Sound also is a particular or distinctive Attribute, for in spite of its being a 'class,' it is, like colour, etc., apprehended by only one of the external senses. Thus the meaning is that such effect is not observed in which sound preceded by a like Attribute in the couse thereof may appear.—24.

Sound not an Attribute of tangible things.

Upaskâra.—It might be said that Sound is observed in a lute, flute, tobour, conchshell, dsum, etc., which are effects and that consequently it is preceed by a like Attribute in their causes. So he says :

कार्य्यान्तराप्रादुर्भावाच्च शब्दः स्पर्शवतामगुणः ॥ २ । १ । २५ ॥

कार्य्यान्तराप्रादुर्भावात् Kâryyântarâprâdurbhâvât, because of the non-appearance of another or a different effect. च Cha, and. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, sound. स्पर्शवताम् Sparśavatâm, of thing possessing Touch. अगुणः, Aguṇaḥ, not attribute.

25. Sound is not an Attribute of things possessing Touch, because of the non-appearance of (similar) other effects.—73.

It would have been so, if, as when Colour, Taste, etc., are observed in yarns, potsherd, etc., other Colour, Taste, etc., homogeneous with the former, are also observed in a cloth, pot, etc., so the congener of the sound which is observed in the constituent parts of a lute, flute, tabour, etc., were also observed in the wholes made up of those, *i. e.*, lute, flute, tabour, etc. But this is not the case ; for, in fact, it is seen that a lute, etc., are originated by constituent parts which are destitute of all Sound, whereas it is not seen that a cloth, a pot, etc., have their origin in yarns, potsherds, etc., which are destitute of Colour. Moreover if Sound were a particular Attribute of tangible things, then the relation of high and low and lower tones, etc., would not be observed

in it. For Colour, etc., which appear in a single composite whole are not observed to be varying in degree. Therefore Sound is not a distinctive Attribute of tangible things.—25.

Bhaṣya.—reads II. I. 25 as two sphorisms, *viz.*, Also because of the non-appearance of different effects (*Kârya-antara-aprâdurbhâvât cha*), and Sound (is) not an attribute of tangible things (*Śabdah sharsavatâm agnaâh*).—the meaning, however, remaining the samo.

Nor of Soul, nor of Mind.

Upaskâra.—But, it might be said, Sound will be either an Attribute of Soul or an Attribute of Mind. So he says :

परत्र समवायात् प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च नात्मगुणो न मनोगुणः ॥ २ । १ ।२६॥

परत्र Paratra, elsewhere, with other objects. समवायात् Samavâyât, because of combination. प्रत्यक्षत्वात् Pratyakṣatvât, because it is an object of sense-perception. च Cha, and ; also. न Na, not. आत्मगुणः Âtma-guṇaḥ, an Attribute of Soul. न Na, not. मनोगुणः Mano-guṇaḥ, an Attribute of Mind.

26. Because it combines with other objects, and because it is an object of sense-perception, therefore sound is neither an Attribute of Soul nor an Attribute of Mind.—74.

If sound were an Attribute of Soul, then there would be such states of consciousness as "I am filled (with Air)," "I am sounded," "I give out Sound," etc., as there are such state as "I am happy," "I try," "I know," "I desire," etc. But it is not the case ; on the contrary, the experience of all men is that a conch-shell is filled with Air, a lute is played upon, etc. Moreover, Sound is not an Attribute of Soul, because, like colour, etc., it is apprehended by the external sense. Also if Sound were a particular Attrtbute proper to Soul, then it would be, like pain, etc., perceived by a deaf man also. Therefore it has been rightly said, "Because it combines with other objects." He states the reason of its not being an Attribute of Mind, by saying "Because it is an object of sense-perception." The fact that the words *âtman* and *manas* have not been compounded, as they could have been, in the form "na âtmamanasor guṇaḥ," indicates that, by the logic or law of similars, the very same reason, "Because it is an object of sense-perception," excludes the idea that Sound might be an Attribute of Space or of Time even.—26.

Therefore of Ether.

Upaskâra.—He states why this method of exhaustion has been applied :

परिशेषाल्लिङ्गमाकाशस्य ॥ २ । १ । २७ ॥

परिशेषात् Pariśeṣât, from exhaustion, लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark. आकाशस्य Âkaśasya, of Ether.

27. By the method of exhaustion (Sound) is the mark of Ether.—75.

'Sound' is the complement of the aphorism. Here too a Substance, over and above the eight Substances, is proved by analogous inference,

in this way that, being an Attribute, Sound, like Colour, etc., must reside somewhere. And it is an Attribute, because, like Colour, etc., it belongs to a 'class' capable of being apprehended by only one external sense. Being non-eternal, it resembles knowledge, etc., both of which are combined with 'Universal Substances.' And its non-eternality will be shown later on. The Substance, proved by exhaustion, is eternal, as there is no reason for the supposition of constituent parts in it, and is also universal, because Sound is observed in all places. 27.

Bhâṣya. The idea of *Kaṇâda* is that Time as well as Space are really identical with Ether.

Ether is a Substance, and is eternal.

Upaskâra.—To prove, by analogy or over-extension, the Substance-ness and eternality of Ether of which the mark is Sound, he says :

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ । १ । २८ ॥

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve. Substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vâyunâ, by Air व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

28. The Substance-ness and eternality of Ether have been explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—76.

As Air is eternal because it does not possess any other Substance as its combinative cause, so also is Ether. As Air is a Substance because it possesses Attributes, so also is Ether. This is the meaning.—28.

Ether is one.

Upaskâra.—Is there then one Ether or are there many Ethers ? To this he replies :

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ २ । १ । २९ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvam, that-ness, One-ness, Unity. भावेन Bhâvena, by existence.

29. The unity (of Ether is explained) by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—77.

The agreement of the words in the aphorism is with 'vyâkhyâtam' (or explained), *i. e.*, the same word, as in the last aphorism, with the inflection changed. The meaning is that as 'Bhâvaḥ,' *i. e.*, Existence, is one, so also Ether is only one and not many.—29.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked, "The unity of Existence is proved by the virtue of a similative experience. How will unity be proved in Ether, by comparison with that ?" So he says :

शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषाद्विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्च ॥ २ । १ । ३० ॥

शब्दलिङ्गाविशेषात् Śabdaliṅgâviśeṣât, because there is no difference in Sound which is the mark. विशेषलिङ्गाभावात् Viśeṣaliṅgâbhâvât, because there exists no distinguishing mark. च Cha, and.

30, (Ether is one), because there is no difference in Sound which is its mark, and because there exists no other distingushing mark.—78.

The sense is that the unity of Ether is proved. Ether being ubiquitous or universal, all Sounds are explained by their having that one and the same foundation or seat. Therefore to suppose a different basis will be shewing an exuberance of imagination. Besides the very same Sound must be the mark of the different Ether which is to be supposed, and that, *i. e.*, Sound, is undifferentiated ; nor is there any other mark which can prove the differentia or the difference or division. It will be stated afterwards (III. ii-20) that although the mark, *e. g.*, knowledge, etc., of Souls is really non-differentiated, still the plurality of Souls is proved by other marks, according to 'difference of conditions' or circumstances.—30.

Vivriti.—Plurality of Souls is proved by the differences of the products of the Soul, *viz.*, pleasure and pain, seeing that at one and the same time an effect in the form of pleasure is produced in one Soul, while in another Soul an effect in the form of pain is produced. But in the case of Ether there is no differenciation of Sound which is its mark, whereby a multiplicity of Ether might be established. Nor is there any other mark which can establish a plurality of Ether. So that no account of the absence of proof, and no account of simplicity, Ether is one and not many.

Individuality of Ether.

Upaskara.—It may be said, "Let unity by all means belong to Ether. Let it also have extreme largeness as it is universal. Let Conjunction and Disjunction also belong to it as it is the non-combinative cause of Sound, But how can individuality belong to it ?" So he says :

तदनुविधानादेकपृथक्त्वञ्चेति ॥ २ । १ । ३१ ॥

तदनुविधानात् Tad-anu-bidhânât, because it follows or accompanies that, *i. e.* unity. एकपृथक्त्वं Eka-prithaktvam, separateness of one individuality. च Cha, and. इति Iti, finished

31. And individuality also belongs to Ether, since individuality follows unity.—79.

Individuality is proved by this that individuality regularly goes together with unity. 'Iti' indicates the end of the chapter.

The subject-matter of the chapter is the definition or statement of the characteristics possessing particular Attributes and which are not the objects of mental perception or perception by the internal organ. Hence the characteristics of Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether and, in passing, of the divine Soul also, are stated in this chapter. Thus Earth possesses fourteen Attributes, and these Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, Touch, Number, Measure, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Gravity, Fluidity, and Impression. Exactly the same number of Attributes, with the exception of Smell and addition of Viscidity, belong to Water. These same Attributes, with the exception of Taste, Smell, Viscidity, and Gravity

belong to Fire, and with the exception of Smell, Taste, Colour, Gravity, Viscidity, and Fluidity, belong to Air. With the addition of Sound, the five Attributes beginning with Number, belong to Ether. Only the five Attributes beginning with Number belong to Space and Time. The five Attributes beginning with Number, together with Priority, Posteriority, and Impetus, belong to Mind. The five Attributes beginning with Number, and Cognition, Desire, and Volition belong to Îśvara.—31.

Here ends the first chapter of the second book in the Commentary given by Śaṅkara to the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms of Kaṇâda of great powers.

Vivṛiti.—The subject-matter of this chapter is the definition of Substances possessing particular Attributes which do not appear in that which possesses 'bhâvanâ,' *i. e.*, impression or meditative understanding. Substances are the five elements and God.



BOOK SECOND—CHAPTER SECOND.

Smell may be essential or accidental.

Upaskâra.—Now the author desires to examine the characteristics, such as Smell, etc., of the "elements" (bhûta). Therefore, by way of establishing that Smell, etc., may be essential or natural as well as accidental or conditional, he says :

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः सति सन्निकर्षे गुणान्तराप्रादुर्भावो वस्त्रे
गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् ॥ २ । २ । १ ॥

पुष्पवस्त्रयोः Puṣpa-vastrayoḥ, of a flower and a cloth. सति Sati, existing. सन्निकर्षे Sannikarṣe, contact. गुणान्तराप्रादुर्भावः Guṇântarâprâdurbhâvaḥ, non-appearance from another Attribute. वस्त्रे Vastre, in the cloth. गन्धाभावलिङ्गम् Gandhâbhâva-liṅgam, mark of the non-existence of Smell.

1. The non-production (of the smell which is perceived in the cloth), after or during its contact with a flower, from the Attribnte (of the constitutive cause of the cloth), is the mark of the non-existence of smell in the cloth.—80.

Where Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch are produced from the corresponding Attributes in the cause, there they become essential and so acquire the nature of being characteristic marks, and not otherwise. For, the fragrance which is perceived in the breeze, or the cold which is perceived in a tablet of stone, or the warmth which is perceived in water, does not become a characteristic. Therefore he says. 'Of a flower and a cloth.' For the fragrance of the golden *ketaki* (Pandanus Odoratissimus), which is perceived in the cloth when the cloth has been brought into contact with the golden *ketaki* flower, does not belong to the cloth, because it is not produced according to the (corresponding) Attribute of the cause (*i. e*., yarns). What, then ? It is accidental or conditional, because due to the proximity of the golden *ketaki* ; for the non-existence of Smell in the *ketaki* is not the mark of the non-existence of Smell in the cloth. What is the mark ? So it has been said, "Non-appearance from another Attribute," *i. e*., non-production from the Attribute of the cause. For, if the Smell, which is perceived in the cloth, were essential to it, then it would be percieved in the cloth also before the constituent parts, *i. e*., the yarns of the cloth, are brought into contact with the *ketaki* ; but it is not so. This is the meaning. Thus the Smell in question is not inherent in the cloth, because, like cold and hot Touch, etc., it is a particular Attribute which is not produced by the Attribute of the constituent parts.—1.

Vivṛiti.—It has been already stated that the possession of Smell, etc., are the marks of Earth, etc. But this would not be proper. For Smell being perceived of Air, etc., combined with fragrant parts, the mark becomes too wide. For this reason he shows that the perception of Smell, etc., in Air, etc., is accidental.

Smell is essential in Earth.

Upaskára.—He says that essential Smell is the mark of Earth :

व्यवस्थितः पृथिव्यां गन्धः ॥ २ । २ । २७ ॥

व्यवस्थितः Vyavasthitaḥ, established. पृथिव्यां Prithivyâm, in Earth. गन्धः Gandhaḥ, Smell.

2. Smell is established in Earth.—81.

'Established in the Earth'—*i. e.*, determined by absence of connection as well as connection with other objects.* The meaning is that Smell is the mark, because it serves to differentiate Earth from objects of similar and dissimilar classes. For Earth has Smell only and only Earth has Smell. It is therefore established that Smell which differentiates Earth from the eight similars beginning with Water, and the five dissimilars beginning with Attribute, is essential to Earth.—2.

Vivṛiti.—'Established,' *i. e.*, ascertained or undoubted, as there is nothing to oppose it.

Heat may be essntial or accidental.

Upaskára.—Extending the mode of establishing Smell as an essential Attribute, to Hotness also, which is the characteristic of Fire, he says :

एतेनोष्णता व्याख्याता ॥ २ । २ । ३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. उष्णता Uṣṇatâ, Hotness. Warmth. व्याख्याता Vyâkhyâtâ, explained.

3. By this hontness is explained.—82.

This extension or analogy should be understood also in the case of coldness, etc., which are the characteristics of Water, etc.—3.

Heat is essential in Fire.

Upaskára—He examines the characteristic of Fire :

तेजस उष्णता ॥ २ । २ । ४ ॥

तेजसः Tejasaḥ of Fire. उष्णता Uṣṇatâ, Hotness.

4. Hotness (is the charateristic) of Fire.—83.

The meaning is that natural or essential Hotness is the characteristic of Fire. Colour, white and luminous, is also implied.—4.

Coldness is essential in Water.

Upaskára.—He examines the characteritic of Water :

अप्सु शीतता ॥ १ । २ । ५ ॥

अप्सु Apsu, in Waters. शीतता Śîtatâ, Coldness.

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* "Absence of connection as well as connection with other objects." *i. e.*, Smell is always found in essential *agreement* with Earth and in essential *difference* from Non-Earth.

5. Coldness (is the characteristic) of Water.—84.

The meaning is that natural or essential coldness is the characteristic of water ; so that it is not too wide by over-extending to a stone-tablet, sandal-wood, etc. Colour and Taste also are said to be the characteristics of Water in the same way as coldness which also implies Viscidity and constitutional Fluidity.

It cannot be asked, " Why is there this breach in the order of the charactoristics according to the enumeration of Earth, etc ? " Because it is intended to indicate that the Touch of Fire overcomes or overwhelms the Touch of Earth and the Touch of Water, and so the examination of Fire should of course come in between them. Or, the order has not been observed in order to introduce the examination of Air. Thus it should be inferred that Touch, which is neither hot nor cold and is not due to be the action of fire or heat, is essential to Air, and, as such, is its characteristic. This is the import.—5.

Vivriti.—The order of enumeration has been abandoned with the object of indicating that the mark of Air, *i. e.*, the possession of a heterogeneous Touch, should be investigated in the same way. The explanation, given by the learned writer of the Upaskâra, namely that the violation of the order is intended to show that the Touch of Fire overcomes the Touches of Earth and Water, is not satisfactory. For it is known to all that in gold as well as in moon-light, etc., the Touches of Earth and Water overcome the Touch of Fire.

Marks of Time.

Upaskâra.—Thus it has been stated that particular Attributes such as smell, etc., of tangible things, which are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, are the charachteristics of Earth, etc., Now he begins the section on the charachteristics of Time, brought in by the order of enumeration, by saying :

अपरस्मिन्नपरं युगपत् चिरं क्षिप्रमिति काललिङ्गानि ॥ २।२।६॥

अपरस्मिन् Aparasmin, in respect of that which is posterior, अपरं Aparam, posterior. युगपत् Yugapat, simultaneous. चिरं Chiram, slow. क्षिप्रं Ksipram, quick. इति Iti, such. काललिङ्गानि Kala-lingâni, marks of Time.

6. 'Posterior' in respect of that which is posterior, 'simultaneous', 'slow,' 'quick,'—Such (cognitions) are the marks of Time.—85.

The word ' iti ' which shows the mode of cognition, relates to each individual word ; so that the meaning is that the cognition ' it is posterior' the cognition ' it is simultaneous,' the cognition ' it is slow or late,' the cognition ' it is quick or early,'—are the marks of Time. By ' posterior in respect of that which is posterior,' we are also to understand ' prior, in respect of that which is proir.' Therefore the sense is this : If we make a youth our point of view of starting point, then the cognition of Priority is produced in an old man, whose birth has been distanced by a large number of the revolutions of the sun ; and this

Priority depends upon some non-combinative cause. Now. Colour, etc., cannot be the non-combinative cause, owing to their variable presence. The three, beginning with Smell, do not produce Priority in respect of Air. Touch also, rendered different by the difference of hot, etc., is in each case variable in its presence. Nor is a fixed Measure the non-combinative cause, for it does not originate a heterogeneous object. Therefore it remains at last that, the revolutions of the sun being connected with a different substratum, conjunction with a Substance determined by those revolutions is really the required non-combinative cause. And that Substance, being conjoint both with the lump of matter on earth (*e. g.*, the body of a youth) as well as the sun, must be universal. If the characteristic of that Substance be supposed to be belonging to Ether, then it would follow that the beating of a drum at any place will produce Sound in all drums everywhere. Thus the Conjunction of Time alone, which is conjoint with the sun, with the lump of matter in question, is the non-combinative cause of Priority. It is Time which demonstrates the action of the sun, because, for the purpose of the determination of a different Substance in the case of the properties of a different Substance, the Soul is dependent upon an affinity in addition to its own propinquity, otherwise the redness of a *kusumbha* flower at Vârânasi (Benares) would entail redness in a crystal at Patna also. But Time being supposed to be of that very nature, this (*i. e.*, dependence upon another affinity) is no fault here. If it be asked, why Time also would not transmit colour, we reply, it is because Time has been established only as that which always demonstrates action.

In the same way, the production of Posteriority should be ascertained in a youth, with an old man as the starting point. 'Simultaneous': 'They are born simultaneously,' They exist simultaneously,' 'They act simultaneously,'—in such cognitions, 'simultaneously' means at the same time, during the same movement of the sun, in other words, at the same time as determined by the movement of the sun. It is not unconnected movements of the sun, which undergo the qualifications, *e. g.*, 'simultaneously born,' etc. ; nor are these connected by their own nature. Therefore, these specific cognitions being incapable of a different proof, the Substance which establishes the specification, is Time.—6.

Like Air, Time is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskâra.—It may be said, "Let Time be proved. But there is no proof that it is a Substance, nor that it is eternal." So he says :

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ । २ । ७ ॥

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, substanceness and eternality. वायुना Vâyunâ, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

7. The Substance-ness and eternality (of Time) are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—86.

The meaning is that, as the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance,

because it possesses Attributes, and is eternal, because it is a Substance which does not contain any other Substance, so also is Time.—7.

Like Existence, Time is one.

Upaskâra.—"Even then," it may be said, "there may be a plurality of Times." So he says :

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ २ । २ । ८ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvam, unity. भावेन Bhâvena, by Existence.

8. The unity (of Time is explained), by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—87.

The aphorism has grammatical connection with the word 'vyâkhyâte' in the last aphorism, reduced to the form 'vyâkhyâtam.' The meaning is : Time, like Existence, is one, because, in spite of their multiplicity, the marks of Time, *viz.*, the cognition 'it is slow or late,' etc., are the same in all places, and because no distinguishing mark, like those of Souls, exists.

It may be objected, "Time is manifold according to the difference of moments, two-moments, hours, three-hours, days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. How then can it be one ?" We reply that it is not so, because the appearance of difference is due to *upâdhi* or an external condition. For, it is found, that as the self-same crystal appears to be different according to the reflection thrown upon it by the external condition or *upâdhi* of a China rose, *tâpiñja* (Xanthochymus Pictorius), etc., so also does the one and indivisible Time appear to be different according to the limit set by the movement of the Sun, etc., as well as according to the limit imposed by their respective effects. Thus moment (kṣaṇa) is the external condition of Time, which does not pervade or cover another external condition of Time, or it is Time which is not the receptacle of the counter-opposite of the prior as well as posterior non-existence of what is placed or contained in it ; and this should be understood from the production of something and the destruction of something at every moment. It is proved by the Veda that a 'lava,' is an aggregate of two moments, and so on.

"Yet," it may be objected," "Time must be at least three-fold, according to the difference of the past, the future, and the present ; for it is heard, 'The three times return,' 'The three Times are not accomplished or proved,' etc." We reply, it is not, for the use of three-fold Time is due to the limits of (the existence of) a thing, its prior non-existence, and its total destruction. The Time which is determined or delimited by a thing, is its present ; the Time which is delimited by the prior non-existence of a thing, is its future ; and the Time which is delimited by the total destruction of a thing, is its past. Thus the use of the threefoldness of Time depends upon the threefoldness of the determinant or that which delimits.—8.

Time, a cause of non-eternal Substances.

Upaskâra.—Here he says that Time is the cause of all that is produced.

नित्येष्वभावादनित्येषु भावात् कारणे कालाख्येति ॥ २।२।९॥

नित्येषु Nityeṣu, in eternal Substances. अभावात् Abhâvât, because it does not exist. अनित्येषु Anityeṣu, in non-eternal Substances, भावात् Bhâvât, Because it exists. कारणे Kâraṇe, in the cause. कालाख्या Kâlâkhyâ, the name of Time. इति Iti, hence.

9. The name Time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it does not exist in eternal substances and exists in non-eternal substances.—88.

The word 'iti' is used in the sense of 'because.' For this reason the name Time is applicable to 'cause,' *i. e.*, the cause of all that is produced. He states the reason :—"Because it does not exist in eternals, and because it exists in non-eternals." The meaning is this : Because in the case of the eternals such as Ether, etc., there do not arise the cognition, "produced simultaneously," "produced slowly or late," "produced quickly or early," "produced now," "produced during the day," "produced at night," etc., whereas cognitions of simultaneity, etc., do arise in the case of the non-eternals such as the pot, cloth, etc. ; therefore, by the methods of agreement as well as difference, Time is proved to be a cause. It is to be understood that Time is the occasional or efficient cause of all that is produced, not only in virtue of the cognitions of simultaneity, etc., but also in virtue of the application of the terms, hibernal, vernal, pluvial, etc., to flowers, fruits, etc.—9.

Vivriti.—In fact, scriptural texts such as "All is produced from Time," etc., are proof that Time is the cause of every thing that is an effect.

Mark of Space.

Upaskâra.—Having finished the section on the mark of Time, and going to begin the section on the mark of Space, he says :

इत इदमिति यतस्तद्दिश्यं लिङ्गम् ॥ २ । २ । १० ॥

इतः Itaḥ, from this. इदम् Idam, this. इति Iti, such. यतः Yataḥ, whence तत् Tat, that. दिश्यं Diśyam, relating to Space. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

10. That which gives rise to such (cognition and usage) as "This (is remote, etc.) from this,"—(the same is) the mark of Space.—89.

'Diśyam'—that which belongs to Space, *i. e.*, is the mark of the inference of Space. The meaning is this : 'Space' is that substance 'from which,' in respect of two simulaneously existing bodies which are also fixed in (direction) and place, 'such' cognition and usage arise that 'this,' *i. e.*, the ground or substratum of the conjunctions of a comparatively large number of conjoint things, is prior 'to,' (other than or distinct from) this *i. e.*, the substratum of the conjunctions of a comparatively small number of conjoint things, and also that 'this,' *i. e.*, the substratum of the comparative smallness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint, is 'posterior' to 'this,' *i. e.*, the substratum of the

comparative largeness in number of the conjunctions of the conjoint. For, without the existence of such a substance, there is no other means of establishing a comparatively large or small number of the conjunctions of the conjoint in the two bodies; nor, without such establishment, can there be any particular or concrete understanding about them respectively; nor, without such understanding, can Priority and Posteriority arise; nor, without their appearance, can there be concrete cognition and usage about them.

It cannot be said, "Let Time be the means also of establishing the conjunctions. What is the use of another Substance?" For Time is proved only as the means of establishing constant or unchangeable actions. If, on the contrary, it is supposed to be the means of establishing the inconstant or changing property of Remoteness, then it would establish the colouring of the paste of the saffron of Kâśmira (Cashmere) on the breasts of the women of Karṇâta (the Carnatic). The same will be the implication if Ether and Soul also are similarly made to be the means of communicating the property of Remoteness. Whereas Space being proved only as the invariable means of communicating the property of Remoteness, there is no such absurd implication. In this way Space, which establishes conjunctions, is really separate from Time, which establishes actions.

Moreover, these cognitions, namely "This is east of that," "This is south of that," "This is west of that," "This is north of that," "This is south-east of that," This is south-west of that," "This is north-west of that," "This is north-east of that," "This is below that," "This is above that,"—are brought together by the statement "This from this," because it is not possible for these cognitions to have another occasional or efficient cause. Further, Time establishes external conditions or *upâdhis* which are constant, while Space establishes external conditions or *upâdhis* which are not constant. For, when one thing is 'present' (in Time) with reference to another thing, that other thing also is 'present' with reference to the former: but in the case of the external condition or *upâdhi* of Space, there is no such rule or fixity, because that which is east in relation to a person, the very same sometime becomes west in relation to the same person. The same is to be observed with regard to north, etc., also. The direction or quarter which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun rises, with reference to another direction, is east in relation to the latter; the direction which is nearer to the mountain whereon the sun sets, with reference to another direction, is west in relation to the latter. Nearness, again, is the fewness of the conjunctions of the conjoint; and these conjunctions with the sun, whether they be a few or many, are to be established by Space. In like manner, the direction, which is determined by the portion of Space falling on the left of a person facing towards east, is north; the direction determined by the right division of such a person, is south; while rightness and leftness are particular 'classes' residing in the constituent parts of the body. The direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is produced by an act of which Weight is the non-combinative cause, is below; and the direction, which is the support of the conjunction which is produced by the conjunction of Soul possessing *adriṣṭam* (invisible

consequences of conduct) or by the action of fire, is above. In this way, from their reference as east, etc., they are also otherwise referred to, as in the statement, "Directions are ten in number, as marked out by their being presided over by Indra, Agni, Yama, Nirṛita, Varuṇa Vâyu, Soma, Îśâna, Nâga, and Brahmâ."—10.

Like Air, Space is a Substance, and is eternal.

Upaskâra.—Substance-ness and also eternality belong to Space in the same way as to the ultimate atom of Air. So he says :

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ २ । ११ ॥

द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vâyunâ, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyâkhâyâte, explained.

11. The substanceness and eternality (of Space are) explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—90.

The meaning is that it possesses Substance-ness, because it possesses Attributes, and eternality, because it is independent of or non-resident in any other substance.—11.

Like Existence, Space is one.

Upaskâra.—Extending or attributing unity (to Space), he says :

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ २ । २ । १२ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvam, unity. भावेन Bhâvenâ, by Existence.

12. The unity (of space is explained) by (the explanation of the unity of) Existence.—91.

Unity is proved in Space, as in Existence, by the absence of difference in the marks of Space together with the non-existence of any differentiating mark. Separateness of one, *i. e.*, individuality, also belongs to Space, because individuality constantly follows unity.—12.

Bhâṣya.—According to *Kaṇâda*, it appears, there is but one Substance, variously called as Ether, Time, and Space. For, he has taken much pain to establish the difference of Ether from tangible things, Self, and Mind, but he has made no attempt to prove the difference of Ether from Time and Space as well. Nor has he attempted to prove the difference of Time and Space themselves from any other Substance. It may be, therefore, considered that with the difference of Ether, the difference of Time and Space also has been established. But it may be asked, if there be one Substance only, how does it come to be variously called as Ether, Time, and Space ? He replies that this is due to the variety of effects produced by it (II ii. 13) and also to the variety of external conditions attending it (II, ii, 14, 15, and 16.)

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked, "If Space is only one, how then can there be its cognition and use as ten quarters or directions ?, So he says :—

कार्य्यविशेषेण नानात्वम् ॥ २ । २ । १३ ॥

कार्य्यविशेषेण Kâryya-viśeṣeṇa, owing to difference or distinction of effects. नानात्वं Nânâtvam, multiplicity or diversity.

13. The diversity (of Space) is due to the difference of effect—92.

The meaning is that the attribution of multiplicity is due to the divergence of effects.—13.

Directions explained.

Upaskâra.—Showing the aforesaid divergence of effects, he says :

आदित्यसंयोगाद्भूतपूर्व्वाद्भविष्यतो भूताच्च प्राची ॥२।२।१४॥

आदित्यसंयोगात् Âditya-saṁyogât, from the conjunction of the sun. भूतपूर्व्वात् Bhûta-pûrvvât, past and gone. भविष्यतः Bhaviṣyataḥ, future. भूतात् Bhûtât, what has taken place or come into existence ; present. च Cha, and. प्राची, Prâchî, east (*lit.* Orient).

14. (The direction comes to be regarded as) the east, from the past, future, or present conjunction of the sun—93.

The east (prâchî) is so called, because the sun first (prâk) moves (añchati) there. Thus that direction is called the east, wherein the first conjunction of the sun took place, or will take place, or is taking place in the course of its circulation round Mount Meru.

Here the reference to the three times rests upon the difference, of the conceptions of the present (*i. e.*, the observer). For with some one on the morning of the previous day, the conjunction of the sun first took place in this direction ; therefore it is the east ; so the use of the word, east. With some other, the next day, the conjunction of the sun will first take place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use of the word, east. With some other, again, at this moment, the conjunction of the sun is taking place in this direction ; so, in view of this, the use of the word, east. In the word, 'bhûtât,' the affix, 'kta,' is used in the sense of incipient action. Therefore, no fixed point being invariably necessary, the repetition of the use of the word, east, is proved also in those cases, even where there is no conjunction of the sun, as at night, or at mid-day, etc. This is the import.—14.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Extending the same method to the use of the other directions also, he says :

तथा दक्षिणा प्रतीची उदीची च ॥ २ । २ । १५ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similarly. दक्षिणा Dakṣiṇâ, south. प्रतीची, Pratîchî, west. उदीची Udîchî, north. च Cha, also.

15. South, West, and North also are similarly (dis-tinguished).—94.

In the very same way, the use of the term, South, arises from the past, or future, or present conjunction of the sun with the mountain situated in the south direction. The use of the West and North also is to be similarly understood. Rightness and leftness (have their technical or recognised meanings, or) have been explained above.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Extending the very same method to the intervals of direction also, he says :

एतेन दिगन्तरालानि व्याख्यातानि ॥ २ । २ । १६ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. दिगन्तरालानि, Digantarâlâni, intervals of Space or Direction. व्याख्यातानि, Vyâkhyâtâni, explained.

16. By this, the intervals of direction are explained.—95.

The use of South-East arises from the intermixture of the mark of the East and the South direction. South-West, West-North, and North-East are to be similarly understood.

It has been explained at length in *Kaṇâda-Rahasyam* (*lit.*, the secret of Kaṇâda) that Space or Direction is that universal Substance by which the above conjunctions of the sun are established.—16.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief.

Upaskâra.—It has been already established that the characteristics, *e. g.* Colour, etc., of the four ' elements ' are essential, if they are preceded by like Attributes in their causes, and if not, then they are conditional or accidental. The marks of the ' universal substances*' which are devoid of any distinctive Attribute, have also been stated. Now, the mark of Ether, *i. e.*, Sound, should be examined. And here we meet with the contradictory conclusions of the Tântrikas. Some say that Sound is a Substance, and some call it an Attribute. Even when they call it an Attribute, it is eternal according to some, while according to others it is non-eternal. Others, again, distinguish even in Sound another Sound, which they call by the name, "*Sphoṭa.*" Accordingly, to begin the examination of Sound, he first of all establishes Doubt itself, which is the first element or member of an examination, by its characteristic and cause, and says :

सामान्यप्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषा प्रत्यक्षाद्विशेषस्मृतेश्च संशयः ॥ २ । २ । १७ ॥

समान्यप्रत्यक्षात् Sâmânya-pratyakṣât, from the perception of the Genus or general property. विशेषाप्रत्यक्षात् Viśeṣâpratyakṣât, from the non-preception of the Species or special property or differentia. विशेषस्मृतेः, Viśeṣa-smriteḥ, from the recollection of particulars, *i. e.*, alternatives. च, Cha, and. संशयः Saṁśayaḥ, doubt.

17. Doubt arises from the perception of (the object containing) the general property, the non-perception of the differentia, and the recollection of the alternatives, all at once or in one act of thought.—96.

' Sâmânyapratyakṣât ' means from the perception, *i. e.*, apprehension, of the object which possesses the general property, the affix ' matup,' signifying possession, having been elided. 'Viśeṣâpratyakṣât' means from the non-perception or non-apprehension of the property which is the means of mutual differentiation, *e. g.*, crooked, hollow, etc.,

and also head, hand, etc. 'Viśeṣasmṛiteḥ' means from the recollection of the particulars, *i. e.*, the alternatives characterised as a trunk and as a person. Recollection also includes apprehension by sense, because, in some instances, bodies which are being perceived also become the alternatives. The word 'cha' brings together *adṛiṣṭam* (invisible consequences of voluntary conduct) etc., which are also the causes of Doubt.

It has not been said that an individual or particular property is the source of uncertain knowledge. Nor has it been said that a particular or special property, being the means of discrimination, is such a cause, and that this differenciation from similar and dissimilar objects is really the common property. Contradiction, again, consists of two propositions arising from two opposite conclusions ; one being 'Sound is eternal,' and the other being 'Sound is non-eternal.' Both of them as well as both the forms of knowledge produced by them, do not together become the source of Doubt, since they do not exist simultaneously. Hence it has not been separately stated that there the cause of Doubt is either the non-common property, such as Soundness, or the common property, such as the being existent, the being the subject of proof, etc.

Uncertain knowledge finds no place in the kindred system of Gautama (*i. e.*, Nyâya Philosophy), and so a non-common property has been mentioned there as a cause of Doubt. Contradiction, *i. e.*, two opposite propositions, containing as a rule a positive and a negative statement, has been mentioned as a cause of Doubt. In the commentary on Nyâya, Doubt has been described as five-fold, according as the fact that something is being perceived, or the fact that something is not being perceived, is the cause of Doubt. Thus Doubts may arise whether what is being perceived be existent, whether what is being perceived be non-existent, whether this thing which is being perceived be existent or non-existent, whether what is not being perceived be existent, such as a radish, a latch, etc., and whether what is not being perceived be non-existent, as a lotus in the air. But all these are really of the same kind, being explained in the very same way by the expression 'from the perception of the common property.' Again, the three-foldness of Doubt, according to differences in its cause, as taught in the Nyâya-Vârttika, is also not possible, as the three, *viz.*, common property, etc., themselves cannot be causes on account of their variability. For heterogeneity should not be supposed here, like heterogeneity in fire produced from grass ; a strike-stick (araṇi) (*i. e.*, where fire is kindled by striking two sticks against each other), and a gem, because *ex hypothesi* the causality consists of the common property of producing an effect defined by the characteristic of Doubt. The heterogeneity which is said to appear in the form of referring primarily to the positive alternative, or primarily to the negative alternative, etc., does not serve the purpose of a differentia, as it is not sufficiently extensive, or wide.

Thus Doubt is neither three-fold nor five-fold, but is of one kind only. The writer of the aphorisms, however, will himself explain its two-foldness in another respect.

* 'Universal Substances' are Ether, Space, Time, and Soul.

It may be objected, ' Doubt is knowledge which produces the desire to know.'—This is not the definition, as it overlaps uncertainty. Doubt is knowledge which does not produce impression (saṃskâra).'—This too is common to unmodified or undifferentiated knowledge or state of consciousness ; for, if it is a concrete knowledge, then Doubt also produces an impression. Again though it is a 'class,' yet the quality of Doubt is not a characteristic, for as the quality of Doubt does not reside in the object containing the property (the perception of which is the occasion of the Doubt), the 'class' also does not appear there, since it is not found that a ' class ' appears elsewhere than in what it classifies." To this our reply is that from the definition of Doubt it follows that Doubt is knowledge of diverse and contradictory forms in respect of one and the same object.—17.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief—continued.

Upaskâra.—Doubt is two-fold : that which relates to external objects, and that which relates to internal objects. And that which relates to external objects, is also tow fold : where the object is visible, and where the object is not visible. Of these, Doubt, in which the object is visible, may be illustrated as the uncertainty whether it be a post or a person, which arises on seeing some object distinguished by height ; and Doubt, in which the object is not visible, is such as when on seeing the horns only in the body of a cow or a gayal (Bos gavæus), etc., which is concealed by the intervention of a bush, etc., the uncertainty arises, " whether it be a cow or a gayal." In fact, in the latter case also the Doubt really relates to the property of the horn, *i. e.*, whether the horns are the horns of a cow or of a gayal. The statement of the two-foldness of Doubt is however, a figure of speech. Now, the Genus (*i. e.*, Common property) which is the source of Doubt, raises Doubt by being observed either in more than one object or one object. He explains the first kind :

दृष्टञ्च दृष्टवत् ॥ २ । २ । १८ ॥

दृष्टं Dṛiṣṭam, that which is seen. च Châ, and दृष्टवत् dṛiṣṭa-vat, Like that which was seen.

18. And that which is seen, resembles that which was seen—(this also is the source of Doubt.)—97.

Height, which is seen, is the source of Doubt. ' Dṛiṣṭavat ' is formed by ' vati,' *i. e.*, the affix of similarity. Thus, something similar to the previously seen post and person, lies before. The meaning is that the height, which is observed in what lies before, is a source of Doubt, because it has been previously observed (in more than one object).—18.

Causes of Doubt or Disbelief.—continued.

Upaskâra.—He illustrates the observed common property which relates to one object :

यथादृष्टमयथादृष्टत्वाच्च ॥ २ । २ । १६ ॥

यथादृष्टं Yathâ-dṛiṣṭam, that which has been seen in a certain form अयथादृष्टत्वात् A-yathâ-dṛiṣṭatvât, because it is not seen in that form. च Châ, and.

19. (Doubt also arises), where that which has been seen in one form, is seen in a different form.—98.

" The source of Doubt"—this completes the aphorism. The word ' cha ' understands what has been said before. The meaning is that

because an object is seen in a different form, therefore that which was seen in a certain form, also gives rise to Doubt, as Chaitra who was seen in a certain form, *i. e.*, with hair on his head, is at another time seen not in that form, *i. e.*, with the hair removed. Then afterwards when the very same Chaitra is seen with his head covered with a piece of cloth, Doubt arises whether this Chaitra has hair or not. Here the identity of Chaitra is the common property which gives rise to Doubt, and it is seen in one object only. Therefore what is here the source of Doubt is seen in one, undifferentiated object.—19.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He says that the very common property of being (cognised or) the object of thought is the cause of Doubt :

विद्याऽविद्यातश्च संशयः ॥ २ । १ । २० ॥

विद्याऽविद्यात: Vidyâ-a-vidyâta, from science and uescienc. च Cha, and. संशय: Saṁśayaḥ, Doubt.

20. Doubt (arises) also from science and nescience.—99.

Internal Doubt really springs from science and nescience. For instance, an astronomer predicts correctly, and predicts incorrectly, eclipses of the moon, etc. Accordingly Doubt arises in his mind as to his knowledge, whether it be accurate or not. Or knowledge is sometimes science, and sometimes nescience, *i. e.*, wanting in proof ; and, consequently, Doubt arises with respect to something, whether, ivasmuch as it is known, it be existent or non-existent.

The retention of the word, 'Doubt,' in the aphorism, indicates that here, too, Doubt arises only from the perception of the common property, and not from any other source. Thus the opinion held by some that he uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition alluded to in the definition of Gautama, "Doubt is deliberation in expectation of a differentia, due to the proof of the common properties as well as of the properties of similar and dissimilar objects, the non-proof of, or uncertainty as to, these properties, and also the uncertainty or inconstancy of cognition and non-cognition," (Nyâya-Sûtras I. I. 22), is a different source of Doubt, is hereby refuted.—20.

Vivṛiti.—Here the affix 'tasi' in 'vidyâ-avidyâtaś' is used in the genitive sense. Therefore the expression means "of true knowledge and false knowledge." And the doubt is whether it be true knowledge or false knowledge. From the word 'cha,' 'and,' it follows that Doubt as regards the object of knowledge also arises from the perception of the common property. Thus, 'The mountain contains fire,' 'The lake contains fire,' in these and other causes of true or false knowledge, the Doubt, whether such knowledge be true or false, arises from the knowledge of the common property of their both being knowledge. In like manner, after such Doubt, Doubt also arises whether the mountain contains fire or not, whether the lake contains fire or not, etc., from the knowledge of the common property of their being objects of knowledge. Now, a contrary certainty, the proof of which has not been obtained, is opposed to Doubt, and the Doubt whether it be true knowledge or false

knowledge operates to dispel such contrary certainty. And not that such Doubt of itself gives rise to Doubt about the object of knowledge.

Sound—what ?

Upaskāra.—Having thus elucidated the nature and characteristic of Doubt which is the first member of an examination, he now explains the object Sound which is the subject matter of examination, and says :

श्रोत्रग्रहणो योऽर्थः स शब्दः ॥ २ । २ । २१ ॥

श्रोत्रग्रहणः Śrotra-grahaṇaḥ, of which ear is the organ of apprehension. यः Yaḥ, which, अर्थः Arthaḥ, object. सः Saḥ, that. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, sound.

21. Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the Ear.—100.

'Śrotragrahaṇaḥ' means that of which ear is the organ or instrument of apprehension. 'Arthaḥ' means that which contains properties. So that the definition has not the defect of over-extending to Soundness, loudness, etc., Attribute-ness, Existence, and other properties residing in Sound and capable of being perceived by the ear. By the word 'arthaḥ' meaning that which contains properties, the possession of a class property is intended ; hereby it is indicated that Sound called '*Sphoṭa*' (*i. e.*, by which the words of a sentence can convey a complete sense), inherent in Sound, does not exist.

It may be argued as follows ; *Sphoṭa* must be postulated on the strength of the intuitions, 'one word,' 'one sentence.' for the intuition, of unity does not arise in a word composed of several letters, nor in a sentence composed of several letters. And the word *sphoṭa* forms a name or nominal on which the elucidation of the sense depends. The letters individually do not at all produce the intuition of the meaning of the whole sentence; their combination again is impossible, because they speedily disappear, being uttered by one speaker ; therefore the intuition of the sense of the whole arises from *sphoṭa* only, because elucidation of the sense does not take place without the knowledge of it. And this *sphoṭa*, although it is present in one and all the letters standing as words, yet becomes manifest in the last letter." We reply that it is not so. Conventional letters form words. Thus the sense being intuited from the word in virtue of convention alone, what is the use of *sphoṭa* ? The use of the expression 'one word' is a pretence, intended to denote the one property of making up one sense, possessed by a large number of letters. So also in the case of a sentence. If some inner meaning of the word, beyond that of its component letters, could be apprehended by perception, then the same might have been admitted to be *sphoṭa*. Therefore the author of the aphorisms has overlooked this doctrine of *sphoṭa* as being of no consideration.—21.

Causes of Doubt with respect to Sound.

Upaskāra.—Sound having thus appeared as an object which contains properties, its being the mark or Ether depends solely on its being an Attribute. Therefore to establish its Attribute-ness, he brings out the trilateral Doubt, and says :

तुल्यजातीयेष्वर्थान्तरभूतेषु विशेषस्य उभयथा दृष्टत्वात् ।२।२।२२॥

तुल्यजातीयेषु Tulya-jâtiyeṣu, in homogeneous things. अर्थान्तरभूतेषु Arthântârabhûteṣu, in heterogeneous things विशेषस्य Viśeṣasya, of the particular, *i. e.*, the difference, or differentia. उभयथा Ubhayâthâ, in both. दृष्टत्वात् Dṛiṣṭatvât, the being observed ; because it is observed.

22. (Doubt arises in respect of Sound), because its difference is observed both in (from) homogeneous objects and in (from) heterogeneous objects.—101.

"Doubt arises in respect of sound,"—is the complement of the aphorism. Sound-ness and perceptibility by the ear are observed in Sound. And this gives rise to Doubt whether Sound be an Attribute, or a Substance, or an Action, because the 'partcular,' *i. e.*, difference or divergence is observed both in homogeneous objects, namely the twenty-three Attributes, and in heterogeneous objects, namely Substances, and Actions. But Doubt, whether it be a Genus, or a Species, or a Combination, does not arise, inasmuch as difference in point of being existent, being produced by a cause, etc., is observed.

It may be said, "A non-common property cannot be the cause of Doubt by being the cause of indecision or uncertainty. And Sound-ness as well as perceptibility by the ear is really a non-common property." We say : Truly its difference or divergence is common to homogeneous and hetrogeneous things, and so only this common difference or divergence has been stated to be the cause of Doubt. Difference or divergence, which is the counter-opposite of Sound-ness, is the common property ; and the characteristic of being the counter-opposite of the difference or divergence belonging to both, in other words, Sound-ness, is the non-common property. Therefore it has been said : "From the observation of the difference in both." Here the observation of particular, *i. e.*, the difference, in both, *i. e.*, in homogeneous and heterogeneous things, constituting tho cause of Doubt, it becomes really the common property.—22.

Sound not a Substance.

Upaskâra.—Showing Doubt in this way, he says, in order to eliminate the alternative of Substance-ness :

एकद्रव्यत्वान्न द्रव्यम् ॥ २ । २ । २३ ॥

एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravyatvât, because it resides in one Substance. न Na, not. द्रव्यं Dravyam, Substance.

23. (Sound) is not a Substance, since it resides in one Substance only.—102.

'Ekadravyam' is that which has one Substance only as its combinative cause. And no Substance whatever contains a single Substace as its combinative cause. Therefore, owing to this difference in property from Substances, this Sound is not a Substance. This is the meaning. —23.

Nor an Action.

Upaskâra.—It may be said, "Action is surely uni-substantial. Therefore Sound may be an Action." So he says :

नापि कर्म्माऽचाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ २ । २ । २४ ॥

न Na, not. अपि Api, also कर्म्म Karmma, action. अचाक्षुषत्वात् Achâkṣuṣatvât, not being visible.

24. Nor (is Sound) an Action, because it is not an object of visual perception.—103.

Because the intuition of perception of Sound is not visual, *i. e.*, is produced by an external sense-organ other than the eye. So that the import is that, like the quality of Taste, etc., Sound-ness also does not reside in Actions, because it is a 'class' which does not reside in the objects of visual perception.—24.

Sound is transient, and not eternal.

Upaskâra.—If it is said that, as it speedily disappears, like Throwing upwards, etc., therefore Sound is an Action ; so he says :

गुणस्य सतोऽपवर्गः कर्म्मभिः साधर्म्यम् ॥ २ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणस्य Guṇasya, of Attribute. सतः Sataḥ, being. अपवर्गः Apavargaḥ, speedy destruction. कर्म्मभिः Karmmabhiḥ, with Actions. साधर्म्यं Sâdharmmyam, resemblance.

25. The resemblance (of Sound), although it is an Attribute, with Aetions, consists in its speedy destruction.—104.

'Apavargaḥ' means speedy destruction. And this, even in the case of Attribute-ness, is dependent upon the incidence of a rapidly appearing destroyer, in the same way as duality, etc., are. This constitutes only its resemblance to Actions, and not its Action-ness. The quality of undergoing rapid destruction which you (*i. e.*, the objector) advance as as an argument, is not one-pointed *i. e.*, multifarious, because it is found in Duality, Knowledge, Pleasure, Pain, etc., as well. This is the import.—25.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be said, "Let Sound be proved as an Attribute. Still it cannot be the mark of the existence of Ether. For it would justify the inference of Ether, if it were an effect of it. But it is eternal instead Its occasional non-cognition, however, is due to the absence of something which could reveal it." With this apprehension, he says :

सतोलिङ्गाभावात् ॥ २ । २ । २६ ॥

सत: Sataḥ, of (Sound as) existent. लिङ्गाभावात् Liṅgâbhâvât, from the absence of mark.

26. (Sound dœs not exist before utterance), because there is no mark of (Sound as) evistent (before utterance),—105.

For, if Sound were existent (before and after utterance), then there would be found some 'mark,' *i. e.*, additional proof, of it as existent. But in the state of non-hearing, there is no proof that Sound exists. Therefore it is only an effect, and not something which requires to be revealed only.—26.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He says that for this reason also, it (Sound) is not something which only requires to be made known :

नित्यवैधर्म्म्यात् ॥ २ । २ । २७ ॥

नित्यवैधर्म्म्यात् Nitya-vaiadharmmyât, owing to difference in property from what is eternal.

27. (Sound is not something which only requires to be brought to light), because it differs in property from what is eternal.—106.

The difference of Sound from what is eternal, is observed. Whereas, as in "Chaitra speaks," the existence of Chaitra, Maitra, etc., even though they are covered from view, may be inferred from their voice ; and whereas that which reveals, *e. g.*, the lap, etc., is never inferred by that which is revealed, *e. g.*, the water-pot, etc. ; therefore Sound is only a product, and not something which requires to be brought to light. This is the sense.—27.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Pointing out the objections to its being something to be revealed only he now states the ground of its being non-eternal :

अनित्यश्चायं कारणतः ॥ २ । २ । २८ ॥

अनित्यः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. च Cha, and. अयं Ayam, it. कारणतः Kâraṇataḥ, from its having a cause.

28. And Sound is non-eternal, (because it is observed to be produced) by a cause.—107.

"Because its production is observed,"—this is the complement. For Sound is observed as issuing out of the (temporary) conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick, etc. So that it is non-eternal, because it has a production (or beginning). Or "From a cause" may imply the reason that it has a cause.—28.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Lest it might be said that the possession of a cause is disproved in Sound by its very nature, so he says :

न चासिद्धं विकारात् ॥ २ । २ । २९ ॥

न Na, not. च Cha, and. असिद्धं Asiddham, disproved. विकारात् Vikârât from change.

29. Nor is (the dependence of Sound upon a cause) disproved by its modifications.—108.

From observing the loudness, softness, and other modifications, it should not be concluded that the possession of a cause by Sound is thereby disproved. For a loud or soft sound is perceived according to the hardness or softness of the beating of the drum with the drum-stick, and the like; whereas the loudness, etc., (*i. e.*, the intensity) of that which is made known, is not dependent on the loudness, etc., (*i. e.*, the intensity) of that which makes it known. Hence from its undergoing modification according to the modification of the cause, it is inferred to be a product, and not something to be revealed only.—29.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be argued, " It is the virtue of that which reveals, that it reveals in the form of intensity, softness, etc. And it is Air impelled by the drum and the drum-stick, etc., which, being intense and soft or slow (in velocity and volume), produces like perceptions," Hence he says :

अभिव्यक्तौ दोषात् ॥ २ । २ ३० ॥

अभिव्यक्तौ Abhivyaktau, in (the theory of the) manifestation or revelation (of Sound). दोषात् Doṣât, from defect. Because there will be a defect.

30. (Sound is not eternal), because the theory that it requires to be revealed only, will entail a defect.—109.

On the theory of the revelation of Sound, the defect will arise that (in each case) an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed will have to be admitted in respect of things co-existent and capable of being perceived by the same sense. But the invariable relation-ship of the revealer and the revealed is nowhere observed of such things. If it be not assumed here, then it will follow that on the manifestation of one letter, say *ka*, all the letters will become manifest. The rejoinder that an invariable relation of the revealer and the revealed is in fact observed to obtain among the characteristic of being existent, the characteristic of being a man, and the characteristic of being a Brâhmaṇa, which are also co-extensive and are revealed by their individual difference, situation, and origin, is invalid. For they lack in being co-extensive, inasmuch as the extension of the characteristic of being a man, or of the characteristic of being a Brâhmaṇa, is not so large as that of the characteristic of being existent.—30.

Above continued (Production of Sound.)

Upaskâra.—He says that for the following reason also Sound is not something which requires to be revealed only :

संयोगाद्विभागाच्च शब्दाच्च शब्दनिष्पत्तिः ॥ २ । २ । ३१ ॥

संयोगात् Saṃyogât, from Conjunction. विभागात् Vibhâgât, from Disjunction. च Cha, and. शब्दात् Śabdât, from Sound. च Cha, and. शब्दनिष्पत्तिः Śabda-niṣpattiḥ, production of Sound.

31. Sound is produced from Conjunction, from Disjunction, and from Sound also.—110.

'From Conjunction'—*i. e.*, from Conjunction of the drum and the drum-stick. 'From Disjunction'—*i. e.*, when a bamboo is being split up. Here Conjunction is by no means the cause of the first Sound, because there is then no Conjunction. Therefore the Disjunction of the two halves of the bamboo is the efficient or conditional cause, and the Disjunction of the halves and Ether is the non-combinative cause. And where Sound is produced in a distant flute, and the like, there Sound which is produced in the order of a current, reaches the portion of Ether limited by the hollow of the ear, and thereby becomes heard. Therefore Sound is produced from Sound also.—31.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He brings forward another ground of its being non-eternal :

लिङ्गाच्चानित्यः शब्दः ॥ २ । २ । ३२ ॥

लिङ्गात् Lingât, from its mark. च Cha, and. अनित्यः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. शब्दः Śabdaḥ, Sound.

32. Sound is non-eternal, also because of its mark.—111.

The meaning is that Sound, consisting of letters (*i. e.*, articulate Sound), is non-eternal, because, while possessing a 'class,' it is capaple of being perceived by the ear, like the Sound of a lute, etc.—32.

Arguments for the eternality of Sound.

Upaskâra.—Now, in order to confute the arguments, advanced by the conclusionist (the Mîmâmsâ thinker), in support of the eternality of Sound, he says :

द्वयोस्तु प्रवृत्त्योरभावात् ॥ २ । २ । ३३ ॥

द्वयोः Dvayoḥ, of both. तु Tu, but. प्रवृत्त्योः Provrittyoḥ, of the activities or occupations. अभावात् Abhâvât, from the non-existence or absence.

33. (Sound is eternal), because (otherwise) the occupations of both (the teacher and the pupil) will vanish out of existence.—112.

The word 'tu' cuts off conncetion with the context, and introduces the statement of an objection of the first party. The occupation or employment 'of both,' *i. e.*, of the teacher and the pupil in teahing and learning respectively, is observed. "From its non-existence or absence," *i. e.*, from the entailment of its non-existence. For teaching is an act of gift or donation. The teacher makes a gift of the Veda to the pupil. If it is something constant or fixed, then a donation of it is possible. The second party may say, "A cow, and the like which are being given away, are perceived as standing between the donor and the donee ; whereas the Veda, etc., are not perceived as lying between the teacher and the pupil. Therefore teaching cannot be a donation." Our (*i. e.*, the first party's) reply is that they are perceived in the interval between the

teacher and the pupil by the ear of a person standing there. Moreover, the eternality of Sound follows from recurrence also. As in "He sees the colour for five times," the recurrence or persistency of colour which is constant or permanent is observed, so the recurrence or persistency of Sound in "The *anuvâka* or paragraph has been read ten times, twenty times," is proof of the constancy or permanence of Sound. And constancy or steadiness being proved, since nothing is known which can destroy it, its eternality also is necessarily proved, on the principle "What will afterwards destroy it which is constant or lasting all this time?" This is the import.—33.

Arguments for the eternality of Sound—continued.

Upaskâra.—He translates another reason urged in favour of the eternality of Sound :

प्रथमाशब्दात् ॥ २ । २ । ३४ ॥

प्रथमाशब्दात् Prathamâśabhât, from the word 'the first.'

34. From the word, 'the-first,' (it follows that Sound is eternal).—113.

The meaning is that the thrice recitation of the first and the last *mantra* for kindling a sacrificial fire, as enjoined in the text, "The first should be recited three times, the last three times," is not justified or accountable without the steadiness of Sound.—34.

Bhâsya—reads II. ii. 34 as *Prathamâ-âdi-Śabdât* while the meaning remains unchanged. (Âdi=and others, *e. g.*, the second).

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He translates another reason advanced by the conclusionist for the eternality of Sound :

सम्प्रतिपत्तिभावाच्च ॥ २ । २ । ३५ ॥

सम्प्रतिपत्तिभावात् Sampratipatti-bhâvât, from the possibility or existence of recognition. च Cha, and.

35. (The eternality of Sound follows), also from the possibility of recognition.—114.

'Sampratipatti-bhâvât'—*i. e.*, from the existence of recognition. The word 'pratipatti' (cognition) alone would have conveyed the sense of recognition which is a particular kind of the former; therefore the prefix 'Sam' (in the sense of thorough-ness) implies certainty. Thus, "He is reciting the very same poem which was recited by Maitra," "He is reading the same verse over and over again," "You are repeatedly saying the same thing which has been said before," "You are even now making the very same statement which was made by you last year and the year before," "It is that same letter *ga*,"—on the strength of the recognition of Sound in such cases, the steadiness or permanence of Sound is proved.—35.

The same refuted.

Upaskâra.—Confuting all those reasons, he says :

सन्दिग्धाः सति बहुत्वे ॥ २ । २ । ३६ ॥

सन्दिग्धाः Sandigdhâḥ, Doubtful. Uncertain. Inconclusive. सति Sati, existing. बहुत्वे Bahutve, plurality.

36. Plurality (of Sound) existing, (these arguments are) inconclusive.—115.

'Sandighâḥ,' *i. e.*, not one-pointed. So it has been said, " Kaśyapa taught that a contradictory, unproved, or uncertain mark was no mark." Thus it is oberved that there can be learning, repetition, and also recognition, also if there is a plurality of diversity of Sound, therefore these arguments are inconclusive. For, "He learns dancing," "He practises dancing." "He danced the same dance twice," "You are dancing the same dance to-day, which you danced the other day," "This man also is dancing the same dance which was danced by another dancer,"—in these cases, learning, repetition, and recognition (of Action) are observed. But you (the conclusionist) too do not on this account admit the permanence (or eternality) of dancing which is a particular kind of Acting.—36.

Bhâṣya :—*reads* II. ii. 36 as simply *sandigdhâḥ*, supplying for himself the reason for the declaration there, and *joins* the latter part of it to II. ii. 37, and *interprets* it to mean that in spite of plurality of individual sounds, their definite enumeration is possible by means of reference to their genera or types.

Counter objection stated and answered.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected, ' Fifty letters ; an eight-lettered *mantra* ; a three-lettered *mantra* ; the eight-lettered metra, *anuṣṭubh* ; etc.—How can there be such uses of members, when, the letters being non-eternal, there is a possibility of their being infinite in number according to the difference of utterance ? " So he says :

संख्याभावः सामान्यतः ॥ २ । २ । ३७ ॥

संख्याभावः Saṃkhyâbhâvaḥ, the existence or application of Number. सामान्यतः Sâmânyataḥ,from Genus.

37. The existence of number (in Sound) is with reference to the Genus.—116.

The meaning is that the existence of the number, fifty, etc., arises from the class notion of *ka*, *ga*, etc. Although there might be an infinity of *ka's*, etc., the letters determined by the notions of *ka*, *ga*, etc., are fifty, three, or eight, in the same way as Substances, Attributes, etc., are nine, twenty-four, etc., although there may be an infinity of them according to differences within the group of each of them. This is the import.

The objector may say: "This is that *ga*,"—This rocognition itself proves the permanence of Sound. Nor is it opposed by the perception, 'Loud *ga*, soft *ga*,' which conveys, contrary properties; because loudness, etc., are there due to external conditions. Nor is it to be maintained that there cannot appear any difference from the difference of the external condition also; for, then, the crystal also will not shine as different, developing in the form of blue, yellow, etc., from the conjunction of the China rose *tāpiñja*, etc., nor will the face also, when reflected as elongated, etc., in the sword-blade, jewel, and looking-glass, appear to be different. If it be asked, To what does this property of loudness, etc., belong, which influences *ga*? We reply: It may be the property of Air, or of utterance, or of resonance. What is the use of fixing upon the particular one amongst them? You also admit that loudness, etc., are natural distinctions, as the relation of high and low amongst them cannot be established or explained by the notions of *ka*, *ga*, etc."

We reply: It is not so. Because even when such contrary perception exists, *viz.*, '*ga* is produced,' '*ga* is destroyed,' '*ga* which was just heard, does not exist,' 'the noise has stopped, etc., if this recognation does not then cease, then it must be supposed to relate to class-notions. Otherwise such recognition coming to rest upon the permanence or steadi-ness of individual Sounds, the above contrary perceptions themselves would not be produced. Nor is this the property of Air, because the properties of Air are not the objects of aural perception. Nor again is it the property of the utterance; for if utterance is only Air, then the defect has been already pointed out; if it is something else, then nobody can say what it is. Nor again is it the property of resonance, for loudness, etc., are perceived also in the resonance from the conch, etc., even though *ga* is not found there. The naturalness of loudness, etc., however, does not involve an intermixture of classes, for its diversity is obtained from its being pervaded by the class-notion of *ga*, etc., Moreover, there is a very distinct mode of distinguishing forms in the *ga's*, etc., utterer by male and female parrots and man, as also in those uttered by a male and a female, as well as in those uttered by those who are neither males nor females; by which a parrot, etc., concealed from vision by branches, a screen, etc., are inferred. But their being produced by external conditions does not arise from external conditions which can be perceived, as in "a young woman looking yellow with saffron." Nor is their being produced by external conditions proved by argument, for no proof of such a conclusion exists. So far in brief.—37.

Here ends the second chapter of the second book in Śaṅkara's commentary on the Vaiśeṣika aphorisms.

Vivṛtti.—Some explain the production of Sound on the principle of ripples and waves. According to them, the first Sound is produced from the impact of a drum and a drum-stick, etc., within the limits of that particular Space. Then outside that circle and within the confines of the ten quarters the second Sound is produced from the first, and extends it. After that, beyond this second circle, and within the confines of the ten quarters, the third Sound is produced from the second. And

in the same way the production of the fourth and other Sounds should be understood. Others, however, hold that the production of Sound takes place on the principle of the ball of the *kadamba* flower. In their view, the second and other Sounds are neither single nor confined to the ten quarters taken together, but are produced ten-fold in ten-quarters. (Thus the one is the theory of the successive production of single Sounds, while the other is the theory of the simultaneous production of multiple Sounds). This is the difference.

BOOK THIRD—CHAPTER FIRST.

Objects of the senses.

Upaskâra.—Having thus in the second book completed the examination of the external Substances, the another following the order of enumeration, now proceeds to construct a basis for an inquiry respecting the Soul.

प्रसिद्धा इन्द्रियार्थाः ॥ ३ । १ । १ ॥

प्रसिद्धाः Prasiddhâḥ, universally known, perceived. इन्द्रियार्थाः—Indriyârthâḥ object of the senses.

1. The objects of the senses are universally known.—117.

The objects of the Senses, *e. g.*, Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch, and Sound, are capable of being apprehended by the several external sense-organs. Amongst them, the universal cognition or experience of Sound having been shown by the aphorism, "Sound is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the ear" (II. ii. 21), it is in like manner demonstrated that Smell, etc., ending with Touch (*i. e.*, Smell, Taste, Colour, Touch) are universally known. Thus Smell is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the olfactory organ; Taste is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of taste; Colour is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the eye alone; Touch is that object of which the organ of apprehension is the organ of touch alone. And by the word, 'object' there is, in all these cases, denoted a real entity possessed of properties, and therefore the definitions cannot be too wide by over-extending to Smell-ness, etc., and to the non-existence of Smell, etc. Hence Smell-ness is the possession of a sub-class of Attribute-ness, appearing in what is apprehended by the olfactory organ. So also with regard to Taste, etc. Consequently, supersensuous Smell, etc., are not left out.—1.

Vivṛiti.—'Prasiddhâḥ,' means subject of ascertainment by perception.

Mark of supersensuous object.

Upaskâra—He explains the application of the universal experience of the objects of the senses to the inquiry respecting the Soul.

इन्द्रियार्थप्रसिद्धिरिन्द्रियार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्य हेतुः ॥ ३ । १ । २ ॥

इन्द्रियार्थप्रसिद्धिः Indriyârtha-prasiddhiḥ, the universal experience of the objects of the senses. इन्द्रियार्थेभ्यः Indriyârthebhyaḥ, from the senses and their object. अर्थान्तरस्य Arthântarasya, of a different object. हेतुः Hetuḥ, mark.

2. The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) object different from the senses and their objects.—118.

'Hetuḥ,' *i. e.*, Mark, 'Arthântarasya,' *i, e.*, of the Soul. 'Indriyârthebhyaḥ, *i. e.*, from the senses as well as their objects. The meaning is that it is the mark of the Soul which is a different object from Colour,

etc., as well as from those which possess them. Though it is implied here that only knowledge is the mark of the existence of the Soul, yet inasmuch as there being a universal experience of the objects of the senses, the immediate presentation to the mind of Colour, etc., is more commonly known, the mark of there being a Soul is described as constituted by that universal experience. Now this universal experience must reside somewhere, either as an effect as a water-pot, or as an Attribute, or as an Action. This universal experience, again, since it is an act in the same manner as cutting is an act, must be produced by an instrument. That which is the instrument of the universal experience is the senses; and the latter, being an instrument, must be employed by an agent, as an axe and the like, are employed. Thus, that in which this universal experience resides, and which employs the olfactory and other organs for its instruments, is the Soul.—2.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception.

Upaskâra.—Lest it be said, "Let the body or the senses be the foundation of the universal experience or perception, because their presence and absence are more manifest as determining perception. What is the use of the supposition of any other foundation? Thus, consciousness is an attribute of the body, being its effect, like its Colour, etc. The same should be understood in the case of its being an attribute of the senses;" so he says :

सोऽनपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । ३ ॥

सः Saḥ, that, *i. e.*, perception. अनपदेशः Anapadeśaḥ, the semblance or simulacrum of a mark; a false mark.

3. Perception (as a mark inferring the body or the senses as its substratum) (is) a false mark.—119.

'Anapadeśaḥ' means the appearance or semblance of an 'apadeśa,' *i. e.*, mark. Thus the meaning is that the being an effect of the body or the senses is the mere semblance of a mark, inasmuch as such an argument applies to the cognition produced by a lamp is therefore not-one-pointed, *i. e.*, multifarious.—3.

Bhâsya.—The sense or the object cannot be a mark for the inference of the Self.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be rejoined, "By 'the being an effect of the body or the senses' is meant the being an effect of them only in so far as they are determined by the characteristic of consciousness; whereas the whole of consciousness is not the effect of the lamp, etc. Therefore there is no indeterminateness of fluctuation." So he says :

कारणाज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ४ ॥

कारणाज्ञानात् Kâraṇâjñanât, because the causes or constituents are devoid of cognition or consciousness.

4. (The body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because there is no consciousness in the causes (*i.e.*, the component parts, of the body).—120.

It is meant (that the body or the senses cannot be the seat of perception), because of the absence of consciousness in the hands, feet, etc., or in their parts, which are the causes, *i.e.*, components of the body. For it is observed that the particular attributes of Earth, etc., are preceded by like attributes in their causes. In like manner, if there existed consciousness in the components of the body, it might possibly exist also in the body. But this is not the case. It cannot be urged that consciousness may exist also in the components of the body; for it would entail the absence of uniformity in the actions of the body, since uniformity is never observed amongst a plurality of sentient beings. It would then also follow that, after the amputation of the hand, there will be no more recollection of that which was experienced within the limit of the hand, according to the maxim, "One does not remember that which has been experienced by another." Moreover, the supposition would entail that, after the destruction of the body, there would be no experience of the consequences of the acts performed by the body, *e. g.*, causing hurt, etc., for certainly Maitra does not suffer the consequences of the sins committed by Chaitra. And hence there would be an annihilation of acts performed, and an accession of acts not performed.—4.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be added in objection that consciousness exists in a minute degree in the components of the body, whereas it is manifest in the body, and that therefore it cannot be said that it is not preceded by a like attribute in the cause, nor does there arise the impossibility of uniformity. Anticipating this, he says :

कार्य्येषु ज्ञानात् ॥ ३ । १ । ५ ॥

कार्य्येषु Kâryeṣu, in the effects. ज्ञानात् Jñânât, because there would be consciousness.

5. Because (there would be) consciousness in the effects.—121.

If, as a matter of fact, consciousness existed in the primary causes of the body, namely the ultimate atoms, then it would also exist in the water-pot, etc., which are the effects originated by them also. Moreover, consciousness would exist in products such as water-pots, etc., also because the particular attributes of Earth pervade all terrene existence. But consciousness is not observed to exist in these products.—5.

The body or the senses are not the seat of perception, continued.

Upaskâra.—In anticipation of the further rejoinder that consciousness may in reality exist, in an imperceptible degree, in the water-pot, etc., also, he says :

अज्ञानाच्च ॥ ३ । १ । ६ ॥

अज्ञानात् Ajñânât, because it is not known. च Cha, and.

6. And because it is not known (that any minute degree of consciousness exists in the water-pot, etc).—122.

The meaning is that there is no consciousness in the water-jar, etc., inasmuch as it is not known by any means of knowledge. If you admit that which is beyond the range of all means of knowledge, then you will have to admit also that a hare has horns, and so on. For, by no kind of evidence, is it known that consciousness exists in the water-jar, etc.—6.

Vivṛiti.—It is more proper to conceive some one other substance as the seat of consciousness than to imagine a plurality of consciousness in various portions of matter. This is the import.

On the theory that consciousness resides in the body, recollection of what is experienced in infancy, will be impossible in youth, etc., because of the non-existence of that which had the experience, since the destruction of the infant-body must be observed by the destruction of its material. Similarly, there would be no activity at sucking the breasts on the part of a child just born, because of the impossibility at that stage of the understanding that this is the means of attaining the desirable which is the cause of activity. According to the advocate of the existence of a separate conscious being, the activity explained by the possibility of reminiscence due to the impression produced by the understanding in the previous birth that this is the means of attaining the desirable. Recollection of other experiences in the previous birth does not take place owing the absence of appropriate external stimuli.

Bhâṣya.—reads III. i. 5 and 6 as one aphorism, and explains it in the sense that as cognition is found within one effect, *e. g.*, the body, and is not found within another effect, *e. g.*, a jar, therefore, it follows that there can be no cognition in their combinative causes (which must be same in both cases).

Fallacious mark.

Upaskâra.—It may be urged, " It has been affirmed that an employer (a presiding soul) is inferred from the organ of hearing and other instruments. But this is not a legitimate inference, for the auditory and other organs are neither identical with, nor are produced by, the Soul, and, unless one of these alternatives be admitted, there is no proof of the universal concomitance or inseparable existence of these organs and the Soul ; and, unless there be such inseparable existence, there can be no inference." So he says in reply :

अन्यदेव हेतुरित्यनपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । ७ ॥

अन्यत् Anyat, something else. एव Eva, certainly. हेतुः Hetuḥ, make. इति Iti, hence. अनपदेशः. Anapadeśaḥ, no mark.

7. A mark is certainly something else (than that of which it is a mark). Hence (a mark, which is identical with the thing of which it is a mark, is) no mark (at all.)—123.

The mark or means of proof can but be something else than that which is to be proved. It cannot be identical with that which is to be proved ; for, were it so, it would follow that the thing which is to be proved, would have no differance from the means of proof. Therefore, a means of proof, constituted by identity with that which is to be proved, is no means of proof, *i. e.*, no mark at all.—7.

Bhâṣya.—Something quite different is the mark of inference of the Self; the sense or the object cannot be such a mark. What this 'something quite different' is, is declared in the eighteenth aphorism of this chapter.

Fallacious mark—continued.

Upaskâra.—It be may said, "As the Soul is not identical with the auditory and other organs of sense, so there is no production of the latter from the former. For the senseorgans of hearing, etc., are not produed from the Soul, as smoke is produced from fire" So he says :

अर्थान्तरं ह्यर्थान्तरस्याऽनपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । ८ ॥

अर्थान्तरं Arthântaram, any one thing : हि Hi, because. अर्थान्तरस्य Arthâutarasya, of any other thing. अनपदेशः Anapadeśh, not a mark.

8. (Although a mark is quite different from that of which it is a mark, still they are not wholly unconnected), for, any one thing cannot be a mark of any other thing.—124.

Because, as the effect, *e. g.*, smoke, etc., is a different thing from an ass, so it is also a different thing from its cause, *e. g.*, fire, etc. So that in the absence of any distinction in respect of being a different object, a particular nature is the regulative principle here, whereby the smoke does not infer an ass, but only fire. And if that nature belongs to any thing other than the effect, then that too really becomes a mark. Thus an effect cannot be a mark, if it is devoid of the particular nature intended here. Thus, identity and causation only constitute inseparable existence or universal concomitance ; these two are reduced into inseparable existence ; or, it is co-ordinate with them as the principle of inference ; or, its apprehension is dependent upon the apprehension of the above two only. Hence the aphorism is only the statement of an argument for causing confusion to the disciples in the above way. This is the import.—8.

Marks of inference.

Upaskâra.—Now, in order to make it clear that universal concomitance or inseparable existence may be found elsewhere than in the cases of identity and causation, he says :

संयोगि समवाय्ये-कार्थसमवायि विरोधि च ॥ ३ । १ । ९ ॥

संयोगि Saṁyogi, the conjunct. समवायि Samavâyi, the combined or inherent. एकार्थसमवायि Ekârthasamavâyi, the combined together in one thing, or co-inherent. विरोधि Virodhi, the contradictory.

9. The conjunct, the combined, the con-combined, and the contradictory also (are marks of inference).—125.

"The body has skin, because it is the body"—here the mark is the conjunct or the contiguous. For skin is described as a natural integument of matter capable of growth and decay. And it is neither an effect nor a cause of the body, but merely produced together with the body and in invariable conjunction with it. Similarly, the combined is also a mark. For instance, "Ether possesses Magnitude or extension, because it is a Substance, like a water-pot, etc." ; here Magnitude or

extension which is to be proved is proved by the property of Substanceness which is in essential combination with Ether. Or, to take another example. The extension of an atom, a particular form or limit of extension or Magnitude is proved by this that the relativity or degree of extension or Magnitude must somewhere cease; whereby the ultimate atom is inferred as that in which the limit of extension rests.

The inference of Ether by Sound, etc., and the inference of the Soul by knowledge, etc., are inferences of the cause by the effect; so that they are not instanced here.—9.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskâra.—The author of the aphorisms illustrates the co-inherent or co-existent mark.

कार्य्यं कार्य्यान्तरस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १० ॥

कार्य्यं Kâryyam, an effect. कार्य्यान्तरस्य Kâryyântarasya, of another effect.

10. One effect (may be the mark of inference) of another effect.—126.

An effect *e. g.*, Colour, is the mark of another effect, *e. g.*, Touch. This is merely illustrative. Thus, that which is not an effect, *e. g.*, the unity of Ether, is a mark of the individual separateness of Ether, and so in the case of its extreme largeness.—10.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He illustrates the contradictory mark.

विरोध्यभूतं भूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । ११ ॥

विरोधि Virodhi, the contradictory. अभूतं Abhûtam, the non-existent, or non-product, or that which has not taken place. भूतस्य Bhûtasya, of the existent, or that which has taken place.

11. The opposite, *i.e.*, the non-existent (is a mark) of the existent.—127.

That which has not taken place, *e. g.*, a shower, is a mark of that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the conjunction of air and clouds, (where clouds being dispersed by air, showers do not take place). So also is the recitation of a *mantra* which is the contradictory or counter-agent of a tumour, etc. Thus that which has not taken place, *i. e.*, has not been produced, *e. g.*, a tumour, etc., is the mark of that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the recitation of a *mantra* or sacred text, (where a tumour is prevented by the recitation of the appropriate *mantra*).—14.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskâra.—He gives another illustration of a contradictory mark :

भूतमभूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १२ ॥

भूतं Bhûtam, that which has taken place. अभूतस्य Abhûtasya, of that which has not taken place.

12. That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which has not taken place.—128.

That which has taken place, *e. g* , a tumour, etc., is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, the recitation of a *mantra*. So also that which has taken place, *e. g.*, the conjunction of air and clouds is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, a shower. Similarly that which has taken place, *e. g.*, a burn, is a mark of that which has not taken place, *e. g.*, the application of a gem, etc., to destroy the burning power of the fire. Similar instances should be understood.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He illustrates another contradictory mark :

भूतो भूतस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १३ ॥

भूत: Bhûtaḥ, that which has taken place भूतस्य Bhûtasya, of that which has taken place.

13.—That which has taken place, (is a mark) of that which has taken place.—129.

There is sometimes inference of an existing contradictory from another existing contradictory ; as when, on seeing a snake swelling with anger, it is inferred that there is an ichneumon behind a bush. In this case, the snake excited is that which is, existent, and the ichneumon hidden by the bush is also in existence. Therefore, an existent, as the mark of another existent object. On the other hand, a shower cannot exist at the same time as the conjunction of air and clouds, nor can tumours, etc., co-exist with the recitation of *mantras*.—13.

Marks of inference—continued.

Upaskâra.—Now he shows the importance or use of the above recapitulation :

प्रसिद्धपूर्व्वकत्वादपदेशस्य ॥ ३ । १ । १४ ॥

प्रसिद्धिपूर्व्वकत्वात् Prasiddhipûrvakatvât, because preceded by (the recollection of) the 'pervasion' or universal relation. अपदेशस्य Apadeśasya, of the mark.

14. (These are valid marks), because the characteristic of an inferential mark is that it is preceded by (the recollection of the) universal relation (of itself and of that of which it is a mark).—130.

'Prasiddhî' means recollection of universal relation. 'Apadeśa' denotes a mark. Therefore the mark attended with the recollection of universal relation, is described by that member of an argument which states the mark, or by that member which states the deduction ; so that the mark is, as has been stated, preceded by recollection of universal relation. Thus universal relation, (*i. e.*, a true major premiss) exists in all these cases of inference of an agent by the instruments such as the organ of bearing, etc., and of the Soul as their substratum by the

attributes such as knowledge, etc.; whereas there is no universal relation in the inference by which you (*i. e.*, the opponent) have sought to establish knowledge as an attribute of the body, through the mark that it is an effect of the body. This is the import.

It may be asked, what is this universal relation ? It is not merely inviolable relation ; for, in the case of inference from cause to effect, it is not known that inviolable or invariable concomitance is the being not the ground of the co-existence of the absolute non-existence of that which has to be proved, and because inference from cause to effect it is impossible that invariable concomitance is the not being the seat of that which is not the seat of that which has to be proved, and also because smoke, etc., are the seat of that which is not the seat of that, whatever it may be, which has to be proved.

Nor is it inseparable existence, for that is either the non-existence of the mark in the absence of that which is to be proved, or existence of the mark after deduction has been drawn from that which is to be proved. It cannot be said that because sometimes there is non-existence of smoke, also where no ass exists, and there is existence of smoke also where an ass exists, therefore uniform agreement and uniform difference are intended here ; because the very same uniformity is the subject of enquiry.

Nor is it relation to a whole. If it be the relation of the whole of the major term to the middle term, such relation does not exist even in the case of smoke, etc., which are not equally pervasive as their corresponding major terms. Let it be relation of the whole of the middle term to the major term ; but this is impossible, for there does not exist in the whole of the middle term relation to a single major term. Let it be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term. This also is not valid, for it is nowhere possible that there should be relation of the whole of the major term to the whole of the middle term, inasmuch as the individuals denoted by the major and ths middle term are related each to each. And in the case of the terms being unequally pervasive, there would be a want of pervasion or universal relation.

Nor is the relation essential. For essence means either the nature or condition of a thing, or (condition in itself, or production by itself). Now, if the nominal affix which converts 'essence' into the form 'essential,' has the sense of production thereby, then the definition will be too narrow to apply to universal relation characterised as Combination. If the affix bears the sense of dependence upon it or residing in it, in that case also the definition will be too narrow to apply to Combination, for combination does not reside in, *i. e.*, depend upon, anything whatever ; and also because even Conjunction neither resides in, nor is produced by, smoke-ness, etc., which are the properties of the middle term.

Nor is the relation, non-accidental or non-coditional. For an *upâdhi*, accident or external condition, itself is difficult to ascribe, and were it easy to ascribe, would be difficult to conceive. And were it easy to conceive, it would still involve 'mutual dependence' or

'reciprocity' or argument in a circle, for there being pervasion of the major term, the conception of the non-pervasion, etc., of the middle term would depend upon the conception of the universal relation.

Nor is universal relation mere relation. For, though variable relation also appears as universal relation, though its reference to particular place and particular time, yet, as the knowledge of it does not govern the inferential process, it is, therefore, required to determine that universal relation only which, by being known, will become the means of inference.

Nor is universal relation co-existence with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence appertaning to that which contains the middle term, (*i. e.*, the minor term). For fire also is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence, present in that which has smoke, since it is not that in a kitchen hearth there is not the absolute non-existence of volcanic fire. In such an intance as "This has conjuncetion, because it is a Substance," the definition would become too narrow, as the absolute non-existence of Conjunction would be co-extensive with the mark or means of inference. It cannot be said, Universal relation is co-extension with the major term which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence which is co-extensive with itself and which is the contradictory of the counter-opposite, because the absolute non-existence of conjunction falls short of being the contradictory of the counteropposite." For the absolute non-existence of conjunction also is the contradictory of the counter-opposite; otherwise, it would be useless to imagine differences of delimiting circumstances for differences of delimitations are not imagined for the purpose of showing the states of being produced and non-eternal.

Nor is universal relation the not being the foundation or substratum of non-co-extension with the major term; for in the inference from cause to effect, there is not konwn any such non-co-extension with the major term. It is in fact another form of being the foundation of that which is not the foundation of the major term.

Nor is the universal relation of a thing the possession of the form which determines its relation to something else, for the characteristic of fire also has the function of determining relation to or the co-extension of smoke. It cannot be sait that because of wider extension this is not the case; for it is obsevred that, that which determines the pervasion (*e. g.*, fire) has a wider extension (in other words, fire exists where there is no smoke), and the characteristic of Smoke also has a wider extension inasmuch as there exists smoke pendant on the surface of the sky *e. g.*, in clouds). If therefore, a qualification be added for the purpose of excluding such instances, then it must be allowed that, that which determines the characteristic of being the middle term (*vyápya*) the same is intended to determine the characteristic of being co-extended, and hence there is the fallacy of self-dependence (*átmásraya*). The view also that two things are universally related, when the one possesses the form of determining the co-existence of the other in a common substratum, is fallacious in the same way.

In reply to the above objections, we may proceed to state as follows: pervasion or universal relation is a non-accidental relation;

while by the being non-accidental is meant co-existence in the same substratum with a variably present *sâdhya* or that which has to be proved (*i.e.*, the major term which is predicated of the minor, in the conclusion), of all those in which the mark or middle term is sometimes present and sometimes absent, or co-existence in the same substratum with a *sâdhyâ* co-existent with the absolute non-existence of the counter-opposites of all those which are the counter-opposites of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the mark. The meaning of the two expressions is co-existence in the same substratum with the *sâdhya* which is not pervaded by anything that does not pervade the *sâdhana* or the middle term; in other words, it is the characteristic of being pervaded by all that which is pervasive of the *sâdhya*. It may be said that this is difficult to understand from the relative compound which has been employed here. For this reason there is need of observation and argument also. In other words, pervasion, *vyâpti*, is co-existence in the same substratum with the *sâdhya* which is not the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence co-existing in the same substratum with the *sâdhana*. By absolute non-existence is intended that which possesses the counter-opposite determined by the genera of fire-ness, etc., Therefore, even though in the smoke of the kitchen hearth there is co-existence in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of mountain fire, yet it is no fault, because there never arises the intuition that there is not fire in that which has smoke. Substanceness, however, is never co-existent in the same substratum with the absolute non-existence of the charateristic of being in conjunction, for we never have the intuition that substance is not conjunct, because, although conjunctions singly do not appear in that which is the subject of pervasion, yet the generic quality of being conjunct appears in that which is the subject of pervasion, and is itself pervasive.

Objection.—But the being non-accidental implies the absence of accident or adjunct, *upâdhi*; and *upâdhi* itself is difficult to obtain.

Answer.—It is not so. Because the characteistic of *upâdhi* belongs to that which does not pervade the *sâdhana*, *i. e.*, the middle term, while it does pervade the *sâdhya, i. e.*, the major term. So it has been said, "*upâdhi* is that which is dependent upon another *upâdhi*, (for determining non accidentality), in the case of the *sâdhana,* and which is not dependent upon another *upâdhi*, (for determining non-accidentality), in the case of the *sâdhya.*"

Objection.—But the definition does not include an *upâdhi* which is only non-pervasive of the *sâdhya*. For example, Air is perceptible, because it is the substratum of touch which is perceptible. Here the possession of developed colour is such an *upâdhi.* So also is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs (which might produce blackness), in, "He is black, because he is the son of Mitrâ" (a low-born woman). For, the possession of developed colour is not pervasive of perceptibility, since it does not exist in the perception of the Soul as well as of Attribute and Action; nor is the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs pervasive of blackness, since it does not exist in the case of the blackness of the black crow, cuckoo, cloud, black-berries, etc.

Answer.—The objection is not valid. For, that which is non-pervasive of the *sâdhana*, while it is pervasive of the *sâdhya* as finally determined,—the same is intended as the *upâdhi*. And a *sâdhya* becomes finally determined, when it is determined by a property, by determination by which the pervasiveness of the *upâdhi* remains unbroken. In the instances given the possession of developed colour is pervasion of perceptibility by the determination or limitation of external substantiality, and is apprehended by agreement and difference. As regards the second instance, it has been ascertained in the works of Charaka, Suśruta, and other medical writers, that the characteristic of being produced by eating herbs is pervasive towards the *sâdhya* determined by the blackness of a person, which can be produced (artificially). Other cases should be similarly understood.

Objection.—Still it is not the meaning of the word, *upâphi*. An *upâdhi* is something the property of which shines in another object, *e.g.*, a China rose, etc., in reference to a crystal, etc. In the case of an unequally pervaded *upâdhi*, there being absence of the characteristic of that which can be pervaded, its property cannot shine in the approved *sâdhana*.

Answer.—This is true. The primary use of the word, *upâdhi*, is only where it is equally pervaded (as the *sâdhya*), *e. g.*, in the possession of fire produced from moist faggots, (for wherever there is such fire, there is smoke, and *vice versa*). In other places, its use is secondary. The secondary sense infers variation, or deviation, according to the rule that, that which deviates from the pervader of something, also deviates from that thing. And there exists *sâdhana* which deviates from the *upâdhi* which is pervasive of the *sâdhya*. Hence, that the *sâdhana* deviates from the *sâdhya*, and that, that which is not pervaded by that which pervades an object, is also not pervaded by that object, together infer that there is no proof of the characteristic of being pervaded, or brings forward a contrary argument, *satpratipakṣa*,* there being proof of the non-existence of the *sâdhya* from the non-existence of the *upâdhi*, which is pervasive of the *sâdhya*, in the *pakṣa*, *i. e.*, the subject, which is the minor term). So it has been said, " The disputant may bring forward an *upâdhi*, governing the *sâdhya* finally determined, even though it be divorced from the rule or determination of the *sâdhya* maintained by the speaker, such *upâdhi* being equally (a means of discrediting the conclusion, or) a source of *satpratipakṣa*." And such *upâdhi* is brought forward by arguments adverse to the absence of arguments in favour of *bâdha* obstruction, (*i. e.*, the certainty of the non-existence of the *sâdhya*), and deviation (*i. e.*, the non-co-existence of the *sâdhana* with the *sâdhya*).

It has been held that by the non-co-existence of which the non-co-existence of the *sâdhana* with the *sâdhya* arises, the same is *upâdhi*. But here the instrumental case-ending is used to express neither instrument, nor means, mode, nor mark. Nor is the construction to be completed thus, By the non-co-existence of which *being known*, the non-co-existence of the *sâdhana* with the *sâdhya* *becomes known* ; for the definition, not

* *satpratipakṣa* has been defined as " an argument which contains a counter-mark capable of demonstrating the non-existence of that which has to be proved," (*vide* Tarka-saṃgraha).

applying to an unknown *upâdhi*, would not apply to *upâdhis* in obvious cases of non-co-existence. It is diffcult to ascertain it (*i. e.*, *upâdhi*) significatively or by its significance, since it is impossible to formulate or invent, an *upâdhi* without (first) establishing the characteristic of being the means of the inference of non-co-existence. The characteristic of being other than the *pakṣa* (or the subject of the conclusion), again, though suffering from the characteristic of an *upâdhi*, is yet not an *upâdhi* ; for, it would involve obstruction to itself, *e. g.*, dubiousness and not-one-pointedness in the *pakṣa*. For if there is no doubt about it, then it is not a *pakṣa* ; if it is a *pakṣa*, then doubt is necessary, and consequently, dubiousness and not-one-pointed-ness become certain. That which remains to be said on this topic, may be sought in the *Mayûkha*.—14.

Enumerration of fallacies.

Upaskâṣa.—Now, with a view to distinguish (logical) marks (of inference) which have gone before as well as those which will come hereafter, from fallacious marks, he begins the section of fallacies, and says :

अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः ॥ ३ । १ । १५ ॥

अप्रसिद्धः Aprasiddhaḥ, unproved. अनपदेशः Anâpedeśaḥ, a fallacious mark. असन् Asan, non-existent. सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, dubious. च Cha, and. अनपदेशः Anapadeśaḥ, A fallacious mark.

15. The unproved is a false mark ; the non-existent and the dubious also are false marks.—131.

'Aprasiddhaḥ, means that which is not pervaded or in universal relation, and that the universal relation of which has not been observed, and that which is in opposite universal relation, *i. e.*, the contradictory. The word includes the two forms of the unproved, in point of universal relation or being pervaded, and the contradictory. 'Asan' means non-existent in the *pakṣa* or the minor term, *i. e.*, that which has not the property or possibility of residing in the *pakṣa* or subject. And this is due sometimes to the unreality of the form (attributed to the mark), and sometimes to the absence of uncertainty and the desire to prove (as) in the proof of that which has been already proved. 'Sandigdhaḥ' means that which causes the doubt whether the *sâdhya* be existent or non-existent (in the subject of the conclusion). And this arises sometimes from the observation of common property, sometimes from the observation of a non-common property, and sometimes from the observation of the mark accompanying the *sâdhya* as well as its non-existence. The first is general multifarious, the second is particular multifarious, and the third is inconclusive.—15.

Bhâsya.—splits up III. i. 15 into two aphorisms : "*Aprasidhaḥ anapadeśaḥ*" and *Asanasandigdhaḥ cha anapadeśaḥ.*"

Fallacy illustrated.

Upaskâra.—Of the above-mentioned false marks, he gives an illustration or a mark which is fallacious because it is not pervaded by the denotation of the major term, also because it is contradictory, and also because it is not known to exist in the form attributed to it :

यस्माद्विषाणी तस्मादश्वः ॥ ३ । १ । १६ ॥

यस्मात्—Yasmâṭ, because. विषाणी Viṣâṇi, (It) has horns. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. अश्वः Aśvaḥ, a horse.

16. Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a horse.—132.

Where, the body of an ass becoming the *pakṣa* or subject of the conclusion, such confusion, as " This is what is a horse, because it has horns," due to the observation of the negative co-existence (or, simply, disagreement) that that which is not a horse is not horned as a hare, a jackal, a man, a monkey, etc., prevails, there it is an example of the not-pervaded, the unreal, and the contradictory marks (*i. e.*, the fallacies of non-pervasion, unreality, and contradiction).—16.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He illustrates multifariousness :

यस्माद्विषाणी तस्माद्गौरिति चानैकान्तिकस्योदाहरणम् ॥३।१।१७॥

यस्मात् Yasmâṭ, because. विषाणी Visâṇi, (it) has horns. तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore. गौः Gauḥ, a cow. इति Iti, such, this. च Cha, and. अनैकान्तिकस्य Anaikântikasya, of a not-one-pointed or many-sided mark. उदाहरणम् Udâharaṇam, an example.

17. And, "Because (it) has horns, therefore (it is) a cow," such is the example of a many-sided (mark).—133.

Where, taking a buffalo as the *pakṣa* or subject, it is concluded that it is a cow because it has horns, there is general many-sided-ness. But when it is concluded that Ether is eternal because it is the seat of Sound, then there is particular many-sided-ness. So also in such examples as " Sound is non-eternal because it is sound," there being no universal relation, there is only particular many-sided-ness. But when the *sâdhya* or the middle term is proved (to exist) only in the *paṣka* or the minor term, by bringing forward arguments which exclude *vipakṣa** or contrary instances, it is then, that is, when co-existence with *sapakṣa*† (or objects of the same class as the *pakṣa*), becomes known, that the mark of inference is a valid mark, for a *pakṣa* ‡ also must be a *sapakṣa*.

There, (*i. e.*, in the fifteenth *Sûtram* above), the unproved is that which is not proved by pervaded appearance in the *pakṣa*. And it is three-fold : (*a*) unproved in point of being pervaded, (*b*) unproved as such or by itself, (*i. e.*, in respect of the form attributed to it), and (*c*) unproved by substratum or situation. Of these, the unproved in point of being pervaded, is that of which the pervasion or invariable co-existence has not been observed, whether from the non-observation of actually existing pervasion, or from the non-existence of pervasion. Hence the non-existence of favourable arguments, etc., are different kinds of the unproved. And this invalid mark has a thousand divisions according to the diversity of impossibility of predicate, impossibility of

* *Vipakṣa* is that wherein the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
† *Sapakṣa* is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is certain.
‡ *Pakṣa* or subject, is that wherein the existence of that which has to be proved, is doubtful.

subject, impossibility of both, uncertainty and impossibility of predicate, uncertainty and impossibility of subject, uncertainty and impossibility of both, and so on. And in all these cases, only absence of proof can be discerned.

Here the idea is this : The mark of inference is of three kinds only, according to its division into the purely positive, the positive-and-negative, and the purely negative. Amongst these, the purely positive is an attribute belonging to all subjects of attributes, (*i. e.*, objects) ; *e. g.*, knowableness, nameableness, qualifiability, predicability, absolute non-existence of annihilation in attributes etc., destructible by the destruction of the subtratum of the absolute non-existence of eternal substances, etc. For, no such thing exists, as that in which these attributes do not exist. The characteristic of the purely positive, therefore, is that it penetrates everywhere, or that it is the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence. Though these exist in themselves also, (and so that uniformity of the mutual distinction of the container and the contained, is violated), that is no fault ; for it has been said, " In the case of appearance or existence (of one thing in another), recourse should be had to proof, and not to that which establishes difference and non-difference."

That mark is purely positive, of which the *sâdhya* is purely positive. Of this there are four forms, namely, existence of the *pakṣa*, existence of the *sapakṣa*, unobstructedness, and the not being confronted with a *satpratipakṣa* or equally valid argument to the contrary, which are the means of leading to inference. The same, together with the non-existence of the *vipakṣa* are the five forme of the positive-and-negative. With the exception of the existence of the *sapakṣa* the remaining are the four forms of the purely negative. That mark, therefore, is a mere semblance, *i. e.*, a false mark, which is void of one or another of all the forms which, as a true mark, it might possess as the means of leading to an inference. Accordingly, the characteristic of being a false mark or fallacy, is the being void of one or another of the forms which are the means of leading to an inference. Hence doubt also, like certainty, about the voidness of one or another of these forms, is an obstruction to inference, and proof of the inconclusiveness of the mark put forward by the speaker. But the purely positive and purely negative marks do not become fallacies by being void of one or another of their forms ; because, in the case of the purely positive, non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, and in the case of the purely negative, existence of the *sapakṣa*, lack the characteristic of being the means of leading to an inference. Similarly, the unproved by situation (*e. g.*, a castle in the air), the unproved by itself (*e. g.*, a golden lion), and the unproved in part, are fallacies by reason of the absence of that form which is existence of the *pakṣa* ; the unproved in point of being pervaded, the contradictory, and the general many-sided, are fallacies by reason of defect in that form which is non-existence of *vipakṣa*; the particular many-sided and the inconclusive are fallacies by reason of defect as regards existence of the *sapakṣa* ; the obstructed and the confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary, are fallacies by reason of the absence of the characteristics of not being obstructed and of not being confronted with an equally valid argument to the contrary. So also, accidental-

ness and inapplicability do not lead to inference, because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa ;* absence of favourable argument, and unfavourable argument, also do not lead to inference because of the absence of certainty of the non-existence of the *vipakṣa*. In like manner, apparent (but fallacious) examples, inadequate in regard to the *sâdhya*, or in regard to the *sâdhana*, or in regard to both, if invalid as being fallacies, are so through the uncertainty of the existence of the *sapakṣa*. If they are fallacious by themselves as being examples in appearance only, yet they are so mediately through the mark which is the same uncertainty of existence of the *sapakṣa*.

Marks of which the positiveness or agreement is not manifest, and marks of which the negativeness or difference is not manifest, however, are resolved only into the insufficient, the inopportune, and the ground of defeat.

Self-dependence, mutual dependence, circle in an argument, and infinite regression, by unsettling the certainty of universal relation or pervasion, become deficient in respect of one or the other of the forms of existence of the *sapakṣa* and non-existence of the *vipakṣa*, and thereby acquire the nature of fallacies.

Amongst these fallacies, that is accompanied with non-co-existence, which causes doubt alternating between the existeace and the non-existence of the *sâdhya*. The contradictory is that fallacy which produces certainty of the non-existence of the *sâdhya*. The unproved is that which is void of pervasion, existence in the *pakṣa* and proving. According to Kâśyapa, obstruction and an equally valid argument to the contrary are not independent fallacies. Of these, obstruction resolves itself either as the unproved by situation, or as the many-sided ; as it has been said, " In obstruction (*bâdhâ*), the mark is either non-existent in the *pakṣa*, or is many-sided." An equally valid argument to the contrary, also by causing doubt in respect of pervasion or invariable co-existence, etc., in other places, really resolves itself into the many-sided, etc.

The writer of the *vṛitti*, however, says that the word, ' cha,' in the Sûtram, अप्रसिद्धोऽनपदेशोऽसन् सन्दिग्धश्चानपदेशः (III, i, 15, *ibid*), has tho sense of bringing forward *bâdhâ* (obstruction) and *satpratipakṣa* (an equally valid argument to tho contrary), and thereby follows the view of Gautama as expressed in tho *sûtram*, " Fallacies are five, that which is accompanied with non-co-existence, the contradictory, that which is identical with the *pakṣa* that which is identical with the *sâdhya* and that which is post in time,"(Nyâya Sûtram, 1. ii.4). But, from such statements as " The contradictory, the unproved, and the dubious, declared Kâśyapa, are no marks," it appears that the Sûtrakâra, *i. e.*, Kaṇâda), himself was inclined to uphold the threefoldness of fallacy. The word ' cha,' however, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before.

This is the idea. I have not dilated upon it for fear of increasing the bulk of the book. More details should be sought in *Mayûkha*.—17.

Mark of Inference of Soul.

***Upaskâra*.—He now points out the result of the analysis of fallacies :**

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद्यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् ॥ ३ । १ । १८ ॥

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षात् Âtmâ-indriya-artha-sannikarṣât, from contact of the soul, the sense, and the object. यत् Yat, which. निष्पद्यते Niṣpadyate, is produced. तत् Tat, that. अन्यत् Anyat, other, different.

18. That (*i. e.*, knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark).—134.

From the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, it is knowledge that is produced. And it is a mark of the existence of the soul, and, as such a mark, is different from the unproved, the contradictory, and the many-sided, that is to say, is not a fallacy. Thus, knowledge is, in two ways, a mark of the existence of the soul; either by the inference that knowledge must reside somewhere, because it is an effect, like colour, etc., or by assuming the form of recognition, *e. g.*, "I who saw am the same as I who am touching." In the former case, effectness belonging to knowledge is not unproved, because of the assertion "(that) which is produced;" nor it is contradictory, for here, as in all other instances of analoguous inference or inference from a *sâmânyatodriṣṭa* or commonly-observed mark, there can be no contradiction; nor is it many-sided, for the very same reasen. So that by means of the commonly observed characteristic, appertaining to it, *viz.*, of being an effect or an attribute, knowledge truly becomes a mark of the existence of the soul. Recognition, again, resiling from other agents, resolves into having but one agent or cause.

(The Bauddha theory criticised.)

Objection.—Recognition may be also due entirely to the relation of effect and cause subsisting between understanding and consciousness.

Answer.—This cannot be, as it would entail recognition also, of the understandings of the disciple and the preceptor.

Objection.—But relation of the matter (*i. e.*, knowledge which causes activity or inclination) and the form does not exist there; and that relation is the exciting cause of recognition.

Answer.—'Matter,' having the property of Substance, cannot possibly exist in the understanding (which is an attribute). Even if its existence were possible, understandings being momentary, recognition of what was perceived before, would not be possible. For, no impression is thrust into subsequent understandings by a previous understanding, since you do not admit the existence of an abiding impression. And if it consists of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, it cannot be the cause of recollection at another time, nor of recognition.

Objeetion.—The stream of subjective consciousness, which is really different from the stream of objective consciousness, is that which recollects as well as that which recognises.

Answer.—If it is permanent, then our obeject is fulfilled. If it is of the form of a stream of temporary understandings, then it has not yet freed itself from the fault already pointed out; for then even there can be no permanent impression. Moreover, proof is wanting that it is something different from objective consciousness.

Objection.—Proof is supplied by the stream of understandings, 'I am,' 'am,' and so on.

Answer.—May be. But if here states of objective consciousness take in or receive as their matter, only the subjective consciousness, then, in the absence of the characteristic of being the matter, from the states of objective consciousness, their efficient causality also will disappear; for efficient causality is derived from the characteristic of being pervaded by the characteristic of the material cause.

Objection.—Let there be no efficient causality also.

Answer.—In that case, their existence also is gone. For the characteristic of an entity or real substance is that it is the means of serving necessary purposes.

Objection.—Both the streams are received, as material, jointly by the stream of objective consciousness and the stream of subjective consciousness.

Answer.—If it is so, then what fault has been committed by conjunction of wholes made up of parts, etc., when you also admit that a cause can operate at a different place?

Therefore, recognition proves, as being permanent, the soul which is inferred by knowledge, as its substratum. Hence nothing remains unproved.

Or, the *sûtram*, आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षाद् यन्निष्पद्यते तदन्यत् is calculated to refute the Sâṁkhya theory that the understanding, being eternal, is not fit to infer the soul as its cause. It should be, then, interpreted thus: what you call the principle or entity, *viz.*, the understanding, is nothing but knowledge; for, there is the statement of synonyms, namely, "understanding, comprehension, knowledge." And it is produced from the contact of the soul, etc., and is really other than the inner sense the existence of which you admit. This is the meaning. The import, therefore, is that that dœs become the mark of the existence of the soul.—18.

Vivṛiti.—He gives another proof of the existence of the Soul:

From 'contact, *i.e.*, of the mind with the 'object of the sense,' which is the 'soul,' in other words, from the conjunction of the soul and the mind, the 'knowledge which is produced,' in the form of "I am happy," etc., is 'different,' *i.e.*, other than inference, as a proof of the existence of the Soul. This is a roundabout way of indicating that knowledge produced by the cognition of the soul and the mind, is perceptual, since the definition of perception is knowledge produced from the contact of the senses ond objects. Altough such perception does not prove the soul as different from the body, etc., yet, as it proves the soul in general, it is unobstructed. This is the import.

Or, the *sûtram* states that the mark which infers the soul, is not a false mark.

Marks of Inference of other Souls.

Upaskâra.—Having described the inference of one's own soul, he now shows the inference of other souls :

प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती च प्रत्यगात्मनि दृष्टे परत्र लिङ्गम् ॥ ३ । १ । १९॥

प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती Pravṛitti-nivṛittî, activity and inactivity, occupation and withdrawal. च Cha and. प्रत्यगात्मनि Pratyag-âtmani, in the in-going or in-dwelling soul, in one's own soul. दृष्टे Driṣte, observed. परत्र Paratra, elsewhere, of other souls. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

19. And activity and inactivity, observed in one's own soul, are the marks of (the existence of) other souls.—135.

'Pratyag-âtmani' means in one's own soul. ' Pravṛitti-nivṛitti' are particular volitions caused by desire and aversion. By them are produced bodily actions, characterised as चेष्टा or muscular motion, of which the objects are the acqisition of the agreeable and the avoidance of the disagreable. So that, on observing muscular motion in another body, the inference of another soul takes place in the following manner. This muscular motion must have been produced by volition, because it is muscular motion, as is my muscular motion. And that volition, is the product of a soul, or is seated in a soul, because it is volition, as is my volition.—19.

Here ends the first chapter of the third bcok in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms,



BOOK THIRD—CHAPTER SECOND.

Mark of the existence of Mind.

Upaskâra.—Distinction of real and fallacious marks is the subject-matter of the (preceding) chapter. Now, going to bring the examination of the Soul to a close, the author, by a transgression of the order of enumeration (of the Substances) (*vide* I. i, 5), introduces the examination of the Mind, and says :

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे ज्ञानस्य भावोऽभावश्च मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥३।२।१॥

आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे Âtmendriyârthasannikarṣe, on contact of the Soul with the senses and their objects. ज्ञानस्य Jñânasya, of knowledge. भावः Bhâvaḥ, existence, production, appearance. अभावः Abhâvaḥ, non-existence, non-production, non-appearance. (*Bhâṣya.—reads* the words '*bhâvaḥ*' and '*abhâvaḥ*' in a compounded form as *bhâvâbhâvaḥ.*') च Cha, and. मनसः Manasaḥ, of the Mind. लिङ्गम Liṅgam, Mark.

1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.—136.

He will say that the movement of the Mind is the mark (of the Soul). If, therefare, Mind is found on examination to be the instrument or means of knowledge, and as being dense, moulded, or ponderable (मूर्त्ति), then it becomes proved that the Soul is that, being directed by which, the Mind comes te be connected with the sense apprehensive of the desired or agreeable object, rather than with any other sense. This is the reason of tho violation of the order of enumeration. The meaning is that the Mind is that which, while there is contact of the soul with the sense and its object, being connected with the sense, there is production of knowledge, and which not being so connected with the sense, there is non-production of knowledge.

Objection.—Mind is all-pervading or universal. Nevertheless, non-simultaneity of knowledge can be inferred from this alone that Mind possesses the property of an iastrument. Moreover, Mind is universal because, like Time, it is a substance void of any distinctive attribute ; because, like the Soul, it is the substratum of Conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge ; and because, like Ether, it possesses the absolute non-existence of Touch ; and there are similar other proofs of its universality.

Answer.—It is not so. If Mind were universal or all-pervading, then as it would be connected with all the senses, there would be only one cognition including all the senses (*i. e.*, omni-sensuous). If it be replied that (*objection*) such is not the case, because there is a contrariety amongst the effects ; we deny this, (*answer*) for a complete cause does not take notice of contrariety and non-contrariety whereby it might be apprehensive of the contrariety of the characteristics of belonging to perception by the eye, organ of taste, etc. It cannot be said, (*objection*) "Or, it (cognition) may be of a variegated form like variegated colour, as it is in the case of eating some pudding," (where perceptions of taste, flavour, etc., take place all together) ; for (*answer*) even there

attention or attachment to a particular object (*i. e.*, taste or flavour, etc.,) is observed. Nor can it be asked, (*objection*) " How then does the complex belief arise, *viz.*, ' I perceive Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch simultaneously '?" ; for, (*answer*) it is merely a senso of simultaneity in respect of the five cognitions, produced by the swiftly moving Mind and presented in memory. It cannot be objected that attention to particular objects is also dependent upon the property of the instrument, for the answer has already been given. If it be maintained (*objection*) that attention depends upon the desire to understand ; we deny this, for, (*answer*) on that supposition, it would follow that when there was a desire to understand all, there would be a total presentation of all objects, whereas the only result of a desire to understand is connection of Mind with the sense percipient of the oject desired. Inasmuch, therefore, as non-simultaneity of cognition is otherwise impossible, the Mind is proved to possess a minimum of divisibility. Consequently, the marks of universality are obstructed by proof which comprehends or infers the subject. Moreover, if the Mind were all-pervading, then there would not be such local character of pleasure, etc., as in " pleasure in my foot," " pain in my head," etc. ; for, the effects of 'universal substances' uniformly appear in places delimited by their non-combinative causes. It cannot be said that in our view also it follows that pleasure, etc., are confined to the place of the atom ; for, the rule is that a non-combinative cause really produces an extensive effect at its own place, so that there is no opposition to their production even beyond the limits of their instrumental causes, *e. g.*, sandalwood, etc. It cannot be urged, " Mine too is request for remoteness from ths instrument causes ;" for, it would entail a breach of the above uniformity. Further, how will there be conjunction of the universal Mind with the Soul ? It cannot be replied that it is without beginning, for then disjunction will also necessarily become beginningless. It canot be said that owing to the difference of their limitations (*i.e.*, substrata wherein they take place), both of them remain uncontradioted ; for, the difference of the limitations of conjunction and disjunction depends upon their own causes, whereas in the case of the difference of things which have no beginning, such dependence does not exist. This is the direction.—1.

Mind is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskâra.—Now, it may be asked, "The perception of pleasure, etc., is producible by an instrument, because it is an act, like the perception of Colour : from inference in this way, or by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, Mind is proved as the instrument of that perception. But whence does it derive its Substance-ness, and eternality?" Hence he says:

तस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ३ । २ । २ ॥

तस्य Tasya, its, of the mind. द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vâyunâ, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained by (the explanation of the Snbstance-ness and eternality of) Air.—137.

As the ultimate atom of Air, inferred from Substance made up of parts, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute and action; so Mind, inferred by the non-production of simultaneous cognition, is a Substance, because it possesses attribute. For it is not productive of cognition, withont conjunction with the sense, whereby it might appear that possession of attribute does not belong to it. Moreover the presentation of pleasure, etc., (to the Soul) must have a sense as its instrument, because it is a presentation, like the presentation of Colour, etc. Hence Mind is proved as an instrument or sense. And the being a sense means the being the foundation or seat of the conjunction of the Mind which is the instrument of cognition ; so that the Subtanceness of Mind is proved without much ado. And its eternality follows from its not being made up of any other Substance. And this latter characteristic follows from the absence of any proof for the supposition of its being made up of parts.—2.

Mind is one.

Upaskâra.—Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than one Mind, existing in each individual body. He states the means of decision :

प्रयत्नायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानायौगपद्याच्चैकम् ॥ ३ । २ । ३ ॥

प्रयत्नयौगपद्यात् Prayatnâyaugapadyât, from the non-simultaneity of volitions. ज्ञानयौगपद्यात् Jñânâyâugapadyât, from the non-simultaneity of cognitions च Cha, and. एकम् Ekam, one.

3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the non-simultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one (Mind) (in each organism).—138.

" Mind in each organism " is the complement of the Sûtram.

If there were many Minds in a single organism, then cognitions and volitions would be simultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that many volitions are produced at one and the same time, becanse simultaneous actions are observed in the fingers of the hands and the toes of the feet of a dancing girl ; for, that being explained or possible by the swift movement alone of the Mind, simultaneity of necessary or corresponding particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state, is not obtained. Hereby (*i. e.*, by the necessary particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state), the theory that in one and the same body there are five Minds, and that on the conjunction of two, three, four or five of them with their respective senses, two, three, four or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted, as it would entail a superfluity of suppositon ; while the sense of simultaneity is upheld (as an illusion). The implication of the simultaneity of two cognitions, *e. g.*, the cognitions " bitter treacle," produced by the connection of the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, under the limitation of the sense-organ of Taste, also does not exist in view of the property (*i. e.*, of rapid transition) of the instrument or internal sense, (*i. e.*, Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into two or three pieces, arises from the impact of the chopper, etc., or the rapid transition of the Mind, or the invisible operation of another (and barren) Mind which has just slipped off from a liberated Soul.

The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a leech, and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of a leech, simultaneity and non-simultaneity of cognitions are respectively produced, is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the supposition of its parts. This is the direction.—3.

Marks of the existence of the Soul.

Upaskâra.—Now, showing the purpose of the violation of the order of enumeration, he says, with a view to complete the enquiry into the Soul :

प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्चात्मनो लिङ्गानि ॥ ३ । २ । ४ ॥

प्राणापाननिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः Prâṇa-Apâna-Nimeṣa-Unmeṣa-Jîvana-Manogati-Indriyântaravikâraḥ, ascending life-breath, descending life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the movement of the Mind, and affections of the other senses. सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाः Sukha-Duḥkha-Ichchhâ-Dveṣa-Prayatnâ, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition. च Cha, and. आत्मनः Âtmanaḥ, of the Soul. लिङ्गानि Liṅgâni, marks.

4. The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also Pleasure, Pain, Desire , Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the existence) of the Soul.—159.

It must not be imagined that cognition itself is the only mark of the Soul. There are also the ascending life-breath, etc., which are the marks of the Soul. Thus that is surely the Soul in consequence of the volition of which the upward and downward motions in the air moving within the body and characterised as the ascending and the descending life-breath, take place, not being possible otherwise than by volition, just as the throwing upward and the throwing downward of a pestle, etc., (in a mortar, etc.), are not possible without volition. For, Air, the nature of which is to blow obliquely, cannot undergo such change of nature without volition. It cannot be said that two bodies of Air flowing in opposite directions and producing different effects may, like two similar bodies of water, have an upward motion. For, were this the case, there would be then the upward motion only but not the downward motion, nor oblique motion as in exsufflation or blowing by the mouth. There is then a being, who, by his volition, impels the air upwards or downwards. I cannot be asked how there could be upward and downward motions of the ascending and descending life-breaths in a state of deep or dream-less sleep ; for, at that time, though volition proper does not exist, there exists another kind of volition which is called volition the source of vitality. In like manner, the closing and the opening of the eye-lids also infer a presiding agent in the organism. Thus the closing of the eye-lide (*nimeṣa*) in an action which produces the conjunction of the lids of the eye ; *unmeṣa* or the opening of the eye-lids is an action

which produces their disjunction. These two actions, being constantly produced without any visible cause such as molecular motion, impact, etc., are not produced otherwise than by volition. As the dancing of a wooden manikin depends upon some one's volition, so also does the dancing of the eye-lids. Thereby an entity, possessing volition, is inferred. Similarly, life also is a mark of the Soul. Thus by the word 'life' the effects of vitality, such as growth, the building up of wounds, fractures, etc., are indicated by implication. So that as the owner of a house builds up a broken edifice or enlarges a building which is too small, so the presiding agent of the organism effects, by food etc., the increase of enlargement of the organism which is to him in the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like, causes what is wounded to grow again, and broken hands and feet to grow together again. Thus like the master of a house, a guardian of the body is also proved. In the same way, the movement of the Mind also is a mark of the Soul. Thus it has been proved, in the foregoing section, that the Mind is something moulded or ponderable (*mûrta*) and that it is indivisible. Its application to a sense percipient of the desired object is dependent upon desire and attention. So that the inference is that the Soul is that being whose desire and attention direct the Mind, as a boy standing at the corner of a room sends a top or ball of lac hither and thither within the room itself.

It may be objected, "The dancer of the wooden manikin, the master of a house, or the boy (referred to above) is not different from his body, so that he could be adduced as an example. Moreover, it is the body which is the seat of consciousness inasmuch as it is the object of the sense of I-ness (*ahaṃkâra*) ; for, there are "I am fair," "I am stout," and the like intuitions which are co-extensive with I-ness. It may be urged that, on this theory, a man would not recollect in his youth or old age what he perceived in his boyhood, because as in the case of a difference of bodies, like those of Chaitra and Maitra, so here too there would be no recognition, on the maxim, "One does not remember what another saw." Here we may point out that Chaitra and Maitra being two different currents, there may not be any correlation, whereas (in the case of a single indvidual) in spite of the differences of boyhood and youth, the current being the same, correlation by means of the relation of cause and effect will be possible." To this argument we will reply that it would follow, on the above theory, that the son also would remember what was perceived by the father. If it be rejoined that perception of the difference of body prevents this, we reply that correlation (in the form of recollection) will not be possible also in the case of an old man who perceives his present body only as different from the body which he had as a boy, and also that there is no perception of the difference of body for a boy who has never known his father. In "My body," the sense of I-ness appears as identical with the sense of 'My-ness' (and not as identical with the intuition of the body). If it be replied that the same holds good in the case of "My Soul" also ; we reply that it does not, because the use of 'My' is there topical, since the genitive may be used even where there is no difference, as in "The head of Râhu" (Râhu being all head). The consequences of killing, etc., (*i. e.*, Merits and Demerits) also will not result to the agent or doer, as his body will be different and different (at every

stage of transmigration). Further, (on your theory), consciousness being limited to the *bhûtas* or elements (which constitute the body and are different at every new birth), if a man desires a sinful act, he will escape the consequences of his own acts, and there will be also the defect of the acquisition of the results of acts not done by him who experiences them. This is the point.

" From the affections of the other senses."—For surely is observed an overflow of the salivary juice , induced by a strong desire for the taste, of one who, after experiencing the particular taste, accompanied by the particular colour, of an orange or a *chira-vilva*, observes such fruit again. Now, this cannot take place without the inference of the acid taste ; nor the inference, without the recollection of the universal relation or invariable co-existence (of the taste and the colour) ; nor the recollection, without impression (*Saṃskâra*) ; nor the impression, without the experience of the universal relation ; nor the experience, without repeated observation. This concatenation of cognitions, standing to one another in the relation of cause and effect, cannot be possible without (the existence of) a selfsame agent. Thus there is the *Sûtram* of Gautama. " From the affections of the other sense." (Nyâya-Sûtraṁ, IIII. i. 12).

Pleasure and the like also are to be regarded, like cognition, as marks of the Soul. Thus pleasure and the like must reside somewhere or must reside in some substance, because they are things which are produced, or qualities like colour, etc. Hence an inference by analogy, accompanied by an exclusion of other possibilities, takes for its subject inherence or residence in a Substance other than the eight Substances. For the proposition that desire which does not reside in Earth and seven other Substances, resides in a Substance, is not complete unless it assumes as its mood the being resident in a Substance other than the eight Substances. Where, however, exclusion of other possibilities does not appear at first, there the being resident in a Substance other than the eight substances, will have to be proved by argument from effect to cause or negative reasoning. This is the distinction. It is absurd to say that inference has only the mood of that which determines the universal relation ; for that alone is the mood there without which the intuition or inference would not result. Otherwise, in " A dyad not being resident in an effect, must reside somewhere, because it is a whole made up of parts," and such other cases, there would be no inference having for its mood the being resident in a noneffect.—4.

Soul is a substance, and is eternal.

Upaskâra.—Well, granted that there is proof of a fixed Soul. But whence is it eternal, and whence is it a Substance ? To meet this objection, he says :

तस्य द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे वायुना व्याख्याते ॥ ३ । २ । ५ । ॥

तस्य Tasya, its, of the Soul. द्रव्यत्वनित्यत्वे Dravyatva-nityatve, Substance-ness and eternality. वायुना Vâyunâ, by Air. व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.—140.

As there is no proof for the supposition of parts in the ultimate atom of Air, and therefore Air is eternal, so also in the case of the Soul.

As the ultimate atom of Air is a Substance, because it possesses attributes, so also is the Soul. This is the meaning.—5.

Objection : I. Mark of the Soul, not visible.

Upaskâra.—He cites an objection of the opposite party to the foregoing conclusion :

यज्ञदत्त इति सन्निकर्षे प्रत्यक्षाभावाद्दृष्टं लिङ्गं न विद्यते ॥ ३ । २ । ६ ॥

यज्ञदत्तः Yajñadattaḥ, He is Yajñadatta. इति Iti, this. सन्निकर्षे Sannikareṣe, there being contact. प्रत्यक्षाभावात् Pratyakṣâbhâvât, from the absence of perception. Because there is no perception. दृष्टं Driṣṭam, visible. लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

6. There is no visible mark (of the existence of the Soul), because there being contact (of the senses with the body of Yajñadatta), perception dœs not arise that this Soul is Yajñadatta).—141.

There being contact, if no such perception take place as "This is Yajñâdatta," then there is no visible mark, *i. e.*, no mark the universal relation of which with the *sâdhya* or what has to be proved, has been grasped by perception. The meaning is that as smoke, perceived as accompanying fire which is perceptible, is a visible mark in the case of fire, so there is no such visible mark which can estaclish the existence of the Soul.—6.

2. Analogy does nct prove Soul as such.

Upaskâra.—Lest it might be urged, "Although no visible mark exists, the universal relation of which has been observed by perception, yet a *sâmânyatcdriṣtam*, or commonly-observed or analogous mark, will be the mark, for it is not that there can be no inference from that," therefore the objector says :

सामान्यतोदृष्टाच्चाविशेषः ॥ ३ । २ । ७ ॥

सामान्यतोदृष्टात् Sâmânyato-driṣṭât, from a commonly-observed or analogous mark. च Cha, and. अविशेषः Aviśeṣaḥ, non-particular. Not a thing in particular or as such.

7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no (inference of anything in) particuiar.—142.

A commonly-observed mark also becomes a mark of inference. But it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above the eight Substances. It would only prove that desire, etc., must be resident somewhere. And this does not suggest the thought of a Soul. This' is the meaning. Therefore it is stated, "Not a thing in particular."—7.

3.—Therefore Soul proved by Revelation.

Upskâra.—Are then the texts of the Vedas, for instance, "He is the Soul, in whom all sins are killed," etc., meaningless ? Apprehending this, the same objector says :

तस्मादागमिकः ॥ ३ । २ । ८ ॥

तस्मात् Tasmât, therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by reasoning. आगमिकः Âgamikaḥ, scriptural, proved by the revealed texts.

8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation.—143.

The Soul is really proved by Revelation only, but not by inference, since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore, mental vision of the principles or essences of things results from the proper hearing of the *Upaniṣads*, and not from the course of intellection. So that this Regulation (*i. e.*, the Vaiśeṣika system), which teaches intellection, is no regulation. For, it is observed in the case of " ten ghosts, swimming across the river," etc., that the cognition of the person who has representation of these things in his consciousness, arises only from the very instrnctions that ten ghosts dwell on this tree, that such and such an object floats across the river, etc.).—8,

Objcetions answerd.

Upaskâra.—To this objection of the first party, set forth in the three foregoing *sûtras*, the upholder of the doctrine of inference replies :

अहमितिशब्दस्य व्यतिरेकान्नागमिकम् ॥ ३ । २ । ९ ॥

अहम् Aham. I. इति Iti, this, शब्दस्य Śabdasya, of the word. व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekât, exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence, न Na, not, आगमिकम् Âgamikam, Scriptural. Proved by Revelation.

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word 'I' (to other designates or objects).—144.

Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word ' I,' or the word 'Soul,' must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says, "Because of non-application," in other words, because of the non-application or divergence of the word 'I' from Earth, etc. For, there never arises any such use of language or intuition as "I am Earth," "I am Water," "I am Fire," "I am Air," I am Ether," "I am Time," I am Space," "I am Mind." If you object that such intuition or use arises with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others ; if, that it arises with respect to one's own body, we reply that it is not so, for 'one's own' or one's self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, " My body," proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (*objectiou*) "Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ; " for, (*answer*) in the word 'I,' I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or distinction. So that on the strenght of the property of its being an

attribute of the subject of the argument (*pakṣa*), it follows that I-ness is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in particular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object, from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompained with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been made, namely, " From ' *hearing* ' alone results realization or intuition of the Soul ; what is the need of all this proof ?", is not sound. For, without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering minds cannot be purged away ; without this purification, there can be no aptitude in them for constant meditation ; and without constant meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direction in Space, etc. This is the import.

If it be asked, "Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence) be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible ?", we reply, "Who has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible ? On the contrary, the Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of conjunction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as 'I am happy,' 'I know,' 'I desire,' 'I will,' 'I feel pain,' etc ? For these intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marks, for they arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow upon enquiry for that." If it be urged that they are appearances of perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have then for their object something which is not apparent (*i.e*, real), for it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon, another object.—9.

Vivṛiti.—The *sûtram* is illustrative. It should be known that inferences, as described above, by the marks of knowledge, etc., are also proofs of the existence of the Soul.

Counter-objection stated.

Upaskâra.—"If this be so (*i.e.*, if the Soul can be known by sense-perception)," the objector says, "then what is the need of inference ?"

यदि दृष्टमन्वक्षमहं देवदत्तोऽहं यज्ञदत्त इति ॥ ३ । २ । १० ॥

यदि Yadi, if. दृष्टं Dṛiṣṭam, observation. अन्वक्षं Anvaksam, sensuous. अहं Aham, I. देवदत्तः Devadattaḥ, Devadatta. अहं Aham, I यज्ञदत्तः Yajñadattaḥ, Yajñadatta. इति Iti, such.

10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions) as 'I am Devadatta,' 'I am Yajñadatta,' (then there is no need of inference).—145.

The word 'iti' marks the form of knowldge, In 'dṛiṣṭam,' the affix 'kta' is used in a passive sense. 'Anvakṣam' means sensuous or perceptual. Therefore the meaning is : if there is perceptual or sensuous observation in the form of 'This is Devadatta,' 'This is Yajñadatta,' then what is the use of taking the troule of making an inference ? "For an elephant being in sight or observation, those who infer. do not infer it by its screaming."—10.

Above answered.

Upaskâra.—To this the advocate of Inference says :

दृष्टआत्मनि लिङ्गे एक एव दृढ़त्वात् प्रत्यक्षवत् प्रत्ययः ॥ ३।२।११ ॥

दृष्टे Dṛiṣṭe, (lit.Seen), grasped by perception. आत्मनि Âtmani, the soul. लिङ्गे Liṅge, being accompanied with marks. एकः Ekaḥ, one. एव Eva, only दृढ़त्वात् Driḍhatvât, because it becomes more firm or fixed. प्रत्यक्षवत् Pratyakṣavat, like other percepts or perceptions. प्रत्ययः Pratyayaḥ, intuition. Belief.

11. As in the case of other percepts, so, if the Soul, which is grasped by perception, is also accompained with, or comes at the top of, marks (from which it can be inferred), then, by means of, confirmation, the intuition becomes fastened to one and only one object.—146.

'Dṛiṣṭe,' *i. e.*, grasped by perception ; 'âtmani' ; 'liṅge,' *i.e.*, having all its marks or causes developed ; eka eva,, *i.e.*, having one object only as its matter ; 'pratyayaḥ.' 'Pratyayaḥ' implies the expulsion of all apprehension of error. "How can it be so ?" Hence he says, 'dṛiḍhatvât,' *i. e.*, because the current of proof is capable of removing the apprehension of its being otherwise. He gives an example, 'pratykṣavat'; *i. e.*, as even when there is perception of water from a distance, yet inference of water by the mark of the *balâkâs* (water birds) is made for the purpose of corroboration. So it has been said, "Skilful logicians desire to understand by inference even what is grasped by perception." The import here is this : Although at times the Soul really shines in mental perception, yet, like knowledge, produced by the flash of lightning, it does not derive so much fixity or permanence being overclouded by such other conflicting perceptions as "I am fair," "I am lean," and the like. Here another form of knowledge produced by marks which cannot but lead to their proper inference, confirms or fixes the very knowledge previously obtained from perception. Moreover, inference must be applied to the Soul owing to the desire to infer the knowledge that intellection of the Soul as taught in the precepts "(The Soul) should be heard about, reflected upon," and the like, is a means towards the realization of that which is desirable, *i. e.*, the Supreme Good. Because if there be no intellection of the Soul, then constant meditation would be impossible, and consequently there would be no realization of the Soul in the understanding, and so salvation would be impossible. This is the purport.

The statement of the two separate intutitions, 'I am Devadatta,' and "I am Yajñadatta," in the foregoing Sûtram, is intended to show that there can be only individual intutition of every Soul.—11.

Counter-objection stated and answered.

Upaskâra.—"Well," it may be objected, "if the intutition, 'I am Yajñadatta' refers to the Soul, then the appearance (of the notion Yajñadatta) as co-existing in the same substratum with Going, as in 'Yajñadatta goes,' is impossible." So he says :

देवदत्तो गच्छति यज्ञदत्तो गच्छतीत्युपचाराच्छरीरे प्रत्ययः ॥ ३ । २ । १२॥

देवदत्तः Devadattaḥ, Devadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. यज्ञदत्तः Yajñadattaḥ, Yajñadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. इति Iti, such. These. उपचारात् Upachârât, by transference. शरीरे Śarîre, in the body. प्रत्ययः Pratyayaḥ, intutition. Belief.

12. 'Devadatta goes,' 'Yajñadatta goes,'—in these cases, the belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference.—147.

For there are such intutitions as "I am fair," "I am stout," and there is also such differential intutition as "My body." Now, in "Devadatta goes," the perception of co-existence with motion, and the use of language to express it, are topical, whereas the intutition "my" is real as carrying its own meaning. Although the property of being Devadatta is a *jâti*, kind or genus, existing in the body whereby the use of language as Devadatta goes" is in the primary sense and the intutition is true in its own meaning, yet if the term Devadatta be applied to the Soul delimited by it, it is then to be understood as a transferred epithet.

Another objection.

Upaskâra.—Here he apprehends (an objection):

सन्दिग्धस्तूपचारः ॥ ३ । २ । १३ ॥

सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, doubtful. तु Tu, however. उपचारः Upachâraḥ, Transference.

13. The transference, however, is doubtful.—148.

The word 'tu' points out the oppenent's view. The intutition and the use of the word, 'I,' are observed both in respect of the Soul and body. Therefore the doubt arises which intutition and expression be the primary, and which the secondary ones.—13.

Above answered.

Upaskâra.—He solves the doubt:

अहमिति प्रत्यगात्मनि भावात् परत्राभावादर्थान्तरप्रत्यक्षः ॥ ३ ।२।१४॥

अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, this. प्रत्यगात्मनि Pratyag-âtmani, in the in-going or individual Soul. भावात् Bhâvât, because it exists. परत्र Paratra, other-

where. अभावात् Abhâvât, because it does not exist. अर्थान्तरप्रत्यक्षः Arthântara-pratyakṣaḥ, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of perception.

14. Because the intuition 'I' exists in one's own soul, and because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.—149.

'Arthântara-pratyakṣaḥ' is that intuition in which 'arthântaram,' *i. e.*, the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows : Since the intuition 'I' arises in respect of 'pratyagâtma,' *i. e.*, one's own Soul, and since it does not arise 'paratra' *i. e.*, in respect of other Souls, therefore it is proper to regard the reference to 'arthântaram' or one's own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary reference were to the body, then the intuition whould be produced by the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, and the intuition 'This is I' is mental being produced even without the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the form of 'I am happy,' 'I know,' 'I will,' 'I desire,' This intuition is not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is only mental; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one's own Soul, it would also refer to the Souls of others ; we deny this, for the Soul of one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or relation to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appropriate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only, but of every Substance. For Substance becomes perceptible only by the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the ear were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour, we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that possession of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word 'pratyag,' in-going, points out divergence from others.—14.

Another objection.

Upaskâra.—He apprehends another objection :

देवदत्तो गच्छतीत्युपचारादभिमानात्तावच्छरीरप्रत्यक्षोऽहङ्कारः

॥ ३ । २ । १५ ॥

देवदत्तः Devadattaḥ, Devadatta. गच्छति Gachchhati, goes. इति Iti, this. उपचारात् Upachârât, from transference. अभिमानात् Abhimânât, from fancy,

reference to Soul, Conceit, Egotism, or Self-identification. तावत् Tâvat, because, therefore. शरीरप्रत्यक्षः Śarîrâpratykṣaḥ having the body as the object. अहंकारः Ahankârah, *ahaṁkâra*. The intuition of I. I-ness.

15. The intuition of 'I' has the body for its object. Therefore to say that, in 'Devadatta goes,' there is a transference (of epithet), is a mere fancy.—150.

'Ahankâraḥ,' *i. e.*, the intuition of 'I.' It is 'Śarîrapratyakṣah,' *i. e.*, that which has the body as the percept or subject-matter. You have determined that the intuition or, for the matter of that the expression, "Devadatta goes," is due to transference. Now, this transference is a fancied one, because such intuitions and expressions as "I am fair," "I am lean," "I am fortunate, my brith is a mere repetition," and the like, cannot be reconciled on the theory of transference. This is the meaning.—15.

Above answered.

Upaskâra.—He gives the solution:

सन्दिग्धस्तूपचारः ॥ ३ । २ । १६ ॥

सन्दिग्धः Sandigdhaḥ, doubtful. तु Tu, but. उपचारः Upachâraḥ, transference.

16. The transference, (as characterised by you), however, is doubtful.—151.

The word 'tu' here points out the solution (of the foregoing objection). The meaning is that there is doubt even in what has been said (by you, *i. e.*, the opponent), namely that the transference is a fancied one, whereas the intuition of 'I' is in respect of the body itself. Since, therefore, the intuition is a false witness on either side, we must endeavour to find out a distinction. Since on making this endeavour, we observe that even a man, whose eyes have been closed, still has the intuition of 'I,' we must hold that it refers to an object different from the body, and beyond the cognizance of the external senses. If it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and also would not take place in independence of the eyes. If it be asked how there can be such common measure or co-extension as in "I who am stout or thin, am happy;" we reply that in this case it is possible that the body would appear as the condition of pleasure, etc., as in "This forest is resonant with the roar of a lion" (there is such appearance). Mere I-ness, presented by the Mind, is superimposed upon the body, just as heat, presented by the organ of touch, in the judgments, "The water is hot," "The body is hot," etc.—16.

Above answered—continued.

Upaskâra.—By elaborating the solution he says :

न तुशरीरविशेषाद्द यज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रयोर्ज्ञानं विषयः ॥ ३ । २ । १७ ॥

न Na, not. तु Tu, but. शरीरविशेषात् Śarîra-viśeṣât, perceiving the difference of bodies. यज्ञदत्तविष्णुमित्रयोः Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrayoḥ, of Yajña-

datta and Viṣṇumitra. ज्ञानं Jñânam, knowledge, thought. विषयः Viṣayaḥ, object

17. But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Visnumitra do not become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an attribute of the body).—152.

'Jñânam' implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of the Soul. As the bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are mutually different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like, different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajñadatta, so also, though no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in Yajñadatta, will the knowledge, etc., "I feel pleasure," "I know" "I will," "I desire," be objects (of perception); because the sensible body being an object of perception, knowledge, etc., which are (*ex hypothesi*) its properties, like its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this is imposible. Therefore (such is the import), it should be said that the seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from the body. 'Śarîraviśeṣât' means from difference of body. The fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception, while difference of body is being perceived.—17.

Proof of Soul not from Revelation only.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected as follows :—"The Soul is not perceptible, since, like Ether, it is a colourless Substance, or a Substance without component parts. Therefore the body itself should be affirmed to be the object of the cognition "I am thin, pale." If occasionally there arises also the consciousness "I feel pleasure," it is proper to suppose that pleasure and the like becoming manifest without a substratum, are transferred to or superimposed upon the body. As in "Hot, fragrant water," heat and fragrance appearing without a substratum are superimposed upon water, but for the sake of this the intuition of water also does not contain as its object anything except common water ; so I-ness in "I am" is real only in reference to the body, whereas pleasure and the like are sometimes superimposed upon it. There is then, in respect of the Soul, no knowledge of it in the form of perception. That which has to be supposed as the substratum of pleasure, etc., must be established by revelation. There is no perception of it." In reply to this objection, he says :

अहमिति मुख्ययोग्याभ्यां शब्दवद् व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचाराद् विशेषसिद्धेर्नागमिकः ॥ ३ । २ । १८ ॥

अहम् Aham, I. इति Iti, this. मुख्ययोग्याभ्यां Mukhya-yogyâbhyâm, by innate or self-evident and perceptive or sensible cognition. शब्दवत् Śhbdavat, like sound. व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचारात् Vyatirekâbyabhichârât, from the invariability of absence or divergence. विशेषसिद्धेः Viśeṣa-siddheḥ, frcm proof in particular. न Na, not. आगमिकः Âgamikaḥ, scriptural, proved by revelation.

18. (The soul is) not proved (only) by Revelation, since, (as Ether is proved by Sound, so) (the Soul is) proved in particular, by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of 'I,' accompained by the invariable divergence (of such cognition from all other things), as is the case with Sound.—153.

This is the meaning. The cognition, "I feel pleasure," or "I am in pain," is neither scriptural, nor verbally communicated, nor inferential, since it arises even without the help of verbal communication or of marks of inference. Whereas it has been said that colourlessness and simplicity (or the not being an aggregate of component parts) are obstacles to the perception of the soul, this holds true in the case of perception by external senses, for of this the possession of colour and the possession of more than one substance are the necessary conditions or exciting causes, while mental perception is independent of these. It may be objected that this would be the case were there proof of the existence of the Soul, but that there is none. Accordingly it has been said, "From proof in particular by invariable divergence, as is the case with Sound." As in the Substances, Earth, etc., the absence of Sound is invariable, *i. e.*, uniform, and there is thereby proof of a particular Substance, namely Ether, in addition to the eight Substances, as the Substratum of Sound, so on account of the invariable divergence of desire from Earth, etc., the substratum of desire also must be different from the eight Substances. Lest it be argued that all this goes to show only that the Soul is a subject of inference, not an object of perception, the words "by the innate as well as the sensible cognition in the form of 'I' are employed. By the word 'iti' the form of the cognition is indicated. Therefore the cognition, in the form of 'I,' which is produced, without the help of verbal communication and mark of inference, in one whose eyes are closed, should be explained by the innate idea of Egoity or I-ness and its sensible or perceptible attributes, and not by reference to the body, and the like, since the divergence or absence of desire is invariable there. After "by the innate as well as the sensible cognition" the words "Should be established" are to be supplied. There are many proofs of the existence of the Soul. They are omitted here for fear of increasing the volume of the treatise. They should be sought in the *Mayûkha*.—18.

Vivṛiti.—Vedântins, however, hold that the soul is nothing but eternal knowledge (vijñâna) according to the *Śruti*, अविनाशीवाऽरेऽयमात्मा सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म, "Lo! the Soul, imperishable, is truth, knowledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (*Brihadârṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV. v. 14). Although, in reality, it is one, yet, owing to the diversity of its *Upâdhi* or adjuncts in the form of the inner sense, which are products of *Mâyâ*, *i.e.*, limitation, it appears as manifold. That it is so, follows from such *Śrutis* as एकमेवाद्वितीयम् "One only, without a second," *Chhândogya Upaniṣad*, VI. ii. I), एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपोबभूव "So the one inner Self of all beings, for every form, became its counterform" (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. v. 9.)

He discredits this view.

The words, 'object of perception' are the complement of 'aham iti,' 'I'—this. Thus, the object of such popular mental perceptions as 'I feel pleasure,' etc., is not 'âgamika,' *i. e.*, identical with Îśvara, the *probandum*, of such 'âgama' or text of the Veda as "truth, knowledge, infinite, and all-pervading," (*Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, II. i. 1). He states the reason of this by सुखदुःखाभ्यां etc. विशेषसिद्धेः because difference from Îśvara is established by pleasure and pain, which, though primary

or instinctive or original or innate, are yet sensible. The instinctiveness of pleasure lies in agreeables or desirables, since it is there the object of desire which is not dependent upon any other desire; whereas the instinctiveness of pain lies in disagreeable, since it is there the objeet of aversion which is not dependent upon any other aversion. Sensibleness, again, is the being the object of perception (*i. e.* by the inner sense). This is mentioned for the purpose of removing the (possible) apprehension that the mark is an unproved or unknown mark. and also to prevent overextension, in the case where eternal bliss is attributed to Îśvara, because eternal bliss can never be an object of perception. Pleasure and pain, therefore, being products, are proof of the difference between the Jîva and Îśvara. This argument is illustrative: it should be observed that knowledge, volition, desire, and also aversion, as products, establish difference from Îśvara.

It may be urged that in such inferences as, "The soul which is the object of the perception, 'I am,' is different from Îśvara, because it possesses pleasure which is a product," there being no example, and consequently no observation of congruity of similar instances, knowledge of the universal relation is impossible. For this reason, it has been said व्यतिरेकाव्यभिचरात् *i. e.*, from the uniformity of difference. The use of the ablative inflexion has the object of denoting the (necessary) condition leading to the inference, and the syntactical connection of the word is with the word विशेषसिद्धे: The import, therefore, is, that, even though there is no example by way of agreement, yet, Îśvara being an example by way of difference, an inference with respect to the matter in hand is possible, through the observation of the universal relation of difference, dependent upon the concomitance or congruity of difference.

It may be urged, again, that that a mark can establish difference from Îśvara, by the universal relation of difference, has not been known before. To remove this apprehension, it has been stated शब्दवत् *i. e.*, like Sound, etc. The meaning is this: As the difference of Ether from Îśvara is proved by the mark, namely Sound, which is known by the method of the universal relation, or uniformity, of difference, so the difference of the soul from Îśvara is proved by the possession of pleasure, etc., which are products.

Bhâṣya:—In III. ii. 6—17, the author gives, in the form of a dialogue, contrary arguments as to whether the Self be an object of perception only, or of inference only, or of both, and gives his own conclusion in III. ii. 18.

Unity of Soul, as an objection.

Upaskâra.—Having thus finished the section on the investigation of the Soul, he now begins the section on the plurality of Souls. Therein the following aphorism sets forth an adverse doctrine.

सुखदुःखज्ञाननिष्पत्त्यविशेषादैकात्म्यम् ॥ ३ । २ । १२ ॥

सुखदुःखज्ञाननिष्पत्त्यविशेषात् Sukha-duḥkha-jñâna-niṣpatti-aviśeṣât, because there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge. ऐकात्म्यं Aikâtmyam, identity or unity of Soul.

19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.—154.

There is only one Soul, in spite of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others. Why ? Because of the non-distinction in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, *i. e.*, because the origin of pleasure, pain, and knowledge is really undifferentiated in this that it is determined by, or confined to, the body as a whole. If there were another mark to prove the difference of the Soul, the difference of the Soul might be proved, but there is no such mark. As Ether is only one, in spite of the production of Sounds within the limits of particular spaces, since there is no distinction in Sound which is its mark ; as Time is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of simultaneity, etc., which is its mark ; as Space is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of East, West, etc., which is its mark ; (so the Soul is only one).—19.

Vivṛti.—It may be urged that the identity of Jîva and Îśvara must be admitted, on the strength of the texts of the Veda, " One only, without a second. तत्वमसि श्वेतकेतो, " Thou, O Śvetaketu, art that," (Chhândogya Upaniṣad VI. viii. 7), etc. It cannot be held that difference is proved by the aforesaid inference ; because, pleasure, pain, etc. , being properties of the internal organ, are unproved by themselves (*i. e.*, have no independent existence). Thus says the Brihadâraṇyaka Upanisnd, I. V. 3., कामः संकल्पोविचिकित्साश्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरेतत् सर्वं मनएव, "Desire, Intention, Doubt, Faith, Unfaith, Patience, Impatience, Modesty, Intelligence, Awe,—all this is verily Mind." Here the word Desire denotes pleasure, and the word Intelligence denotes knowledge in the from of a faculty. Moreover, pain, also, appearing, as it does, in co-existence with pleasure, cannot be an attribute of the Soul.

This he apprehends :

The meaning is that, अविशेषात् *i. e.*, becasue the difference of the Jîvâtmâ (embodied Soul) from Îśvara is not proved, निश्चयात्, *i. e.*, by the certainty or ascertainment, सुखदुःखज्ञानानां , *i. e.*, of pleasure, pain, and knowledge ; in other words, they, being proved in the mind by the above Śruti or Vedic text, are thereby disproved in the Soul.

Its diversity explained.

***Upaskâra.*—He states the solution or conclusion :**

व्यवस्थातो नाना ॥ ३ । २ । २० ॥

व्यवस्थातः Vyavasthâtaḥ, from status. नाना Nânâ, many.

20. Plurality of Souls is proved by status.—155.

Souls are many. Why ? Because of status. Status means several conditions, as one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another unhappy, one is of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another ignorant. These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of Souls, prove a diversity of Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the states of one and the same Soul is diversified by the difference of birth

or by the difference of childhood, youth and old age, so also it will be in the case of the difference of the bodies of Chaitra, Maitra, and others, for it is possible to impose contradictory attributes (on one and the same subject) by means of change of Time (*i. e.*, at different times).—20.

Vivriti.—He removes the apprehension. नाना means non-identity of the Souls, in other words, that the Jivâtmâ is not identical with Îśvara. Whence ? व्यवस्थातः, because of the certainty of the existence of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc., are not properties of the mind, because the mind not having largeness or large size, pleasure etc., would be imperceptible; and minuteness or atom-ness or subtleness must be affirmed of the mind as determining the non-simultaneity of acts of knowing. The Śruti, "Desire, Resolution, etc.," however, like "Life is clarified butter," etc., demonstrates that the mind is the cause of desire, etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that it is identical with them.

Its diversity explained—continued.

Upaskâra.—He gives another proof :

शास्त्रसामर्थ्याच्च ॥ ३ । २ । २१ ॥

शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात् Śâstra-sâmarthyât, from the authority (or force or significance) of the *Śâstras*. च Cha, and.

21. (Plurality of Souls follows) also from the authority or significance of the *Śâstras.*—156.

'Śâstram' means Veda or revelation. Because difference of Soul is proved by it also. For it is heard. "Two Brahmans (*i. e.*, Souls) have to be known," etc.; and also "Two birds, friends and kindred, embrace the same tree, etc." (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad III, i. I.)—21.

Here ends the second chapter of the third book in the Commentary of Śri Śaṅkara on the Aphorisms of Kaṇâda.

Vivṛiti.—It cannot be asked. "What then will be the fate of these texts, *viz.*, "Thou art that, O Śvetaketu!" "One who knows Brahman, verily becomes Brahman," etc. ? For the text, "Thou art That," conveys the sense of identity in this sense that what is devoted to, or, belongs to, That, is not different from That. The text, "One who knows Brahman, verily becomes Brahman," does not convey the sense of identity, but that, of similary of the Jîva (*i. e.*, the embodied Soul), to Îśvara (*i.e.*, the Great Soul), in point of freedom from suffering etc.; for, otherwise, the text. "The stainless one attains to supreme similarity," can have no meaning. In popular language also there is the topical use of identity in the sense of resemblance, as when there is an abundance of wealth, it is said, "this priest has become a king," and so on. Nor should it be maintained that identity is produced in the state of salvation, on the cessation of ignorance or false knowledge, since difference, being eternal, is incapable of destruction, and even if we admit the destruction of difference, then since there is necessity for the existence of two individuals. So much in brief.

Bhasys :—*Interprets* III. ii. 19, 20, and 21 in the monistic sense namely, that there exists only one Self, variously differentiated on the phenomenal plane, as witnessed by such texts as " One only, without a second," " One shining Being is immanent in all created things," " All Selves become one," "All Selves emanate from this, Same Self," Two birds," etc.

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BOOK FOURTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

The eternal defined.

Upaskâra.—Having finished the enumeration, definition, and examination of the nine Substances, Earth, etc., and desiring to refute the doctrine, held by the Sâṁkhya philosophers, that *prakṛiti* or Matter is the prime cause. and to establish that ultimate atoms are the prime cause and enter into the composition of earth, etc., the author first of all gives the definition of the Genus, eternality.

सदकारणवन्नित्यम् ॥ ४ । १ । १ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. अकारणवत् Akâraṇavat not having a cause, uncaused, *causa sui*. नित्य Nityam, eternal.

1. The eternal is that which is existent and uncaused.—157.

'Akâraṇavat,' means not having a precedent cause, on the maxim of the purity of words (which excludes other interpretations of the term). Hereby the water-pot, and the like are excluded. Still the definition may be too wide by including previous non-existence ; so he says, 'existent' *i. e.*, having connection with existence. In the case of the Predicables, Combination and Species, connection with existence is nothing but combination or inherence in one and the same object with existence. In the case of any other Genus and of existence connection with existence consists only in being the object of the cognition that it exists. This cognition is not in respect of a thing as such. "Let it be so;" it cannot be objected, "in other cases also. What is the use of existence ?" For, existence has already been proved as the cause of assimilative understanding.—1.

Vivṛiti.—Some hold that the existent is produced from the non-existent. What they have in view is this. Seeds, etc., are not productive of effects such as shoots, etc. Were this the case, then seeds, etc., lying in a granary, would also produce shoots, etc. But since shoots appear only after the destruction of seeds sown on a field, by the disjunction of their parts, it follows that it is the destruction of seeds, etc., which is the cause of shoots, etc., So we have the *sûtram* of Gautama, stating the argument of an opponent, "Production of exietence (is) from non-existence, as there is no appearance without destroying." (Nyâya-Sûtram, IV. i. 14).

Only to refute this view, he strengthens the theory of progressive origination by the series of ultimate atoms, etc.

'Sat,' means something in the form of existence ; 'akâraṇavat' means a non-product ; 'nityam' means an entity which opposes annihilation. The meaning is : the primary cause of compound bodies is not non-existent, that is to say, because, if causality of destruction were admitted, then it would entail the production of shoots even from powdered seeds.

Mark of existence of ultimate atoms.

Upaskâra.—After describing the Genus, eternal, he now says with reference to ultimate atoms :

तस्य कार्य्यं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४ । १ । २ ॥

तस्य Tasya, its. Of the ultimate atom. कार्य्यं Kâryyam, effect. लिङ्गं Liṅgam, mark.

2. The effect is the mark (of the existence) of the ultimate atom.—2.

'Tasya,' *i. e.* of the ultimate atom; kâryyam,' *e. g.*, the water-pot and the like; 'liṅgam.' Accordingly the *sûtram* of Gautama. "From the evolved is the production of the evolved, on the evidence of (experience by) perception," (Nyâya-sûtram IV. i. II). Now the inter-relation of parts and wholes is perceived. If it were unlimited, there would be no difference in size of measurement between mount Meru and a grain of mustard seed; for, they wauld be without distinction, both being orginated by infinite parts. Nor can it be said that difference will be caused by the differences of the size of each part, and of the aggregation of parts; for, without a difference of number, these also would be impossible. If it be said that *pralaya* or destruction of the creation may be the limit (of the series of parts and wholes); (we reply that) the final something *ex-hypothesi*) having no parts, *pralaya* itself would be impossible, for it is only disjunction and destruction of parts which can destroy substances. Nor is disjunction the limit, for it is impossible for it to have only one substratum. Therefore, a substance without parts, must be the limit, and this the ultimate atom. A mote is not the limit; for, being a visible substance, it possesses magnitude, and is composed of more substance than one; magnitude, as the cause of visual perception, presupposes, or is dependent upon, multiplicity of substance; else there would be no magnitude even, what then would be the cause? Nor are the constituent parts of the mote atoms, for we must infer that they also, as originatfve of a substance possessing magnitude, are compossed of parts, like thread, and like potsherd. Therefore. whatever substance is an effect, is composed of parts, and whatever substance is composed of parts, is an effect. So that from whichever part the nature of being an effect goes away, from it goes away also the nature of being made up of parts. This is the proof of the existence of indivisible ultimate atoms. So it has been said by Professor Praśastadeva, "Earth is twofold, eternal and non-eternal.—2.

Law of Causation.

Upaskâra—Now he states an argument or proof, to prove that there are colour, etc., in the ultimate atom:

कारणभावात् कार्य्यभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ३ ॥

कारणभावात् Kâraṇa-bhâvât, from existence in the cause. कार्य्यभावः Kâryyabhâvaḥ, existence in the effect

3. The existence (of colour, etc.) in the effect, (follows) from (their) existence in the cause.—159.

The existence of colour, etc., in the effect, is due to their existence in the cause. For the attributes of the effect result from the attributes

of the cause, the same being observed in the case of the water-pot, canvas, etc. This is the meaning.—3.

Vivṛiti.—He points out an objection to the primary causality of nonexistence.

'Bhâvaḥ,' *i. e.*, the existence, of the ' effect,' *i. e.*, compound bodies, follows from the existence of the ' cause,' *i. e.*, the primary cause (*viz.*, ultimate atoms). Otherwise, like the quality of being clayey, of that which is made of clay, it would follow that effects, *i. e*,. compound bodies would be non-existent, because they are constituted by what is non-existent.

The eternal exists.

Upaskâra.—With a view to silence the advocate of the doctrine of the transiency of all things, he now says :

अनित्य इति विशेषतः प्रतिषेधभावः ॥ ४ । १ । ४ ॥

अनित्यः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. इति Iti, such, *i. e.*, such intuition and expression. विशेषतः Viśeṣataḥ, of the particular, *i.e.*, the eternal. प्रतिषेधभावः Partiṣedha-bhâvaḥ, the form of negation.

4. "Not-eternal"—such (intuition and expression) can be accounted for only as the negation of the eternal.—160.

In ' viśeṣataḥ ' the affix ' tasi ' is used in the genitive sense. There would be negation of ' viṣeśa ' *i. e.*, the eternal, if there were not such intuition, and application of the word as ' non-eternal,' because the prefix *nañ* (non) has the force of negating the meaning of the word next to it. Therefore how can there be the intuition and expression, ' non-eternal,' in the absence (of that) of the eternal ? Hence it is proved that the eternal exists. Or, (the meaning of the *Sûtram* may be), the negation of the eternal must be made by you in this way that (it is) " not eternal," *i. e.*, that the ultimate atom is not eternal. But negation in this way is not successful, since it is frustrated by proof and disproof. (In this interpretation), the *sûtram* should be rendered thus : The word अ (not) will be a negative term by itself, as the rule, "अ, मा, नो, and ना are negative terms." Thus " non-eternal " will mean not eternal. 'Pratiśedha-bhâvaḥ, means the nature or form of negative. Hence " not eternal "—this is the form of the negation of viṣeśa,' ; *i.e.*, the eternal, and it is not possible. This closes the argument.—4.

Vivṛiti.—He refutes the view that all is non-eternal, that there is nothing which is eternal.

अ (in the aphorism) is an indeclinable, having the same meaning as नञ (non). Thus, ' not eternal'—such negation is ' viśeṣotaḥ,' *i. e.*, with reference to particular things. So that, there may be the negation that compound bodies are not eternal, but such whole-sale negation as everything is not eternal, is not possible, because the eternal, which is the counter-opposite, is frustrated by proof and disproof. This is the whole meaning.

The theory that atoms are not eternal, is erroneous.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected as follows : The ultimate atom is not eternal, since it is corporal of ponderable, like a water-pot. Similarly, the possession of colour, the possession of taste, etc., may be, one by one, adduced as so many reasons. So also by simultaneous conjunction with six (other ultimate atoms), an ultimate atom has six parts ; so that from its possession of parts, and from its being the substratum of the conjunction appearing in objects which it cannot pervade, (we may infer that the ultimate atom is not eternal). Moreover, if there be Ether within an ultimate atom, then being porous, it must have parts ; if there be no Ether inside it, then it would follow that Ether does not penetrate every where. Further, (the ultimate atom is not eternal), because it casts shadow, and possesses circulation. Again, the non-eternality of the ultimate atom follows also from the inference which establishes transiency, *e. g.*, the inference, that all that exists is momentary. If then there be such a series of inferences, how can it be maintained that the ultimate atom is eternal ?

To meet these objections, he says :

अविद्या ॥ ४ । १ । ५ ॥

अविद्या Avidyâ, ignorance, error.

5. (It is) an error (to suppose that the ultimate atom is not eternal).—161.

Every inference, which has for its subject the non-eternality of the ultimate atom, is ignorance, *i.e.*, is of the form of error, since it springs from a fallacy, This fallacy is occasionally obstruction or opposition to the proof which comprehends the subject ; always absence of the characteristic of being pervaded (or being the mark), due to want of evidence preventive of its existence in the *vipakṣa* (*i. e.*, in which the non-existence of that which has to be proved, is sertain) ; sometimes unproof by itself ; and others which should be learnt from the kindred system (*i.e.*, the Nyâya-Sûtram of Gautama).—5.

Bhâṣya.—Reads IV. i. 3. 4, and 5 as two aphorisms only, *viz.*, *kâraṇabhâvât kâryabhâvo, nilya iti'*, and *Viśeṣataḥ pratiṣedhabhâvo 'vidyâ'*, and interprets them to mean, respectively, "The nature of the effect, (though) following from the nature of the cause (which is eternal) is non-eternal" and " It is an error to suppose that because things (*e.g.*, atoms) exist as effects (*e.g.*, compound bodies), therefore they cannot exist in the causal (or atomic) state",—in order to explain the application of the word "non-eternal" in, I. i. 8 where the reference is to things which are products.

Requisites of perception.

Upaskâra.—It may he objected, " Well, if the ultimate atom exists, why is it not perceived by the senses ? It is you who have proved that the possession of colour, the possession of touch, etc., are exciting causes of sensibility." Hence he says :

महत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् रूपाच्चोपलब्धः ॥ ४ । १ । ६ ॥

महति Mahati, in respect of an object possessing magnitude. अनेकद्रवत्त्वात् Aneka-dravya-vattvât, by means of its possession of what is composed of more than one substance. रूपात Rupât, by means of colour. च Cha, and. उपलब्धिः Upalabdhiḥ, perception.

6. External perception (takes place), in respect of an object possessing magnitude, by means of its possession of that which is composed of more substances than one, and by means of its colour.—162.n

'Mahati' means in respect of a substance possessing magnitude, the affix, *matup*, denoting possession, among affixes denoting quality, being elided after the word, *mahat*, denoting measure. 'Anekadravyatvât' means from the nature or state of containing that of which more substances than one are the substrata. This being so, Air also would be perceptible. Hence he says, "And by means of Colour," *i. e.*, as will be later on said, developed and uneclipsed or unobscured colour. "Upalabdhiḥ" is complemented by the words, "by the external sense." Therefore it goes without saying that there is no external perception of the ultimate atom, since it does not possess magnitude. "The possession of that which is composed of more than one substance" means either the being constituted by a compound of more than one substance, or the being the substratum of the magnitude which is due to a multiplicity of component parts.

It cannot be said that the possession of that which is a compound of more than one substance, is rendered futile (as a condition precedent of perception), by the very possession of magnitude; since the reverse is also possible. Nor can it be said, "Futility of the producer is caused by the producible, but not that of the producible by the producer;" for the agreement and the difference of the producible and the producer being simultaneously apprehended, there is no futility, since otherwise it would follow that the futility of the staff, etc., will be caused by the whirling of it, etc. Nor can it be said that there is a development of, or rise in, perceptibility at a distance due to development of, or rise in, magnitude; for a development of, or rise in, the possession of a compound of more substances than one being also possible, there can be no discrimination. Moreover, while a spider's web measuring four cubits, etc., is not perceptible from a distance, the perceptibility of the spider itself is certainly due to a development of the possession of a compound of more substances than one, since a preponderance of magnitude exists in the web. So also it should be observed that while a piece of cloth, constituted by five yarns, is not perceptible at a distance, is in spite of a preponderance of magnitude in it, a club of a very small magnitude is perceptible there.—6.

Cause of non-perception

Upaskâra.— Such being the case, there should, it might be urged, also be perception of the light of a shooting star at midday, of the light of the eye, or of Air, as well as of magnitude which combines with colour by means of its combination with Touch. Hence he says:

सत्यपि द्रव्यत्वे महत्त्वे रूपसंस्काराभावाद्वायोरनुपलब्धिः ॥ ४ । १ । ७ ॥

सति Sati, there being. अपि Api, even, in spite of. द्रव्यत्वे Dravyatve, substance-ness, महत्त्वे Mahatve, magnitude. रूप Rûpa, colour. संस्कार Saṁskâra, impression, evolution, reformation. अभावात् Abhâvât, on account of the absence or non-existence of. वायोः Vâyoḥ, of Air. अनुपलब्धिः Anupalabdhiḥ, non-perception.

7. The non-perception of Air, in spite of there being substance-ness and magnitude, is due to the non-existence of the evolution of colour.—163.

By the term "evolution of colour" are intended combination or inhesion of colour, the development of colour to the degree of appreciability, and the non-obscuration of colour. Though, therefore, in the case of Air, the selfsame combination of touch is also the combination of colour, yet it is not qualified or determined by colour, for there is in it absolute non-existence of colour. In the light of the eye, there is no evolution, that is, appreciability, of colour. In the light of the shooting star at midday, there is no evolution, that is, non-obscuration, of colour. Of these, therefore, there is no perceptibility. In like manner, evolution of colour is to be analogously applied to the heat of the summer, the fire in a frying pan, gold, etc.

The writer of the *Vritti* has, however, said that रूपसंस्कार is a compound of the words रूप and रूपसंस्कार, formed by the elision of one of the two रूप's, and that, therefore, the non-perception of Air is in consequence of the non-existence of colour in it, while the non-perception of the ocular light, etc., is due to the non-existence of the evolution of colour.—7.

Requisites of perception of colour.

Upaskâra.—In this way having, immediately after the section on the eternality of the ultimate atoms, finished the section on the perceptibility of external objects, as a subsidiary topic, by their being the inferential marks of the ultimate atoms, and intending to set forth, by introducing an example, the section on the perceptibility of Attributes, he says :

अनेकद्रव्यसमवायात् रूपविशेषाच्च रूपोपलब्धिः ॥ ४ । १ । ८ ॥

अनेक Aneka, more than one. द्रव्य Dravya, substance. समवायात् Samavâyât, from combination in. रूप Rûpa, colour. विशेषात् Viśeṣât, from some special characteristic of. रूप Rûpa, colour. उपलब्धिः Upalavdhiḥ, perception.

8. Perception of colour (arises) from its combination with a compound of substances more than two, and from (its possession of) some special characteristic of colour.—164.

'Rûpaviśeṣa' means the species or peculiarity inherent in colour, and that consists of the characteristics of being developed to the degree of appreciability, of being unobscured, and of being colour. From this, perception of colour takes place. Lest it might be said that, such being the case, the colour of the ultimate atom as well as of the dyad would be perceived, so it has been added—'anekadravya-samavâyât.' The word 'aneka' denotes multitude ; hence 'anekadravya' means that to which many substances belong as its substratum, *e. g.*, a molecule of the atoms, and the like. To term 'anekadravya-samavâyât' therefore, means from combination with such a compound substance. The water-pot, etc., although they are originated by two parts, (*i. e.*, potsherds, etc.), really contain a multitude of substances as their substratum, in the serial arrangement of the parts of these parts, and so

on. As taste, touch, etc., lack in the characteristic of colourness, so there is no ocular perception of them. In the case of ocular fire or light, non-visibility is due to the absence of the degree of appreciability. Development or appreciability is only a particular universal entity or 'class' belonging to the particular attributes of colour, etc., and is pervaded by, or included in, colourness, etc.

Objection :—This being so, no relation of higher and lower (classification) will be at all established even by whiteness, fragrantness, sourness, etc. If, however, you suppose a manifoldness of development or appreciability, pervaded by, or included in, them respectively, then there will be a redundancy of supposition, and the term development or appreciability, उद्भव also will have various meanings.

Answer :—It is not so ; for, development or appreciability denotes the *upâdhi* or condition, namely, the characteristic of the attribute capable of being apprehended by each individual external sense, while non-development or non-appreciability denotes only the absence of the *upâdhi* or condition. Some say that appreciability is simply the non-existence of non-appreciability. This should be considered, since non-appreciability also cannot be similarly established. It may be said that non-appreciability is a particutar attribute beyond the cognizance of the senses. If it be so, then it would follow that appreciability is a particular attribute within the reach of the senses. If it be asked, "What is the determinant of sensuousness ?," we reply that both of us, (*i. e.*, the disputants) are equally at a disadvantage here. They also say that appreciability is the one and only one 'class' present in all particular attributes, and that the non-establishment of the relation of higher and lower is no fault in the case of the class inhering in attributes.—8.

Perception of Taste, Smell, and Touch.

Upaskâra.—Of the attributes other than Touch, co-exsistence in the same substratum with colour is itself the necessary condition of their being perceptible by the external senses. For this reason, after having stated the conditions of perception of colour, he now extends them to other cases, and says :

तेन रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४ । १ । ९ ॥

तेन Tena, by this,. रसगन्धस्पर्शेषु Rasa-gandha-sparśeṣu, in respect of taste, smell, and touch. ज्ञानं Jñânam, knowledge. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

9. Hereby is explained (perceptual) knowledge in the case of Taste, Smell, and Touch.—165.

'Tena' means by the preceptual knowledge of colour. As preception of colour arises from some special characteristic of colour, *viz.*, colourness, non-obscuration, and appreciability, so perception of taste arises from some particularity of taste, characterised as tasteness, non-obscuration, and appreciability. This should be applied to other cases. Combination with a compound of more than two substances, should be also extended. From inappreciability to the organs of the ear, the tongue,

and the skin, result non-apprehension of smell, taste, and touch. Being undeveloped or inappreciable, smell and taste are not perceived in a stone, etc. ; for they are perceived in their ashes. Some maintain that they are perceived indeed in the stone, etc., but not distinctly. The non-apprehension of the colour of a watery substance, the parts of which have been disjoined from one another, is due to non-development of the colour. So also is the non-apprension of taste. In hot water, there is non-apprehension of the colour of the fire, in consequence of its non-development, and of touch, in consequence of its obscuration. In comminuted camphor, the *champaka* flower, etc., non-apprehension of colour, taste, and touch is due to their non-development or inappreciability. In gold, and the like, colour is indeed developed, but whiteness and luminousness are obscured. Some hold that colour also is obscured, whereas the apprehension of gold takes place with the help of other colour. Obscuration, again, is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, and not merely relation or connection with a powerful like object. For, since connection with a powerful like object has to be ascertained by non-apprehension it is the non-apprehension which is of primary importance. Whereas the powerful like object is not of primary importance, as the necessary condition of non-apprehension ; because neither non-apprehension, nor antecedent non-existence of apprehension, nor its absolute non-existence is subject to its operation, while the annihilation of apprehension does not exist there. If it be objected, " Then your proposition also, that obscuration is non-apprehension caused by the apprehension of a more powerful like object, is not proved," we reply, " Let it be so. Still apprehension and non-apprehension alone are the necessary conditions of the strength or weakness of a like object, or of the existence of such a relation ; and the same is the meaning of the word, obscuration."—9.

Gravity, not perceptible.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked, " Since Gravity also is combined with a compound of more than two substances (*i. e.*' atoms), and appears in the same substratum with colour and magnitude, why then it is not perceptible ; " Hence he says :

तस्याभावादव्यभिचारः ॥ ४ । १ । १० ॥

तस्य Tasya, of this, *i. e.*, the genus of colourness, etc., and development or appreciability. अभावात् Abhâvât, because of the non-existence अव्यभिचारः Avyabhichâraḥ, non-deviation. No breach of uniformity or the rule.

10. Because of the non-existence of this, there is no violation (of the above law of perceptibility in the case of Gravity.)—166.

Gravity is not perceptible, because of the non-existence, in Gravity, of this, *viz.*, the genus of colourness, etc., and development or appreciability. It might be said that granted that, colourness, etc., do not exist there, yet there may be perception of Gravity. To prevent this, he adds ' avyabhichâraḥ.' There is ' non-deviation ' *i. e.*, unbroken uniformity of the five ' classes ' or universals, *e. g.*, colourness, etc., towards

apprehensibility by each individual sense. Whenever there exists one or another of the pentad of colourness, etc., there also exists apprehensibility by the respective external senses, as shown by the method of difference (that where the former are not, there the latter does not exist). This is the meaning.

Gravity, by reason of its being left obscure in the sûtram, as the topic of discussion, by Praśastadeva classed among things supersensuous, is by Vallavâchârya said to be perceived by touch.—10.

Where Numbers, etc., are objects of visual perception.

Upaskâra.—Having thus stated objects perceptible by the senses individually, he now enumerates objects perceptible by two senses jointly :

संख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे कर्म्म च रूपिद्रव्यसमवायात् चाक्षुषाणि ॥ ४ । १ । ११ ॥

संख्याः Saṁkhyâḥ, numbers. परिमाणानि Parimâṇâni, magnitudes, extensions. पृथक्त्वं Prithaktvam, separateness. संयोगविभागौ Saṁyoga-vibhâgau, conjunction and disjunction. परत्वापरत्वे Paratva-aparatve, priority and posteriority. कर्म्म Karmma, action. च Cha, and. रूपिद्रव्यसमवायात् Rûpi-dravya-samavâyât, through combination with substances possessing colour. चाक्षुषाणि Châkṣuṣâṇi, visible, objects of visual perception.

11. Numbers, Magnitudes, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, and Action become objects of visual perception, through their combination with Substances possessing colour.—167.

The words have not been formed into a compound in order to indicate their mutual independence in respect of their visual or tactual perceptibility. Although there is dependence upon महत्त्व, *i. e.*, largeness, yet it is not as upon a mode of extension or magnitude. The word 'cha' has the force of involving the addition of Viscidity, fluidity and Impetus. The word चाक्षुषाणि implies tactual perceptibility ; or the word 'cha' should be applied after the word चाक्षुषाणि also. The plural number in Numbers, comprehends all numbers, from unity upwards. If it be held that unity is only a Genus, and not an Attribute, then if it appear in substances only, its denotation will be neither more nor less than that of substanceness ; if, on the other hand, it be present in attributes and actions also, then its denotation will be neither more nor lesr than that of existence. "How, then," if it be asked, "can there be perception of unity, etc., in attribute, etc. ?," it may be answered that it is by means of attributed unity ; or that by reason of the proximity known as combination or co-inherence in one and the same object, the perception of unity is quite justified. This unity is eternal in eternal substances, and in non-eternal substances it has causal unity for its non-combinative cause. On the other hand, duality, etc., are the product of relative understanding. Relative understanding is the mental basis or support of various unities, when two homogeneous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye.—11.

Here they are not.

Upaskâra.—Having in view all the above things up to action, he says :

अरूपिष्वचाक्षुषाणि ॥ ४ । १ । १२ ॥

अरूपिषु Arûpiṣu, in substances not possessing colour. अचाक्षुषाणि Achâkṣuṣâṇi, not objects of visual perception.

12. In substances not possessing colour, they are not objects of visual perception.—168.

Numbers, etc., up to action, are not objects of visual perception, when they are present in substances which are devoid of colour. It should be observed that they are not objects of tactual perception also. It has not been said that they are imperceptible ; for, if it were so, then the unity of the Soul also would not be an object of perception.—12.

Attribute-ness and existence perceptible to all the senses.

Upaskâra.—Colour, etc., are uni-sensuous or perceptible by the senses individually. Numbers, etc., are bi-sensuous or perceptible by two senses jointly. Pleasure, etc., are mental or perceptible by the inner sense. So that it results that the two Genera, Attribute-ness and existence, are omni-sensuous. So he says :

एतेन गुणत्वे भावे च सर्व्वेन्द्रियं ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ४ । १ । १३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. गुणत्वे Guṇatve, in regard to attributeness. भावे Bhâve, in regard to existence. च Cha, and. सर्व्वेन्द्रियं Sarvvendriyam, omni-sensuous. Relating to all the senses. ज्ञानं jñânam, knowledge. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

13. By this it is explained that knowledge in regard to attributeness and existence, is omni-sensuous or of all the senses.—169.

Capability to apprehend the individuals, is itself the capability to apprehend the class. And if the individuals are respectively apprehended by all the senses, then it results that also the classes, *viz.*, Attribute-ness and Existence, are apprehensible by all the senses. This is the meaning.—13.

Here ends the first chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.



BOOK FOURTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Three-fold division of Earth, and other products.

Upaskâra.—In the fourth book, of which the subject-matter is the examination of tangible substances, intending to examine only tangible substances by their effects, immediately after the examination of the ultimate atoms which are the root causes, he says :

तत्पुनः पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम् ॥ ४ । २ । १ ॥

तत् Tat, that. पुनः Punah, again. पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्रव्यं Prithivî-âdi-kâryya-dravyam, earth, and other product-substance. त्रिविधं Trividham, three fold. शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम् Śarîra-indriya-viṣaya-saṁjñakam, named as body, sense, and object.

1. The aforesaid product-substance, Earth, etc., is, again, three-fold, under the names of body, sense, and object.—170.

Here corporeity or the characteristic of the body is a kind of *upâdhi* or adjunct, namely, the characteristic of being constituted by final parts (*i.e.*, atoms), possessing activity, of which the non-combinative cause is the conjunction of the soul exercising volition. But corporeity is not a class or universal entitiy, since in that case Earthness, etc., will establish no relation of higher and lower divisions. The characteristic of being a sense, is the being the seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge which produces no reminiscence, or the being a seat of the conjunction of the mind, which is the cause of knowledge, while at the same time it is not a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound. On the other hand, the light of the eye of animals that prowl at night, is really another kind of light. In regard to its being treated as forming the visual sense, the words " not being a substratum of appreciable particular attributes other than sound and colour " should be added. The characteristic of being a sense, however, is not a ' class,' for then the characteristic of Earth, etc., will not establish the relation of higher and lower divisions without entailing cross-division). And objectivity, or the characteristic of being an object, although it is the being the means of phenomenal experience, that is to say, the being the object of ordinary perception, common to substance, attribute, action, genus, and non-existence—yet should be, in accordance with the aphorism, observed to be the characteristic of being a product-substance which is the object of ordinary perception, for the aphorism is this only that Earth and other product-substances are three-fold. Objectivity also, therefore, is not a class or universal entity.—1.

Body is not a compound of five elements.

Upaskâra.—Now, in order to refute the assertion that the body is composed of three elements or four elements, he says :

प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां संयोगस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वात् पञ्चात्मकं न विद्यते ॥ ४ । २ । २ ॥

प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षाणां Pratyakṣa-apratyaksâṇâm, of perceptible and non-perceptible objects. संयोगस्य Saṁyogasya, of conjunction. अप्रत्यक्षत्वात् Apratykṣatvât, on account of imperceptibility. पञ्चात्मकं Pañchâtmakam, Penta-substantial. Constituted by five elements. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

2. (Nothing exists, which is constituted by five elements, or) the body is not constituted by five elements, for the conjunction of things, perceptible and imperceptible, is imperceptible.—171.

Were the body, by reason of its odour, moisture, digestive heat, breath, and porosity, composed of five elements, then it would be imperceptible. In the same manner as the conjunction of perceptible and imperceptible objects, *e. g.*, air and trees, is imperceptible, the body also would be imperceptible. Thus the aphorism employs an example. The word 'body' is the complement of "penta-substantial does not exist." Moisture, digestive heat, etc., however, belong to the efficient causes or conditions of the body, namely, water and fire. The theory that the body is composed of four elements should be also similarly understood. Let it then, it may be urged, contain three elements, as there is perception of three elements. This cannot be, for an origination not of hetorogeneous elements is denied. One attribute in a whole made up of parts is not originative of similar other attributes. If, therefore, the production were from Earth and Water, then that which they originate would be void of smell and taste. In like manner, if it originated in Earth and Fire, it would not possess smell, colour, and taste; if in Earth and Air, it would be destitute of smell, taste, colour, and touch. Other cases should be similarly understood.—2.

Nor a compound of three elements.

Upaskâra.—He continues the same topic :

गुणान्तराप्रादुर्भावाच्च न त्र्यात्मकम् ॥ ४ । २ । ३ ॥

गुणान्तराप्रादुर्भावात् Guṇa-antara-aprâdurbhâvât, by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute. च Cha, and. न Na, not. त्र्यात्मकम् Tri-âtmakam, tri-substantial. Composed of three elements.

3. And by reason of the non-appearance of another attribute, it is not composed of three elements.—172.

A body originated by Earth, Water, and Fire only, which are objects of perception, might be perceived, if there were manifested in it another attribute having for its antecedent a like attribute in the cause. But this can never be the case, as it has been already stated that a single smell, etc., is not originative. Therefore the body is not composed of even three elements, *i. e.*, is not originated by the three elements possessing colour.—3.

Bhâṣya—reads IV. ii. 3 as two aphorisms, *viz.*, "*Guṇântarâprâdurbhâvâchcha,*" and "*Na tryâtmakam.*"

Conjunction of various atoms, not denied.

Upaskâra.—How then is there perception of digestive heat, etc., in one single body? He gives the answer :

अणुसंयोगस्त्वप्रतिषिद्धः ॥ ४ । २ । ४ ॥

अणुसंयोगः Aṇusaṁyogaḥ, conjunction of atoms. तु Tu, but. अप्रतिषिद्धः Apratiṣiddhaḥ, not denied.

4. But a conjunction of atoms is not denied.—173.

A mutual conjunction of the five elements as (the basis or) conditional causes of one another, is not denied. But it is not desired that the conjunction of two heterogeneous atoms can be the non-combinative cause of a substance. Thus, as its conditional or efficient causes, digestive heat, etc., are perceived in the body. If it be asked, then, of what nature the human body is, the answer is given by the aphorism of Gautama :—"(The body is) terrene, the distinctive attribute of Ether being perceived (in it)." Nyâya-Sûtram III. i. 28(?). Smell which is the distinctive attribute of Earth, is observed in the human body as not departing from it till its dissolution, whereas digestive heat, etc., are not observed in the decayed body. These attributes, therefore, are accidental, while Smell is essential. Hence its terreneness is established.—4.

Body is two-fold: sexually produced, and asexually produced.

Upaskâra.—He divides the body :

तत्र शरीरं द्विविधं योनिजमयोनिजञ्च ॥ ४ । २ । ५ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, amongst terrene, aqueous, and other bodies. शरीरं, Śarîram, body, terrene body. द्विविधं Dvividham, two fold. योनिजं Yonijam, sex-begotten, sexually generated. अयोनिजम् Ayonijam, not sexually generated. च Cha, and.

5. Of these, the body is two-fold :—sex-born and not sex-born. —174.

Of these, *i. e.*, among terrene, aqueous, and other bodies, the terrene body is two-fold. What are the two kinds? In answer, he says, 'sexborn and not-sex-born.' Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies, well-known in the spheres of Varuṇa, Âditya, and Vâyu, are entirely a-sexual. A-sexuality means independence of the commixing of semen and blood. The bodies of gods and sages are also a-sexual, according to the text of revelation, "Manu and others, the mind-born or desire-born of Brahmâ." If it be asked how there can be an effect without a cause, we reply that the female organ of generation is not a cause essential to or determining corporeity, as it does not apply to the bodies of worms, mosquitoes, etc., produced by warmth. The possession of a particular constitution also is not proved, since our bodies are different in appearance in comparision with the bodies of gods and sages.

The sexaul body, again, is two-fold, womb-born and egg-born. Womb-born are bodies of men and animals, wild and domestic, the womb being the name given to the receptacle of the embryo. The bodies of birds and reptiles are egg-born. Snakes, worms, fishes, etc., also are really reptiles, since it is their nature to crawl about.

Trees and the like also are no doubt so many kinds of bodies, being the seat of experience (*i. e.*, the field wherin particular souls reap the consequences of their acts in previous births). For without the characteristic of being the seat of experience, life, death, sleep, waking, use of medicine, propagation of the seed, approaching the agreeable, avoiding the disagreeable, etc., would be impossible. And growth and the healing up of wounds and fractures, which prove experience, are manifest in them. There is also the sacred text :

नर्म्मदातीरसम्भूताः शरलार्ज्जुनपादपाः ।
नर्म्मदातोयसंस्पर्शात् ते यान्ति परमां गतिम् ॥

"The Śarala and Arjuna trees, which grow on the banks of the Narmadâ from contact with the waters of the Narmadâ, attain to the highest state hereafter," etc. And also,

श्मशाने जायते वृक्षः कङ्कगृध्रादिसेवितः ।

"In the cemetery grows a tree haunted by herons and vultures, etc.," etc. Yet germinant bodies do not evidently possess activity or movement and senses, and they are therefore not treated as bodies.—5.

Vivṛiti.—That trees, etc., are bodies (*i. e.*, ground of the experience of the consequences of acts) is evidenced by the text of Manu, *viz.*, "A man acquires the condition of an immovable existence, by faults of action, born of the body."

A-sexual bodies, how produced.

Upaskâra.—He states the cause from which asexual bodies are produced :

अनियतदिग्देशपूर्व्वकत्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ६ ॥

अनियतदिग्देशपूर्व्वकत्वात् A-niyata-dik-deśa-pûrvakatvât, because it (*i. e.*, a-sexual body) has for its antecedent ultimate atoms which are not constant in direction aud place.

6. Because a-sexual bodies are formed by ultimate atoms inconstant in direction and place.—175.

Ultimat atoms, inconstant in direction and place, possess activity or movement produced by a particular *dharma* or virtue. And they are the antecedents of a-sexual bodies.—6.

Vivṛiti.—In the words of Varuṇa, etc., there exist a-sexual, aqueous, igneous, aerial, and mental bodies, which are not dependent, for their production, upon semen, blood, etc. Whence come the ultimate atoms which orignate them ? In the case of sexual bodies, it is observed that only the ultimate atoms of semen and blood are their originators. To remove this apprehension, the present aphorism has been

formulated. Terrene, aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms exist in all directions and in all places. Since there is nothing to confine them to direction and place, there can be no scarcity of ultimate atoms in the production of a-sexual bodies For it is not the case that ultimate atoms other than the ultimate atoms of semen and blood, are not originative of bodies, seeing that in that case there would be no production of gnats, mosquitoes, trees, shrubs, etc.

A-sexual bodies, how produced—continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected, how there can be production of a substance (*i. e.*, a body), without conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of substance, seeing that there can be no conjunction without the action of the ultimate atoms. Hence he says :

धर्म्मविशेषाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ७ ॥

धर्म्मविशेषात् Dharmma-viśeṣât, from a particular *dharma* or virtue. च Cha, and.

7. And (the action of the ultimate atoms arises) from a particular *dharma* or virtue.—176.

The sense is that, at the beginning of creation, action or motion arises in the ultimate atoms in consequence only of the conjunction of the soul carrying with it the invisible (*adriṣtam*) consequences of its previous acts, and the ultimate atoms, having by that action come together, originate, in the order of binary atomic aggregate, etc., the a-sexual badies of gods and sages.

The aphorism is illusrative. It should be also observed that, in consequence of particular *adharma* or vices, the tortured bodies of mosquitoes and other small insects, generated by heat, are produced.—7.

Proof of their existence.

Upskâra.—He gives another proof that the bodies of gods and sages are a-sexual :

समाख्याभावाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ८ ॥

समाख्याभावात् Samâkhyâ-bhâvât., because name or definitions exist. च Cha, also,

8. Also because names or definitions exist.—177.

समाख्या means a significant name, or definition, such as is well-known in Śruti, Itihâsa, Purâṇa, etc. Thus, Durvâsas, and other sag es were born from the mind (of Brahmâ) ; Aṅgiras was produced from *ahaṁkâra* (the sense of ' I'') ; and so on. From this also it is known that there ar e a-sexual bodies of gods and sages.—8.

Vriṛiti.—But whence do a-sexual bodies derive their names, in the absence of parents, etc. ? For it is observed on earth that the names Chaitra, Maitra, etc., are affixed by parents, etc. Lest there be such an apprehension, so he says :

' Bhâvât,' *i. e.*, from the existence, of ' Samâkhyâ,' *i. e.*, the name ; ' even in the absence of the procreative parents, etc.' is the complement.

For, all names are not affixed only by parents, etc., as it is not the case with the names, water-pot, canvas, etc. Therefore, the import is that the names, Manu, Marichi, etc., have been put upon a-sexual bodies, by the very same Îśvara by whom names have been affixed to the water-pot, canvas, and other unconscious objects.

A-sexual bodies, how produced.—continued.

Upaskâra.—He gives another proof :

संज्ञाया आदित्वात् ॥ ४ । २ । ९ ॥

संज्ञायाः Saṁjñâyâḥ, of name. आदित्वात् Âditvât, because of the primitiveness.

9. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) from the primitiveness of the name.—178.

By means of the name, Brahmâ, etc., which came to be the beginning, *i. e.*, primordial, at the beginning of creation, it is known that a-sexual body exists. For then there were not parents of Brahmâ, by whom the name Brahmâ, etc., should be given.—9.

Vivṛiti.—But there being no proof of the existence of Îśvara, how can it be affirmed that the names of the water-pot, the canvas, etc., have been given by Him ? So he says :

Because Îśvara, which is the complement of the aphorism, is the beginning (âdi), *i. e.*, the cause or source, of names. Thus the proof of Îśvara having been already stated, by the characteristic of His being the author of names, in the aphorism, " But name and effect are the mark (of the existence) of beings distinguished from ourselves " (II. i. 18 Ibid), being the author of names remains unobstructed. This is the sense.

Conclusion : A-sexual bodies exist.

Upaskâra.—He concludes :

सन्त्ययोनिजाः ॥ ४ । २ । १० ॥

सन्ति Santi, exist. अयोनिजाः Ayonijâḥ, a-sexual bodies.

10. A-sexual bodies exist.—179.

The words " particular forms of bodies " are the complement of the aphorism.—10.

Another proof that a-sexual bodies exist.

Upaskâra.—In order to strengthen the above conclusion all the more, he gives another proof :

वेदलिङ्गाच्च ॥ ४ । २ । ११ ॥

वेदलिङ्गात् Veda-liṅgât, from the texts which throw light upon the *mantra* portion of the Veda, *i. e.*, from the Brâhmaṇa portion of the Veda. च Cha, and.

11. (The existence of a-sexual bodies is proved) also from the Brâhamaṇa portion of the Veda.—180.

'Veda' means mantra. That by which it is *liṅgyate, i. e.,* made known, is 'veda-liṅgam,' *i. e., Brâhmaṇam.* From this also a-sexual body is proved. This is the meaning. Thus there is the *Brâhmaṇam* :

प्रजापतिः प्रजा अनेका असृजत्, स तपोऽतप्यत प्रजा सृजेयमिति, स मुखतो ब्राह्मणमसृजत् बाहुभ्यां राजन्यमूरुभ्यां वैश्यम् पद्भ्यां शूद्रमिति

"Prajâpti (*i. e.,* the lord of creation) created numerous creatures: He practised penance, with the desire, "I may be able to create creatures." He created the Brâhmaṇa from His mouth, King from his arms, the Vaiśya from His thighs, the Śûdra from his feet."

There is also the Veda :

ब्राह्मणोऽस्य मुखमासीत् बाहू राजन्यः ऊरू तदस्य यद्वैश्यः पद्भ्यां शूद्रोऽजायत इत्यादि।

"His mouth became the Brâhmaṇa ; the arms were made the King *i. e.,* Kṣtriya) ; it was His thigh, which became the Vaiśya ; the Śûdra was born from the feet, etc."

Thus terrene body, sexual and a-sexual, has been described in the above way. Aqueous, igneous, and aerial bodies can be only a-sexual, since semen and blood are, as a rule, terrene, and a terrene substance does not originate an aqueous one.

The terrene sense is the organ of smell, common to all living beings. The organ of smell is originated by terrene particles unoverpowered or unobscured by water, etc. The organ of smell is terrene, because it causes manifestation of smell, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like the excrement of the fowl which causes the manifestation of the perfume of the musk. Similarly, the organ of taste, the tongue, is the aqueous sense, as it causes the manifestation of taste only, while it does not cause the manifestation of colour, etc,. like water which causes the manifestation of the taste of the pudding. In like manner, the eye is the igneous sense, because it causes the manifestation of colour only, while it does not cause the manifestation of taste, etc., like light. The skin is the aerial sense, because it causes the manifestation of touch only, while it does not cause the manifestatiou of smell, etc., like the wind blown by the fan which causes the manifestation of the coolness of the water (perspiration) sticking to the body.

The object which is terrene, is characterised as earth, stone, and the immoveable. Therein the modifications of earth are the divisions of the land, wall, brick, etc., Stones are the mountains, jewels, diamond, red-chalk, etc. The immoveable are grass, herbs, trees, shrubs, creepers, and trees bearing fruits without flowers. Aqueous objects are rivers, seas, dew, hail-stone, etc. Igneous object is four-fold, differentiated as terrestrial, celestial, abdominal, and mineral. The terrestrial is that which is produced from fuel, such as wood. The celestial is not produced from fuel ; *e. g.,* lightning, etc. The abdominal is the stomachic, capable of extracting the juice of rice, etc. And the mineral is gold, etc. The aerial object is the wind wdich is the seat or support of touch which can be felt. The fourth effect of Air, which is called

Prâṇa; *i.e.*, the life-breath, and which is the means of disposing of the essences (*rasa*), excreta; and the humours or vital fluids (*dhâtu*) within the body, though it is one, still acquires the names of Apâna (*i.e.*, the air which throws out)' etc., according to the diversity of its functions.—11.

Here ends the second chapter of the fourth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms of Kaṇaḍa.

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BOOK FIFTH—CHAPTER FIRST.

Action in the hand, how produced.

Upaskâra.—The subject of the fifth book is the investigation of Action. The investigation of Action, producible by volition, is the subject of the first chapter. In this there are sections treating of (1) throwing upwards, (2) throwing upwards effected without volition, (3) action which has virtue or merit as its cause, and (4) actions, goods, bad, and indifferent.

आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्यां हस्ते कर्म्म ॥ ५ । १ । १ ॥

आत्मसंयोगप्रयत्नाभ्यां Âtma-saṁyoga-prayatnâbhyâm, by means of conjunction with, and volition of, the soul. हस्ते Haste, in the hand. कर्म्म Karmma, action.

1. Action in hand (is produced) by means of conjunction with, and volition of, the Soul.—181.

With reference to a particular form of muscular or bodily action, (*e. g.*, in using a pestle and mortar), the author says :

By means of conjunction and volition of the soul, Action (is produced) in the hand which is its combinative cause. And of this Action, conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative cause, and volition is the efficient or conditional cause. It is this which is called muscular action, for muscular action is action which has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising volition, or action producible by volition of something other than, that which possesses touch and which is not combined with, and is additonal which to that in which the action appears (*e. g.*, hand.)—1.

Vivṛiti.—Here हस्ते 'in the hand,' is an illustration. The meaning is that by the conjunction, and volition, of the soul, action, in the form of muscular motion, is caused in the body as well as in the parts thereof. So it has been said.

आत्मजन्या भवेदिच्छा इच्छाजन्या भवेत् कृतिः ।
कृतिजन्या भवेच्चेष्टा तज्जन्यैव क्रिया भवेत् ॥

That which is produced by the Soul, may be called Desire. That which is prodnced by Desire, may be called first Impulse or stir. That which is produced by Impulse, may be called muscular motion. It is that which is produced by muscular motion, that may be called Action or physical change.

Action in the pestle described.

Upaskâra.—After describing the throwing upwards of the hand, he describes the throwing upwards of the pestle, which depends upon the former :

तथा हस्तसंयोगाच्च मुषले कर्म्म ॥ ५ । १ । २ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similar. हस्तसंयोगात् Hasta-saṁyogât, from conjunction with the hand. च Cha, and. मुषले Muśale, in the pestle. कर्म्म Karmma, action.

2. And, from conjunction with the hand, a similar Action appears in the pestle.—182.

The word 'cha' implies 'gravity,' which is another efficient cause. 'Tathâ' means 'like that,' *i. e.*, of the form of throwing upwards. Or 'tathâ' and 'hasta-saṁyogât' may be taken as constituting a single term, which will then mean 'from conjunction with hand possessing upward motion.' Here, again, conjunction of the pestle with the hand conjoined with the soul exercising volition, is the non-combinative cause; the pestle is the combinative cause; volition and gravity are the efficient causes.—2.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He states the cause of the sudden motion upward which is produced in the pestle when struck by the mortar :

अभिघातजे मुषलादौ कर्म्मणि व्यतिरेकादकारणंहस्त-संयोगः ॥ ५ । १ । ३ ॥

अभिघातजे Abhighâta-je, produced by impact. मुषलादौ Muṣatadau, in the pestle, etc. कर्म्मणि Karmmaṇi, in action. व्यतिरेकात् Vyatirekât, because of absence (of volition). अकारणं Akâraṇam, not cause. हस्तसंयोगः Hasta-saṁyogaḥ, conjunction with the hand,

3. In the action, produced in the pestle, etc., by impact, conjunction with the hand is not a cause, because of the absence (of volition).—183.

Here, though there is also conjunction of the hand with the rising pestle, yet that conjunction possesses no causality On the other hand, the impact of the mortar only is the non-combinative cause. It may be asked, "Why so?" Therefore he adds, 'vyatirekât,' which means because of the absence of operativeness of volition." If there were volition at that moment, there would surely be no sudden upward motion in the pestle. By a volition to hold fast, there would be rather sustention of the pestle; or, the upward motion again of the pestle would be caused by muscular action. This is the import.—3.

Vivṛiti.—Conjunction with the hand is not the combinative cause. 'Conjunction' is indicative. Volition and muscular action also, it should be understood, are not the efficient causes.

Action in the hand.

Upaskâra.—With a view to specify a particular cause of the action of the hand, as it flies upward with the pestle, and for the purpose of disproving the non-combinative causality of conjunction with the soul exercising volition, he says :

तथात्मसंयोगः हस्तकर्म्मणि ॥ ५ । १ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathâ, the same, *i. e.*, not a cause. आत्मसंयोगः Âtma-saṁyogaḥ, conjunction with the soul. हस्तकर्म्मणि Hasta-karmmaṇi, in the action of the hand.

4. In the case of action of the hand, ccnjunction with the soul is not a cause.—184.

In the case of the action of the hand, as it springs upwards with the pestle, ' conjunction with the soul,' *i. e*, conjunction with the soul exercising volition, is ' the same, *i. e.*, not a cause. The term ' not-a-cause ' which appears in the preceding aphorism, is carried over here by ' tathâ,' the same.—4.

Vivriti.—Yhis too is illustrative. If shouln be understood that that volition also is not a non-common efficient cause.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—" Whence then at that time the upward motiou in the hand " ? In answer to this, he says :

अभिघातान्मुषलसंयोगाद्धस्ते कर्म्म ॥ ५ । १ । ५ ॥

अभिघातात् Abhighâtât, from impact. मुषलसंयोगात् Muṣala-saṁyogât, from conjunction with the peetle. हस्ते Hoste, in the hand. कर्म्म Karmma, action.

5. The action (*i. e.*, upward motion) in the hand is from impact, and from conjunction with the pestle.—185.

As, when the pestle flies upwards, the iron-ring at the end of the pestle rises upwards, so the hand also at that time springs upwards. Here by the word, ' impact,' re-action (*i. e.*, recoil) produced by impact, is expressed by transference. By the vigorous action of the up-going pestle, accompanied with the impact, re-action or recoil is produced in the pestle itself which is the substratum of that substratum of that action. Subject to the re-action so effected, upward motion appears in the hand also, in consequence of the conjunction of the hand and the pestle, as its non-combinative cause ; and not that this upward motion has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with the soul exercising volition, for the hand rises involuntarily together with the pestle. This is the idea.—5.

Action in the body.

Upaskâra.—" well," it may be asked, " conjunction with the soul exercising volition is the cause of the action which is produced in the body or in a part of the body. Why is it not so in the present instance " ? Hence he says :

आत्मकर्म्म हस्तसंयोगाच्च ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

आत्मकर्म्म Âtma-karmma, action of the body, and its members. हस्तसंयोगात् Hasta-saṁyogât, from conjunction with the hand. च Cha, and, also.

6. Action of the body and its members is also from conjunction with the hand.—186.

The word ' âtmâ,' by transference, means the body and its parts. For, impossibility of order or coherence in the text, is the germ of a transference of epithet. Thus the action which appears in a part of the body also, that is, in the hand, arises from the conjunction of the hand and the pestle. The would ' cha ' implies also impetus. In the action of the hand, conjunction with the hand is really the non-combi-

native cause. There is no deviation or breach of uniformity in this respect. This conjunction is sometimes conjunction with the soul exercising volition, and sometimes conjunction of the hand with pestle, etc., possessing impetus, as is the case with the action of the body and its parts, of a mad man.—6.

Falling how produced.

Upaskâra.—He begins the section on action independent of volition :

संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ ५ । १ । ७ ॥

संयोगाभावे Saṁyoga-abhâve, in the absence of conjunction. गुरुत्वात् Gurutvât, from gravity. पतनम् Patanam, falling.

7. In the absenee of conjunction, falling (results) from gravity.—187.

By the term, ' conjunction,' every kind of impediment is indicated. Hence in the absence of impediments, in consequence of gravity as its non-combinative cause, falling *i. e.*, an action resulting in conjunction below, is produced. Here in fruit, etc., possessing gravity, the impediment is conjunction ; in a bird, etc., however, volition to hold up is the impediment to falling ; in an arrow, etc., when discharged, it is the re-action that is the impediment to falling. The meaning is that, in the absence of these, falling is caused by gravity. In the case of holding up of poison, etc., in the air, by thought-transference, etc., conjunction with the soul endowed with *adriṣṭam* (invisible after-effects of previous acts), or *mantra*, and the like are really the impediments. These also are included by the term ' conjunction.'—7.

Bhâṣya.—reads Saṃskâra in the place of *Saṃyoga.*

Falling how produced—continued.

Upaskâra.—Will, if falling is caused by gravity, then how can there be sometimes an upward, and sometimes a sideward motion in a stone, etc., when thrown up ? To meet this objection, he says :

नोदनविशेषाभावान्नोर्द्ध्वं न तिर्य्यग्गमनम् ॥ ५ । १ । ८ ॥

नोदनविशेषाभावात् Nodana-viśeṣa-abhâvât, owing to the absence of a particular movement or impulse. न Na, not. ऊर्द्ध्वं Urddhvam, upward. न Na, not. तिर्य्यक् Triyyak, oblique, sideward. गमनम् Gamanam, going.

8. Owing to the absence of a particular molecular movement, there arises no upward or sideward motion (in the fruit, bird, and arrow).—188.

The upward or sideward motion which takes place in a stone, arrow, etc., though they possess gravity, results from a particular *i. e.*, a violent, molecular movement. So that in the case of the falling of a fruit, a bird, an arrow, etc., in the absence of conjunction, volition, and re-action, there does not exist a particular movement, and consequently there is no upward or sideward motion. This is the sense.—8.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But whence is particular molecular movement itself produced? He gives the answer :

प्रयत्नविशेषान्नोदनविशेषः ॥ ५ । १ । ६ ॥

प्रयत्नविशेषात् Prayatna-viśeṣât, from a particular volition. नोदनविशेषः Nodana-viśeṣaḥ, particular molecular movement or impulse.

9, Particular molecular movement (results) from particular volition.—189.

Particular volition is caused by the desire "I will throw sideward, upward, far, or near." By this, particular *nodana* or molecular movement is produced, from which upward or sideward motion is possible produced in a substance possessing gravity, *e. g.*, a stone, etc.—9.

Throwing far away, how produced.

Upaskâra.—'Udasanam' means throwing far upwards.

नोदनविशेषादुदसनविशेषः ॥ ५ । २ । १० ॥

नोदनविशेषात् Nodana-viśeṣât, from a particular melecular movement. उदसनविशेषः Udasana-viśeṣaḥ, particular throwing away.

10. From particular molecular movement, (results) particular throwing away.—190.

Vivṛiti.—नोदनविशेषात्, *i. e.*, from a heterogeneous molecular movement produced by the aforesaid volition, उदसनम्, *i. e.*, throwing high upwards, going upwards, भवति, *i. e.*, takes place, which completes the aphorism. Thus, by agreement and difference, the causality of particular molecular movement toward upward motion, is proved. उदसनम्, going upwards, is an indication. Sideward motion, etc., also should be understood.

Non-volitional action, not a cause of virtue or vice.

Upaskâra.—The action which is produced in the hand together with the pestle, by the impact of the mortar, is not at all preceded by volition, nor is it the source of virtue and vice. He extends a similar nature to the playful movements of the hands and feet, etc., of a child :

हस्तकर्म्मणा दारककर्म्म व्याख्यातम् ॥ ५ । १ । ११ ॥

हस्तकर्म्मणा Hasta-karmmaṇâ, by the action of the hand. दारककर्म्म Dâraka-karmma, the action of a child. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

11. By the action of the hand, the action of a child (has been) explained.—191.

Although a child's movement of its hands, feet, etc., is surely preceded by effort, it has not for its result the acquisition of the good and the avoidance of the evil, nor is it consequently a source of virtue and vice. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy.—11.

Vivṛiti.—But how is action, in the form of sideward and upward motion, of the hands and feet of a child lying on the lap, produced, in

the absence therefrom of the particular molecular movement or impulse? So he says;

By the action of the hand, of the form of throwing upwards, etc., simultaneous with the throwing upwards of a stone, the action, *i, e.*, the throwing upwards of the hands and feet, of a child, is explained, *i. e.*, proved. Thus, a particular molecular movement is not the cause of all throwing high upwards, but only of particular acts of throwing high upwards. Hence the throwing upwards of the hands and feet of a child is not unproved. Otherwise, the throwing upwards of the hands of one who throws up a stone, etc., will be also unproved.

Certain volitional action also, not a cause of virtue or vice.

Upaskâra.—Now, extending similarity to the action of a child to action which, though preceded by volition, is yet not the cause of a virtue and vice, he says:

तथा दग्धस्य विस्फोटने ॥ ५ । १ । १२ ॥

तथा Tathâ, the same. दग्धस्य Dagdhasya, of a burnt person. विस्फोटने Visphotane, in the case of a boil.

12. The same (is action directed towards the killing of a felon), when (a house being set on fire by him) the body of a person burnt therein, is torn open by fire.—192.

A house being set on fire by a felon and in it boils being caused to a person burnt by the fire, action which is produced in the hand, etc., by volition directed towards the killing of that felon, is neither a cause of virtue nor a cause of vice; as it has been said, " In the slaying of a felon, there is no sin in him that slays openly or covertly: wrath encounters wrath. An incendiary, a poisoner, an assassin, a thief, a ravisher of wife and field,—these six are felons. "—12.

Vivriti.—Sometimes throwing upwards, etc., result also from particular molecular movements which are not dependent upon particular volition produced by the desires, " I throw upwards," etc. This he points out:

दग्धस्य, of a burnt body, building, fruit, etc.; विस्फोटने, in the going sideward and upward of their parts; तथा, molecular movement, caused by a particular volition, is not the cause. This is the meaning.

Non-volitional action in the body described.

Upaskâra.—Now, he points out actions which take place without volition.

यत्नाभावे प्रसुप्तस्य चलनम् ॥ ५ । १ । १३ ॥

यत्नाभावे Yatna-abhâve, in the absence of volition. प्रसुप्तस्य Prasuptasya, of the sleeping. चलनम् Chalanam, movement.

13. Movement of the sleeping (takes place) in the absence of volition.—193.

The word 'prasuptasya' implies the state of absence of consciousness. Therefore, the movement caused by air in the unconscious state of a person in swoon, while living, should be observed here.—13.

Vivriti.—Even in the absence of volition caused by the desire, "I throw up," etc., 'movement' of the body, *i. e.*, action such as the side-ward and upward movements of the limbs of a person 'sleeping' or attended with deep sleep, is produced. Therefore, a particular volition is not everywhere the cause. This is the import.

Action in things other than the body.

Upaskâra.—Having explained the actions of the body, he treats of other actions :

तृणे कर्म्म वायुसंयोगात् ॥ ५ । १ । १४ ॥

तृणे Triṇe, in the grass. कर्म्म Karmma, action. वायुसंयोगात् Vâyu-saṁyogâṭ, from conjunction with air.

14. Action in the grass (arises) from conjnnction with air. —194.

By the term 'grass,' he implies trees, shrubs, creepers, and all such other objects —14.

Vivriti.—He points out similar other actions also.

Even in the absence of a particular volition, from conjunction with air, action is produced in the grass.

Action produced by adriṣṭaṃ.

Upaskâra.—Enumerating actions dependent upon *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, he says :

मणिगमनं सूच्यभिसर्पणमदृष्टकारणकम् ॥ ५ । १ । १५ ॥

मणिगमनं Maṇi-gamanam, movement of the jewel. सूच्यभिसर्पणं Sûchî-abhisarpaṇam, approach of the needle. अदृष्टकारणकम् Adriṣṭa-kâraṇakam, have *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, (*i.e.*, the invisible consequences of previous acts) as their cause.

15. The movement of the jewel, and the approach of the needle, *adṛiṣṭaṃ* as their cause.—195.

By the term 'jewel,' bell-metal, etc., are implied. In the going, which takes place, therefore, of the jewel, bell-metal, etc., informed with *mantra* or incantation, towards the thief, there, of that movement, the jewel, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction of the jewel with the Soul of the thief possessed of *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, is the non-combinative cause, and the vice of the thief is the efficient or instrumental cause. By the word, 'needle,' in 'the approach of the needle,' all metal as well as grass are implied. Thus, in the case of the movement of the needle, etc., towards that which is attractive of iron (*i. e.*, the magnet), and of the movement of grass towards that which is attractive of grass, the needle, etc., are the combinative cause, conjunction with the soul of the person possessed of *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, who is affected for good or for bad by that movement of the grass, the needle, etc., is the non-combinative cause, and his very *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, is the instrumental cause. Other instances, *e. g.*, the flaming upwards of fire, the sideward motion of air, the action of the ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation, etc., should be similarly understood.—15.

Vivṛiti.—By the term, 'jewel,' are intended vessels made of gold, etc., and filled with water. To such a vessel magicians apply incantations for the recovery of stolen property. The tradition of the ancients is this. The vessel is set on the ground, and some other person lays his right hand upon it. The vessel accompanied with the hand, in consequence of the efficacy of the incantation, moves towards the spot where the stolen property has been deposited, and on reaching that place, stops.

The reason of the movement of such a vessel is not a particular volition, but the efficient cause is the merit of the former possessor or the demerit of the thief. The non-combinative cause is conjunction of such a vessel with soul possessing such *adṛiṣṭam* (or results of actions done in previous states of existence); and the combinative cause is such a vessel. In like manner, *adṛiṣṭam* is also the cause of the attraction towards a loadstone, which takes place in needles, *i. e.*, iron-rods, when in proximity with the magnet. If it be asked, in consequence of whose *adṛiṣṭam* motion takes place in needles, etc., the reply, is that it is the *adṛiṣṭam* of him to whom benefit or injury accrues by the motion, that is the cause. The term, 'needle,' is indicative, iron in general attracted by the load-stone being intended. It is to be understood that *adṛiṣṭam* is the cause of the motion of grass attracted by that which is attractive of grass (amber ?), of the upward flaming of fire, of the sideward motion of air, and of the action of the ultimate atoms at the beginning of creation.

Plurality of action.

Upaskāra.—It may be doubted whether an arrow, a bird, a wheel of burning charcoal, etc., have only one action, or many, till they come to a stop. To remove this doubt, he says :

इषावयुगपत् संयोगविशेषाः कर्म्मान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥ ५ । १ । १६ ॥

इषौ Iṣau, of the arrow. अयुगपत् Ayugapat, non-simultaneous. संयोगविशेषाः Saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ, peculiarities of conjunctions. कर्म्मान्यत्वे Karmma-anyatve, in respect of diversity of action. हेतुः Hetuḥ, cause. Mark

16. Peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions of the arrow, are the mark of the diversity of its action.—195.

In 'iṣau' the locative inflection has been used in the sense of the genitive. The sense of the aphorism is as follows : After conjunction with a wall and the like, of an arrow, etc., moving with impetus, a cessation of motion is observed, even though the arrow, etc., still exist. Here it is not the destruction of the substratum which causes the destruction of the motion, for the substratum continues to exist. Any contradictory attribute is also not observed. It is, therefore, inferred that it is conjunction produced by itself, that destroys the action. And this conjunction, produced at the fourth moment, destroys action of the fifth moment. Thus, first there is production of action, then disjunction, next destruction of the previous conjunction, after it subsequent conjunction, and lastly destruction of action. The meaning, therefore, is that peculiarities of non-simultaneous conjunctions make known the diversity of the action. 'Saṁyoga-viśeṣaḥ' means

peculiarity in conjunction, which is nothing but self-produced-ness. Otherwise, were conjunction, as such, destructive of action, action could not abide anywhere.—16.

Action produced by Saṁskâra.

Upaskâra.—After the section on Action producible by impulse, he begins the section on Action producible by resultant energy.

नोदनादाद्यमिषोः कर्म्म तत्कर्म्मकारिताच्च संस्कारादुत्तरं तथोत्तरमुत्तरञ्च ॥ ५ । १ । १७ ॥

नोदनात् Nodanât, from impulse of molecular movement. आद्यं Âdyam, original, first. इषोः Iṣoḥ, of the arrow. कर्म्म Karmma, action. तत्कर्म्मकारितात् Tat-karmma-kâritât, produced by that action. च Cha, and. संस्कारात् Saṁskârât, from resultant energy. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. तथा Tathâ, similarly. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. उत्तरं Uttaram, the next. च Cha, and.

17. The first action of the arrow is from impulse ; the next is from resultant energy produced by that (*i.e.*, the first) action ; and similarly the next, and the next.—197.

Of the first action, which is produced in an arrow, when discharged from a bowstring, drawn by the volition of a person, the arrow is the combinative cause, volition and gravity are the efficient causes. And by this first action, resultant energy, called impetus, and having the same substratum, is produced. It is proved even by perception, *viz.*, " It (*i. e.*, the arrow) moves with velocity." By that resultant energy, action is produced in that arrow ; of which the non-combinative cause is the resultant energy, the combinative cause is the arrow, while the efficient cause is an intense form of molecular movement. In like manner, a succession of actions one after another is produced by the resultant energy which continues until the arrow falls.

Since, on an action being destroyed by subsequent conjunction produced by (the action) itself, another action is produced by resultant energy, therefore, a single resultant energy only is productive of a succession of actions ; whereas, on the ground of redundancy, it is not proper to assume a succession of resultant energy, similar to the succession of actions. To point out this, he says " similarly the next, and the next," and also uses the singular number in " from resultant energy produced by that action." In the Nyâya doctrine, however, which admits a succession of resultant energies like the succession of actions, there is redundancy. The reason, again, that of two arrows, simultaneously discharged, the impetus of the one is swift and that of the other slow, is the swiftness and slownees of the impulse or molecular movement.—17.

Vivṛiti.—The original action itself of a discharged arrow, etc., destroys, at the third moment from its own origin, its cause, *viz.*, molecular movement or impulse, given by the bow. Therefore, there

being absence of impulse, how will other actions be produced at the fifth, and succeeding moments ? In view of this objection, he states the aphorism.

Falling of arrow, how caused.

Upaskâra.—But if only a single resultant energy be productive of a succession of actions, then there would be, under no circumstances whatever, a falling of the arrow, because of the existence of the resultant energy which is productive of aciton. |To this objection, he replies :

संस्काराभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥ ५ । १ । १८ ॥

संस्काराभावे Saṁskâra-abhâve, in the absence of resultant energy (or propulsive energy generated by action). गुरुत्वात् Gurutvât, from gravity. पतनम् Patanam, falling.

18. In the absence of propulsive energy generated by action, falling (results) from gravity.—198.

Gravity, which is the cause of falling, invariably follows (the arrow), at every moment. That gravity, being counter-acted by resultant energy, could not cause the falling (of the arrow). Now, in the absence of the counter-active, the very same gravity causes falling. This is the meaning.—18.

Here ends the first chapter of the fifth book in Śaṅkara's Commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

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BOOK FIFTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Causes of action in Earth.

Upaskâra.—This is the section on the examination of Action producible by impulse, etc., Therein he says:

नोदनाभिघातात् संयुक्तसंयोगाच्च पृथिव्यां कर्म्म ॥५।२।१॥

नोदनाभिघातात् Nodana-abhighâtât, from molecular movement or impulse, and from impact. संयुक्तसंयोगात् Saṁyukta-Saṁyogât, from conjunction with the conjunct. च Cha, and. पृथिव्यां Prithivyâm, in Earth. कर्म्म Karmma, action.

1. Action in Earth (results) from impulse, impact, and conjunction with the conjunct.—199.

नोदनं is a particular form of conjunction: conjunction, action produced by which does not become the cause of the disjunction of conjoint things from each other; or, conjunction which does not become the efficient cause of Sound. That particular form of conjunction is called impact, which becomes the efficient cause of Sound, and action produced by which becomes the cause of disjunction of conjoint things from each other. By each of them also action is produced in Earth called clay. In Earth action is produced from impulse given by the foot, as well as from the impact of the foot. Here clay is the combinative cause; impulse and impact are respectively non-combinative causes; gravity, impetus, and volition are, so far as they are necessary, efficient causes. "From conjunction with the conjunct:" Because action is simultaneously observed in a water-pot, etc., lying on clay, when action is produced in that clay from impulse or from impact.—1.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But what is the non-combinative cause of earthquake, etc., which take place without the intervention of impulse and impact? He gives the answer:

तद्विशेषेणादृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । २ ॥

तत् Tat, that, *i. e.*, action in Earth. विशेषेण Viśeṣeṇa, with a particular consequence. अदृष्टकारितं Adṛiṣṭa-kâritam, caused by *adṛiṣṭam* or destiny.

2. (If action in Earth happens) with a particular consequence, it is caused by *adṛiṣṭaṁ.*—200.

'Tat' alludes to action in Earth. Action in Earth alone, if it happens with a particular consequence, *i. e.*, under the tendency (*vâsanâ*) of transmigratory souls towards birth, life, and experience (*bhoga*), is then caused by *adṛiṣṭam.* Therefore, the non-combinative cause of earthquake is conjunction of the soul, possessing *adṛiṣṭam*, of a person whose pleasure or pain is produced by the earthquake; the earth is the combinative cause; and *adṛiṣṭaṁ* is the efficient cause.

'Or' 'tat' alludes to impulse and impact. 'Viśeṣaḥ' means absence. So that, the meaning is, action in Earth, which is produced in the absence of impulse and impact, is caused by *adṛiṣṭam*.—2.

Bhâṣya.—explains adriṣṭa in V. ii. 2 in the sense of unseen natural force, the causes of seismic disturbances, of the revolution of the terrestrial globe round the sun, and of other actions in Earth.

Cause of rain.

Upaskâra.—Now, in the section on the examination of action combined with fluid (which includes liquid) substance, he says :

अपां संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् ॥५।२।३॥

अपां Apâm, of waters. संयोगाभावे Saṁyoga-abhâve ; in the absence of conjunction. गुरुत्वात् Gurutvât, from gravity. पतनम् Patanam, falling.

3. The falling of waters, in the absence of conjunction, is due to gravity.—201.

The falling of waters, in the form of a shower, is caused by gravity, which is its non-combinative cause. It takes place in the absence of conjunction, *i. e.*, conjunction with the cloud. Therefore, absence of conjunction is the efficient cause. This is the meaning.—3.

Causes of flowing of water.

Upaskâra.—But how is action, productive of mutual conjunction amongst the drops of water themselves, produced ? He gives the answer.

द्रवत्वात् स्यन्दनम् ॥५।२।४॥

द्रवत्वात् Dravatvât, from fluidity. स्यन्दनम् Syandanam, flowing.

4. Flowing (results) from fludity.—202-

By the mutual conjunction of drops of water fallen on earth, a large body of water, in the form of a stream, is produced. And the flowing or distant progression, which takes place in it, is produced from fluidity as its non-combinative cause, and from gravity as its efficient cause, in water drops which are its combinative causes.—4.

Cause of evaporation of water.

Upaskâra.—But the falling in rain, due to gravity, would be possible, if water lying on earth went up. But how does this take place ? So he says :

नाड्यो वायुसंयोगादारोहणम् ॥५।२।५॥

नाड्यो Nâdyaḥ, the sun's rays. वायुसंयोगात् Vâyu-saṁyogât, through conjunction with air. आरोहणम् Ârohaṇam, ascent.

5. The sun's rays (cause) the ascent (of water), through conjunction with air.—203.

The word, 'cause' (verb), is the complement of the aphorism. The rays of the sun cause the going up of water, through conjunction with air.

In the summer, the sun's rays, being impelled by air, cause the ascent of water. This is the meaning.

Where the reading is नाड्यवायुसंयोगात् there it should be interpreted as conjunction with air related to the sun's rays.—5.

Cause of evaporation of water, continued.

Upaskâra.—But how do the sun's rays come to possess such power that they carry up water lying on the earth? Hence he says.

नोदनापीडनात् संयुक्तसंयोगाच्च ॥ ५ । २ । ६ ॥

नोदनापीडनात्—Nodana-âpîḍanât, from concussion, or being violently shaken by or through the impulse. संयुक्तसंयोगात् Saṁyukta-saṁyogât, from conjunction with the conjunct. च Cha, and.

6. (Particles of water fly upwards), by means of concussion with impulse, and of conjunction with the conjunct.—204.

Particles of water fly up, being conjoined with the sun's rays, which are, in turn, conjoined with air, through concussion with the impulse of strong wind; in the same way as the rays of fire, bestirred by air, carry up particles of water boiling in a cauldron. The word 'cha' conveys the sense of 'as.' And here only particles of water boiling in a cauldron should be observed to be the simile.—6.

NOTE: *Upaskâra* compares the two processes of evaporation and ebullition of water

Cause of circulation of water in trees.

Upaskâra.—Water poured at the root, goes up in all directions, through the interior of a tree. Neither impulse and impact, nor the sun's rays prevail there. How, then, is it caused? He gives the answer.

वृक्षाभिसर्पणमित्यदृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । ७ ॥

वृक्षाभिसर्पणं Vriksa-abhisarpaṇam, circulation in trees. इति Iti, this. अदृष्टकारितम् Adrisṭa-kâritam, caused by *adrisṭam* or destiny.

7. The circulation (of water) in trees is caused by *adrisṭam*. —205.

'Abhisarpaṇam' means flowing towards or all over. That takes place in a tree, of water poured at its root. It is caused by *adrisṭam, i. e.*, of those souls whose pleasure or pain is produced by the growth of the leaves, branches, fruits, flowers, etc. The meaning, then, is that action by which water rises up and causes the growth of trees, arises from conjunction with the above-mentioned souls, possessing *adrisṭam*, as its non-combinative cause, and from *adrisṭam*, as its efficient cause, in water which is its combinative cause.—7.

Cause of condensation and dissolution of water.

Upaskâra.—Constitutional fluidity has been stated to be the characteristic of water. Upward, downward, and sideward motion of such water only has been proved. The aqueousness of snow, hail, etc., also are proved without a dispute, since they possess coldness. Therefore, how do these possess condensation, *i. e.*, hardness, and how dissolution? Hence he says.

अपां सङ्घातो विलयनञ्च तेजःसंयोगात् ॥ ५ ।२ । ८ ॥

अपां Apâm, of waters. सङ्घातः Saṅghâtaḥ, condensation. विलयनं Vilayanam, dissolution. च Cha, and. तेजःसंयोगात् Tejaḥ-saṁyogât, from conjunction with fire.

8. Condensation, and dissolution, of water, are due to conjunction with fire.—206.

Aqueous ultimate atoms, originating a binary atomic aggregate, in consequence of being impeded by celestial fire, do not originate fluidity in these binary atomic aggregates. Snow, hail, etc, void of fluidity, are thus originated, in the course of binary and others atomic aggregates, by constituent parts void of fluidity. Therefore hardness is observed in them.

Such being the case, it may be asked, what proof is there that snow, hail, etc., are modifications of water? Accordingly it has been said, "Dissolution also from conjunction with fire." By a more powerful conjunction with fire, action is produced in the ultimate atoms originative of snow, hail, etc. Action produces disjunction. From the successive destruction thereby of originative conjunctions follows the destruction of the larger compounds, snow, hail, etc. In consequence of the departure therefrom of conjunction with fire, which was an impediment to fluidity, the very same ultimate atoms originate fluidity in binary atomic aggregates; whence dissolution takes place of snow, hail, etc., thus endowed with fluidity. Here also the subsequent ingress of a more powerful fire is the efficient cause.—8.

Bhâsya.—splits up V. ii. 8 into two aphorisms, *viz.*, *Apâm Saṅghâtaḥ*, and *Vilayañcha tejaḥ saṃyogât.*

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But what is the proof that there is subsequent ingress into water of a more powerful fire present in other? So he says :

तत्र विस्फुर्जथुर्लिङ्गम् ॥ ५ । २ । ९ ॥

तत्र Tatra, there, *i. e.*, in the case of the ingress of fire into water. विस्फुर्जथुः Visphurjjathuḥ, the pealing of thunder. लिङ्गम् Liṅgam, mark.

9. The pealing of thunder is the mark of that.—207.

'Tatra,' *i. e.*, in the matter of the subsequent ingress of fire, present in ether, into water floating in ether, 'visphurjjathuḥ liṅgam,' *i.e.*, the pealing of thunder itself is the mark. This is the meaning. Far-reaching flash of lightning is clearly perceptible; thunder which immediately follows it, is also really perceptible. By this it is inferred that fire present in ether, in the form of lightning, has entered into the cloud from which hailstones appear. By its presence, as a condition, impediment is caused to the fluidity of water-particles originative of hailstones.—9

Cause of condensation of water, continued.

Upaskâra.—Of this he gives yet another proof.

वैदिकश्च ॥ ५ । २ । १०॥

वैदिकं Vaidikam, Vedic, Derived from Veda. च Cha and.

10. (There is) Vedic (proof) also.—208.

The meaning is that the ingress of fire into water is proved by the Veda also. Thus :—

"आपस्ता अग्निं गर्भमादधीरन्,
या अग्निं गर्भं दधिरे सुवर्णं" इत्यादि ।

"Those waters held fire in their womb, which held fire in their womb," etc.—10.

Cause of thundering.

Upaskâra.—But how is thundering produced, since conjunction and disjunction, which are the causes of Sound, are not observed ? Hence he says :

अपां संयोगाद्विभागाच्च स्तनयित्नोः ॥ ५ । २ । ११ ॥

अपां Apâm, of waters. संयोगात् Saṁyogât, from conjunction. विभागात् Vibhâgât, from disjunction. च Cha, and. स्तनयित्नोः Stanayitnoḥ. of cloud.

11. (Thunder-clap results) from conjunction with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud.—209.

"Visphurjjathuḥ" is the complement of the aphorism. Conjunction with, and disjunction from, water, of the cloud, by becoming efficient causes, produce sound, *i. e.*, thundering, in ether as the combinative cause, through the conjunction of the cloud itself with ether, as the non-combinative cause. Sometimes, again, conjunction with, and disjunction from, air, of the cloud, are the efficient causes, and conjunction of the cloud with ether, and its disjunction therefrom, are the non-combinative causes. This is collaterally mentioned in the topic of the causes of action. Or, since action is the leading topic here, it is indicated that, conjunction of the cloud and ether, or their disjunction, being the non-combinative cause of sound, the (efficient) cause is action produced from the impulse and impact of water alone—11.

Vivṛiti.—Thundering takes place from the conjunction of water, *i. e.*, from the impact of air with it, and from its disjunction from the cloud.

Causes of conflagration, tempest, etc.

Upaskâra.—It has been stated that conjunction with soul possession *adṛiṣtam* is a cause of earth-quake. As there, so in the case of the action which is produced in fire which causes sudden conflagration, and in air which causes a sudden agitation of trees and the like, conjunction with soul possessing *adṛiṣtam* is also the non-combinative cause ; air and fire are the combinative causes ; and *adṛiṣtam* is the efficient cause. This is the meaning.

पृथिवीकर्म्मणा तेजःकर्म्म वायुकर्म्म च व्याख्यातम्
॥ ५ । २ । १२ ॥

पृथिवीकर्म्मणा Prithivi-karmmaṇâ, by the action of Earth. तेजःकर्म्म Tejaḥ-karmma, action of fire. वायुकर्म्म Vâyu-karmma, action of air. च Cha, and व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

12. The action of Fire, and the action of Air are explained by the action of Earth.—210.

The twice recurrence of the word action in the aphorism, has the object of indicating the action of meteors, etc.—12.

Causes of initial action of fire, air, atoms, and mind.

Upskâra.—He mentions other actions of which conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣtam* s the non-combinative cause.

अग्नेरूर्द्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्य्यक्पवनमणूनां मनसश्चाद्यं कर्म्मादृष्टकारितम् ॥ ५ । २ । १३ ॥

अग्नेः Agneḥ, of fire. ऊर्द्ध्वज्वलनं Ûrddhva-jvalanam, flaming upward. वायोः Vâyoḥ, of air. तिर्य्यक् Tiryyak, sideward. पवनं Pavanam, blowing. अणूनां Aṇunâm, of atoms, मनसः Manasaḥ. of mind. च Cha, and. आद्यं Âdyam, initial, first. कर्म्म Karmma, action. अदृष्ट कारितम् Adrista-kâritam, caused by *adriṣtam*.

13. The initial upward flaming of fire, the initial sideward blowing of air, and the initial actions of atoms, and of mind are caused by *adriṣtam*.—211.

'Âdyam' means contemporaneous with, or existing at, the beginning of creation. At that stage, impulse, impact, etc., being non-existent, conjunction with soul possessing *adriṣtam* is in these cases the non-combinative cause. The adjective, 'initial,' qualifies upward flaming, and sideward blowing also. It is proper to hold that impetus is the non-combinative cause of other (than initial) actions of fire and air, for there being a visible or known cause there is no occasion for the supposition of an invisible or unknown cause—13.

Cause of action of mind.

Upaskâra.—With reference to non-initial action, he says :

हस्तकर्म्मणा मनसः कर्म्म व्याख्यातम् ॥ ५ । २ । १४ ॥

हस्तकर्म्मणा Hasta-karmmaṇâ, by the action of the hand. मनसः Manasaḥ of mind or the internal organ. कर्म्म karmma, action. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

14. The action of mind is explaind by the action of the hand.—212.

As in the throwing upward, etc., of the pestle, the action of the hand has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercising volition, so the action of the mind also, for the purpose of coming

into contact with the (external) sense receptive of the object desired, really has for its non-combinative cause conjunction with soul exercising volition. Although mind, the sense, is not directly subject to volition, still it should be observed that action is produced in mind by volition which can be reached by the nervous process by which mind travels. That the nervous process can be apprehended by the tactual sense-organ, however, must be admitted; for, otherwise, assimilation of food, drink, etc., also will not be possible by volition which can be reached by the nervous process through which life or the vital energy travels.—14.

Pleasure and pain are marks of action of mind.

Upaskâra.—But, it may be objected, there is no proof that action is produced in the mind. Hence he says:

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् सुखदुःखे ॥ ५ । २ । १५ ॥

आत्मेन्द्रियमनोऽर्थसन्निकर्षात् Âtmâ-indriya-manaḥ-artha-sannikarṣât, from contact of soul, sense, mind, and object. सुखदुःखे Sukha-duḥkhe, pleasure and pain.

15. Pleasure and pain (results) from contact of soul, sense, mind, and object.—213.

'Pleasure and pain' is indicative; cognition, volition, etc., are to be understood. The universality or ubiquity of mind has been already refuted and its atom-ness established. It has also been stated that the non-production of cognitions simultaneously is the mark of mind. There could, therefore, be no pleasure and pain at all, without the conjunction of mind with the respective localities of the senses. The meaning is that, did no action take place in mind, there could be no feeling in the form of "Pleasure in my foot," "Pain in my head," etc. Although all the particular attributes of the soul depend upon contact of mind, yet pleasure and pain are (alone expressly) mentioned, because, on account of their intensity, they are very manifest.—15.

Yoga *described.*

Upaskâra.—Well, if the mind is so fickle or restless, then there being no inhibition or restraint of the internal organ there can be no *yoga* or communion, and without *yoga* there can be no intuitive knowledge of the soul, and without it, there can be no *mokṣa* or salvation. Therefore, the undertaking of this treatise is futile. In anticipation of this objection he says:

तदनारम्भ आत्मस्थे मनसि शरीरस्य दुःखाभावः स योगः ॥ ५ । २ । १६ ॥

तदनारम्भः Tat-anârambhaḥ, non-origination of that, *i. e.*, pleasure and pain, or action of mind. आत्मस्थे Âtmasthe, steady in the soul. मनसि manasi, mind being. शरीरस्य Śarîrasya, of body, *i. e.*, of the embodied soul. दुःखाभावः duḥkha-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of pain. स Saḥ, that. योगः Yogaḥ, *yoga*, communion.

16. Non-origination of that (follows) on the mind becoming steady in the soul; (after it, there is) non-existence of pain in the embodied soul. (This is) that *yoga*.—214.

When the mind of an indifferent person who has come to believe in the vanity of all objects of enjoyment, comes to stay only in the soul, at that stage, owing to the absence of volition corresponding to its action, action is not produced in the mind which then becomes comparatively steady. It is this (state) which is (called) *yoga*, since the characteristic of *yoga* is the inhibition or restraint of the internal organ, *chittam*.

'Tat-anârambhaḥ, means non-origination of action of mind. Or, by the word, 'tat,' only pleasure and pain are denoted, being in the context. 'Duḥkha-abhâvaḥ'; Being the means of the non-existence of pain, *Yoga* itself is (spoken of as) non-existence of pain, as is the expression "Food is life." Or, it is a relative compound word meaning where there is non-existence of pain. 'Śarîrasya' means the soul as limited or determined by the body. 'Saḥ yogaḥ': here the word, 'that,' refers to a universally known object, (the meaning being) this is that *Yoga*.

Or, by the word, 'âtmâ,' life is here denoted by transference, since soul is inferred by life. So that, by action in the nervous process which is the channel of the life breath, action of the life breath, (respiration), is also produced. Or, the action of the life breath has, for its non-combinative cause, conjunction of the life-breath with soul exercising volition the source of vitality. And volition, which is the source of vitality, is supersensible, and has to be inferred by the movement of the life-breath. Otherwise, how can there be inspiration of air, even in the state of deep sleep? This is the import.—16.

Vivṛiti.—'Âtmasthe manasi,' *i. e.*, when, quitting the senses, etc., in virtue of the six-limbed *Yoga*, mind abides in the soul alone, then, 'tat-anârambhaḥ,' *i. e.*, 'anârambhaḥ' or non-production of action of mind. The mind then becomes fixed or steady. In this state, 'Śarîrasya duḥkha-abhâvaḥ,' *i. e.*, pain in relation to the body is not produced. 'Saḥ,' *i. e.*, conjunction of mind, resiling from the outside, with soul, is called *Yoga*.

The following verses of *Skandapurâṇam* also prove the same thing:

वाताहतं तथा चित्तं तस्मात्तस्य न विश्वसेत् ।
अतोऽनिलं निरुन्धीत चित्तस्य स्थैर्य्यहेतवे ॥
मरुन्निरोधनार्थाय षडङ्गं योगमभ्यसेत् ।
आसनं प्राणसंरोधः प्रत्याहारश्च धारणा ।
ध्यानं समाधिरेतानि योगाङ्गानि भवन्ति षट् ॥

"So also, (*i. e.* restless) is *Chitta*, (*i. e.*, the internal organ), smitten with air. Therefore, do not trust it. Accordingly, restrain air, for the purpose of steadiness of *Chitta*. For the purpose of restraining air, practise *Yoga*, of which there are six *aṅgas* or limbs. Posture, Regulation of breath, Abstraction or Inhibition of the senses, Concentration of mind, Meditation, and Absorption,—these are the six *aṅgas* or limbs of *Yoga* or communion."

Therefore, there being cessation of false knowledge, etc., brought about by the manifestation of intuitive knowledge of soul, after the attainment of *Yoga*, final emancipation remains unimpeded. Consequently a system of thinking about things (like *Kaṇâda Sûtras*) is not fruitless. This is the import.

Other actions of mind, etc. independent of volition, and dependent on adṛiṣṭam.

Upaskâra.—But, if volition were the efficient cause of the action of life and mind, then, when life and mind go out from the body, in the state of death, and, on the production of another body, re-enter into it, there being no volition, both these actions would be impossible. How, again, can be produced action, productive of conjunction of even what is eaten and drunk, *i. e.*, food and drink, which conjunction is the cause of the growth of the body and its limbs, as well as action which causes conjunction and disjunction during life within the womb ? In anticipation of this objection, he says :

अपसर्पणमुपसर्पणमशितपीतसंयोगाः कार्य्यान्तरसंयोगाश्चेत्यदृष्टकारितानि ॥ ५ । २ । १७ ॥

अपसर्पणं Apasarpaṇam, going out, egress. उपसर्पणं Upasarpaṇam, coming into, ingress. अशितपीतसंयोगाः Aśita-pîta-saṁyogâḥ, conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk. कार्य्यान्तरसंयोगाः Kâryya-antara-saṁyogâḥ, conjunctions of other effects or products. च Cha, and. अदृष्टकारितानि Adṛiṣṭa-kâritâni, caused by *adṛiṣṭam.*

17. Egress and ingress (of life and mind, from and into, body), conjunctions (*i.e.*, assimilation) of food and drink, and conjunctions of other products,—these are caused by *adṛiṣṭam.*—215.

Here the neuter gender in the word ' adṛiṣṭa-kâritâni ' is according to the rule that word of the neuter gender, appearing together with a word of another gender, may optionally entail neuter gender in both. The word, ' Saṁyoga,' again, secondarily denotes action which is its cause. ' Apasarpaṇaṁ,' *i. e.*, the going out of life and mind from the body alone, on the wearing away of action which originated the body ; ' Upasarpaṇaṁ,' *i. e.*, the entrance of life and mind into another body as it is produced ; action which is the cause of the conjunction (*i. e.*, assimilation) of food, drink, etc. ; and action which is the cause of the conjunction (*i. e.*, pulsation, etc.) of another product, *i. e.*, the fœtus ;—all these have as their non-combinative cause conjunction with soul possessing *adṛiṣṭam.* The word, ' iti,' implies that the actions of the humours and excreta of the body are also caused by conjunction with soul possessing *adṛiṣṭam,* as their non-combinative cause.—17.

Vivṛiti.—He mentions other actions dependent on *adṛiṣṭam.*

' Apasarpaṇaṁ,' *i. e.*, egress of mind from the body at death ; ' Upasarpaṇaṁ,' *i. e.*, the ingress of mind into another body when it is produced ; action from which conjunctions of what is eaten and drunk, *i. e.*, food and water, are produced ; action from which conjunctions of other effects, *i. e.*, the senses and life, with the body, are produced :—all these are caused by conjunction with soul possessing *adṛiṣṭam,* as the non-combinative cause.

Mokṣa *described.*

Upaskâra.—But, it may be urged, if the production of another body were necessary, how would there be *Mokṣa* ? Hence he says :

तदभावे संयोगाभावोऽप्रादुर्भावश्च मोक्षः ॥ ५ । २ । । १८ ॥

तदभावे Tat-abhâve, in the non-existence of that, *i. e.*, the causal body, or potential body, or the subtle body of impressions and tendencies, acquired during life, which becomes the cause of re-birth, and in re-birth, becomes encased, as it were, in the gross, physical body. संयोगाभावः Saṁyoga-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of conjunction, *i. e.*, with the existing physical body. अप्रादुर्भावः A-prâdurbhâvaḥ, non-re-appearance, or non-re-birth. च Cha, and. मोक्षः Mokṣaḥ, salvation. *Mokṣa.*

18. *Mokṣa* consists in the non-existence of conjunction with the body, when there is at the same time, no potential body existing, and consequently, re-birth cannot take place.—216.

Here the idea is as follows : The power of *Yoga* produces intuitive knowledge of the self ; false knowledge, attended with desire, is thereby annihilated ; consequently, attraction, aversion, stupidity or irrationality or spiritual blindness (*moha*), and other faults due to it, disappear ; then inclination or activity goes away ; birth, due to it, therefore, does not take place ; and, consequently, pain, bound up with birth, also vanishes away. This, then, is the nature of things. Now, in virtue of the power born of *yoga*, a *yogin*, considering the entire mass of virtues and vices, or merits and demerits, which are the uncommon or particular causes of pleasure and pain to be enjoyed, at particular places and times, in the bodies of a horse, an elephant, a serpent, a bird, etc., in accordance with those merits and demerits, and then going through those several forms of physical existence, thereby wears away or exhausts his previously produced merits and demerits by experiencing them. His faults being thus neutralised, when other merits and demerits are not produced, and when there is in consequence no production of another future or potential body, at that time, it is the non-existence of conjunction, which then exists, with the former body, that is (called) *mokṣa*. 'Tat-abhâve' means in the absence of conjunction, in the non-production of a future body.

To meet the objection that this state is common to all at *pralaya*, or periodical dissolution of creation, he adds 'aprâdurbhâvaḥ. The meaning is, after which manifestation of body, etc., does not again take place. 'Saḥ mokṣaḥ :' that is, annihilation of pain, which results in that state, is *Mokṣa*.—18.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected that the stream of bodies being without beginning and without end, the impossibility of emancipation is also the same. Hence he says :

'Tat-abhâve,' *i. e.*, in the absence of *adṛiṣtam*, that is to say, where future *adṛiṣtam* is exhausted by intuitive knowledge of self, and existing *adṛiṣtam*, by experience, *bhoga* ; 'saṁyoga-abhâvaḥ.' *i. e.*, a severance

takes place from connection with the stream or succession of bodies ; following it, is 'aprâdurbhâvaḥ ; *i. e.*, non-production of pain, since the causes, *viz.*, body and *adriṣṭam*, do not exist. It is then and there that emancipation becomes possible. Therefore, emancipation is not chimerical like the horns of a hare. This is the import.

Darkaess is non-existence.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected :—The action of a substance is observed also in darkness, there being the perception, "The shadow moves." Here there is no volition, no impulse or impact, no gravity or fluidity, no resultant energy. Therefore, another efficient cause should be enumerated ; but it does not fall within observation. Accordingly he says :

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यादभावस्तमः ॥ ५ । २ । १९ ॥

द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मनिष्पत्तिवैधर्म्यात् Dravya-guṅa-karmma-niṣpatti-vaidharmmyât, because of difference in production from Substance, Attribute, and Action. अभावः Abhâvaḥ, non-being, non-existence. तमः Tamaḥ, darkness.

19. Darkness is non-existence, because it is different in its production from Substance, Attribute, and Action.—217.

By this aphorism, the determination or delimitation that substances are nine only, also becomes established.

Now, the production of substance is dependent upon substances possessing touch ; but in darkness, touch is not felt. It cannot be that touch is only undeveloped here ; for development of touch is essential to development of colour.

Objection.—This is the rule in case of Earth, whereas darkness is the tenth substance.

Answer.—It is not. For no other substance is substratum of blue colour, and gravity is inseparable from blue colour, as also are taste and smell.

Objection.—As sound is the only distinguishing attribute of Ether, so also will blue colour be the only distinguishing attribute of darkness.

Answer.—It is not so, as there is contradiction to its visibility. For, if darkness were something possessing blue colour, or were it blue colour itself, then it would not be perceived by the eye without the help of external light.—19.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—What, then, causes the perception of motion (in darkness) ? He gives the answer :

तेजसो द्रव्यान्तरेणावरणाच्च ॥ ५ । २ । २० ॥

तेजसः Tejasaḥ, of light. द्रव्यान्तरेण Dravya-antareṇa, by another substance. आवरणात् Âvaraṇât, because of obscuration. च Cha, and also.

20. (Darkness is non-existence), also because (it is produced) from the obscuration of light by another substance.—218.

Light being obscured by another moving substance, non-existence of light is not observed in the places falling behind, and is observed in the places lying before. It is from this resemblance of the non-existence of light to the moving substance, that, motion is mistaken in it, but not that motion is real in it. This is the meaning, the perception appearing so (*i. e.*, erroneous) from agreement and difference. (That is, whenever a body in motion obscures light, the shadow caused thereby also moves; and where the obscuring body is not in motion, the shadow also does not move).

Darkness, (then), is non-existence of every trace of light possessing developed or appreciable colour.—20.

Space, Time, Ether, and Soul are void of action.

Upaskâra.—Having thus finished the parenthetical section on darkness, in two aphorisms, he begins the section on voidness of action :

दिक्कालावाकाशञ्च क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यान्निष्क्रियाणि ५ । २ । २१ ॥

दिक्कालौ Dik-kâlau, space and time. आकाशं Âkâśaṁ, ether. च Cha, and also. क्रियावद्वैधर्म्यात् Kriyâvat-vaidharmmyât, because of difference from that which possesses activity. निष्क्रियाणि Niṣkriyâṇi, inactive.

21. Space, Time, and also Ether are inactive, because of their difference from that which possesses activity.—219.

The word 'Cha' brings in the soul. Difference from that which possesses activity lies in the imponderableness or incorporiety of space, etc., for activity always accompanies corporeity or form.—21.

Action, Attribute, Genus, Species, and Combination are void of action.

Upaskâra.—He points out the inactivity of actions and attributes :

एतेन कर्म्माणि गुणाश्च व्याख्याताः ॥ ५ । २ । २२ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, actions. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes. च Cha, and. व्याख्याताः Vyâkhyâtâḥ, explained.

22. By this, Actions and Attributes are explained (as inactive).—220,

'Etena' means by difference from that which possesses activity. Difference from that which possesses activity, in other words, incorporeity or imponderableness, belongs to attribute and action. They are, therefore, explained to be inactive.—22.

Vivriti.—The word 'Cha' implies Genus, etc.

Combination has no beginning, and so is independent of action.

Upaskâra.—It may be urged :—If attribute and action are inactive, how then can there be relation of substance with them? Connection by conjunction may be possible; but that is dependent upon action. Hence he says :

निष्क्रियाणां समवायः कर्म्मभ्यो निषिद्धः ॥ ५ । २ । २३ ॥

निष्क्रियाणां Niṣkriyâṇâṁ, of the inactive. समवायः Samavâyaḥ, combination. कर्म्मभ्यः Karmmabhyaḥ, from actions. निषिद्धः Niṣiddhaḥ, excluded, beyond, independent.

23. (The relation) of the inactive (*i.e.*, Attribute and Action), (to Substance), is Combination, (which is) independent of actions. —221.

It is combination which is the relation of attributes and actions (to substance). It is excluded from actions. The meaning is that this relation, *i. e.*, combination, has no production even, and that its dependency upon action, therefore, remains at a long distance.—23.

Attributes are non-combinative causes.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected : If attributes, being imponderable, are not the combinative causes of action, then how are attributes and actions produced by attributes ? For causality, save and except in the form of combinative causality, is not possible. To meet this objection, he says :

कारणन्त्वसमवायिनो गुणाः ॥ ५ । २ । २४ ॥

कारणं Kâraṇaṁ, cause. तु Tu, however. असमवायिनः A-samavâyinaḥ, non-combinative. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes.

24. Attributes are, however, non-combinative causes.—222.

Attributes are non-combinative causes but not combinative causes also, whereby they might be receptacles or fields of action. And that non-combinative causality arises, in some cases, from combination in the same object with the effect, as that of the conjunction of soul and mind in the particular attributes of the soul, and of conjunction, disjunction, and sound in sound, and, in other cases, from combination in the same object with the cause, as that of the colour, etc., of potsherds, etc., in the colour, etc., of the water-pot, etc.—24.

Vivṛiti.—The use of ' cause ' instead of causes, is aphoristic.

Space is a non-combinative cause.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected :—Action is produced *here*. Action is produced *now*. On the strength of such perceptions, Space and Time also are surely combinative causes of action. How, otherwise, could they be assigned as the seat of action in these cases ? Accordingly he says:

गुणैर्दिग्व्याख्याता ॥ ५ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. दिक् Dik, space. व्याख्याता Vyâkhyâtâḥ. explained.

25. Space is explained by Attributes.—223.

The meaning is that gravity, and other attributes, being imponderable, are not the combinative cause of action, so space also, being imponderable, is not the combinative cause of action. As to being the seat or receptacle, however, it can arise even without combinative

causality, as in "cotton-seeds in a bowl," "curd in a bowl," "the roaring of a lion in the forest," and other instances.—25.

Time is an efficient cause.

Upaskâra.—With the same object as already stated, he says :

कारणेन कालः ॥ ५ ।२ । २६

कारणेन Kâraṇena, by cause, *i. e.*, by way of efficient causality. कालः Kâlaḥ., Time.

26. By way of (efficient) causality, (the reference of action to Time as its seats, being explained), Time (is explained to be inactive, so far as combinative causality is concerned).—224.

The syntactical connection of the aphorism is with "explained to be inactive,"—corresponding words in the preceding aphorism, with necessary changes. The use of 'Kâraṇena,' instead of 'nimittakâraṇena,' is an instace of denoting an object principally as an existence, (*i. e.*, without qualification). The meaning, therefore, is that Time, being the efficient cause, is only the seat of action, but is not its combinative cause.—26.

Here ends the second chapter of the fifth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Visśeṣika Aphorisms.

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BOOK SIXTH—CHAPTER FIRST-

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative.

Upaskâra.—The subject of the sixth book is the examination of *dharma*, virtue or merit, and *adharma*, vice or demerit, which are the root causes of transmigration, *Dharma* and *adharma*, again, have to be supposed on the strength of such precepts and prohibitions as "Let him who desire heaven, perform sacrifices." "Let him not eat tobacco," etc., and their existence depends upon the authoritativeness of these perceptive and prohibitive texts. And that authoritativeness can be possible or arise from the speaker's previously possessing the attribute characterised as knowledge of the meaning of the sentences as corresponding to objective reality since authoritativeness *per se* is excluded. Hence the author, in the first place, commences the demonstration of the attribute which clothes the Veda with authoritativeness.

बुद्धिपूर्व्वा वाक्यकृतिर्वेदे ॥ ६ । १ । १ ॥

बुद्धिपूर्व्वा Buddhi-pûrvvâ, preceded by understanding, वाक्यकृतिः Vâkya-Kritiḥ, composition of sentences. वेदे Vede, in the Veda.

1. In the Veda the composition of sentence has been preceded by understanding.—225

'Vâkya-kritiḥ,' *i. e.*, composition of sentences, is 'buddhi-pûrvvâ,' *i. e.*, preceded by the speaker's knowledge of the meaning of the sentences as corresponding to objective reality because it is composition of sentences, like composition by ourselves and others of such sentences as "There lie five fruits on the bank of the river.'

'In the Veda' means in the aggregate of sentences. Here the composition of aggregated sentences is the *pakṣa* (*i. e.*, the subject of the conclusion). It cannot be otherwise established (as authoritative), namely by the characteristic of being preceded by the understanding of ourselves and others ; for, in such instances as "Let him who desires heaven, perform sacrifices," the fact that performance of sacrifices is a means of attaining the desired object, or that securing heaven is an effect, is beyond the reach of our and others' understanding. It is, therefore, proved that the Veda, as an effect, has for its antecedent an Absolute or Independent Person. And the characteristic of the Veda is that, while the subject of its meaning is not certain knowledge produced by proof other than the proof supplied by words and all that which depends upon them, it is word of which the proof or authority is not produced by knowledge of the meaning of sentences produced by words.—1.

Vivṛiti.—By this aphorism, the doctrine of Mîmâṁsâ philosophy, that word is eternal, is refuted.

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.

Upaskâra.—He shows in another manner that the sentences of the Veda have been preceded by understanding :

ब्राह्मणे संज्ञाकर्म्म सिद्धिलिङ्गम् ॥ ६ । १ । २ ॥

ब्राह्मणे Brâhmaṇe, in the portion of Veda, so called. संज्ञाकर्म्म Saṁjñâ-Karma, attribution or distribution of names. सिद्धिलिङ्गम् Siddhi-lingaṁ, mark of knowledge of things named, or of the conclusion that the Veda is an intelligent production.

2. The distribution of names in the Brâhmaṇa (portion of the Veda) is a mark of knowledge, (on the part of the framer of the names), of the things named (therein).—226.

Here 'Brâhmaṇaṁ' denotes a particular portion of the Veda. 'Saṁjñâ-Karmma,' i. e, the distribution of names, which appears there, points to understanding on the part of the framer of the names, as in the world the distribution of such names as Long-ear, Long-nose, Long-neck, does.—2.

The Veda is a work of intelligence, and therefore, authoritative, continued.

Upaskâra.—He mentions another form of proof :

बुद्धिपूर्व्वो ददातिः ॥ ६ । १ । ३ ॥

बुद्धिपूर्व्वः Buddhi-pûrvvaḥ, preceded by understanding. ददातिः Dadâtiḥ, gives, to give, gift.

3. (Precepts enjoining) gift (are) preceded by understanding. —227.

The injunction of gift (as a source of *dharma*), which has been established in such text as "Let him who desires heaven, give a cow," has been made from the knowledge that it is the means of attaining the object desired. The conjugated form, 'dadâtiḥ,' gives, topically denotes 'gift' which is the meaning of the root 'to give.'—3.

Above continued.

Upaskâra—He gives yet another proof :

तथा प्रतिग्रहः ॥ ६ । १ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathâ, so, the same. प्रतिग्रहः Pratigrahaḥ acceptance.

4. The same is acceptance (of a gift.)—228.

Texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of gifts, are also preceded by understanding. The word, "pratigrahaḥ" indicates a Vedic text of which it is the subject. Thus, texts of the Veda, enjoining acceptance of land, etc., imply its efficacy to the welfare of the acceptor. Texts of the Veda, of which the subject-matter is the acceptance of the skin of a black-and-white antelope, point out or bring to light its efficacy towards that which is not desired by the acceptor. And efficacy towards the desired and efficacy towards the undesired, or potencies for good and for evil, cannot, in these cases, appropriately fall within the cognizance of the understanding of persons later born.—4.

Vivṛti.—Although all these have been already explained by the first aphorism, still this much undertaking is for the purpose of pointing out some of the *dharmas* or duties.

Attributes of one soul do not produce effects in another soul : he reaps who sows.

Upaskâra.—Now, in justification of the aphorism of Jaimini, " Result (of action), indicated by the Śâstra, (accruse) to the performer, " (Pûrva-Mîmâṁsâ Sûtram) he says :

आत्मान्तरगुणानामात्मान्तरेऽकारणत्वात्॥ ६ । १ । ५ ॥

आत्मान्तरगुणानां Atmâ-antara-guṇânâṁ, of the attributes of one soul. आत्मान्तरे Âtmâ-antare, in another soul. अकारणत्वात् A-kâraṇatvât, because there is no causality.

5. [" Result (of action) indicated by the Śâstra, (accrues) to the performer"], because there is no causality of the attributes of one soul in (the attributes of) another soul.—229.

Because the attributes of one soul, *e. g.*, merits and demerits arising from sacrifice, slaughter, etc., are not causes of the attributes, in the shape of pleasure and pain, of another soul. This being the case, pleasure and pain are produced by *dharma* and *dharma* appertaining to each individual soul, and not by *dharma* and *dharma* existing in different substrata. Otherwise, the fruits of sacrifice, slaughter, etc., will accrue to him by whom these were not performed, and hence, loss of the fruits of acts done, and acquisition of the fruits of acts not done will be the result.

Objection.—There is no such universal rule since there is a violation of it in the sacrifice for the birth of a son, sacrifice in favour of the departed ancestors, etc. Thus, it is heard that the fruits of *Śrâddha* or performance of obsequies, etc., performed by the son, accrue to the departed ancestor ; it is also heard that the fruit of the sacrifice for the birth of a son, performed by the father, accrues to the son. You connot say that here is really in these cases the co-existence of the performance and its fruit is the same subject, the agent-enjoyer, by means of the fruit accruing to the son and the departed ancestor ; in the one case, the fruit of the *Śraddha* accrues to the son in this way that he becomes the son of departed ancestors participating in the enjoyments of heaven and in the other case, the fruit of the sacrifice accrues to the father in this way that he becomes the father of a vigorous son.

For this view his adriṣtam becomes inoperative, conflicts with the Veda ; for, it is heard that the fruit is only the satisfaction, etc., of the departed ancestor, and the vigorousness, etc., of the son, the supposition of any other fruit being precluded by redundancy.

Anwer.—Let then *âpûrvaṁ or adriṣtam* accrue to the agent as the fruit, while heaven accrues to the departed ancestor.

Objection—It cannot be so, since activity must in your theory, uniformly co-exist in the same subject with the fruit. Otherwise where, immediately after the performance of the *Śrâddha*, the son is liberated and consequently, heaven will not accrue to the departed ancestor.

Objection.—It cannot be said that it " will not accrue," since it is the same in the other way, for, when the departed ancestor is already liberated (*i. e.*, freed from the bonds of all enjoyment and suffering whatever) (prior to the performance of the *Śrâddha*) then no such fruit will issue from the *Śraddha*, however perfect it may be in all its parts.

Conclusion.—But this is not the case. For, the declaration that " Result (of action), indicated by the Śâstra, (accrues) to the performer, being a general rule, admits of exception, in the presence of a strong contradiction, and, in the matter in hand, it is the Śruti, or Revelation of the fruit accruing to the departed ancestor and the son, which is the contradication.

Objection.—This being so, there is proving too much.

Answer.—Not so, for, the corresponding texts of the Veda themselves prevent any such too much proving.

Another objection.—In the case of the greatest gifts (*mahâdânam*, a technical term which denotes sixteen kinds of specially meritorious gift), heaven only (*i. e.*, heaven without the mention of the enjoyer) is fruit, and in the name of whomsoever person they declared to be are performed, the fruit they produce, accrues to that person.

Answer.—This is an absurd argument. For, here there being no contradiction to the general observation, the general observation accompanied with the absence of contradiction or exceptional instance, becomes the rule, and hence, it would not follow that kings and such other persons need not observe fast, etc., though observance of such and such acts would be possible for them by means of other persons, with the intention or prayer that the fruit of those acts may accrue to the former. Moreover, it is the rule, that the thorough performance of the duties of a householder produces fruit in the form of attainment of the world of *Brahmâ*, and thus the declaration in general terms has been made with the object of showing that fruit accrues to each individual agent.

The writer of the *Vṛitti*, however, says : " Result (of action), indicated by the Śâstra," etc., is really a rule without an exception. On the other hand, the fruit which accrues to the departed ancestor, etc., results from the influence of benedictory *mantras* pronounced by Brâhmaṇas entertained at the *Śrâaddha*, etc., the *mantras* in question being in the case of sacrifice for the departed ancestor, " May thy *pitṛis* or departed ancestors have their objects fulfilled," and, in the case of sacrifice for the son, " May a son be born unto thee, who will be vigorous, beautiful as the moon, and the feeder of all," in the same way as neutralization of the effect of poison on the body of a person bitten by a snake, is produced from the recitation of *mantras* or incantation by foresters.—5.

Vivṛiti.—" Result (of action), indicated by the Śâstra, (accrues) to the performer,"—this aphorism of the system of Jaimini should be supplied at the end of the present aphorism ; for otherwise, the ablative in it will remain unconnected.

Entertainment of impure Brâhmanas at a Śrâddha is useless.

Upaskâra.—Those fruits accrue from the benediction of Brâhmaṇas who have been satisfied with the entertainment, and who are not wicked, in other words, whose conduct is in accordance with the *Śâstra*, but not from the benediction of the wicked who have been excluded from the category of recipients, *e g.*, an illegitimate son born during wedlock, an illegitimate son born after the death of the husband, etc. This is what he says here :

तद्दुष्टभोजने न विद्यते ॥ ६ । १ । ६ ॥

तत् Tat, that, *i. e.*, the fruit of benediction. दुष्टभोजने Duṣṭa-bhojane, (Srâddha) in which impure (Brâhmaṇas) are entertained. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists, accrues.

6. That does not exist where the impure are entertained. —230.

'Tat' alludes to the fruit of benediction. The meaning is that where at a *Śrâddha (i. e.,* the observance of obsequial rites) evil or impure Brâhmaṇas are entertained there the fruit of benediction does not accrue to the departed ancestor, or the meaning is this that the fruit of the *Śrâddha* itself does not accrue to the departed ancestor.—6.

Impure explained.

Upaskâra.—Who are they that are called impure ? Accordingly he states the characteristic of the impure.

दुष्टं हिंसायाम् ॥ ६ । १ । ७ ॥

दुष्टं Duṣṭaṁ, wickedness, impurity. हिंसायाम् Hiṁsâyâm, in killing.

7. Impurity (lies) in killing.—231.

Here 'hiṃsâyâm' is indicative of all prohibited acts whatever. The meaning, therefore, is that a person, given to or occupied in a prohibited act, should be known as impure.—7.

Association with the impure is sinful.

Upaskâra.—He says that not only non-existence of fruit accrues from entertaining an impure Brâhmaṇa invited at a *Śrâddha*, but sin also accrues.

तस्य समभिव्याहारतो दोषः ॥ ६ । १ । ८ ॥

तस्य Tasya, his, of the wicked or impure Brâhmaṇa. समभिव्याहारतः Samabhivyâhârataḥ, from companionship or association. दोषः Doṣaḥ, vice, demerit, *adharma*.

8. Demerit results from association with him.—232.

The meaning is that 'doṣaḥ,' *i. e.*, sin, accrues, 'Samabhivyâhârataḥ,' *i. e.*, from association, characterised as eating in the same row, sleeping in company, reading in company, etc., with a Brâhmaṇa engaged in forbidden acts.—8.

Entertainment of a pure Brâhmaṇa is not sinful.

Upaskâra.—Does then sin accrue also from association with one who is not impure ? He says, No.

तदुष्टे न विद्यते ॥ ६ । १ । ९ ॥

तत् Tat, that, *i. e.*, sin. अदुष्टे A-duṣṭe, in the case of (entertaining) one who is not impure. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists, accrues.

9. This does not accure in the case of (entertaining) one who is not impure.—233.

The meaning is that 'tat,' *i. e.*, sin, 'na vidyate,' *i. e.*, does not accrue, where a Brâhmaṇa, whose conduct is in accordance with the precepts and prohibitions of the *Śâstra*, is entertained at a *Śraddha* —9.

Preference should be given to worthy recipients afterwards.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked, what should the rule of conduct be in a case where worthy recipients being not available, unworthy ones are at first invited, but gradually worthy recipients become available. To this he replies :

पुनर्विशिष्टे प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । १ । १० ॥

पुनः Punaḥ, again, afterwards. विशिष्टे Viśiṣṭe, in or to a superior, or a qualified or worthy person, *i. e*, recipient. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛittiḥ, inclination, attention, preference.

10. Preference (should be given), to a worthy recipient (who is available) afterwards.—234.

At a *Śrâddha*, or where gifts have to be received, if qualified persons, *i. e.*, those who do not transgress the rules of the *Śâstra* in their conduct, are obtained, then one should entertain them only, leaving aside the censurable ones, although invited. The rule, " One should not reject persons invited," refers to worthy recipients only. One should, however, gratify censurable persons, who have been invited, by giving money, etc.—10.

Vivṛiti.—But what is to be done where *Śrâddha*, etc., have been performed through the services of an impure Brâmaṇa ? He gives the reply :

Attention should be given to the thing of quality, *i. e.*, the re-performance of the *Śrâddha*, etc., by a pure Brahmaṇa, etc. The *Śrâddha*, previously performed, is all useless. This is the import.

Equals or inferiors, if pure, should be accepted as guests or recipients.

Upaskâra.—He lays down the rule of conduct where, at a *Śrâddha*, distribution of gifts, etc., recipients superior to the agent himself, are not obtained :

समे हीने वा प्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । १ । ११ ॥

समे Same, in or to an equal. हीने Hine, in or to an inferior. वा Vâ, or. प्रवृत्तिः Pravṛittiḥ, inclination, attention, preference.

11. Preference (should be given) to an equal, or to an inferior, (if he is free from impurity or fault).—235.

The meaning is that at Śrâddha, charity, etc., attention or preference should be given to a recipient, free from fault, who is equal, *i. e.*, like oneself, or inferior, *i. e.*, less than oneself, in point of merit, etc., because happiness accrues, to the departed ancestor, from blessings pronounced by them only. The import is that persons prohibited are by all means to be rejected, but not the pure, whether they be equals or inferiors.—11.

Reception of gift is also a source of dharma, *or, stealing is not sinful, in certain circumstances.*

Upaskâra.—Having described the production of *adharma* by the meritorious character of the donation at a *Śrâddha* or charity, he extends production of *dharma* from reception also of a similar nature :

एतेन हीनसमविशिष्टधार्म्मिकेभ्यः परस्वादानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ६ । १ । १२ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. हीनसमविशिष्टधार्म्मिकेभ्यः Hîna-sama-viśiṣṭa dhârmmikebhyaḥ, from inferior, equal, superior virtuous persons. परस्वादानं Parasva-âdânaṁ, reception of property. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

12. By this is explained reception of property from virtuous persons who are inferior, equal, or superior (to oneself).—236.

The excellence of *dharma* is in the order of its mention. The meaning is that *dharma* accrues from the reception of a gift of land, etc., from a virtuous person, whether he be inferior, equal, or superior to oneself. 'Parasvâdânaṁ' means reception of property from another.

The writer of the *Vritti*, however, says : " 'Parasvâdânaṁ,' *i. e.*, the taking of another's property, by theft, etc., is explained. Thus, according to the *Śruti*, शूद्रात् सप्तमे वैश्यादशमे क्षत्रियात् पञ्चदशे ब्राह्मणात् प्राणसंशये, to save himself or his family, suffering from starvation, a man may steal the food of a Śûdra, when he has not obtained food for seven days. Similarly, when he has not obtained food for ten days, or when he has not obtained food for fifteen days, or when life is in danger, to steal food from a Vaiśya, a Kṣatriya, or a Brâhmaṇa respectively, does not tend to *adharma* or sin."—12.

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances.

Upaskâra.—Not only is the taking of another's property, when life is in danger, not forbidden, but in such circumstances those who do not give anything to take away, may even be put to death. By all this there is no loss of *dharma*, or appearance or production of *adharma*. This is what he says :

तथा विरुद्धानां त्यागः ॥ ६ । १ । १३ ॥

तथा Tathâ, likewise. विरुद्धानां Virûddhânâm, of those who stand in the way. त्यागः Tyâgaḥ, the making away with.

13. Likewise the making away with those who stand in the way, (is justified).—237.

The meaning is that they are to be put to death who act in the contrary manner, (*i. e.*, who play the enemy), in such circumstances. So it has been said :

कर्म्मणा येन केनापि मृदुना दारुणेन वा ।
उद्धरेद्दीनमात्मानं समर्थो धर्म्ममाचरेत् ॥

" Let a man save his poor self by whatsoever deed, mild or cruel. When he is able, let him practise *dharma* or righteousness."—13.

Vivriti.—He points out that certain censurable deeds also do not produce sin :

The meaning is that the killing of those who are about to take one's life, is likewise not forbidden, according to the saying " Let one kill an aggressive felon without a second thought."

Note.—The author of the Upaskâra gives up his own context, and here follows the *Vritti* quoted by him under the preceding aphorism.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—But is the making away with another to be resorted to with any distinction whatever ? He says, No :

हीने परे त्यागः ॥ ६ । १ । १४ ॥

हीने Hîne, in an inferior. परे Pare, in another. त्यागः Tyâgaḥ, making away with, killing.

14. Making away with another (is not sinful), if (he is) inferior (to oneself.)—238

If another who does not give anything to take away, is inferior to oneself, he, the Śûdra, or the like, may be put to death.—14.

Vivriti.—' Para ' means an enemy, (and not one who does not give anything to take away).

Killing is not sinful in certain circumstances, continued.

Upaskâra.—With reference to an equal, he says :

समे आत्मत्यागः परत्यागो वा ॥ ६ । १ । १५ ॥

समे Same, in the case of an equal. आत्मत्यागः Âtma-tyâgaḥ, self-abandonment. Suicide. परत्यागः Para-tyâgaḥ, destruction of another. वा Vâ, or.

15. In the cause of an equal, either suicide or destruction of the other (may be resorted to).—239.

Where it is a Brâhmaṇa, equal to oneself, who becomes the adversary, then destruction of oneself only by starvation, etc., is to be committed. Or, if there appear no other means of preserving oneself or one's family, and the opponent be an equal, he is to be then made away with.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—If, then, a person, superior to oneself, become the adversary, should he even be put to death ? He says, No :

विशिष्टे आत्मत्याग इति ॥ ६ । १ । १६ ॥

विशिष्टे Viśiṣte, in the case of a superior. आत्मत्यागः Âtmatyâgaḥ self-destruction. इति Iti, *finis*.

16. In the case of superior, self-destruction (is to be committed).—240.

In the case of a person, superior to oneself, *i. e.*, excellent by the study of the Veda, etc., becomming the opponent, destruction of oneself only is lawful. The meaning is that even when life is in danger, a man may design only his own death, but must not slay a Brâhmaṇa.

'Iti' indicates the end of the chapter.—16.

Here ends the first chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśesika Aphorisms.



BOOK SIXTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Exaltation is the motive of actions of which no visible motive exists.

Upaskâra.—Thus, in the first chapter, because the proof, supplied by the Veda, is produced by some attribute or quality, therefore, in connection with its production, a description of the attribute or quality then the consideration that " Result (of action), indicated by the Śâstra, (accrues) to the performer," and also the consideration of this that under certain circumstances there is non-production of demerit, even on the performance of forbidden acts, have taken place. Now, the author, with a view to explain the second aphorism, " *Dharma* is that from which (results) the attainment of exaltation and the Supreme Good" (I. i. 2, above), is going to make an examination of the production of *dharma* or merit, in particular cases, and accordingly he says :

दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोजनमभ्युदयाय॥ ६ । २ । १॥

दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनानां Drisṭa-adrisṭa-prayojanânâṁ, of which the motives are visible and invisible. दृष्टाभावे Drisṭa-abhâve, where no visible motive exists. प्रयोजनं Prayojanam, motive. अभ्युदयाय Abhyudayâya, for the purpose of exaltation or knowledge of reality.

1. (Of actions) of which the motives are visible and invisible, the motive, where no visible (motive) exists, (tends) to exaltation. —241.

Actions of which the motives are visible, are agriculture, commerce, service under the king, etc. Actions of which the motives are invisible, are sacrifice, charity, *brahmacharya* or celibacy and devotion to learning, etc. Amongst these actions, where no visible object is observed, there an invisible object has to be supposed. And that is conducive to ' exaltation,' *i. e.*, knowledge of reality or truth. Or, in ' abhyudayâya,' the dative has been used in the sense of the nominative. The meaning, therefore, is that the fruit (of the action) is exaltation. The invisible fruit is nothing but *adrisṭam* (or potential after-effects of past acts). If it is produced by *yoga* or holy communion, then the exaltatton is spiritual intuition of the self. If it is produced by, sacrifice, charity, etc., then the exaltation is heaven. Here, again, unlike the actions milking, cooking, etc., which bear fruit then and there but like the actions sowing, ploughing, etc., which bear fruit after a while, the actions sacrificing, giving alms, practising *brahmacharya*, etc., by no means bear fruit then and there, for no such production of fruit is observed. Nor are gain, etc., through being known as virtuous, themselves the fruit ; for those who practise *brahmacharya* have no eye to such fruit. Therefore, heaven, etc., which will accrue in the distant future, are the fruit. And this is not immediately connected with action which by nature speedily vanishes out of existence. Hence it results that there is an intermediate common substratum of the action and the fruit, and this is *apûrvaṁ* or *adrisṭaṁ*.

Actions of which the motive is invisible.

Upaskâra.—He enumerates actions of which the fruits are invisible :

अभिषेचनोपवासब्रह्मचर्य्यगुरुकुलवासवानप्रस्थयज्ञदानप्रोक्षणदिङ्नक्षत्रकालनियमाश्चादृष्टाय ॥ ६ । २ । २ ॥

अभिषेचनोपवासब्रह्मचर्य्यगुरुकुलवासवानप्रस्थयज्ञदानप्रोक्षणदिङ्नक्षत्रकालनियमाः Abhiṣecha-na--upavâsa--brahmacharyya--gurukulavâsa--vânaprastha--yajña--dâna-prokṣaṇa-dikaṣatra-kâla-niyamâḥ—Ablution, Fast, *Brahmacharya*, Residence in the family of the preceptor, Life of retirement in the forest, Sacrifice, Gift, Oblation, Direction, Constellation, Seasons and Religious observances. च Cha, and. अदृष्टाय Adriṣṭâya, condusive to *adriṣṭam*, or invisible fruit.

2. Ablution, fast, *brahmacharya*, residence in the family of the preceptor, life of retirement in the forest, sacrifice, gift, oblation, directions, constellations, seasons, and religious observances conduce to invisible fruit.—242.

'Adṛṣṭâya' means for the purpose of the fruit characterised as *adriṣṭam*, or for the purpose of the fruit, characterised as heaven and salvation, through the gate of *adriṣṭam*. Hereby are included all actions or duties enjoined in the Veda and smṛiti and having *adṛtṣṭam* as their fruit. Here 'abhiṣechanam means ablution as enjoined in such precepts as " One should bathe in the Gaṅgâ (Ganges)." Fast denotes such as is enjoined in such precepts as " One should abstain from food on the eleventh day of the moon." 'Brahmacharyyam' means clutivation of *dharma* in general. 'Gurukulavâsaḥ,' is that of *Brahmachârins* or students for the purpose of stuaying the Veda the twelve-year vow called *Mahâvrata*, etc., 'Vânaprastham' means the duty of those who have retired to the forest on the ripening of age. 'Yajñaḥ' denotes *Râjaasûya*, *Vâjapeya*, and other sacrifices. 'Dânaṁ' is as enjoined by such precepts as " One sbould give away a cow." 'Prokṣaṇaṁ,' is as enjoined by such precepts as "One should offer rice." 'Dik' denotes such as is enjoined by the precepts., "One should perform sacrifice on an altar inclined towards the east," "One should eat rice, etc., facing towards the east," etc. 'Nakṣatraṁ' is such as *Maghâ* (the tenth lunar asterism), etc., on the occasion of a *śaâddha*, etc. 'Mantraḥ' denotes " O, ye waters, who are the sources of pleasures," etc. (Rig Veda X. ix. 1), and other sacred hymns. 'Kâlaḥ' is as is enjoined by such precepts as " Month after month food shall be given to thee" where one should offer food in the afternoon of the day of new moon, " In summer let one be surrounded with five fires," " In spring let one deposit the sacrificial fires," etc. 'Niyamaḥ' means conduct, in accordance with the Śâstra, of those who observe the distinction of caste and the four stages of holy living, *i. e.*, *Varña* and *Âśrama*.

Now, it will be seen that of the *dharma*, so produced, the soul is the combinative cause, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non-combinative cause, and faith and the knowledge of the motives or objects characterised as heaven, etc., are the efficient causes.—2.

Other sources of dharma *and sources of* adharma.

Upaskâra.—**Having thus mentioned the sources of *dharma*, he now mentions them along with the sources of *adharma* also :**

चातुराश्रम्यमुपधा अनुपधाश्च ॥ ६ । २ । ३ ॥

चातुराश्रम्यं Châturâśramyaṁ, the observance of the four Âśramas or stages of holy living, *viz.*, the life of continence and scholarship, the life of a householder, the life of retirement in the woods, and the life of absolute selfrenunciation, (*lit.* living on alms). उपधाः Upadhâḥ, defects in respect of faith, misbeliefs and disbeliefs. अनुपधा Anupadhâ, non-defects in respect of faith, beliefs. च Cha, and.

3. The observance of the four *Âśramas* (has been already mentioned). Misbeliefs and disbeliefs as well as beliefs are also (sources of *adriṣṭam* or *dharma* and *adharma*).—243.

That which is the means of *dharma*, common to the four *Âśramas*, has been, (and thus the sentence should be completed), exhaustively denoted by the preceding aphorism alone. 'Upadhâḥ' means defects of *bhâva* (*i. e.*, sentiment) or faith ; 'anupadhâḥ, means non-defects of *bhâva* or faith. They too should be understood to be the sources of *dharma* and *adharma*, according to themselves. By the word, 'upadhâḥ, *all* the means of *adharma* have been included.—3.

Upadhâ and anupadhâ *explained.*

Upaskâra —Distinguishing *upadhâ* or impurity, and *anupdhâ* or purity, as regards their characteristic, he says :

भावदोष उपधाऽदोषोऽनुपधा ॥ ६ । २ । ४ ॥

भावदोषः Bhâva-doṣaḥ, defect of feeling, impurity of emotion, or of the soul. उपधा Upadhâ, (*ety.*) that which is placed, or settles, upon or near anything. Impurity. अदोषः Adoṣaḥ, non-defect. अनुपधा Anupadhâ, purity. Purity of emotion, or of the soul.

4. *Upadhâ* or Impurity (denotes) impurity of emotion, or of the soul ; *anupadhâ* (denotes) purity.—244.

Feeling, desire, attraction, inattention, unfaith, vanity, conceit, envy, and other impurities of the soul are denoted by the word *upadhâ* or impurity. Faith, complacence of mind, perseverance in the performance of prescribed actions, determination of what should be done in particular situation, (or presence of mind), and certitude are called *anupadhâ* or purity of the soul. The efficient causality of all these towards *dharma* and *adharma*, is here declared.—4.

What objects are pure or holy.

Upaskâra.—(Purity and impurity may be internal as well as external, that is, may relate to thought as well as to things. In the preceding aphorism, purities and impurities of the soul have been mentioned. With regard to external objects it is said as follows). Things pure and impure are also called *upadhâ* or purity and *anupadhâ* or impurity. Here he distinguishes between pure and impure objects :

यदिष्टरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शं प्रोक्षितमभ्युक्षितञ्च तच्छुचि॥६ ।२ ।५ ॥

यत् Yat, which. इष्टरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शं, Iṣṭa-rûparasa-gandha-sparśaṁ possesses prescribed colour, taste, smell, and touch. प्रोक्षितं Prokṣitaṁ, aspersed.

Sprinkled with water together with the pronunciation of *mantras* or sacred hymns. अभ्युक्षितं Abhyukṣitaṁ, sprinkled with water without the pronunciation of *mantras*. The above rendering of the two words, ' prokṣtaṁ ' abhyikṣitaṁ ' is in accordance with the view of Śaṅkara misra. But,

उत्तानेनैव हस्तेन प्रोक्षणं परिकीर्त्तितम् ।
न्यञ्चताभ्युक्षणं प्रोक्तं तिरश्चावोक्षणं स्मृतम् ॥

" Sprinkling of water with the pronated hand is called *prokṣaṇaṁ* ; that with supinated hand is called *abhyukṣaṇaṁ* ; and the same with the inclined hand is known as *avokṣaṇaṁ*."—

From the above saying of the *Smṛiti*, it would appear that the correct translations would be, sprinkled with water with pronation, in the case of ' prokṣitam,' and sprinkled with water with supination, in the case of ' abhyukṣitaṁ.' च Cha, and. तत् Tat. that शुचि Śuchi, pure, clean, holy.

5. The pure is that which possesses prescribed Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, and is sprinkled with water along with the recitation of sacred hymns, and also without it, or is sprinkled with water both with pronation and with supination.—245.

Whatever Substance possesses such colour, etc., as are ' iṣṭaṁ,' *i. e.*, prescribed by the Veda and the Smṛiti, the same is of that character (*i. e.*, pure). Therein, Colour (is prescribed) in such texts as " He buys the *soma* drink for a cow, ruddy, one year old, with tawny eyes;" " He should obtain a white goat," etc. ' Prokṣitaṁ, means sprinkled with water during the recitation of sacred hymns ; 'abhyukṣitaṁ,' means sprinkled with water without any sacred hymn. The word ‚ cha ‚ implies that which is lawfully acquired, and that is brought out by such restraining percepts as " A Brâhmaṇa, should acquire wealth by performing sacrifices, by teaching, and by receiving presents, etc.—5.

What objects are impure or unholy.

Upaskâra.—He states the characteristic of impure objects :

अशुचीति शुचिप्रतिषेधः ॥ ६ । ३ । ६ ॥

अशुचि Âśuchi, impure. इति Iti, this Such. शुचिप्रतिषेधः Śuchipratiṣedhaḥ, the negation of exclusion of the pure.

6. Impure,—such is the form of the negation of the pure. —246.

The meaning is that the contrary of such substance as is pure, is impure. In other words, a substance of unpraiseworthy colour, taste, smell, and touch, or not aspersed, or not sprinkled, or sprinkled with forbidden water, or unlawfully acquired, as the substance of a Brâhmaṇa acquired by agriculture and commerce, is impure.—6.

What objects are impure or unholy, continued.

***Upaskâra.*—He mentions other impure objects :**

अर्थान्तरञ्च ॥ ६ । २ । ७ ॥

अर्थान्तरं Arthântarâm, something else. Another thing. च Cha, and.

7. (It is) also something else.—247.

The meaning is that where a thing possesses praiseworthy colour, taste, smell, and touch, and is at the same time aspersed, sprinkled, and lawfully acquired, even there that thing also is impure, if it is vitiated by speech or vitiated by intention.—7.

To produce exaltation, purity must be coupled with selfres-traint.

Upaskâra.—Now he points out another contributory cause of *dharma* and *adharma* :

अयतस्य शुचिभोजनादभ्युदयो न विद्यते नियमाभावात् विद्यते वाऽर्थान्तरत्वाद् यमस्य ॥ ६ । २ । ८ ॥

अयतस्य Ayatasy, of the unrestrained. शुचिभोजनात् Śuchi-bhojanât, from eating that which is pure. अभ्युदय : Abhyudayaḥ, exaltation. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists. Accrues. नियमाभावात् Niyama-abhâvât, owing to the absence of self-restraint. विद्यते Vidyate, exists. Accrues. वा Va, and. अर्थान्तरत्वात् Artha-antaratvât, being a different thing. यमस्य Yamasya, of self-restraint.

8. To the unrestrained, exaltation does not accrue from eating what is pure, inasmuch as there is an absence of self-restraint ; and it accrues, (where there is self-restraint), inasmuch as self-restraint is a different thing (from eating).—248.

'Ayatasya' means void of restraint, or unrestraint. The eating of one, void of the restraints brought out in such precepts as. "A man should take food after washing his hands and feet, and rinsing his mouth, restrained in speech, while taking food, though restrained, he should twice rinse his mouth," does not tend to exaltation, but to sin. It may be asked, Why ? Hence he says, 'niyama-abhâvât,' *i. e.*, owing to the absence of self-restaint, which is a contributory cause. That which takes place where self-restraint exists, is now stated. 'Vidyate va,, *i. e.*, exaltation verily accrues from eating by means of the accompaniment of the self-restraint mentioned above. It may be asked, How ? So he says, 'Artha-antaratvât yamasya,' *i. e.*, because self-restraint is something else than eating. Therefore the meaning is that without the contributory cause there is no production of the fruit, and that with it, there is production of the fruit.—8.

Bhâsya.—reads Vidyateva' rthântaratvât yamasya as a separate aphorism.

Self-restraint alone, again, is not sufficint for the purpose.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected, "If self-restraint alone is the governing element, then eating is not a governing element at all," Accordingly he says :

असति च अभावात् ॥ ६ । २ । ९ ॥

असति Asati, non-existing. च Cha, and. अभावात् Abhâvât, because of non-existence.

9. (Self-restraint alone is not the cause of exaltation), for there is non-existence (of exaltation), where (the eating of pure food) does not exist.—249.

'Of exaltation' is the complement of the aphorism. 'Abhâvât,' *i. e.*, since exaltation does not exist, 'asati,' *i. e.*, where the eating of pure food does not exist, although there is self-restraint. The meaning, therefore, is that it is both of them, namely self-restraint and eating, which is the cause of merit. The word, eating, is illustrative *Yama* and *Niyama*, *i. e.*, self-restraint, external and internal, are accessories also of sacrifice, charity, ablutions, oblations, and other actions prescribed by the Veda and the Smṛiti.—9.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma.

Upâskâra.—Having thus stated self-restraint as a contributory towards the production of *dharma*, he now points out the origin of *fault*, with a view to specify fault as an accessory to *adharma* :

सुखाद्रागः ॥ ६ । २ । १० ॥

सुखात् Sukhât, from pleasure. रागः Râgaḥ, (*Lit.* Colouration), Desire.

10. From Pleasure (arises) Desire.—250.

'Sukhât,' *i. e.*, from pleasure derived from the enjoyment of garlands, sandal-paste, women, and other objects. râgaḥ,' *i. e.*, desire, is produced successively for pleasue of a similar kind, or for the means of attaining it. It is also to be considered that from pain begotten by snakes, thorns, and the like, aversion arises with regard to such pain, or with regard to its source. Desire, aversion, and infatuation are called *faults*, inasmuch as they are incentives to activity (which serves to bind the agent down to this world). Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gautama, " Faults have for their characteristic incitement to acitivity (or worldly occupation)." (Nyâya-Sûtraṁ, I. i. 18),—10.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma, *continued.*

Upaskâra.—" Now," it may be objected, " if only pleasure and pain produced desire and aversion, how then can the latter exist after the destruction of the former ? " Hence he says :

तन्मयत्वाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । ११ ॥

तन्मयत्वात् Tat-mayatvât from transformation into, absorption, or entire occupation of mind with, or habituation to, that. च Cha, and.

11. (Desire and Aversion arise) also through habituation to that.—251.

'Desire and aversion arise'—this is the complement of the aphorism. 'Tat-mayatvaṁ means a particular kind of comparatively powerful impression produced by constant or habitual experience of objects,

through the influence of which, a sad lover, who does not win his mistress, sees his beloved in every object ; and he who has been once bitten by a snake, in consequence of the strong impression regarding that, sees snakes everywhere. So it has been said, "*Tat-mayatvaṁ* (*lit*, full-of-that-ness) means the manifestation of that both internally and externally."—11.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He brings forward another source (of desire and aversion) :

अदृष्टाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । १२ ॥

अदृष्टात् Adriṣṭât, from destiny or *adriṣṭam*. च Cha, and. Also.

12. (Desire and Aversion arise) from *adriṣṭam* also.—252.

'Desire and version'—this forms the complement of the aphorism. Although *adriṣṭam* is a universal cause, still particular causality, towards desire and aversion, sometimes attends it. For instance, it should be inferred by such cases as of desire for a (mistress or) woman on the breaking forth of youth even in one who has not in that birth enjoyed the pleasures of love, and of aversion towards snakes even in those who have not experienced the pain of snake-bites. Nor is it only *saṁskâra* or impression produced in a previous existence (that is to say, instinct), which supplies the missing link in these cases. For there being no proof for the supposition of its existence, or for the supposition of its resuscitation, the supposition of *adriṣṭam* becomes necessary.—12.

Origin of desire which, being a fault, is an accessory to adharma, *continued.*

Upaskâra.—He mentions another contributory cause (of desire and aversion) :

जातिविशेषाच्च ॥ ६ । २ । १३ ॥

जाति विशेषात् Jâti-viśesât, from particularity of race or racial distinction. च Cha, and.

13. (Desire and Aversion arise) also from racial distinctions. —253.

Thus, human beings have desire for rice, etc., animals of the deer class, for grass, etc. ; those of the camel class, for briers. In these cases also, *adriṣṭaṁ* which produces birth in such and such a race, is the governing principle, while race, *i. e.*, distinction of birth, is only a means or medium. Similarly, pigeons, etc., possess desire for crops. In the same way, animals of the buffalo class possess aversion towards the horse ; dogs, towards the jackal ; ichneumons, towards snakes ; and from other instances, it is to be inferred (that racial distinction is a means of desire and aversion).—13.

Desire and aversion produce dharma *and* adharma *through inclination.*

Upaskâra.—Having thus enumerated the efficient causes of desire and aversion, desire and aversion being the efficient causes of *dharma* and *adharma*, he now points out that the causality of *fault* towards *dharma* and *adharma* operates through the medium of activity or inclination.

इच्छाद्वेषपूर्व्विका धर्म्माधर्म्मप्रवृत्तिः ॥ ६ । २ । १४ ॥

इच्छाद्वेषपूर्व्विका Inhchhâ-dveṣa-pûrvvika, preceded by, or having for its antecedents, desire and aversion. धर्म्माधर्म्मप्रवृत्तिः Dharma-adharma-pravṛittih, Activity, tendency, inclination, or application to *dharma* and *adharma*.

14. Application to *dharma* and *adharma* has for its antecedents Desire and Aversion.—254.

'Pravṛittih' or employment in a prescribed action, is due to the link of desire, and in a prohibited action, *e. g.*, killing, is due to the link of aversion. Employment, due to the link of desire, in sacrifices, etc., begets *dharma*; employment, due to the link of aversion, in killing, etc., begets *adharma*. These same desire and aversion cause the wheel of transmigration to revolve. Accordingly there is the aphorism of Gautâma, "*Pravṛitti* or employment is the operation or exeration of speech, mind, and body," (Nyâya-Sûtram, I. i. 17). Verbal employment is exertion of speech; it is meritorious, if it is for the expression of what is true, kind, and beneficial; it is sinful, if it is for the expression of what is nature, unkind, and baneful. By 'Buddhiḥ,' (mind), is meant that by which objects are cognised, *i. e.*, mind. Therefore mental employment is compassion towards all creatures, and other activities. Bodily employment, such as almsgiving, ministration, etc., is tenfold as sinful, and tenfold as meritorious.—14.

Vivṛiti.—The aphorism has been framed in a general way. Hence no harm has been done to the production of *dharma*, etc., also from chance contact with the water of the Gaṅgâ (the Ganges) and such other sources, even though desire and aversion do not exist here.

Dharma *and* adharma *are causes of birth and death.*

Upaskâra.—Now he states the end or object of *dharma* and *adharma*, *i. e.*, reappearance after passing away :

तत्संयोगो विभागः ॥ ६ । २ । १५ ॥

तत्संयोगः Tat-saṁyogah, conjunction produced by them. विभागः Vibhâgaḥ, disjunction.

15. Conjunction (of soul with body, sense, and life), produced by them (*i.e.*, *dharma* and *adharma*), (is called birth); Disjunction (of body and mind, produced by them, is called death).—255.

From these, namely *dharma* and *adharma*, conjunction, *i. e.*, birth, results. Connection with non-pre-existing body, sense, and life is here termed conjunction. 'Vibhâgah' again, denotes disjunction of body and mind, characterised as death. The meaning, therefore, is that this system of births and deaths, *saṁsâra* or ceaseless flow of existences, otherwise termed *pretya-bhâva* or re-appearance after passing away, is caused by *dharma* and *adharma*. The Vedic name of this very *pretya-bhâva* is *ajarañjarî-bhâva* or non-decrepit decrepitude.—15.

How mokṣa *is attained.*

Upaskâra.—To ascertain, therefore, what *mokṣa* is, in which there is an end of this re-appearance after passing away, of the system of births and deaths, he says :

आत्मकर्म्मसु मोक्षो व्याख्यातः ॥ ६ । २ । १६ ॥

आत्मकर्म्मसु Âtma-karmmasu, actions of the soul taking place. मोक्षः Mokṣaḥ, salvation. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, declared.

16. (It has been) declared that the actions of the soul taking place, salvation (results).—256.

This same disjunction of body and mind rises into *mokṣa* or liberation, when there exist the actions of the soul. This is the meaning. Now, the actions of the soul collectively are as follows : 'audition,' intellection, practice of holy communion, or *yoga*, constant meditation, posture, regulation of breath, (*lit.* lengthening of life, the acquisition of the control of the external senses and of the control of the internal sense, spiritual intuition of one's own soul and of the souls of others, accurate knowledge of previously produced *dharma* and *adharma*, which have to be experienced in other bodies and places the building up of various bodies suitable to such experience, the exhaustion of that *dharma* and *adharma* by experiencing them, and ultimate success or emancipation, characterised as cessation of pain, on the cessation of bi:h, when there is cessation of tendency to action, in consequence of the non-production of subsequent *dharma* and *adharma,* due to the overcoming of the mists of faults characterised as desire and aversion. Of these the prime action of the soul is knowledge of the real nature or essence of the six Predicables.—16.

Here ends the second chapter of the sixth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Vivṛiti.—Spiritual intuition of the reality of the self steals away false knowledge, sprung from spiritual blindness, of which the subject-matter is that the soul is not distinct from the body, etc. Thereupon there is cessation of *faults*, characterised as desire and aversion ; from which there follows destruction of activity or inclination productive of *dharma* and *adharma*. And from the non-existence of inclination results annihilation of birth in the form of the initial conjunction of life with a future body. And hence there results final annihilation of the threefold afflictions. It is in this that *mokṣa* consists. Therefore this treatise is useful, as a system of thought intended for the purpose of *intellection* or thinking about things.

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BOOK SEVENTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Allusion to I. i. 6.

Upaskâra.—Having examined *dharma* and *adharma*, as the root causes of *Samsâra* or transmigration, as the efficient causes of all that has a production, as the means of *bhoga* or worldly experience, and as uniformly attaching to each individual soul, from their origin, as well as the *adriṣṭam* of others as conducive to fruits to be experienced by those others, the author now calls back to the mind of the disciples the enumeration and definition of Attributes with the intention of examining these Attributes.

उक्ता गुणाः ॥ ७ । १ । १ ॥

उक्ता : Uktâḥ, stated, mentioned, enumerated. गुणा : Guṇâḥ, attributes.

1. Attributes (have been) mentioned (above).—257.

The meaning is that Attributes have been enumerated and defined. Of these colour, etc., seventeen in all, have been verbally stated, and seven have been brought forward by the word *cha*, ' and '. Accordingly all the twenty-four Attributes have been mentioned. Now, Attributeness connotes possession of the ' class ' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternals present in the eternals, or possession of the 'class' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternals which do not appear in combinative causes, or possession of the ' class ' directly pervaded by existence appearing in eternals appearing in non-combinative causes, or possession of the ' class ' not appearing in action which does not co-exist in the same substratum with the effect.—1.

What attributes are non-eternal.

Upaskâra.—Now, the examination of Attributes, as Attributes, is the subject of the seventh book. Of this, in the first Chapter, there are five sections, *viz.*, (1) the examination of Attributes as eternal, (2) the examination of Attributes as non-etenal, (3) the examination of Attributes due to the action of heat, (4) the examination of Attributes which appear of function in more substances than one, *e. g.*, Number, etc., and (5) the examination of measure or extension. Herein he states the non-eternality of the four Attributes, colour, etc.

पृथिव्यादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शा द्रव्यानित्यत्वादनित्याश्च ॥ ७ । १ । २ ॥

पृथिव्यादिरूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः Prithivi-âdi-rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśâḥ, the Colour, Taste Smell, and Touch of Earth, etc., *i. e.*, of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air. द्रव्यानित्यत्वात् Dravyâ-anityatvât, on account of the non-eternality of the substances in which they reside. अनित्याः Anityaḥ, non-eternal. च Cha, also.

2. The Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, are also non-eternal, on account of the non-eternality of their substrata.—258.

Of the wholes made up of parts, beginning with Earth, and ending with Air, the four Attributes, colour, and the following, are non-eternal. Although other Attributes also, being present in whole made up of parts, are really non-eternal, yet (they are not referred to here, because) their destruction is also due to other causes. The four Attributes, beginning with colour, disappear only on the destruction of their substrata, and

not in consequence of another, and contradictory, Attribute. 'Dravya-anityatvât :' The meaning is that the non-eternality of the dependent Attributes is on account of the non-eternality of substances upon which they depend.—2.

What attributes are eternal.

Upaskâra.—If the non-eternality of substrata governs the non-eternality of colour, etc., then, he says, it is obtained from necessary implication, that those colour, etc., which reside in eternal substrata, possess eternality.

एतेन नित्येषु नित्यत्वमुक्तम् ॥ ७ । १ । ३ ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. नित्येषु Nityeṣu, in eternals. नित्यत्वं Nityatvaṃ, eternality. उक्तम् Uktaṃ, stated. Implied.

3. By this is implied eternality (of Colour, etc., which reside) in eternal substances.—259.

Of the same four Attributes, colour, etc., present in eternal substrata, eternality is implied 'by this,' which means, by the declaration of non-eternality by reason of the non-eternality of the substrata.

The writer of the *Vṛitti*, however, explains thus : नित्येष्वनित्यत्वमुक्तम् —this is the reading, with the addition of an अ, (so that instead of 'eternality,' the reading is 'non-eternality.') Thus, colour, etc., residing in terrene ultimate atoms, disappear on the conjunction of fire.—3.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Does, then, eternality belong also to colour, etc., which reside in terrene eternal substances ? Accordingly he specifies (the eternals referred to in the preceding aphorism).

अप्सु तेजसि वायौ च नित्या द्रव्यनित्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ४ ॥

अप्सु Apsu, in water. तेजसि Tejasi, in fire. वायौ Vâyau, in air. च Cha, and. नित्याः Nityâḥ, eternal. द्रव्यनित्यत्वात् Dravya-nityatvât, in consequence of the eternality of substrata.

4. And also in consequence of the eternality of their (respective) substrata, (Colour, etc.) are eternal in Water, Fire, and Air. —260.

In aqueous ultimate atoms, Colour, Taste, and Touch are eternal ; in igneous ultimate atoms, Colour and Touch ; in ultimate atoms of Air, Touch is eternal. "But," it may be asked, what is the contradiction, if colour, etc., present even in things eternal, be themselves non-eternal like Sound, Understanding, etc. ?" Accordingly, an additional reason, *viz.*, non-appearance of another attribute (*vide* IV. ii. 3 *ante*), is indicated by the word च, 'and.' For, in Sound, the manifestation of a different attribute is observed in the form of tones, high, low, etc. ; and in knowledge, etc., *saṃskâra*, impression or habit, etc., contradictory of, or which oppose, knowledge, etc., (are observed). In aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms, other attributes, contradictory of colour, etc., do not appear. If they appeared, then Colour, etc.,

heterogeneous from the antecedent ones, would be observed also in the aqueous and other wholes made up of parts, or compounds, originated by the same ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic aggregates. But colour, different in kind from white colour, does not belong to Water and Fire ; nor do Touches, different in kind from cold and hot Touches. "Hot water," "Cold air,"—such intuitions are, however, due to the influence of *upâdhi* or adjunct or external condition. This is the import.—4.

Vivṛiti.—" But Colour, etc., residing in aqueous ultimate atoms, being destructible by the conjunction of fire," it may be objected, "why this generalisation, namely, "in eternals" (in the preceding aphorism) ?" Hence he specifies the eternals.

The meaning is that Colour, etc., inherent in the eternal earth (*i. e.,* ultimate atoms of earth), are not certainly eternal, but that it has been stated in the preceding aphorism that those only are eternal, which inhere in the eternal Water, Fire, and Air (*i. e.,* aqueous, igneous, and aerial ultimate atoms).

What attributes are non-eternal.

Upaskâra.—Already it has been stated that (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal in non-eternals among terrene substances. Now he states it in the case of aqueous other non-eternals also.

अनित्येष्वनित्या द्रव्यानित्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ५ ॥

अनित्येषु Anityeṣu, in non-eternals. अनित्याः Anityâḥ, non-eternal. द्रव्यानित्यत्वात्—Dravya-anityatvât, in consequence of the non-eternality of substrata.

5. In non-eternals, (Colour, etc., are) non-eternal, in consequence of the non-eternality of their substrata.—261.

The meaning is that Colour, etc., of aqueous, and other wholes made up of parts, disappear only on the dissolution of substrata, but not in consequence of other, contradictory, attributes.—5.

Vivṛiti.—Are Attributes, inhering in non-eternals, and other than Colour, etc., eternal ? If so, then Conjunction, etc., also will be eternal. To remove this apprehension, he says :

The meaning is that Attributes which exist in non-eternal substances, are, all of them, non-eternal, because their substrata are non-eternal, so that eternal Attributes do not at all exist in non-eternal substances.

Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning.

Upaskâra.—In earth, appearing in the form of wholes made up of parts, (*i. e.,* in terrene bodies), also, Colour, etc., appear and disappear only on the conjunction of fire. How, therefore, are they destructible only by the destruction of their substrata ? To remove this apprehension, he says :

कारणगुणपूर्वकाः पृथिव्यां पाकजाः ॥ ७ । १ । ६ ॥

कारणगुणपूर्व्वकाः—Kâraṇa-guṇa-pûrvvakâḥ, preceded by, or having for antecedents, the attributes of the causes. **पृथिव्यां** Pṛithivyâṃ, in earth. **पाकजाः** Pâkajâḥ, produced by burning. Due to the action of heat. Thermal.

6. In Earth, (Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch) have for their antecedents (like) attributes in (its combinative) causes, (and are also) due to the action of heat.—262.

'Pâkajâḥ' means Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, due to the action of heat, 'Kâraṇa-guṇa-pûrvvakâḥ' means preceded by the attributes of that, *e. g.*, potsherds, etc., which is the combinative cause of the substratum of Colour, *e. g.*, a water-pot. Thus, the Colour of the potsherd is the non-combinative cause of the colour of the water-pot, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the cause. So also in the case of Taste, etc. Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch possess the *jâti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attributeness such as colourness, etc.

Objection.—Colourness, which is nothing but apprehensibility by the eye, is the *uâpdhi* or external condition (of colour-perception).

Answer.—It is not. For, this would entail non-appearance of the intuition of colour immediately on the falling of the sense, since an *upâdhi* or external condition which is not adjacent, is unfit for producing the intuition of that which is conditioned or super-imposed. Here the *upâdhi*, again, is the eye, and the same—the ocular sense—is supersensuous. And apprehensibility is the being the object of apprehension. This too is not an object of ocular perception, since perception distinguished or determined by colour-ness is ocular. Colour-ness, therefore, is the characteristic of the attribute perceptible by the external sense of the eye alone.

Objection.—But it does not pervade or include supersensuous colour.

Answer.—The objection does not arise; for, the possession of the *jâti* or class apprehensible by the external sense of the eye alone, is intended. Such *jâti* is colour-ness; as also are blue-ness, etc.

Objection.—The manifestations of blue, yellow, etc., are eternal, only as each of them is a single, individual, manifestation. There are not blue-ness, and other classes, inasmuch as their denotation is a single individual.

Answer.—This is not the case, as it would entail the non-appearance of the intuition of deeper blue, deepest blue, etc.

Objection.—But the use of the comparative and the superlative may be caused here by the absence of inter-penetration of whiteness, etc.

Answer.—It cannot, since there is no proof of it, and also because of the intuition, "Dark colour is gone, red produced."

Objection.—But such intuition is caused by the production and destruction of combination.

Answer.—No, since there is no trace of combination there, and since combination is eternal. The same (*i. e.*, production and destruction of combination) being applicable also in the case of the non-eternality of the water-pot, etc., the result would be non-finality, since *Anyathâsiddhi*, production by other means, or plurality of causes, can be easily ascribed there by way of the very non-eternality of combination.

Another *objection.*—The attributes, blue, yellow, etc., are not different from substance, since there is no difference between a property and that of which it is a property.

Answer.—This cannot be the case, as it would entail such uses as "Colour is water-pot," "Toucth is water-pot," etc.

Objection.—But there is no harm in it, inasmuch as there are really such intuitions as "White cloth," "Blue cloth," etc.

Answer.—The analogy does not hold, because the intuitions are explained by the supposition of elision of the affix, *matup*, denoting possession, or by the supposition of transference of identity.

Objection.—This supposition would be somewhat probable, were there proof of difference.

Answer.—But difference is proved by means of such predication as "Colour of sandal-wood," "Smell of sandal-wood," etc. If the cloth were identical with colour, then, like the cloth, colour also would be perceived by the sense-organ of the skin, and being asked to bring the colour, one would bring some substance whatever.

Objection.—Let, then, there be identity in difference, seeing that in the case of absolute difference as well as of absolute identity, co-existence in the same substratum would not be possible.

Answer.—This cannot be, for it is impossible for identity and difference, which are contradictory to each other, to appear together in the same place, without the difference of their situation.

Objection.—But the characteristic of mutual non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite of identity, *e. g.*, a waterpot is not a cloth) appears in that which appears in what is not pervaded or included, since it is the characteristic of being the property of that which appears in eternal non-existence, like the characteristic of absolute non-existence (or non-existence which is the counter-opposite of connection with the past, the present, and the future, *e. g.*, there is no waterpot inside the earth).

Answer.—This is not the case. For, in virtue of the intuition of conjunction and its absolute non-existence, the characteristic of appearing in that which is not pervaded, is observed of absolute non-existence, but, in the case of mutual non-existence, such intuition does not exist.

Now, this colour is of various kinds in Earth ; in Water and Fire, it is only white. Sometimes there is one more colour, *i. e.*, variegated or compound colour, also in a cloth, etc. ; for, otherwise, they would not be objects of visual perception, since only substances possessing colour can be objects of perception by the eye.

Objection.—But there can be no origination of colour by heterogeneous colours.

Answer.—This is not the case ; for, homogeneity, only as constituted by the characteristic of being colour, is required in the origination of blue, yellow, etc., since otherwise, as has been already stated, they would not be objects of visual perception.

Objection.—But the apprehension of the colour of a whole made up of parts is possible by means of the apprehension of the colours of those parts.

Answer.—It is not, as it would entail that the parts also, possessing variegated or compound colour, are themselves void of colour. Moreover, wherever, in consequence of the action of heat, variegated colour appears in ultimate atoms, there also variegated colour is produced in the cloth, etc., originated by them successively.

Objection.—In the yellow myrobalan, then, taste also is variegated.

Answer.—No, for no harm would be done, even if the yellow myrobalan were void of taste. The tradition of six tastes, however, is due to the causality which produces the effects or properties of those tastes.

Similarly, smell also is not variegated, since a fragrant and a non-fragrant part are not its originators.

Objection.—In the parts of a *karkaṭī* or cucumber, there is sometimes bitterness, and sometimes sweetness. Which taste, then, exists in *karkaṭī* ?

Answer.—Only sweetness.

Objection.—There existing a conflict of attributes, how can it be so ?

Answer.—On account of the non-existence of bitterness in the parts thereof.

Objection.—How, then, does such sensation (of bitterness) arise ?

Answer.—It arises from the bitter taste of the bilious substance existing at the tip of the tongue irritated by the eating of the *karkaṭī*. It is from this cause that sometimes the mouth also becomes bitter.

Objection.—But how does not this explanation apply in the case of the yellow myrobalan also ?

Answer.—Because, in the parts of the yellow myrobalan, various tastes are felt, *e. g.*, sour, sweet, salt, etc. There is no need of further argumentation or elaboration.

And this colour is an auxiliary to the eye.

Objection.—Such being the case, how do the non-existence of Colour in air, and darkness become objects of ocular perception ?

Answer.—The question does not arise, since colour is an auxiliary to the eye in the apprehension only of existences or objective realities.

The colours of all the three, *viz*., the object, the light, and the eye, are exciting causes of ocular perception.

Taste, again, is that which possesses the *jâti* or 'class,' taste-ness. Taste-ness is the *jâti* or 'class' which is the object of immediate cognition producible by the sense taste alone. And the possession of such a *jâti* or 'class' is taste-ness. It is this, the source of vitality, growth, strength, and health, that is an auxility to the tongue. Thus, taste-ness being possession of the *jâti* or 'class' pervaded by attribute-ness capable of being apprehended by the organ of the tongue, there is no non-pervasion, *i. e.*, exclusion, of super-sensuous taste.

Attribute, apprehensible by the nose alone, is Smell. Smell-ness is the possession of the *jâti* or 'class' pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the nose only. It is two-fold, being fragrant and non-fragrant. Or Smell-ness denotes the possession of the *jâti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attribute-ness appearing only in that which is present in Earth.

In like manner, Touch also is the attribute possessing the *jâti* or 'class,' touch-ness. Touch-ness denotes the possession of the *jâti* or 'class' directly pervaded by attribute-ness apprehensible by the organ of the skin only. Inhering in the quartet of substances, (namely, Earth, Water, Fire, Air), it is, again, three-fold, according to the differences of neither hot nor cold, cold, and hot.

Now, in passing, the process due to the action of heat, is considered. Here, according to those who hold the theory of the burning of an earthenpot (as a whole), the whole of the effect and the cause is burnt. Those who hold the theory of the burning of the ultimate atoms (constituting the whole), maintain that it is the ultimate atoms which are separately burnt, that it is in them that there take place destruction of the previous colour and production of the succeeding colur, etc., and that, following the course of the attribute of the cause, colour, etc., are produced in the burnt (wholes made up again) of (burnt) parts. Here the sense is as follows : From the impulse or the impact, given by fire, to a raw substance, *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., thrown in a kiln, disjunction, which is the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of a compound substance, appears among the ultimate atoms originative of that raw substance, and on the destruction of originative conjunction by the disjunction, destruction of the substance must take place. For, it is seen that of rice, etc., placed in a pan, destruction takes place at once from frying, only by the application of heat from below, and that, (under similar conditions) intense ebullition takes place in milk, water, and the like. Therefore, it is hoping too much that substances, smitten with flames of fire on all sides, in a kiln, will endure. Moreover, if there be no destruction of substances, then burning at their centre will not be possible. For, there is no possibility of conjunction of fire at the centre which is enclosed with harder other constituent parts. So that there will be this great incongruity that the parts are dark but the whole made up of those parts is red.

Objection.—Substances which are wholes made up of parts, are certainly porous. How, otherwise, can oil, clarified butter, etc., poured

into a jar, etc., ooze out, and how also can these be boiled ? Hence, at the centre also, there can be conjunction of fire.

Answer.—This cannot be, inasmuch as, on account of exclusion of ponderable or corporal or dense substances in virtue of the property of impenetrability, conjunction of fire is impossible at the centre which is already conjoined with other (constituent) parts.

Objection.—If there is destruction of the substance, how, then, can there be the recognition, " This is that very water-pot ?" How, again, in all changes of conditions, in the kiln, etc., are the water-pot, etc., observed in one and the same form ? How is it that a pan, a plate, etc., placed on the burning water-pot, etc., are observed in the same position ? For they should fall down on the dissolution of the water-pot, etc. How, again, are exactly the same number of wholes as are placed in the furnace, afterwards obtained from it ? For, during the process of burning, the origination is possible, of more or less substances, by the (dissolved) ultimate atoms, in the order of binary and other atomic aggregates. How, again, are water-pot, etc., of exactly the same dimensions, observed to come out from the furance ? How, again, will not the marks of lines and prints be obliterated ? Burning, therefore, takes place only in the wholes.

Answer.—Such is not the case. For disjunction of three or four tertiary atomic aggregates being effected from a water-pot, etc., with the point of a needle, there being destruction of substance as a whole in consequence of the destruction of conjunction originative of substance, all such contradictions appear in, or are explained on, both the theories. For, even they who hold the theory of the burning of the water-pot as a whole, cannot venture to say that substance as a whole is not destroyed in the case of the above instance.

Even in that case the water-pot, etc., are not destroyed, since it is possible for an effect to continue to exist by inhering in the remaining constituent parts even when there has been destruction of some constituent parts. Were it not so, recognition, etc., would be really impossible. This is the view of the *Mîmâṃsakas*. But they should be asked ; how the water-pot, etc., bearing relation to the situation or arrangement of all the constituent parts, can appear in a smaller number of consituent parts. If it be their reply that it is possible in the same way as is possible contraction of measure or extension or quantit in a cloth which is not yet destroyed ; we reply that there can be no such analogy, for there is no observation of contraction and expansion in the case of wood, stone, pillar, earthen jar, etc., made up of harder constituent parts. It cannot be rejoined by them that what is said to destroy the water-pot. etc., destroys only its measure or extension ; for, measure or extension can be destroyed only by the destructien of its substratum. Moreover, like the recognition of the water-pot, etc., measure or extension also is recognised in the case of the needle-scratch, whereas in their view its destruction also is impossible. This is the point.

On the theory of those who hold that disjunction which is the counteropposite of conjunction originative of substance as well as disjunction which is not its counter-opposite, are produced by one and

the same action in the constituent part, there is production of red colour, etc., at the ninth moment counting from the destruction of the binary atomic aggregate, in another binary atomic aggregate, since action is conceived to exist in the very same ultimate atom. Thus, there is first action in the ultimate atom originative of the binary atomic aggregate, from the impulse given by fire; then, disjunction; then destruction of conjunction originative of substance; then, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate; then, in consequence of conjunction of fire, disappearance of dark colour, etc., from the pure or singly existing ultimate atom, after the destruction of the binary atomic aggregate; after destruction of dark colour, etc., production of red colour, etc., from another conjunction of fire; after production of red colour, etc., cessation of action in the ultimate atom; following it, action in the ultimate atom, from conjunction of soul possessing *adriṣṭam* or destiny; then, disjunction; then, cessation of previous conjunction, originative of substance, with another ultimate atom; then, production of the binary atomic aggregate; after the production of the binary atomic aggregate, production of red colour, etc., in the progressive order of the attribute of the cause. These are the nine moments, if a different action is produced just at the moment of the cessation of the previous action. If, on the other hand, a different action is produced not at the moment of the cessation of the previous action, then there are ten moments. Even if disjunction, etc., produced by disjunction, be admitted, still there are ten moments, if disjunction produced by disjunction has reference to the time in which destruction of conjunction originative of substance takes place. If, on the other hand disjunction produces another disjunction with reference to the time in which destruction of substance takes place, then there are eleven moments in the process. Thus, destruction of the binary atomic aggregate and disjunction produced by disjunction, at one moment; then, destruction of previous conjunction, and cessation of drak colour, etc.; subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc.; cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action, by means of subsequent conjunction; then, action in the ultimate atom, favourable to origination of substance, disjunction from action; cessation of previous conjunction from disjunction; thence, conjunction originative of substance; thence production of substance; production of red colour, etc., in the produced substance. These are the ten moments. Where however, production of disjunction by disjunctiou depends upon the passing of the time containing the destruction of substance, there are, by the increase of one moment, eleven moments. Thus, destruction of substances; then disjunction produced by disjunction and cessation of dark colour, etc.; then subsequent conjunction and production of red colour, etc. then cessation of disjunction produced by disjunction and of action; then action in the ultimate atom, favourable to the origination of substance; then disjunction; cessation of previous conjunction; production of conjunction originative of substance; production of the binary atomic aggregate; production of red colour, etc. These are the eleven moments. Such is the process on the conception of action and cessation of action in one and the same ultimate atom. If action favourable to the origination of substance is conceived to take place in a different ultimate atom, then the production of red colour, etc., should be understood to

appear at the fifth, sixth, seventh, or eighth moment commencing from destruction of the binary atomic aggregate. The same has been explained in *Kaṇâda-Rahasyam.*—6.

Colour, etc., of Earth, produced by burning, continued.

Upaskâra.—In order to establish that the Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms have conjunction of fire as their non-combinative cause. he says :

एकद्रव्यत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । ७ ॥

एकद्रव्यत्वात् Eka-dravya-tvât, Because of the characteristic of inhering in one substance.

7. Because their substratum is the same.—263.

The expression, " of (attributes) produced from burning," is the complement of the aphorism. " Being attributes," and " being effects," are also intended here. The whole sentence, therefore, means : Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms, have conjunction for their non-combinative cause, inasmuch as these, being product-attributes, are at the same time non-abhorrent or incongruent attributes inhering in eternals, like Sound, and like Understanding, etc. Or the *sâdhya*, or what has to be proved, is merely the characteristic of being produced from conjunction. Hence there is no undue extension to, or inclusion of, Sound produced from disjunction, since conjunction of Air is the efficient cause of all Sounds whatever. And from the observation of the presence and absence of fire in relation to them, the non-combinative causality of conjunction of fire, towards terrene colour, etc-, is proved by the force of *pakṣa-dharmatâ i. e.*, the characteristic of the *vyâpya* or the middle term, the mark of inference, existing in the *pakṣa* or the subject of the conclusion.—7.

Vivṛiti.—The question may arise, how the attributes of the cause, as they do not exist in the effect, can be productive of the attributes of the effect, when there is thus a difference of substrata. Apprehending this, he says :

Because they have one substance as their substratum, that is to say, because there is co-existence in the same substratum. Thus, even though the attributes of the cause do not exist in the effect by the relation of immedtate combination, yet, inasmuch as they exist in the effect by the relation of co-existence in the same substratum in the form of combination with that which is in combination with them, their productiveness of the attributes of the effect is not unproved. This is the import.

Non-cognition of Minuteness and cognition of Magnitude, explained before.

Upaskâra.—Having elucidated Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, by long discourses, and going to begin first the examination of Measure of Extension, in violation of the order of enumeration (of the Attributes), following the maxim* of the needle and the kettle, inasmuch as Measure of Extension is proved by common consent, whereas there is a wide range of divergent views on the question of Number,—he says :

* The maxim of the needle and the kettle is that when a man has got to turn out a needle and a kettle, he first makes the needle, the smaller and easier piece of work, and then devotes his whole attention, energy, and time to the manufacture of the kettle, the large and more difficult piece of work.

अणोर्महतश्चोपलब्ध्यनपलब्धी नित्ये व्याख्याते ॥ ७ । १ । ८ ॥

अणोः Aṇoḥ, of the atom or atomic. महत: Mahataḥ, of the molecular or the dense or the extended. च Cha, and. उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी Upalabdhi-anupalabdhî, cognition and non-cognition. नित्ये Nitye, in (the book treating of) the eternal. व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

8. Cognition and non-cognition of the atomic and the extended or massive, respectively, have been explained in (the fourth book treating of) the eternal.—264.

The term, 'in the eternal,' signifies the fourth book, demonstrative of the eternal, *i. e.*, the container, by the contained. 'Cognition and non-cognition': The application (of these words) will be according to relevancy, on the maxim, "When one thing is relevant to another, it belongs to that other, even though lying at a distance." So that the proposition, "Non-cognition of the atomic" is obtained. In like manner, in the perceptual cognition, therefore, namely, "large, blue jug," Measure or Extension also is as much an object (of perception) as blue colour. And by means of this Measure or Extension, Measure or Extension terminating in the ultimate atom, is inferred, as also from Substance-ness. Moreover, in the perceptibility of Substance, Measure or Extension also is a cause, like colour; for, without magnitude, substance cannot be perceptible. It is, therefore, ascertained that, as being a cause of the perceptibility of Substance, and being itself perceptible, an attribute, called Measure or Extension, exists. For, were the distinctive form of a water-pot, etc., its Measure or Extension, a man would bring any water-pot, when he was told to bring महत्, the massive or the extended, and thus there would be a contradiction between the order of the master and the apprehension of it by the servant. Likewise from the term water-pot, Measure or Extension would be understood, or from the term, Measure or Extension, a water-pot.

Measure or Extension is the non-common or specific cause of the usage or application of measures, or a universal attribute inhering in the object which is the cause of the perceptual cognition of Substance. Application of measures is the application of cubits, etc., but not the application of weights, numbers, etc., This Measure or Extension is of four kinds, namely, Largeness, Smallness, Length, and Shortness. Of these, extreme largeness and extreme lenght exist in the four 'universals' (*i. e.*, Space, Time, Ether, and Soul); extreme smallnsss and extreme shortness exist in the ultimate atoms; the next (higher) degree of smallness and shortness exists in binary atomic aggregates; largeness and length exist in substances from tertiary atomic aggregates upwards to composite wholes (or compound bodies as they exist in nature). In this manner, all substances whatever possess two Measures or Extensions. The attribution of smallness to a *vilva* or a *bael* fruit, *âmalaka* (*phylanthus emblica*), etc., and of shortness to fuel-sticks, etc., is relative. And relativity here denotes non-existence of bulkiness. The bulkiness that exists in the *âmalaka* (emblic myrobalan), does not exist in the jujube; the bulkiness that exists in the *vilva*, does not exist in the *âmalaka*. It is this bulkiness, which is the denotation of the

term, relativity, inasmuch as it partakes of both the primary and secondary uses.

Some maintain that length and shortness do not exist in the eternal substances. Others hold that these are not even modes of Measure or Extension ; for, what they mean is this : As in the command, " Bring the longer ones from amongst these bodies," so also in the command, " Bring the spherical and the triangular ones from amongst these bodies," discrimination being equally possible, sphericity or roundness, etc., also could then have to be admitted as modes of Measure or Extension.—3.

Largeness or magnitude how produced.

Upaskâra.—He now enumerates the causes of measure or extension.

कारणबहुत्वाच्च ॥ ७ । १ । ९ ॥

कारणबहुत्वात्· Kâraṇa-vahutvât, from a multiplicity of causes. च Cha, also.

9. Largeness or Magnitude is produced, from a multiplicity of causes also.—265.

The word ' cha ' implies the addition of magnitude and *prachaya* *i. e.*, loose conjunction among parts. " Measure or extension is produced "—this is the complement of the aphorism. Among these, multiplicity of causes alone produces largeness or magnitude and length in tertiary atomic aggregates, since magnitude and accretion do not exist in their causes. That multiplicity is produced by the relative understanding of God, and the apprehension of particular *adriṣtaṃ* or destinies, determines this plurality of objects in such relative understanding. Likewise, it will be stated hereafter, duality existing in two atoms is productive of measure or extension in a binary atomic aggregate. In a piece of cloth, originated by two non-coalescent threads, it is magnitude alone which is the non-combinative cause, since multiplicity and coalescence do not exist there. Where again, a ball of cotton, in this case, inasmuch as an increase of measure or extension is observed, therefore accretion is the cause, since multiplicity does not exist, and since magnitude though existing, is not a condition or occasion for increase of measure or extension. Such being the case, were magnitude cause here, there would be no defect in the argument, for it has been said, " By two, by one, or by all."

Prachaya, coalescence or accretion, is originative conjunction, and is defined as conjunction in an object of some of its constituent parts towards itself, in which object some of the constituent parts were not in conjunction towards itself. And this conjunction of constituent parts, it has been observed, is dependent upon a loose conjunction among their own constituent parts, is productive of measure or extension, and is involved in the origination of Attributes and Actions.—9.

The atomic is the opposite of the large or massive ; the short, of the long.

Upaskâra.—Having demonstrated magnitude and length, he now demonstrates atomic-ness or minuteness.

अतोविपरीतमणु ॥ ७ । १ । १० ॥

अतः Ataḥ, of this. विपरीतं Viparîtam, the contrary. अणु Aṇu, the atomic, small, or minute.

10. The contrary of this is the atomic.—266.

'Ataḥ,' *i. e.*, from large or massive measure or extension established by perception ; 'viparîtaṁ,' (*i. e.*, divergent). The meaning is that that is atomic measure or extension. The contrariety arises from imperceptibility, and from contrariety of causes also. For in the case of magnitude or massiveness, magnitude, multiplicity, and accretion are the causes, while in the case of atomic-ness or minuteness, duality inhering in the cause and produced by the relative understanding of God, is the cause. By this is also to be understood that the contrary of length is shortness, and here too the contrariety is as aforesaid.—10.

In what sense the same thing appears both small and large.

Upaskâra.—He now shows that in the case of a jujube, an *âmalaka*, etc., the attribution of smallness is secondary or relative

अणु महदिति तस्मिन् विशेषभावात् विशेषाभावाच्च ॥७।१।११॥

अणु Aṇu, atomic, small, minute. महत् Mahat, large, massive. इति Iti, such. तस्मिन् Tasmin, in that, *i. e.*, in respect of one and the same object. विशेषभावात् Viśeṣa-bhâvât, from the existence of the species, or of the peculiarity. विशेषाभावात् Viśeṣa-abhâvât, from the non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity.

11. '(It is) smaller,' '(It is) larger,'—such affirmations, in respect of one and the same object, arise from the existence of the species, or of the peculiarity, and from the non-existence of the species, or of the peculiarity.—267.

The word, 'iti,' indicates the sense of attribution or usage. There is, then, all this usage that a jujube, is small in relation to a *bael*-fruit, that an emblic myrobolan is large in relation to a jujube, that a *bael*-fruit is large in relation to an emblic myrobalan. Amongst these, '(It is) large'—such usage with regard to them is primary. If it be asked how it is so, says, 'viśeṣa-bhâvât,' *i. e.*, because of 'bhâva, *i.e.*, existence of 'viśeṣa,' *i. e.* the very species, magnitude, by 'bhâva,' *i. e.*. the relation of more, etc. On the other hand, the trantment of them as small, is secondary or relative. If it be asked how this is so, he says, 'viśeṣa-abhâvât,' *i. e.*, because of the non-existence in them of the species, smallness. For, smallness, as an effect, resides only in binary atomic aggregates, and, as eternal, resides in the ultimate atoms, and consequently it does not exist in a jujube, etc.

Or, the meaning may be, that the treatment of a jujube, etc., as small is secondary, because of the 'bhâva,' *i. e.*, the existence in the constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the 'viṣeśa, *i. e*, the cause of magnitude, namely, multiplicity of constituent parts, magnitude, and accretion, and because of the 'abhâva,' *i. e.*, the non-existence, in the constituent parts of the jujube, etc., of the 'viśeṣa,' *i. e.*, the cause of smallness, namely, duality which does not co-exist in the same substratum with magnitude.—11.

In what sense the same thing appears both small and large, continued.

Upaskâra.—He gives the reason why the attribution of smallnass is secondary :

एककालत्वात् ॥ ७ । १ । १२ ॥

एककालत्वात् Eka-kâla-tvât, from simultaneity (of the cognitions of largeness and smallness).

12, (The attribution of smallness is secondary), because of the simultaneity (of the cognition of largeness and smallness in respect of the same object.)—268.

Magnitude and minuteness are perceived at one and the same time. And these, magnitude and minuteness, being mutually contradictory, cannot appear together in one and the same substratum. The intuition of magnitude, therefore, is there primary inasmuch as the cause of magnitude exists there, and the intuition and application of minuteness are secondary. This is the meaning.—12.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He states the reason for the primariness of the intuition of magnitude :

दृष्टान्ताच्च ॥ ७ । १ । १३ ॥

दृष्टान्तात् . Dristântât, from example, or analogue. च Cha, And.

13. Also because there is the analogue.—269.

The meaning is that it is seen likewise that in the natural order of things the practical recognition, *i. e.*, the application, of large, larger, and largest, must be with regard only to things possessing magnitude, namely, the jujube, the emblic myrobalan, and the *bael* fruit, just as the application of white, whiter, and whitest, is, according to the nature of things, with regard only to white objects, namely, a piece of cloth, a conch-shell, a crystal, etc.—13.

Minuteness and magnitude do not exist in minuteness and magnitude.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected : In virtue of the usage, "Small Measure or Extension," "Large Measure or Extension," it is known that there is magnitude also in magnitude as a measure or extension, and that there is smallness in smallness also. How, then, can these be said to exist in Substance alone ? How, again, does not the contradiction result, in Attribute, of being existent in Attribute ?

अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोरणुत्वमहत्वाभावः कर्म्मगुणैर्व्याख्यातः ॥७।१।१४॥

अणुत्वमहत्त्वयोः Aṇutva-mahattvayoḥ, in minuteness and magnitude. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभावः Aṇutva-mahattva-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of minuteness and of magnitude. कर्म्मगुणैः Karmma-guṇaiḥ, by Actions and Attributes. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

14. The non-existence of minuteness and magnitude, in minuteness and magnitude, is explained by (the explanation, already given, of the non-existence of Actions and Attributes, in) Actions and Attributes.—270.

To this he replies :

The meaning is that as Attribute and Actions do not possess minuteness and magnitude, so also do not minuteness and magnitude possess minuteness and magnitude. The usage should be regarded as derivative.—14.

Above continued.

It may be urged that as Attributes are possessed of Attributes,—and how else could there be such uses as "Large (*i. e.*, extensive) Sound," "Two Sounds," "One Sound," "Twenty-four Attributes," etc. ?—and as Actions appear to be possessed of Actions,—and how else could there be such uses as "It goes quickly," "It goes swiftly" ? so minuteness and magnitude must also be possessed of minuteness and magnitude.

कर्म्मभिः कर्म्माणि गुणैश्च गुणा व्याख्याताः ॥ ७ । १ । १५ ॥

कर्म्मभिः Karmmabhiḥ, by actions. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, actions. गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. च Cha, and. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes व्याख्याताः Vyâkhyâtâḥ, explained.

15. Actions have been explained (to be void) of Actions, and Attributes, of Attributes.—271.

With this in view, he says :

By Actions, Actions are not possessed of Actions. By Attributes, Attributes are also not possessed of Attributes. In like manner, minuteness and magnitude are also not possessed of minuteness and magnitude. The usage, however, is, in all these cases, derivative. This is the meaning.—15.

Minuteness and Magnitude do not exist in Attribute or in Action.

Upaskâra—It may be urged that usage such as "Large Actions," "Minute Actions," "Large Attributes," "Minute Attributes," etc., entails that Actions possess minuteness and magnitude, and also Attributes possess both of them. In anticipation of this, he says :

अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां कर्म्मगुणाश्च व्याख्याते ॥ ७ । १ । १६ ॥

अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां, Aṇutva-mahattvâbhyâṁ, by minuteness and magnitude. कर्म्मगुणा Karmma-guṇâḥ, actions and attributes. च Cha, and. व्याख्याताः Vyâkhyâtâḥ, explained.

16. By minuteness and magnitude, Actions and Attributes also are explained (to be void of minuteness and magnitude). —272.

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude are not possessed of minuteness and magnitude, so Actions are not possessed of either of them, nor are Attributes possessed of either of them. This treatment as such however, is derivative as aforesaid. This is the import.—16.

Bhâsya.—Minuteness and magnitude may be predicated of action and attribute.

Length and shortness do not exist in length and shortness.

Upaskâra.—He extends the process of minuteness and magnitude to length and shortness.

एतेन दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे व्याख्याते ॥ ७ । १ । १७ ॥

एतेन Etena, hereby. दीर्घत्वह्रस्वत्वे Dirghatva-hrasvatve, length and shortness. व्याख्याते Vyâkhyâte, explained.

17. Hereby are explained Length and Shortness.—273.

Length, and shortness also are not possessed of length and shortness, Whatever is productive of magnitude, the same is productive of length ; whatever is productive of minuteness, the same is productive of shortness. If it be asked, the cause being the same, how there can be this difference in the effect, the reply is that it is proved or explained, like attributes produced by burning, by the difference of antecedent non-existence. Wherever there is minuteness, there is shortness ; where there is eternal minuteness, there is eternal shortness, etc. This is the meaning of the extension or analogy.—17

How Measure or Extension is destroyed.

Upaskâra.—He now points out that which destroys (Measure or Extension):—

अनित्येऽनित्यम् ॥ ७ । १ । १८ ॥

अनित्ये Anitye, in the non-eternal. अनित्यम् Anityaṃ, non-eternal, perishable.

18. In the non-eternal, (Measure or Extension also is) non-eternal.—274.

All this four-fold Measure or Extension, being present in perishable substance, disappears only on the destruction of the substratum, and not on account of contradictory, other attributes.

Objection.—But the Measure or Extension of a water-pot is destroyed, although the water-pot still exists; how else, even after the breaking of the neck of the water-pot, can there be the recognition, "This is that very water-pot"?

Answer.—This is not the case, in as much as the destruction of the water-pot is necessary or inevitable, by the destruction of the substratum. For, it stands neither to reason nor to experience that, the binary atomic aggregates being destroyed on the destruction of the conjunction of two ultimate atoms, there is non-destruction of the tertiary atomic aggregates constituted by the binary ones, and of limestone, etc., constituted by the tertiary atomic aggregates.

Objection.—How then does the recognition arise?

Answer.—It is an error, like the recognition, "This is that very flame of the lamp."

Objection.—But the recognitiou of the the lamp is certainly correct knowledge; whereas minuteness and magnitude undergo production and destruction.

Answer.—This cannot be maintained, because it has been already mentioned that their destruction is not possible without the destruction of their substratum.—18.

What Measure or Extension is eternal.

Upaskâra.—Is then minuteness, inhering in ultimate atoms, destroyed, as are Colour, etc., of terrene ultimate atoms? Is magnitude also, inhering in ether, etc., destroyed, as are Sound, Understanding, etc.? In anticipation of these objections, he says:

नित्ये नित्यम् ॥ ७ । १ । १९ ॥

नित्ये Nitye, in the eternal. नित्यम् Nityaṃ, eternal.

19. In the eternal, (Measure or Extension also is eternal. —275.

Measure or Extension which exists in eternal substances, *e. g.*, ether. etc., and also in the ultimate atoms, is eternal since there is nothing to destroy it.—19.

Eternal Measure or Extension is called Parimandalam.

Upaskâra.—He states the name by which the Measure or Extension of the ultimate atom is denoted in the *Vaisesika* system:—

नित्यं परिमण्डलम् ॥ ७ । १ । २० ॥

नित्यं Nityaṃ, eternal. परिमण्डलम् Parimaṇḍalam, *Parimaṇḍala*, the allround, or the spherical. Measure or Extension of the ultimate atom.

20. *Parimaṇḍala* is eternal.—276.

Pârimaṇḍalyaṃ has the same denotation as 'Parimaṇḍalaṃ.' So it has been said, "Elsewhere than in *Pârimaṇḍalya*, etc."—20.

Proof of true Minuteness and true Shortness.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked: If minuteness, or shortness as applied respectively to a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and to fuel-sticks, sugar-canes, etc., is not transcendental or real, (but apparent only), what then is the proof of them as transcendental? Accordingly he says:

अविद्या च विद्यालिङ्गम् ॥ ७ । १ । २१ ॥

अविद्या Avidyâ, false knowledge. Nescience. च Cha, moreover, and. विद्यालिङ्गम् Vidyâ-liṅgaṃ, mark or indication of knowledge.

21. False knowledge is, moreover, the (inferential) mark of (true) knowledge.—277,

'The mark of knowledge' is 'false knowledge.' The meaning therefore, is this: The cognition or consciousness of minuteness in respect of a jujube, an emblic myrobalan, etc., and the consciousness of shortness in respect of sticks for fuel, sugar-canes, etc., are all *avidyâ* or false knowledge, inasmuch as real or transcendental minuteness and shortness do not exist there. Moreover, it is admitted by those who hold the doctrine of *anyatha-khyati*, illusion of the senses, that every where unscientific knowledge is just preceded *i. e.*, presupposed, by scientific knowledge. So that true consciousness of minuteness, as well as true consciousness of shortness, should be inferred. This is the meaning. In like manner, secondary use of words being impossible without the primary use, minuteness and shortness, in the primary sense of the terms, must be thought of to be present somewhere.—21.

Vivriti.—But why should substance, in the form of the ultimate atom, be admitted, when it is not perceptible to the senses? On the other hand, substance which is perceptible to the senses, such as a tertiary atomic aggregate, etc., should be recognised.

To meet this objection he says :

' Avidyâ,' *i. e.*, unscientific knowledge, in other words, cognitions, such as " Earth is eternal," Water is etrnal," etc., of which the objects are wholes made up of parts, is the inferential ' mark,' of ' Vidyâ,' *i. e.*, scientific knowledge, namely, that Earth is eternal, of which the object is (*i. e.*, in respect of), the ultimate atom ; because everywhere scientific knowledge, is preceded by unscientific knowledge, for nowhere it is possible for a man to have the erroneous idea that Earth is eternal, if he does not know what eternality is. This is an indirect proof. The method of proof of ultimate atoms as realities, which has been pointed out before, should be preferred.

Ether and Soul possess infinite Measure or Extension.

Upaskâra.—He describes the nature or proper from of the Measure or Extension of Ether, etc., which has been already inferred by the mark of their substance-ness.

विभवान्महानाकाशस्तथा चात्मा ॥ ७ । १ । २२ ॥

विभवात् Vibhavât, in consequence of omnipresence, infinite expansion, or universality. महान् Mahân, vast. Immense. Infinitely large. आकाशः Âkâśaḥ, Ether. तथा Tathâ, so. The same. च Cha, and. Also. आत्मा Âtmâ, Soul.

22. Ether, in consequence of its vast expansion, is infinitely large. So also is the Soul.—278.

'Vibhavaḥ' denotes capacity for conjunction, or the characteristic of being in conjunction, with all dense bodies ; and this, being impossible, or incapable of proof, without vast magnitude, leads to the inference of vast magnitude. It is also observed by us that Sounds

are produced, just at one and the same time, both at *Bârâṇasî* (Benares) and at *Pâṭaliputra* (Patna) ; It is one and the same Ether that is here the combinative cause. Consequently the pervasion of Ether is proved. Pervasion, again, consists only in connection with infinitely vast Measure or Extension. To suppose a diversity of Ether would be superfluous ; hence only one Ether should be recognised. Such reference as "A portion or division of Ether," is, however, relative, being due to conjunction with the water-pot, etc.. (occupying a limited space, or) possessing limits. And the relativity consists in the characteristic of being in conjunction with substances possessing limits.

'Tathâ âtmâ': As Ether is immensely vast, since it pessesses universal pervasion, that is, the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies, so is also the Soul immensely vast. Did not the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies belong to Soul, then action would not be produced in the respective dense bodies, as a result of conjunction of the Soul carrying its *adriṣṭam* or destiny, inasmuch as *adriṣṭam*, being present in a different substratum, is dependent upon or stands in need of, 'proximity,' (or a common platform), in order that it may be productive of action ; and that 'proximity' is nothing but conjunction of the Soul carrying its *adriṣṭam*. Likewise, as the body moves on, the production of knowledge, pleasure, etc., in particular situations, is impossible or incapable of proof except on the theory of the universal pervasion of the Sould. Consequently, the Soul also is pervasive. The Soul, however, is not only one, like Ether, since, as has been already pointed out, difference of status or condition is observed. This is the import.

In these cases, the magnitude is infinite, and is also eternal, like the minuteness of the ultimate atom.

In like manner, should be inferred infinite length in the case of Ether, etc., and infinite shortness in the case of the ultimate atom.—22.

Mind is infinitely small.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked that Mind being all-pervading, inasmuch as it is always a touchless substance, like Ether, and inasmuch as it is, like the soul, the field wherein takes place the conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of knowledge, etc., why has it not been mentioned along with Ether and the Soul ? Hence he says :

तदभावादणु मनः ॥ ७ । १ । २३ ॥

तदभावात् Tat-abhâvât, in consequenes of the non-existence of that, *i. e.*, universal expansion. अणु, Aṇu, atomic. Minute. Small. मनः Manaḥ, mind. The internal organ.

23. In consequence of non-existence of universal expansion, Mind is atomic or infinitely small.—279.

'Manaḥ' is aṇu,' in consequence of the non-existence of 'that,' *i. e.*, universal expansion or the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies. Did the characteristic of being in conjunction with all dense bodies exist (in it), then, there being simultaneous conjunction with more than one sense, simultaneity of cognitions would

follow, with the result that there would be no particular attachment or act of attention. The two inferences, (namely, that Mind is all-pervading, because it is a touchless substance, and that mind is all-pervading, because it is the seat of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause of cognition, etc.) are, however, unproved in point of their subject matter, so long as Mind is not proved (to exist), while in the state of Mind being proved (to exist), they are counter-oppposed by proof which leads to the cognizance of the object *i. e.*, Mind as an atom.)

Objection.—Minuteness cannot be thus proved from non-existence of universal expansion, since the inference would be unduly applicable to the water-pot, etc.

Answer.—It would not, inasmuch as (only) non-pervasion (and not atomic-ness) is proved by non-existence of universal pervasion.

In one body, therefore, there is just one mind, since the supposition of plurality would entail randundancy. To imagine parts even of a single mind would be showing exuberance of imagination. Moreover, being touchless, they cannot originate. By such arguments, (infinite) minuteness is proved. This is the import.—23

Space is all-pervading.

Upaskâra.—He states the argument for the infinite magnitude of space :—

गुणैर्दिग्व्याख्याता ॥ ७ । १ । २४ ॥

गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. दिक् Dik, space. व्याख्याता Vyâkhyâtâ, explained.

24. By attributes, Space is explained (to be all-pervading). —280.

The meaning is that, 'guṇaiḥ,' *i. e.*, by attributes characterised as priority and posteriority inherent in all dense bodies, and appearing in the forms of the intuitions of the East, the West, etc., common to all persons inhabiting all the island or divisions of the globe, space also is explained under the aspect of pervasion. For, it will be mentioned later on that in the production of (the notions of) priority and posteriority, the cause is relative understanding having for its subject-matter larger and smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct. Moreover, the supposition of a plurality of space is contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition.

Objection.—How, then, can there be the intuition and the expression or reference, namely, "Ten spaces (*i. e.*, quarters)"?

Answer.—The objection does not arise, since it has been already stated that they are due to particular *upâdhi* or external conditions.—24.

Time is all-pervading.

***Upaskâra.*—He explains the universal expansion of Time :**

कारणे कालः ॥ ७ । १ । २५ ॥

कारणे Kârane, in cause. To a specific cause, or to a universal cause. कालः Kâlaḥ, time.

25. Time (is the name given) to (a specific, or a universal) cause. (Hence, in either case' it is all-pervading).281

Time is the name which fully designates the substance which is the cause of the intuitions of reciprocal prior and posterier, simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slow, and fast. Such an intuition, common to all persons in all countries, would be impossible without the universal pervasion of time. Universal parvasion, that is to say, connection with infinite magnitude, therefore, belongs to it.

Or, in virtue of such intuitions as "born now," Time is known to be the efficient or occasional cause of all that is produced; and this is dependent upon universal pervasion, for an occasional cause must be, as a rule, in proximity with the cambinative and non-combinative causes.

Or, the use or application of past, future, and present is universal: consequently time is all-prevading.

Or, time is the name of the substance which is the cause of the application or use of moments, *lavas* (thirty-six winks), hours, watches, days, days-and-nights, fortnights, months, seasons, half-years, years, etc. Consequently, such use or application being universal, time is universal, and therefore, infinitely large.

The supposition of its manifoldness is, as has been already stated, contravened by (the fault of) superfluity of supposition.—25.

Here ends the first chapter of the seventh book in the Commentary of Sankara upon the Vaiśeṣîka Aphorisms.

BOOK SEVENTH—CHAPTER SECOND.

Number : Proof of Unity.

Upaskâra.—In the second chapter there are five section : (a) the section on the examination of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object ; (b) the section on the examination of attributes existing only in more than one object ; (c) the section, in passing, on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (*i. e.*, of words and their meaning); (*d*) the section of the examination of attributes existing in one object and having for their non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of particular or distinguishing attributes ; and, (c) the section on the examination of combination. Now, the perceptibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the same object with magnitude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also separateness, immediately after the determination of measure of extension, in violation of the order of enumeration, the auther says :

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकादर्थान्तरमेकत्वम् ॥ ७ । २ । १ ॥

रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकात्. Rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vytirekât, because of difference from Colour .Taste, Smell, and Touch. अर्थान्तरम् Arthântaram, a different object. एकत्वम् Ekatvam, unity.

1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Unity is a different object.—282.

'Rûpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa' is indicatory of all attributes other than the pentad beginning with number, (*i. e.*, number, measure or extension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). 'Vyatirekat' =because of difference or divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this : "One water-pot"—Such particular intuition can be produced by some particularity. And that particularity is not colour, etc., for the intuition is produced by difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the being a water-pot, etc., that is the condition or occasion (of the intuition), for such intuition is produced in respect of a piece of cloth also. Nor is unity a Genus, like Existence, for its denotation is neither less nor more than that of Existence. Nor, again, is it a Genus confined to substance only, for it is neither less nor more extensive than Substance-ness. Nor does the difference or mutual distinction (of Unity and Substance-ness) arsie from difference of intuition, even though they are neither less nor more extensive than each other ; for if difference of intuition were caused by itself, existence also would be differentiated ; if, on the other hand, it were to be caused by difference of subject-matter, then, difference of subject-matter, as has been stated, is not possible, since, otherwise, there would be difference of the characteristic of being a small water-pot and of being a large water-pot. Nor is the view, held by *Bhûśaṅa*, that unity is non-difference from (or identity with) itself, a reasonable one. Were self-identity of the water-pot its Unity, then there would be no intuition of Unity in the case of a cloth, etc., *Bhûśaṅa's* other view, namely, that difference from itself constitutes Duality, etc., is also not valid ; for variety of uses of difference from itself or self-distinction, as being common to three, four, and so on, is not possible or capable of proof. This is the import.—1.

Proof of Separateness.

Upaskâra.—With a view to prove separateness also, by means of its similarity to Unity, he says :

तथा पृथक्त्वम् ॥ ७ । २ । २ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similarly. पृथक्त्वम् Prithakatvam, separateness. Individuality.

2. Similarly, Separateness (is a different object).—283.

The practice of discrimination or separation verily exists, in the form, namely " This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this." For, separation means definite apprehension or grasp, having regard to certain limits. Here, again, Colour, etc., are not the cause, since they are not its invariable antecedents, and also because the limits (of them) are undefinable.

Objection.—Separateness is nothing but *anyonya-abhâva*, mutual non-existence, non-existence which opposes identitity ; for, like " This is separate from, other than, a different object from, this," the intuition " (This is) different from this " rests on *anyonya-abhâva*.

Answer.—It is not so. Although the terms separate, etc., are synonymous, they do not convey the sense of *anyonya-ahâva*, 'since in that case the use of the ablative ('from ,) would not be possible or reasonable, because the intuitions, " This is separate from this, " and " This is not this, " contain different subject-matter. Nor is separat eness an object or entity which possesses *anyonya-abhâva*, for , then, in " A cloth is a not water-pot, ,, there would also be the use of the ablative. *Objection.*—The intuitions, " It is separate, ,, and ,, It is distinct, " having the same form, Separateness is nothing but distinctness. *Answer.*—It is not. For, in that case, while Maitra possessed the distinction of a staff, the intuition, " This Maitra is separate fcrm Maitra. " would also arise. Likewise it would entail the application of separateness to Ether it is distinguished by Sound, and to the Soul when it is distinguished by Understanding.

For the same reason, dissimilarity or difference in property also is not Separateness, inasmuch as it would entail, in the case of a water-pot, which has been burnt to redness, such usage as " This water-pot is separate from the dark water-pot." For, it is the possession of properties repugnant to a thing, that constitutes difference in property from that thing. And this appears in the state of redness immediately after darkness.

Nor is it Genus itself, which is Separateness. For, the limits of a Genus are undefinable. Moreover, it would entail inter-mixture of classes ; for, if it exist only in existent things, then its denotation would be neither less nor more than that of existence, and if it exist in substance only, then, than that of Substance-ness.—2.

Unity and Separateness do not exist in Unity and Separateness.

Upaskâra.—It may be argued that inasmuch as there is this usage, namely " One Unity," "Separateness is separate from colour, etc.," therefore, there is Unity also in Unity, Separateness, and similarly, in other and other instances. Accordingly he says :

एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वयोरेकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावोऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । ३ ॥

एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वयोः Ekatva-ekaprithaktvayoḥ, in Unity and Separateness of one, or Individuality. एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावः Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of Unity and Individuality. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां Âṇutva-mahattvâbhyâṃ, by minuteness and magnitude: व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

3. The non-existence of Unity and Individuality, in Unity and Individuality, is explained by minuteness and magnitude. —284.

The meaning is that as minuteness and magnitude do not possess minuteness and magnitude, the application of which to them is derivative, so Unity and Individuality do not possess Unity and Individuality do not possess Unity and Individuality, the application of which to them is derivative.

" By Actions, Actions," " By Attributes, Attributes,"—these two aphorisms (vii. 24, 25, *infra*) also, which employ analogy, here seem to carry the same import as the preceding (*i. e.*, the present) aphorism employing an analogy. The meaning is that as Actions are not possessed of Actions, nor are Attributes possessed of Attributes, so Unity and Individuality are not possessed ef Unity and Individuality.—3.

Unity is not universal, but is confined to Substance only.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked : The application or use of Unity is indeed common to Attributes and Actions. What does here lead to the conclusion that Unity exists only in Substances and not in Attributes, etc ? To this, he replies :

निःसंख्यत्वात् कर्म्मगुणानां सर्व्वैकत्वं न विद्यते ॥ ७ । २ । ४ ॥

निःसंख्यत्वात् Niḥ-aṃkhatvât, being void of Number. कर्म्मगुणानां Karmma-guṇânâṃ, of Actions and Attributes. सर्व्वैकत्वं Sarvva-ekatvaṃ, Universal Unity. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exsists.

4. Actions and Attributes being void of Number, universal Unity does not exist.—285.

Unity of all—that does not exist. On what ground? So he says.—' Niḥsaṃkhyatvaṃ ' means the state or condition of standing away from Number. Thus Actions and Attributes are void of Number. Number being an attribute, Number by no means exists in attributes ; nor, again, in Actions, because Attributes are excluded from, or denied to, Action, since, otherwise, Actions would possess Substance-ness. And the attributeness of Number has been proved, and also the Number-ness of Unity. This is the import.—4.

Cognition of Unity in Attribute and Action is erroneous.

Upaskâra.—How, then, do such cognitions arise, as " One colour," " One taste," etc. ? To this, he replies :

भ्रान्तं तत् ॥ ७ । २ । ५ ॥

भ्रान्तं Bhrântaṃ, mistaken ; Erroneous. तत् Tat, that, *i. e.*, the cognition of Unity in Action and Attribute.

5. That (*i.e.*, the cognition of Unity in Action and Attribute) is erroneous.—286.

The meaning is that the cognition of Unity which arises in the case of Attributes and Actions, is erroneous. 'Cognition'—this is the complement of the aphorism, because an objection of the opponent has been thrown into it. The application (of Unity in these cases) is, however derivative, and it is non-difference from itself, or self-identity, which constitutes the derivation. Nor is Unity nothing but that (*i. e.*, self identity), for the reply has been already given.—4.

Bhâṣya :—*explains* VII. ii. 5 as demolishing the view contained in VII. ii, 4.

Indirect proof of Unity.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked : " Let this application of Unity be secondary in the case of substances also and the intuition of it erroneous, what is the use of unity at all ? " To this, he replies :

एकत्वाभावाद्भक्तिस्तु न विद्यते ॥ ७ । २ । ६ ॥

एकत्वाभावात् Ekatva-abhâvât, in consequence of the non-existence of Unity. भक्तिः Bhaktiḥ, derivative function. Secondariness. तु Tu, but. However. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

6. In consequence of the non-existence of Unity, however, secondariness would not exist.—287.

If Unity in its transcendental or real sense be nowhere to be observed, then the application of the term could not be secondary, for the secondary, has for its antecedent the primary, use. Nor, again, could the intuition be erroneous, for error has for its antecedent certain knowledge. For it is the certainly known that is (erroneously) attributed, and not the erroneous, for the intuition of the non-existent has been disproved, and the intuition of the otherwise (*i. e.*, the existent) has been proved.—6.

Bhâṣya :—*explains* VII. ii. 6 in support of the interpretation of VII. ii. 5, thus : Did not unity exist everywhere, there would be no *bhakti*, production, of things at all. For, any one thing is the joint product of several things ; but there can be no such production in the absence of one-ness or unity ; unity, therefore, exists in all places.

Unity and Separateness of one do not exist in effect and cause.

Upaskâra.—Effect and cause, *e. g.*, threads and cloth, possess Unity and single Individuality. Single Individuality also belongs to them for the very same reason for which Unity belong to them. For it is not possible that a thing can be separate from itself. For when a piece of cloth is torn asunder and the threads are drawn out one after another, a piece of cloth different from them is not observed. Were a piece of cloth different from the threads, then it should be observed under the characteristic of being different from them, like a water-pot. In like manner, a water-pot also is nothing but identical with the two potsherds (which compose it), since a water-pot also being broken, nothing over and above the two potsherds is observed. Accordingly it has been said, " A whole made up of parts is nothing else than the parts.": This is the view of the Sâṃkhya thinkers. And for the purpose of controverting it, he says :

कार्य्यकारणयोरेकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावादेकत्वैपृथक्त्वं न विद्यते ॥ ७ । २ । ७ ॥

कार्य्यकारणयोः : Kâryya-kâraṇayoḥ, of or in effect and cause. एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वाभावात् Ekatva-ekaprithakatva-abhâvât, in consequence of non-existence of identity and heterogeneity. एकत्वैकपृथक्त्वं Ekatva-ekapritha-ktvaṃ, Unity and Individuality. न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

7. Effect and cause are neither the same nor similar (in being equally distinguished from all other things) ; therefore, Unity and (single) Individuality do not exist in them.—288.

Effect and cause—these two are not one. Why ? So he says : from non-existence of 'ekatva,' *i. e.*, from non-existence of non-difference and because co-existence of plurality and unity in the same substratum is not therefore, possible, as would be required by the proposition that the very same thing which is the effect, is also the cause, *e. g.*, that threads are a piece of cloth.

Objection.—But there is as a matter of fact such co-existence in the same substratum, seeing that the term, waters, is applied to a drop of water only, and also seeing that the term, wives, is applied to a single woman.

Answer.—Such is not the case. For such applications can be possible by reference to multiplicity of constituent parts. In the case of the ultimate atom of water, however, such application takes place, according to some thinkers, by means of multiplicity of colour, etc., naturally belonging to it ; while, according to others, it is due to the characteristic force of sound or language which should not be found fault with. Nor do fibres present in a *salvinia cucullata* and honey-comb obtain the application of cloth. Nor do threads singly prevail to contain and to drag anything.

Nor, again, can the two, effect and cause, become the substratum of single Individuality, for it is seen that they become the limits of each other. How ? So he says, ' eka-prithakatva-abhâvât,' *i. e.*, in consequence of the non-existence of ' eka-prithakatvaṃ,' or non-hetero-geneity or non-difference in property ; in other words, because, of effect and cause, difference in property is observed, for it is universal among mankind that the notions of thread and cloth, as well as of warter-pot and potsherds, are embraced by different acts of understanding.

Objection.—Why, then, are not Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, cognised by their difference (or separately from one another, *i. e.*, one after another always) ?

Answer.—Because of the absolute similarity of their forms, *i. e.*, modes of manifestation. And when sometimes, as in a piece of cloth of variegated colour, etc., separate cognition also takes place, it is because the differences of Number, Measure or Extension, etc., are most manifest there.—7.

Only non-eternal unity and separateness of one proceed from like attributes in their causes.

Upaskâra.—He points out that non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one have for their antecedents attributes of these causes.

एतदनित्ययोर्व्याख्यातम् ॥ ७ । २ । ८ ॥

एतत् Etat, this, *i. e.*, the characteristic of having the attributes of the cause as antecedents. अनित्ययोः Anityayoḥ, of the two non-eternals, namely, Number and Separateness. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtaṃ, explained.

8. This, (as) explained in the case of the two non-eternals (namely, Number and Separateness, should be understood only in the case of non-eternal Unity and Separateness of one).—289.

The characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents, which has been explained in the case of non-eternal Number and Separateness, should be understood to apply to only non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one, since other Numbers and Separatenesses are produced by relative understanding. As the characteristic of having attributes of the cause as antecedents belongs to non-eternal colour and touch of Fire, so it belongs also to non-eternal Unity and Separateness-of-one. This is the import. It follows, therefore, that Numbers beginning with two and ending with the highest arithmetical number, possess or reside in more than one substance. It also follows that separatenesses beginning with Separateness of two and ending with Separateness of the highest arithmetical number, co-exist in the same substratum with those Numbers. Now, the processes of the production and destruction of Duality, etc., are as follows ; When two homogeneous or heterogeneous substances are in contact with the eye, cognition of the attribute qualified with the notion or characteristic of Unity, which is the genus of the two numbers, Unities, inhering in the two substances, are produced immediately after the elimination of difference in thought *i.e.*, the assimilation of the two substances under the notion (of Unity); and it is this cognition which is called relative understanding or the conception of the one in the many. By it Duality is produced in the two substances. Then there takes place reasoning about the notion or characteristic of Duality which is the genus of the Duality so produced. After it, simultaneously there appear destruction of relative understanding by means of that reasoning, and a qualified or concrete understanding having for its content the attribute Duality as qualified with the notion or characteristic of Duality. And in the next moment there are simultaneously produced destruction of the attribute Duality in consequence of the destruction of relative understanding, and cognition, in the form of "Two substances," qualified with Duality. Thereafter, results *Saṃskâra*, impresssion or a fixed idea, from the above cognition of substances qualified with Duality. Thus, to sum up :—Beginning with contact with the sense and ending with *Saṃskâra* or impression, there are eight moments ; *viz.*, contact of the sense with the substratum of Duality which is going to be produced, then cognition of the genus inherent in the attribute Unity, then relative understanding in the form of cognizance of the many along with the

attribute Unity as qualified with the generic notion or characteristic of Unity, then production of the attribute Duality, then cognition of the genus inherent in Duality, then cognition of the attribute Duality as qualified with that genus, then cognition of substances as qualified with the attribute Duality, and then *Saṃskâra* or impression. The order of destruction, again, is as follows : Destruction of the generic notion or characteristic of Unity, from relative understanding ; destruction of relative understanding, from cognition of the generic notion or characteristic of Duality ; destruction of the generic notion or characteristic of Duality, from cognition of the attribute Duality ; destruction of cognition of the attribute Duality, from cognition of substances as qualified with the possession of Duality ; and destruction of the latter, from *Saṃskâra* or impression, or from cognition of other objects.

Objection.—Why is not cognition of substance qualified with the possession of Unity, itself produced after the cognition of Unity, when all the causes of its production are present there ? For, cognition of attribute taking place, there can be no delay in the cognition of substance. From that same cognition (of substance so qualified), therefore, there being destruction of relative understanding, from its destruction will follow, at its very next moment, destruction of Duality. Hence destruction of Duality resulting at the very moment prior to the qualified or concrete cognition in the form of "*Two* substances," the production of cognition of substance as qualified with the possession of Duality, becomes impossible.

Answer.—The argument is defective ; for, it is relative understanding uninfluenced or unobstructed or unobscured by the causes of the production of Duality, etc., which invariably produces cognition qualified with the content of substance, the above supposition being made on the strength of the result.

Objection.—But still destruction of relative understanding being caused by the very *Saṃskâra* or impression produced by itself, the fault, pointed out above, again appears all the same, since there is possibility of destruction of Duality at the very moment prior to the cognition qualified with Duality.

Answer.—It does not, since cognition of pure attribute, or of attribute unassociated with substance, is not productive of *Saṃskâra* or impression. For pure attribute can be nowhere called back to mind, since everywhere it is only by the background of, or as contained in, substance, that there can be recollection of attribute.

Objection.—Let it be so; still inasmuch as even at the time of the production of qualified or concrete cognition, there may be destruction of Duality, the possibility of non-production of qualified cognition remains in the very same state. For qualified or specific cognition, illuminative of that which is present, cannot possibly appear at the moment of the destruction of the qualification or that which serves to specify, since there is no such observation.

Answer.—This is not the case. For, cognition of that which serves to specify, contact of sense with that which is specified, and non-apprehension of non-association of the above two, which make up the whole

cause of specefic cognition, are possible also in the case of the subject under discussion. If, however, contact of sense with that which serves to specify, is also required, then this too existing at the preceding moment, the very contact, which exists at the preceding moment, is observed to be the cause. That which serves to specify, or a qualification or distinction, which is beyond the compass of specified cognition, may also exist: for, it is only the being the object or content of cognition productive of specified cognition, which determines the characteristic of being a distinction or that which serves to specify, but the being the object of specified cognition does not also determine it.

Objection.—In this view, an *upalakṣaṇam* or indication also will come to have the nature of a *viśeṣaṇam* or distinction.

Answer.—By no means; for, existence in the same substratum, which is invariable and which does not cause specified cognition, determines the characteristic of being a distinction, whereas an indication exists in a different substratum from that which it indicates. Thus, when there is possession of a raven in the house of Devadatta, then the raven is a distinction. But when, flying over the house, it does not exist in it, then the raven is an indication.

Objection.—This being so it would follow that in such cases as "There is taste in that which possesses colour," etc., colour, etc., also would be distinctions.

Answer.—This is not an objection, since it is desired to be so.

Objection.—Then there too taste will exist.

Answer.—No, since that which exists in something distinguished by the possession of something else, does not necessarily exist in that by which it is so distinguished. For a distinction and that which is distinguished are not one and the same thing.

Objection—At the time of the destruction of Duality, there exists no connection with the distinction. How can specified cognition, or cognition of that which is distinguished, be produced?

Answer.—The question does not arise, for the meaning of the term, the being distinguished or qualified, is only non-variation or non-deviation or non-divergence from that (*i. e.*, the distinction); whereas the manifestation of that (*i. e.*, the distinction) exists there (*i. e.*, in specified cognition) also.

Hence, the teachers say, nothing remains unproved.

In like manner, on the analogy of the production and destruction of Duality, should be understood the production and destruction of Triplicity.

Duality is destructible by the destruction of relative understanding, for an existing attribute cannot be destroyed in the absence of another attribute opposed to the destruction of its substratum, like ultimate cognition, since ulitimate cognition is destroyed by destruction of *adriṣṭam*. In some cases it is destroyed also from destruction

of substratum, *e.g.*, where there is knowledge of the genus, unity, simultaneously with action in the constituent parts of the substratum of Duality. It is in this way: Action in constituent parts and cognition of the genus; Disjunction and relative understanding; destruction of Conjunction and production of attribute Duality; destruction of constituted substance and cognition of the genus Duality;—here destruction of Duality results from destruction of substance, and destruction of relative understanding from cognition of the genus Duality; since, destruction of relative understanding taking place at the same time with destruction of Duality, there exists no relation, resembling the relation of effect and cause, between them. Where, however, there is simultaneity of action in the constituent parts of the substratum of Duality and relative understanding, there destruction of Duality results from both destruction of substratum and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this way: Action in the constituent parts and relative understanding; production of disjunction and production of Duality; destruction of conjunction and cognition of the genus Duality; destruction of constituted substance and destruction of relative understanding; destruction of Duality from both, the capacity of each for destroying being observed. This process properly fits in with the theory of two cognitions being related as the destroyed and the destroyer; and it is this theory which is legitimate or established by proof.

Objection.—The entire group of cause being the same in the cases of Duality, Triplicity, etc., how is it that there is this difference in their effects, namely, Duality is constituted by two Unities, Triplicity by three Unities ?

Answer.—The question cannot arise, since Duality, etc., do not exist in Unity.

Objection.—It is Duality, Triplicity, etc., inhering in the combinative cause, which determine cognitions of Duality, Triplicity, etc.

Answer.—This is not the case ; for prior to the production of Duality, etc., Duality, being absent therefrom, the enquiry after the cause of Duality, etc., does not cease even there, and the existence of such difference in relative understanding, and in Unities, or in the supposition of that on the strength of the result, is contravened by non-observation.

Objection.—Let the use also of Duality, etc., proceed from the same source ; what is the need of Duality, etc.? Difference will result from difference of *adriṣṭam*.

Answer.—Were it so, Triplicity, and Four-ness, would be sometimes produced also by the set of causes originative of Duality. Hence it would entail non-uniformity. Moreover, it may be said in this connexion that difference in the effect is explained by difference in prior non-existence ; as in the case of colour, taste, smell, and touch, produced by burning, difference is produced under the same set of causes.

Objection.—Prior non-existence also is common to all, or is the same in all cases.

Answer.—It is not; for each prior non-existence in each particular case has been ascertained to have causality towards its own effect only.

Or, the process should be carried on in this way that Duality is produced by pure relative understanding, and Triplicity by relative understanding accompanied by Duality. In such cases as "I have killed a hundred of ants," Duality is not at all produced in consequence of the non-existence of combinative cause. Accordingly, it should be observed, the use of number is there derivative or secondary.

Professor *Śrîdhara* opines that in the case of an army, a forest, etc., in consequence of the non-existence of constant relative understanding, only multiplicity is produced, but not hundred, thousand, and other numbers. With regard to this view, Professor *Udayana* observes that if such be the case, then in these cases no doubt could arise whether it be hundred, or thousand, etc., nor could there be such cognition as "A large army," "A larger army," and that hence this is not the case. Here the matter should be discussed in the following manner: Multiplicity is either nothing but number commencing from Triplicity, and terminating with the highest arithmetical number, or another number different from them. It cannot be the first since in the case also of any army, a forest, etc., there is as a rule production of hundred, thousand, and other numbers. Nor can it be second, since multiplicity different in mark from Triplicity, etc., is not observed. Multiplicity, therefore, is only number, namely, hundred, etc., produced by relative understanding which is uniformly constant in each case and which does not depend upon Unity. The manifestation of hundred, etc., does not, however, take place there, since nothing exists there which can manifest it.

We, on the other hand, say that multiplicity is really a different number, existing in the same substratum with Triplicity, etc., and producible by relative understanding productive of Triplicity, etc. It is so in consequence of the difference of prior non-existence. How else can such a statement be possible as "All I can say is that there are many"? I do not know particularly whether they be a hundred or a thousand"? As magnitude or largeness and length co-exist in the same substance, so do Triplicity, etc., and multiplicity co-exist in one and the same substratum. For, to the query, "Shall I bring a hundred or a thousand of mango fruits?" the reply is given, *viz.*, "Let a large number of them be brought. What is the use of inquiring about a particular number?" This being so, Triplicity is produced by relative understanding accompained by Duality, Four-ness by relative understanding accompained by Triplicity, and so on, one after the other. In the production of multiplicity, on the contrary, there is no such uniformity or law that the relative understanding must be qualified with the possession or accompaniment of all the numbers which stand behind it. Hence in the case of an army, a forest, and the like, only multiplicity is produced, but not any other number; and so the alternatives amongst which Doubt has to swing also become really non-existent.

Separateness, again, exists in the same substratum with that (*i. e.*, number). Hence as is Duality, so is also separateness of two; and so on.

Objection.—The use of separateness of two, etc., being possible by means of separatenesses of one existing in the same substratum with Duality, Triplicity, etc., what is the use of Separateness of two, etc.?

Answer.—The question cannot be raised in view of the discrepancy that while in the case of "A cloth and a clod are separate from a water-pot" there is no perception of the separateness of the dual (cloth and clod) being produced by the dual and the single limiting each other, there is such perception in the case of their individual separateness. Nor does this theory entail and explain Priority of two, for Priority of two is explained and possible by means of two priorities existing in the same substratum, or co-extensive, with Duality. The contradiction in respect of one being the limit of the other, which exists in the case of separate ness, does not exist in the case of Priority; since the intuition. "These two are prior," is possible or proved in same way as the intuition. "These two are blue." For, though two bodies occupying the same part of space possess equal manifoldness of conjunctions with the conjunct, yet production of different effects is possible by means of the difference of the conjunction of space and body, which is the non-combinative cause. Moreover, as two Unities jointly become the non-combinative cause of Duality, it being, in like manner, possible for two separatenesses of one or single individualities, jointly operating, to possess non-combinative causality towards the production of separateness of two, or dual individuality, it is not observed that more than, one *i.e.*, many, conjunctions are, by their joint operation, originative of one effect, which is not a constituted substance, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the effect. On the other hand, by means of the proximity known as combination in the same object with the cause, a larger number of conjunctions of threads and the cylinder of wood in a loom do really originate a single conjunction of a cloth and the cylinder of wood in a loom This is the direction.

On the analogy of destruction of Duality, etc., should be under stood also destruction of separateness of two, etc.—8.

Vivṛiti.—It may be objected: "The thread is distinct from the cloth and is dissimilar to the cloth"—such intuitions are simply erroneous, since it is threads conjoint among themselves, which becomes the cloth, and since no proof exists that the cloth is distinct from the threads. It cannot be said that difference from the thread can be proved to exist in the cloth by means of its dissimilarity to the thread, for dissimilarity itself is not proved. For, the nature of the cloth does not constitute its dissimilarity to the thread, inasmuch as in the state of the manifestation of the cloth, the nature of the cloth is recognised in the threads themselves. Accordingly it has been taught by Professor *Īśvarakṛiṣṇa*:—

असदकरणादुपादानसंग्रहात् सर्व्वसम्भवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्य्यम् ॥

The effect is existent (in the cause, in an enveloped state, prior to its production); For, there can be no production and manifestation of

that which is non-existent ; there can be no connection of the cause with the effect (if the latter be non-existent) ; (some connection must exist between the cause and the effect, since) the production of everything is not possible from everything else ; there can be production of one thing from another, if the two are mutually related as the producer and the producible (and such relation cannot be possible if the effect be non-existent) ; and the cause and the effect are identical, (so that the one cannot be non-existent, while the other is existent).—*Sâṃkhya-kârikâ*, verse 9).

This being the case, the non-existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity between the cause and the effect remaining itself unproved, how can it establish the relation of Unity and of Separateness of one or single individuality ?

To meet this objection, the author says :

'Etat,' *i. e.*, the possession of the non-existence of Unity and Separateness of one in consequence of the possession of the non-existence of non-difference and non-dissimilarity, has been observed, 'anityayoḥ,' that is, in the case of non-eternal cause and non-eternal effect. This is the meaning. Accordingly on the hypothesis of the non-difference of the threads and cloth, it would follow that in the state of the production of the threads, there would arise the intuition and use of language that the cloth is being produced ; in the state of the production of the cloth, that the threads are being produced ; iu the state of the destruction of the threads, that the cloth is being destroyed ; in the state of the destruction of the cloth, that the threads are being destroyed ; and so on. Nor can it be maintained that production and destruction are not themselves entitled to acceptance, inasmuch-as such intuitions are explained on the very theory of development or appearance and envelopment, or disappearance ; for the hypothesis of an appearance, will entail a regress to infinity. If, on the other hand, the production of the appearance is admitted, then how does the theory of the production of the cloth, etc., become offensive ? If, again, the production of appearance in appearance be not admitted, then appearance would become omniferous, or all-sided, (which is not desired by the objector). For, the all-sidedness of appearance is not recognised even by the Sâṃkhya thinkers. In reality, the common consent of humanity that the cloth is produced, the cloth is destroyed, and so forth, is proof of production and destruction ; for, if experience of one thing be admitted to have another thing as its object, we must deny also the water-pot, cloth, etc.

Conjunction, how produced.

Upaskâra.—He begins another section or topic :—

अन्यतरकर्म्मज उभयकर्म्मजः संयोगाजश्च संयोगः ॥ ७ । २ । ६ ॥

अन्यतरकर्म्मजः Anytara-karmma-jaḥ, produced by the action of either of two things. उभयकर्म्मजः Ubhaya-karmma-jaḥ, produced by action of both. संयोगजः Saṃyoga-jaḥ, produced by conjunction. च Cha, and. संयोगः Saṃyogaḥ, conjunction.

9. Conjunction is produced by action of any one of two things, is produced by action of both, and is produced by Conjunction, also.—290.

Unobstructed intuition that things are conjunct is proof of conjuntion. So also are effects ; *e. g.*, substance, in the case of conjuntions of constituent parts ; colour and other attributes produced by burning, in the case of conjunction of fire ; particular measure or extension, in the case of accretion ; sound, in the case of conjunction of the drum and ether ; such other instances should be understood. Nor is Conjunction merely production without the intervention of empty space. The theories of transiency and transformation of things having been thrown away, Conjunction is the coming together which has non-coming together for its antecedent. And it is produced by the action of one of two things ; as is the conjunction of a motionless post with a hawk in motion, or the conjunction of one in motion, when the motion is not directed where the conjunction takes place, *e. g.*, conjunction of a runner with the back of another runner. Conjunction produced by the action of both the conjunct is that of two rams or of two wrestlers, since it is produced by both of them exercising strength towards each other. The third (conjunction produceed by conjunction) is the conjunction of the hand and the tree resulting from the conjunction of the finger and the tree. And it results sometimes from one conjunction even, as the conjunction of cloth aud reed may result from the conjunction of thread and reed. In some cases, one conjunction is produced from two conjunctions, as from two conjunctions, of ether with two threads, may result only one conjunction of a two-threaded cloth with ether. In some cases, again, a single conjunction is originated even by a plurality of conjunctions, as ten conjunctions of ether with ten threads may originate only one conjunction of a ten-threaded cloth and ether. Sometimes, on the other hand, two conjunctions are produced even from a single conjunction as their non-combinative cause. For example, there having first taken place non-originative conjunction between two ultimate atoms, terrene and aqueous, subsequently two conjunctions, originative of two binary atomic aggregates, are produced, namely, one in the terrene ulimate atom with another terrene ultimate atom, and another in the aqueous ultimate atom with another aqueous ultimate atom. By those two conjunctions inhering in homogeneous things, two binary atomic aggregates are simultaneously produced. Therein by that one non-originative conjunction alone, produced between the terrene and the aqueous ultimate atom, one conjunction of the terrene ultimate atom with the aqueous binary atomic aggregate, and another conjunction of the aqueous ultimate atom with the terrene binary attomic aggregate, are produced simultaneously with the production of the colour, etc., of the two binary atomic aggregates.

Inasmuch as the conjunction of cause and not-cause must necessarily produce conjunctions of effect and not-effect, the conjunction of all-pervading substances (*viz.*, Space, Time, Ether and Soul) with dense or corporal bodies is produced by action of one of the two only. Of two all-pervading substances, however, there is no conjunction, since there is no cause (of conjunction). For in them there is no action, nor is

there any (combinative) cause ; hence there cannot be in this case also conjunction of effect and not-effect resulting from conjunction of cause and not-cause. Eternal conjunction, on the other hand, is not possible, for conjunction is the coming together of two things, which has the not-coming together as its antecedent, and eternality is opposed to it. And were conjunction eternal, Disjunction also would be without production ; and eternality of conjunction will not be obtained, since it would be impossibe for Conjunction and Disjunction, which are contradictories, to exist side by side in their indestructible states. Moreover, *yuta-siddhi* or uncombined or naturally unassociated existence is a necessary condition of Conjunction, and it is not possible in the case of two all-pervading substances. For *yuta-siddhi* is merely the separate existence of two or of one of two (unrelated) things, or the relation of one thing being inherent in another, as its substratum, when the twe have been externally brought into relation with each other.

Destruction of Conjunction, however, results from Disjunction having a common substratum with Conjunction. In some cases it results from destruction of substratum also. For example, action is produced in the constituent fibre of a thread immediately after the Conjunction of two threads ; thereby is caused Disjunction from another fibre ; from Disjunction results destruction of originative conjunction ; from this follows destruction of the thread ; and from destruction of the thread results destruction of Conjunction, where two threads having been long conjoined, action is not produced in them. Some, on the contrary, maintain that Conjunction is destroyed by simultaneously produced destruction of substratum, and by Disjunction, inasmuch as action is conceived to exist in another thread at the moment when by action in the constituent parts of a thread there is effected destruction of Conjunction originative of the thread. This is impossible ; for there can be no production of Disjunction at the moment of destruction of the combinative cause, since the rule is that the combinative cause is of equal duration with the effect.

This same Conjunction which is an independent agent in the origination of substances, and a dependent agent in the origination of attributes and actions, is the counter-opposite of the absolute non-existence existing in the same substratum with itself, since it is observed to be so. For it is perceived that there is conjunction of an ape in the Banyan tree, although conjunction of the ape present in a large Banyan tree is limited to a branch only. Were such mere limitation to a part not sufficient to account for it, then conjunction would come to exist in ultimate atoms, and so would not be cognizable. In the case of the all-pervading substances also, it is the difference of *upâdhi*, adjunct or external condition, which serves to localise them. Conjunction present by limitation to that is not pervaded in its denotation . Of Conjunction residing in the ultimate atoms also, direction in space, and the like should be regarded as determinants.—9.

Disjunction, how produced.

Upaskâra.—By extending the mode of the production of Conjunction to Disjunction he says :

एतेन विभागो व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । १० ॥

एतेन Etena, by this. विभागः Vibhâgaḥ, disjunction. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

10. By this Disjunction is explained.—291.

Like Conjunction, Disjunction also is produced by action of either of two things, by action of both, and by Disjunction. Disjunction takes place between a hawk and a post by the action of the hawk ; disjunction of two wrestlers or of two rams fighting with each other, by the actions of both. And Disjunction in these cases has its production at the moment immediately following the production of action, inasmuch as there exists nothing else to be waited for or depended upon. Accordingly it has been said, " Action is an independent cause of Conjunction and Disjunction " (*vide* I. i. 17, *above*).

Objection.—There is dependence upon substratum where Disjunction has to be produced, and upon destruction of antecedent Conjunction where Conjunction has to be produced.

Answer.—This is not the case, for action is independent since it does not depend upon anything in the form of an existence which has its production immediately after the production of itself.

Disjunction, produced by Disjunction, however, is two-fold, according to the difference of Disjunction of cause and not-cause produced by Disjunction of cause alone, and the difference of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, produced by Disjunction of cause and not-cause. Therein Disjunction of potsherd and Ether, resulting from Disjunction of the two potsherds, is an example of Disjunction of cause and not-cause, resulting from Disjunction of cause alone; and Disjunction of hand and tree resulting from Disjunction of finger and tree, and Disjunction of body and tree, resulting from Disjunction of hand and tree, are examples of Disjunction of effect and not-effect, resulting from Disjunction of cause and not-cause.

Objection.—There is no proof of Disjunction itself, the term, Disjunction, being used to denote only non-existence of Conjunction.

Answer.—It is not so. For, if non-existence of Conjunction be absolute non-existence, then it would follow that the term Disjunction would be used to denote attribute and action also.

Objection.—Absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present in two substances, is the source of the intuition of the disjunct.

Answer.—It cannot be, since it would in that case follow that absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present also in a constituted whole and its constituent parts, would be the source of the intuition of the disjunct.

Objection.—The term " two substances " should be qualified by the expression " not being related to each other as effect and cause."

Answer.—In that case, absolute non-existence of Conjunction, being present in the Vindhya and Himalaya mountains also, would be the cause of the intuition of the disjunct.

Objection.—Indeed there it is.

Answer.—It is not. For there being existence of erroneous intuition, due to it, in the case of attribute and action also, it should be considered how far it will be valid to make it the source of convention or usage with reference to the accurate intuition only.

Objection.—Destruction of Conjunction is Disjunction.

Answer.—Were this the case, it would entail the use of the term Disjunction on Conjunction being destroyed by the destruction of any one of the two things in Conjunction.

Objection.—"Things in Conjunction" should be qualified as being existent.

Answer.—In that case, it would entail the intuition of Disjunction even in the state of Conjunction of a jujube and an emblic myrobalan which become conjunct again immediately after the destruction of one conjunction.

Objection.—Disjunction is the destruction of all Conjunctions.

Answer.—If it be so, then there would be non-existence of Disjunction in the case of destruction of one Conjunction, since the denotation of 'all' finds no place there.

Disjunction, therefore, exists, and it is an additional attribute.

This attribute, again, is destructible by another contradictory attribute, inasmuch as, so long as the substratum exists, destruction of attribute cannot be possible without a contradictory attribute existing in the same substratum.

Objection.—Action itself may be destructive of Conjunction.

Answer.—It cannot be, since only a contradictory attribute is destructive of attribute. Moreover, although where finger, hand, arm, and body come to have conjunction with the tree, by means of their respective actions, there is possibility of destruction of conjunction of the finger and the tree, by means of the action produced in the finger only, yet there would not follow destruction of conjunctions of the hand and the tree, of the arm and the tree, and of the body and the tree, since the hand, etc. are inactive and the action of the finger rests in a different substratum. If it be supposed that even action resting in a different substratum may be destructive of conjunction, it would then follow that there would be destruction of all conjunctions at one and the same moment of time, by action wherever it may be produced.

Objection.—What then is the solution here on your theory?

Answer.—Disjunction of the hand and the tree, produced by Disjunction of the finger and the tree, is destructive of conjunction of the hand and the tree. This is a matter of observation.

Sarvajña has said that there may very well be destruction of conjunction of the hand and tree, by the very action of the finger, resting in a different substratum, and that there will be no undue extension (of the causality of action), inasmuch as it is observed that mutual non-conjunction of the container and the contained is itself destructible by action resting in a different substratum. This too is not a sound opinion; for, distructiveness is everywhere observed to belong only to a contradictory attribute appearing in the substratum, and it is not reasonable to abandon that without some argument to the contrary.

Sound and Disjunction, again, are effects of Disjunction. Therein we shall ponder over the non-combinative causality of Disjunction towards the production of Sound. For, of the Sound which is produced, when a bamboo is being split up, and one of the two halves is held down by the pressure of the foot, and the other is drawn upwards, we find no other non-combinative cause than the disjunction of the half and ether (or of the ether within the halves). Nor do we find any non-combinative cause over and above Disjunction in the case of the sounding forth of a bamboo bursting out while it is being burnt in a conflagration. We also infer the Disjunction of the effect and not-effect from the Disjunction of the cause and not-cause. How else, where conjunction of the finger and the tree, conjunction of the hand and the tree, conjunction of the arm and the tree, and conjunction of the body and the tree are produced by the respective actions of the finger, etc., can there be destruction of the conjunction of the hand and the tree, and of other conjunctions, even on the destruction of the conjunction of the finger and the tree, consequent on the disjunction of the finger and the tree produced by action produced in the finger alone? For, in this case, it is the series of disjunctions, produced by disjunctions, that is, as has been already stated, destructive of the corresponding conjunctions. There is, however, no clear evidence in the case of disjunction of the cause and not-cause, of which the antecedent is the disjunction of the two (constituent) causes (*i.e.*, the two halves of the bamboo); for, it is observed that, production of the disjunction of ether, etc., like the disjunction of one of the two halves of the bamboo, being also possible by the action produced in the other half, disjunction is produced by the action of that other half from all those with which that half was conjunct. For it is not that disjunctions are not produced also from particular parts of ether, etc., by action produced in a finger, equally as disjunction from another finger. Nor is it that disjunctions from particular parts of ether, etc , are not originated by action produced in a lotus-leaf, even as disjunction from another lotus-leaf is produced. We maintain, "Let a single action originate even a hundred disjunctions which are not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. But that action which originates disjunction which is opposed to the conjumction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjuuction which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance. And that which originates disjunction which is not opposed to the conjunction originative of substance, cannot also originate disjunction which is opposed to the conjunction originative of substance."

Objection.—**Is there any reason for taking such a view ?**

Answer.—Yes, there is, diversity of cause being rendered necessary by diversity of effect.

Objection.—Variety is necessary in action, so that one action may produce disjunction which is opposed to conjunction originative of substance, as in the case of flowering lotus-blossoms, etc., and another action may produce both, *i. e.*, disjunctions which are opposed and not opposed to conjunctions originative of substance.

Answer.—This cannot be. For contrariety of effect is the origin of the supposition of diversity of cause; and that contrariety arises by way of the characteristic of the one being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance, but by way of the characteristic of the other not being the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance, inasmuch as diversity also ought to be supposed by those very ways.

This same action, present in the one half of the bamboo, produces only disjunction of the two halves. And this disjunction first originates disjunction from the particular parts of ether, etc.,—disjunction which is not the counter-opposite of conjunction originative of substance. And if it produced disjunction by itself, it would then bear the characteristic of action; hence it depends upon time which is distinguished with the possession of destruction of substance.

Objection.—At that moment also let that action itself produce Disjunction.

Answer.—It cannot do so, being past in time. In the production of Disjunction, Time follows immediately after the production of action itself.

Objection.—But subsequent Disjunction being thus produced by antecedent Disjunction, action cannot produce conjunction with other places.

Answer.—This is not the case; for towards the production of conjunction, action is not past time. Otherwise, action will be never destroyed, it being destructible only by subsequent conjunction.

This same Disjunction, destructible by subsequent conjunction, lasts for three moments only. Sometimes it is destructible by destruction of substratum. It is in this way: Action is produced in the fibre which is a constituent part of the thread; Disjunction of two fibres follows it; at the same moment, action is produced in another thread; then there is destruction of conjunction, originative of the thread, by disjunctiou of two fibres, and Disjunction is produced by action in the thread; then there is destruction of the thread from destruction of conjunction originative of substance, and from destruction of the thread results destruction of Disjunction produced by action in another thread.

Objection.—Such being the case, there will be no destruction of action produced in another thread, since there is nothing to destroy it. For, it can be destroyed by subsequent conjunction, but Disjunction being destroyed, there is no subsequent conjunction.

Answer.—The argument is not valid. As Disjunction of the thread in the state of being destroyed is produced by action which is produced in the thread, so by the same action should be produced Disjunction of the thread from the fibre also. Such Disjunction also is really opposed to originative conjunction. By this Disjunction of the fibre and the thread is produced Disjunction of the thread and ether, which produces subsequent conjunction, and this, in its turn, causes destruction of action. Or, wherever action is produced in a thread, action is produced in its fibre also. That action, again, in the thread in the state of being destroyed, originates simultaneous Disjunctions from the constituent parts of the thread, and particular parts of ether, etc., all these Disjunctions being not opposed to originative conjunction. There is, therefore, destruction of action combined or co-inherent in the thread, by conjunction which has its production immediately after the Disjunction of the effect, *e. g.*, thread, from the not-effect, *e. g.*, ether, etc., produced from the Disjunction of the cause, *e. g.*, the fibre, and the not-cause, *e. g.*, ether etc.

Sometimes Disjunction is destroyed jointly by subsequent conjunction and destruction of substratum. It is in this way : There being conjunction of a thread, and a thread, action is produced in the constituent parts of the thread, namely, the fibre, and action is produced in the reed. This is one moment of time. By action in the fibre is produced Disjunction from another fibre, and by this there is destruction of conjunction originative of the thread. By the action in the reed also, there is Disjunction of the thread and the reed, and there is also destruction of the conjunction of the thread and the reed. Destruction of the thread immediately follow destruction of conjunction originative of the thread. Conjunction of the reed with another portion of space immediately follows destruction of conjunction of the thread and the reed. Jointly from both of them, *viz.*, destruction of substratum, and conjunction, results destruction of Disjunction.—10.

Conjunction and Disjunction do not possess Conjunction and Disjunction.

Upaskâra.—It may be said, "Let there be Conjunction in Conjunction also, and Disjunction in Disjunction also." To prevent this he says :

संयोगविभागयोः संयोगविभागाभावोऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । ११ ॥

संयोगविभागयोः Sâṃyoga-vibhâgayoḥ, in Conjunction and Disjunction. संयोगविभागाभावः Saṃyoga-vibhâga-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां Aṇutva-mahattvâbhyâṃ, by minuteness and magnitude. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

11. The non-existence of Conjunction and Disjunction, in Conjunction and Disjunction, is explained by Minuteness and Magnitude.—292.

As Minuteness and Magnitude are not possessed of Minuteness and Magnitude, so also are not Conjunction and Disjunction possessed of Conjunction and Disjunction.—11.

Actions are void of actions, and Attributes, of attributes.

कर्म्मभिः कर्म्माणि गुणैर्गुणा अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यामिति ॥७।२।१२॥

कर्म्मभिः Karmmabhiḥ, by actions. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, actions. गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. गुणाः Guṇâḥ, attributes. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां Aṇutva-mahattvâbhyâṃ, by minuteness and magnitude. इति Iti, this.

12. Actions are (void) of Actions; Attributes are (void) of Attributes. This (is explained) by Minuteness and Magnitude. —293.

Upaskâra.—This second aphorism has been already explained. (Vide VII. i. 15 supra).

Bhâṣya. reads VII. ii. 12 as two aphorisms viz., *Karmabhirkar-mâṇi guṇair-guṇâḥ* and *Aṇutvamahattvabhyâmiti*, and explains them in the same way as VII. i, 16.

Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause do not exist.

Upaskâra.—If it be asked why there cannot be conjunction of two substances, namely of constituent part and constituted whole, so he says :

युतसिद्ध्यभावात् कार्य्यकारणयोः संयोगविभागौ न विद्येते ॥ ७ । २ । १३ ॥

युतसिद्ध्यभावात् Yutasiddhi-abhâvât, in consequence of the absence of separate or independent existence. कार्य्यकारणयोः Kâryya-Kâraṇayoḥ, of effect and cause. संयोगविभागौ Saṃyoga-vibhâgau, Conjunction and Disjunction. न Na, not. विद्येते Vidyete, exist.

13. In consequence of the absence of separate existence, there exist not Conjunction and Disjunction of effect and cause. —294.

'Yutasiddhiḥ' means the state of being existent, of two things which have no connection with each other, or the characteristic of being supported by separate substrata. A constituent part and a constituted whole, however, do not possess this. This is the meaning.—13.

Vivṛiti.—'Yutasiddhiḥ' means the existence of two uncombined things. Of cause and effect, *e. g.*, of constituent part and constituted whole, conjunction and disjunction do not exist, because of the absence of their uncombined existence. For constituted wholes such as a water-pot, etc., do not exist having no relation to constituent parts such as potsherds, etc., whereby their conjunction and disjunction might be possible.

The relation between a word and its meaning is neither conjunction nor combination.

Upaskâra.—Now follows from the context another section intended to establish the conventional relation of words and objects. Therein he states an adverse argument.

गुणत्वात् ॥ ७ । २ । १४ ॥

गुणत्वात् Guṇatvât, because it is an attribute.

14. (There can be no conjunction of Sound or Words with Objects), because (Conjunction, is an Attribute.—295.

'Of conjunction'— this is the complement. Thus, the meaning is, how can there be conjunction which is an attribute, of an attribute, *e. g.*, Sound or Word, with objects such a water pot, etc. ?—14.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Moreover, the object also is sometimes characterised as colour, taste, etc., Therefore, conjunction is not possible, inasmuch as the existence of attribute in an attribute has not been admitted. This is what he says :

गुणोऽपि विभाव्यते ॥ ७ । २ । १५ ॥

गुणः Guṇaḥ, attribute. अपि Api, also. विभाव्यते Vibhâvyate, is known or established.

15. Attribute also is known (to be an object denoted by Word), or is established (by Word).—296.

'Attribute also, object'—this is the complete sentence. Attribute also, *e. g.*, colour, etc., is an object denoted by Word, but with that there is no relation of conjunction. This is the meaning. Or, the meaning is that attribute also is established (by being denoted) by Word and that with that there is no relation of conjunction of Word.—15.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—Further, conjunction (of Word and Object) cannot be produced by the action of either or by the action of both, because any substance whatever, *e. g.*, Ether, etc., as well as Word are inert. This is what he says :

निष्क्रियत्वात् ॥ ७ । २ । १६ ॥

निष्क्रियत्वात् Niṣkriyatvât, because of inactivity or inertness.

16. Because Word and Object are inert.—297.

'Of Word and of any Object whatever'—Such is the complement of the aphorism.—16.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—He states another obstruction to the inter-relation (of Word and Object) :

असति नास्तीति च प्रयोगात् ॥ ७ । २ । १७ ॥

असति Asati, not existing. न अस्ति Na asti, (It) does not exist. इति Iti, such. च Cha, and. प्रयोगात् Prayogât, because there is application.

17. (Word and Object are not in conjunction), also because in the case of a non-existent object there is such application (of word) as " (It) does not exist."—298.

Even in the case of a non-existent water-pot, cloth, etc., such application (of word) is observed as " There is no water-pot in the room," " Cloth does not exist," "The letter *ga* which was heard before, no longer exists," "There was a cloth," ' There will be a cloth,' etc. ; therefore (there is no inter-relation) This is the meaning. The import accordingly is that there is no conjunction, nor again combination, of Word with a non-existent water-pot, etc.—17.

Word and Object are unrelated.

Upaskâra.—What then ? He gives the answer :

शब्दार्थावसम्बन्धौ ॥ ७ । २ । १८ ॥

शब्दार्थौ Śabda-arthau, sound and sense. Word and object. असम्बन्धौ Asambandhau, unrelated.

18. (Therefore), Word and Object are unrelated.—299.

If Conjunction of Word and Object does not exist, it then comes to this that Word and Object are unrelated. This is the meaning.—18.

Above continued.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked why one or other of the relations of Conjunction and Combination should not exist (between Word and Object). Accordingly he says :

संयोगिनो दण्डात् समवायिनो विशेषाच्च ॥ ७ । २ । १९ ॥

संयोगिनः Saṃyoginaḥ, which is in conjunction. The conjunct. दण्डात् Daṇdât, from the staff. समवायिनः Samabâyinaḥ, which is in combination. The combined. विशेषात् Viśeṣât, from a distinction or distinguishing element. च Cha, and.

19. (Cognition of Conjunction results) from (*e. g.*,) the staff, which is in conjunction (with the hand of a man), and (of Combination) from a distinguishing element which is in combination (with the whole).—300.

" This person is carrying a staff," " The elephant possesses a trunk,"—these intuitions take place. Of these, the first results from conjunction, and the second, from combination. The intuition in respect of the trunk which is a particular member of the body, is dependent upon its combination with the elephant, since it arises from the distinction that that is an elephant to which belongs a trunk as being in combination with it. The distinction itself, *viz.*, the trunk, etc., is distinctive in consequence of the relation of combination. But there is no intuition of threads, etc. also, such as " A cloth possesses threads " etc., under the relation of distinctive possession of the parts. Likewise, " The object, water-pot, is that which possesses the word, water-pot,"—

such intuition does not take place. Of Word and Object, therefore, there is neither conjunction, nor again combination. This is the import.—19.

Intuition of object from word proceeds from convention.

Upaskâra.—If there is neither conjunction nor combination between Word and Object, then by what relation does a word establish a determinate object ? To this, he gives the answer :

सामयिकः शब्दार्थप्रत्ययः ॥ ७ । २ । २० ॥

सामयिकः Sâmayikaḥ, conventional. According to direction. शब्दार्थप्रत्ययः Śabda-artha-pratyayaḥ, intuition of object from word.

20. The intuition of Object from Word (takes place) according to the direction (of God).—301.

" ' Sâmayikaḥ : ' ' Samaya ' means the direction of God, in the form that such an object should be understood from such a word. Whatever word has been assigned by God to a particular object, denotes that object. It is then the will of God which supplies the link between word and object. The same is convention, dependent upon the will of God; as, for example, "Whatever plant the ichneumon touches with its teeth, is an antidote to poison." This is the meaning.

This convention is learnt sometimes from usage ; *e.g.*, when an employer gives the order "Bring the water-pot," and an employee brings an object possessing a tubular neck, a boy standing near by infers the knowledge of the latter in this way. This his activity is produced by knowledge, because it is activity, like my activity; that knowledge again is produced by the words of this order, because it follows immediately after it; and the subject-matter of this knowledge, namely, this object with a tubular neck, is the denotation of the term, water-pot. By such processes of transposition of verbs and cases, the boy becomes informed in respect of the object, water-pot, cloth, etc.

Sometimes the convention is learnt directly from testimony alone ; *e.g.*, that this tubular-necked object is designated by the term, water-pot. Sometimes it is learnt from comparison; *e.g.*, from a comparison of resemblance in such cases as, that a gayal is that which is like a cow, that as is *mudga*, so is *mudga-parṇi* (a kind of bean), that as is *mâṣa*, so is *mâṣaparṇi* (a leguminous plant), etc. Sometimes (knowledge of objects is derived) from condemnatory passages also; *e. g.*, "O, the camel with too pendulous upper lip and long neck, the eater of hard thorns, the vilest of animals"—when after hearing this condematory sentence, one sees a body of this description, knowledge arises in one, *viz.*, "This is that camel." Sometimes it springs from community of substratum, or synonymy, with words of known import; *e. g.*, "The honey-bee is sipping the honey within cloven lotus-blossoms"—after hearing this proposition, (the knowledge arises), "This is what is designated by the term, honey-bee, because it is the sipper of honey within cloven lotus-blossoms," or as in the case of the proposition, "The cuckoo sings sweetly in the mango-tree." Here, in the above instances, it is either a case of inference, or a case of word itself being productive of

knowledge through the force of synonymy with words of known import, or only a particular mode of comparison or analogy, inasmuch as the being the agent in drinking honey infers resemblance to other individuals such as the bee, etc.

The convention, again, has reference to classes only, individuals being brought home by means of special characteristics,—such is the view of the followers of *Tutâta*. According to the followers of *Prabhâkara*, the force of word is in respect of both the class and the individual, but so far as it refers to the class, it denotes the object by the word, by being known, and so far as it refers to the individual, by being its proper form. The teaching of the ancients or elders is that convention is the force itself and that classes appearing in the forms of the individuals are the objects denoted by words. This is the case with words like cow, etc., but the objects denoted by words expressive of attribute and action are both classes and individuals as detailed in the *Mayûkha*.—20.

Vivṛiti.—He now points out the connection between words and objects, which is the means of verbal knowledge.

* * * * 'Samaya' is arbitrament or convention. It is two-fold, eternal and modern. Eternal arbitrament is called force (of words), and modern arbitrament is called definition. Arbitrament has for its form, This object is to be understood from this word, or Let this word convey this signification. Accordingly it has been said,

आजानिकश्चाधुनिकः समयो द्विविधः स्मृतः ।
नित्य आजानिकस्तत्र या शक्तिरिति गीयते ।
कादाचित्कस्त्वाधुनिकः शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ॥

Convention has been declared to be two-fold, original and modern. Therein the original is the eternal, which is called force; whereas the modern is the occasional, imposed by scientific writers and others.

The apprehension of the force of words proceeds from conduct, etc. So it has been said,

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानात्
कोशाप्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च ।
सांनिध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धा
वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदन्ति ॥

The elders declare the apprehension of the force of words to proceed from grammatical analysis or etymology, from comparison or analogy, from lexicography, from authoritative sayings or testimony, from conduct (of the employer who gives an order which is carried out by the employed), from contiguity to a wordof well-known import, from context, and from explication or description.

* * * * The doctrine of the force of the word to denote primarily the class is not sound, for, in such instances as "Bring the cow," the fact which is established by experience, namely, that the individual is the object of verbal cognition, cannot be explained except on

the theory of the force of the word primarily to denote the individual. Nor does the knowledge of the individual arise from implication or derivatively, for in the absence of a primary use a derivative use is impossible. Nor is the knowledge of the individual possible even by the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge); for, inasmuch as the being an object of verbal cognition, standing in the position of an effect, must be produced by a cause, the equivalence of the act and the object of cognition (in verbal knowledge) which is supposed to be the condition, cannot be the condition there, as is desired. We should, therefore, respect the doctrine that the force of the words, cow, etc., lies in denoting the individual charaterised by, or possessing, the generic form and the class or the universal. It has been accordingly laid down in the aphorism of Gautama, " The individual, the generic form, and the universal are, however, the object of the word." (*Nyâya-Sûtram*, II. ii 63).

Priority and Posteriority, how produced.

Upaskâra.—Now he explains Priority and Posteriority, the next in the order of enumeration, in one context, as these are the causes of mutually involved uses, and for the purpose of clearing up the understanding of the disciples as well as for the sake of brevity.

एकदिक्काभ्यामेककालाभ्यां सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां परमपरञ्च ॥ ७ । २ । २१ ॥

एकदिक्काभ्यां Eka-dikkâbhyâṃ, lying in the same direction. एककालाभ्यां Ekakâlâbhyâṃ, existing at the same time सन्निकृष्टविप्रकृष्टाभ्यां Sannikṛiṣṭa-vipkrariṣṭâbhyâṃ, near and remote. परं Paraṃ, prior. अपरं Aparaṃ posterior. च Cha, and.

21. The Prior and the Posterior (are produced by two objects) lying in the same direction, existing at the same time, and being near and remote.—302.

" The Prior and the Posterior'—the reference here is principally in a substantive sense. " Are produced"—such is the complement. Or, the word "usage" or "convention" is to be supplied after 'The Prior and the Posterior : such'. The word "such" should be understood. 'Ekadikkâbhyâṃ' means by two bodies which have the same direction in space. Two bodies occupying equal place (*i. e.*, equally distant) may also have the same direction in space, but by them Priority and Posteriority are neither produced, nor come into use. Accordingly it has been said, 'Near and remote,' which expression means, possessing nearness, *i.e.*, the quality or state of containing a smaller number of conjunctions with the conjunct, and remoteness, *i. e.*, the quality or state of containing a larger number of conjunctions with the conjunct. Hereby combinative cause (of Priority and Posteriority) is stated ; whereas conjunction of bodies and direction in space is the non-combinative cause. Priority and Porteriority are thus produced in a man standing with his face towards the east, by observing a relative paucity of conjunctions with the conjunct in one of two bodies lying in the east and a relative plurality of conjunctions with the conjuct in the other. The non-comcinative cause is thus

stated. 'Near and remote'—the term implies intuition, as the contained metaphorically denotes the container. Relative understanding or cognition of relativity is thus stated to be the efficient cause. Priority and Posteriority are produced in respect only of two bodies lying in the same direction in space ; hence there is no production of them in all places. Relative understanding is produced in one and the same observer only ; hence there is no production of them in all circumstances. Being regulated by relative understanding, there is no production of them at all times. There is no mutual dependence between them, inasmuch as being produced from the capacity or power of the cause, they are proved by sense-perception. For otherwise they would be neither produced nor perceived. For in case of mutual dependence there would be non-production as well as non-perception of both of them. But Priority and Posteriority are perceived, and their perception cannot be possible without their production.

'Existing at the same time'—this has reference to Priority and Posteriority in time. Now 'existing at the same time' means, by two bodies one young and the other old, which occupy the same, *i. e.*, the present, time. Here nearness is the state of having the birth intervened by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun, and remoteness is the state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun. Here too understanding *i. e.*, the container, is implied by the contained. Thus the young and old bodies are the combinative causes. Conjunction of time and bodies is the non-combinative cause. The understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a fewer number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case of Posteriority, and the understanding of the state of having the birth intervened by a larger number of revolutions of the sun is the efficient cause in the case of Priority,

These, Priority and Posteriority, again, are produced even in respect of bodies indeterminate in place and direction in space.

Now there is a seven-fold destruction of Priority and Posteriority in space but their production is simultaneous, else there would be mutual dependence. Priority and Posteriority in space then are destroyed from the destruction of relative understanding (1) from the destruction of conjunction which is the non-combinative cause, (2) from the destruction of substance which is the combinative cause, (3) from the destruction of the efficient and non-combinative causes, (4) from the destruction of the efficient and combinative causes, (5) from the destruction of the efficient cause, (6) from the destruction of the non-combinative cause, and (7) from the destruction of the combinative cause. Now, from the destruction of relative understanding, thus: Production of Priority ; knowledge of the genus Priority ; then destruction of relative understanding ; after its destruction, at the moment of knowledge of substance distinguished by Priority, destruction of Priority,—the process should be understood in the same way as in the case of destruction of duality. Destruction of Priority and Posteriority follows also from the destruction of the non-combinative cause. Thus, as soon as there is relative understanding, action takes place in the body which is the substratum of Priority ; as soon as Priority is produced therefrom, disjunction takes place between direction in space and the

body ; after it, when there is knowledge of the genus Priority, then there is destruction of the conjunction of direction in space and the body ; then, destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus ; at the very same moment, destruction of Priority and Posteriority results from destruction of conjunction of direction in space and the bodies. And in this case destruction of relative understanding does not destroy them, inasmuch as it is synchronous with destruction of Priority.

Objection.—On the theory of destruction of attribute even from destruction of non-combinative cause, great confusion will result from the thus possible destruction of *Saṃskâra*, (tendencies, impressions), *adṛiṣṭaṃ* (invisible after-effects of acts performed), etc., also from the destruction of the conjunction of Mind and Soul.

Answer.—It is not so. For Priority being pervaded by the characteristic of being remote, there must needs be cessation of Priority consequent on the non-existence of remoteness on the removal of the substratum of Priority to some other place. Nor is there at the time any other agent of destruction ; hence, such destruction being otherwise impossible, destruction of conjunction alone is conceived to be the destroying agent. On the other hand *saṃskâra*, *adṛiṣṭaṃ* etc., as well as their effects, *e. g.*, recollection, pleasure, etc., cannot be supposed to be so destroyed, inasmuch as they are observed even after a long time.

This also implies that Priority and Posteriority are destroyed also by the destruction of the conjunction between that particular place and the standard limit as well as the observer, the argument being the same as above.

Destruction of Priority sometimes results also from destruction of combinative cause. Thus, relative understanding arises at the very same moment that action produced in a portion of a body causes disjunction from another portion ; from disjunction results destruction of the conjunction originative of the body, and then production of Priority ; at the next moment, destruction of substance results from destruction of conjunction, and there takes place knowledge of the genus Priority ; destruction of Priority follows destruction of substance, and destruction of relative understanding follows knowledge of the genus. So that, being synchronous, destruction of relative understanding does not destroy Priority.

Destruction of Priority sometimes takes place by the destruction of substance and destruction of relative understanding. It happens in this way : Production of action and relative understanding in a portion of the body ; then, disjunction from another portion, and production of Priority ; next desruction of originative conjunction and knowledge of the genus ; thereafter, destruction of substance and destruction of relative understanding ; and following them, there is destruction of Priority.

Destrcction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of substance and destruction of conjunction. It is in this way : Simultaneously with disjunction amongst the constituent parts of substance,

there is production of action in the body and of relative understanding; following it, appear destruction of conjunction of constituent parts, disjunction between space and body, and production of Priority; thereafter there are destruction of substance, destruction of conjunction of space and body, and production of knowledge of the genus: thereafter destruction of Priority results from destruction of substance and destruction of conjunction of space and body, and destruction of relative understanding from knowledge of the genus.

Destruction of Priority takes place sometimes from destruction of conjunction and destruction of relative understanding. It is in this way: Production of Priority, and action in the body; knowledge of the genus, and disjunction; destruction of relative understanding, and destruction of conjunction of space and the body; then, destruction of Priority.

Destruction of Priority results sometimes from destructions of combinative, non-combinative and efficient causes. It is in this way: Production of Priority, disjunction among constituent parts of the body, and action in the body, take place simultaneously; knowledge of the genus Priority, destruction of conjunction of constituent parts and disjunction between space and the body follow them; thereafter results destruction of Priority or of Posteriority in space, from destruction of relative understanding, destruction of substance, and destruction of conjunction of space and the body, which destructions are simultaneously produced.

Of Priority and Posteriority in time, however, there is no destruction due to destruction of non-combinative cause. As in the case of Priority and Posteriority in space, there is destruction of nearness and remoteness on the destruction of conjunction of space and the body, so it is not the case with Priority and Posteriorityin time. The three cases, therefore, of their destruction namely from destruction of combinative cause, from destruction of relative understanding, and from both jointly, should be understood in the way described above.—21.

Vivṛiti.—It should be observed that, according to the writer of *Muktâvali*, destruction of relative understanding is destructive of Priority and Posteriority in both their forms (*i. e.*, in space and in time), whereas in the *Upaskâra* it is stated that it is the destruction of their three-fold causes which is destructive of Priority and Posteriority.

Priority and Posteriority in Time, how produced.

Upaskâra.—He states a peculiarity in the case of temporal priority and posteriority.

कारणपरत्वात् कारणापरत्वाच्च ॥ ७ । २ । २२ ॥

कारणपरत्वात् Kâraṇa-paratvât, from priority of the cause. कारणापरत्वात् Kâraṇaaparatvât, from posteriority of the cause. च Cha, and.

22. (Temporal Priority and temporal Posteriority are said, by suggestion, to arise respectively) from Priority of the cause and from Posteriority of the cause.—303.

The cause of Priority and Posteriority is time. Priority and Posteriority belong to it. Conjunction of time which is the non-combinative cause of priority, and conjunction of time which is the non-combinative cause of posteriority are stated, by implication, as otherswise, the result would be want of congruity or syntactical connexion. For, priority and posteriority cannot be produced by priority and posteriority themselves. The terms, priority and posteriority, denote, by implication, conjunctions of time which are productive of them.—22.

Vivṛiti.—If the uses of prior (remote) and posterior (near) are produced by cognitions of remoteness and nearness, then, inasmuch as the cognition, Kâśî (Benares) is near in relation to Prayâga (Allahabad), refers also to Prayâga as its object subject-matter, why does not there arise the use of Posteriority (or nearness) in respect of Prayâga? Likewise, why is there not the use of Priority (or remoteness), in respect of Kâśî, etc., which also become the subject-matter of the cognition of remoteness?

He removes this incidental doubt.

'Kâraṇa-paratvât,' *i. e.*, owing to the priority or remoteness of the combinative cause; and also owing to its posteriority or nearness. The uses of priority and posteriority are only in respect of the combinative cause, but not in respect of anything else simply because it becomes the subject-matter of relative understanding. For use is detemined by the object in respect of which the use arises. This is the import.

Priority and Posteriority do not exist in Priority and Posteriority.

परत्वापरत्वयोः परत्वापरत्वाभावोऽणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । २३ ॥

परत्वापरत्वयोः Paratva-aparatvayoḥ, in priority and posteriority. परत्वापरत्वाभावः Paratva-aparatva-abhâvaḥ, non-existence of priority and posteriority. अणुत्वमहत्त्वाभ्यां Aṇutva-mahattvâbhyâm, by minuteness and magnitude. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

23. The non-existence of Priority and Posteriority, in Priority and Posteriority, is explained by mintuteness and magnitude.—304.

Actions are void of actions.

कर्म्मभिः कर्म्माणि ॥ ७ । २ । २४ ॥

कर्म्मभिः Karmmabhiḥ, by actions. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, actions.

24. Actions are (void) of Actions.—305.

Attributes are void of attributes.

गुणैर्गुणाः ॥ ७ । २ । २५ ॥

गुणैः Guṇaiḥ, by attributes. गुणाः Gunâḥ. attributes.

25. Attributes are (void) of Attributes.—306.

Upaskâra.—These aphorisms, being virtually explained above, are not explained here.—23, 24, 25.

Bhâṣya.—reads VII. ii. 24 and 25 as one aphorism.

Combination described.

Upaskâra.—It has been stated that priority, posteriority, etc., are combined in dense or corporal substances only, and that knowledge, pleasure etc., are combined in the soul. Now, what is this combination itself ? Having regard to this inquiry of the disciples, he steps over Understanding which is the next subject for treatment according to the order of enumeration, and describes the examination of Combination.

इहेदमिति यतः कार्य्यकारणयोः स समवायः ॥ ७ । २ । २६ ॥

इह Iha, here, *i. e.*, in the cause. इदम् Idam, this, *i. e.*, the effect. इति Iti, such. यतः Yataḥ, whence. कार्य्यकारणयोः Kâryya-kâraṇayoḥ, of effect and cause सः Saḥ, that. समवायः Samavâyaḥ, combination.

26. That is Combination by virtue of which (arises the intuition) in the form of " This is here," with regard to effect and cause.—307.

'Kâryya-kâraṇayoḥ' is an indication ; non-effect and non-cause also are implied. So it has been said in the section called the Locality of the Predicables, " Combination is that relation of things mutually involved or associated in nature and bearing to one another the relation of the contained and the container,—which is the source of intuition in the form of " (It is) here."" *Ayuta-siddhiḥ*, inseparable association, is the non-existence of things unrelated. As in the case of " There is curd here in the bowl," " There are jujubes here in the bowl," so in the case of " There is cloth here in the threads," " There is mat here in the reeds," " There are substance, attribute, and action here in substance," " There is bovineness here in the cow," " There is knowledge here in the soul," " There is Sound here in Ether," the cognition of *here* which is thus produced, cannot be produced without some relation ; whereby it is inferred that some relation exists. And this relation is not mere conjunction. For the causes of conjunction, namely, action or either of the two things, etc., are absent here ; it does not terminate in disjunction ; related things do not exist unrelated ; it can be inferred as a uniform substratum ; it is not perceptible to the senses ; it is one ; and it is eternal.

Objection.—If combination be one, it would then entail intermixture of substance-ness, etc., since combination of action-ness, etc., would be possible in substance.

Answer.—This cannot be the case, since non-intermixture follows from the very rule of the container and the contained. Although the same combination which is the combination of substance-ness. is also the comibation of attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., still substance is not their container or substratum, since they are not observed there.

Substance-ness is observed in substances only, attribute-ness in attributes only, action-ness in actions only, but not elsewhere. It is from the observation of this agreement and difference, that the uniformity (of the container and the contained) results. As even in the absence of a particular conjunction between the bowl and the curd, it is the bowl which is the container, and not the curd, and hence there is the uniformity of the relation of the container and the contained, so the uniformity is valid in this case also from the very difference of the power of the revealed and the revealer, for action-ness, etc., are not revealed by substance in the same way as substance-ness is. Accordingly it has been said.

सम्विदेव हि भगवती वस्तूपगमे नः शरणम् ॥

All-powerful consciousness is verily our resource in the apprehension of things. For consciousness in respect of the being the container is not reversible ; nor is there the intuition that substance is action ; nor, again, that threads are in the cloth. It is for this reason that, notwithstanding the combination of colour in Air, "There is colour in Air"—such characteristic of being the container is not observed in the case of Air. It is natural capacity, therefore, which everywhere determines the relation of the container and the contained.

This combination, again, is eternal, inasmuch as it is uncaused. For the rule cf production from combinative causes applies to existences or beings, and efficient and non-combinative causes are subsidiary to those causes. Therefore that which would be the combinative cause of combination would be either another combination, or that combination itself. It cannot be the first, as it would entail non-finality ; nor the second, as it would involve self-dependence, for that very combination cannot produce combination with itself.

Objection.—How does the intuition arise that there is combination of cloth in threads, and that there is combination of colour in cloth ?

Answer.—It is by means of the relation of their intrinsic form, or essential relation, as the supposition of another combination would entail non-finality.

Objection.—The intuition of *here*, *e. g.*, "There is colour here in the cloth," will, then, arise by means of the same essential relation. What is the use of combination ?

Answer.—It is not so, since there is no obstruction here to the admission of an additional relation.

Objection.—If it be so, then "Here in this place there is non-existence of the water-pot,"—in this case also there will be either combination or any other relation.

Answer.—No, as the intuition can be possible by means of essential relation itself. For, on the contrary supposition, the absolute and mutual non-existences of the water-pot, which are eternal and combined with more than one substance, would have the characteristic of being Genera, subsequent non-existence also, being an effect in combination, would be perishable or destructible, and antecedent non-existence also, not being produced, though combined, would be indestructible.

Nor is the quality of existence the determining factor there, for the quality of existence can be produced at any time.

The *Bhaṭṭas* maintain that in non-existence there really is present a different relation called distinguishedness or qualifiedness. Nor is this distinguishedness be one and the same in the case of all individual manifestation of non-existence, then it would follow that there is non-existence of the water-pot even in that which contains a water-pot, inasmuch as the distinguishedness of the non-existence of the water-pot would exist by means of the same distinguishedness of the non-existence of the cloth.

Objection.—But the water-pot itself will in this case prevent the cognition of the non-existence of the water-pot.

Answer.—It cannot do this, since the non-existence of that which will prevent such cognition is itself present there by means of the relation of distinguishedness. Nor is the very nature of the substratum (*i.e.*, where the water-pot lies) such that on account of it there can be no manifestation of the non-existence of water-pot in that place, for immediately after the removal of the water-pot follows the intuition of the non-existence of water-pot in that very place.

Objection.—In your view also, why is there not intuition of possession of colour after the destruction of colour, since Combination is, as you say, eternal and one?

Answer.—Because non-intuition of colour is proved from the very destruction of colour.

The arguments against Combination have been demolished in the *Mayûkha* under Sense-Perception. So we stop here.—26.

Combination is different from Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species.

Upaskâra.—By way of proving its difference from the five beginning with Substance (i. e., Substance, Attribute, Action, Genus, and Species), he says :

द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधो भावेन व्याख्यातः ॥ ७ । २ । २७ ॥

द्रव्यत्वगुणत्वप्रतिषेधः Dravyatva-guṇatva-pratiṣedhaḥ, negation or exclusion of substance-ness and attribute-ness, (in or from Combination). भावेन Bhâvena, by existence. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

27. The negation of Substance-ness and Attribute-ness (in Combination) is explained by Existence.—308.

'Bhâvaḥ, means Existence. As Existence is not identical with substance, etc., being cognised by a different form of understanding, so combination also is different from the same Substance, etc., 'Dravyatva-guṇatva' is an indication ; Action-ness, etc., also should be understood.—27.

Combination is one.

Upaskâra.—He proves Unity :

तत्त्वम्भावेन ॥ ७ । २ । २८ ॥

तत्त्वं Tattvaṃ, that-ness. One-ness. Unity. भावेन Bhâvena, by Existence.

28. The Unity (of Combination, is explained) by Existence. —309.

'Explained' is the complement. 'Tattvaṃ,' *i. e*, Unity, 'bhâvena,' *i. e.*, by Existence, is explained. As one Existence everywhere induces the cognition of the existent, so one Combination everywhere induces the cognition of the combined. Moreover the inferential mark of Combination is not differentiated, nor is there any other particular mark. For, we do not find any particular mark, *i. e.*, differentiating mark, of Combination, whereby we could recognise its diversity. For the very same reason, Combination is eternal; for, as in the case of Existence, non-eternality cannot appropriately belong to it which is undifferentiated even in the difference of Space, Time, etc.

Objection—If combination is nothing but this relation, then there may be disunion of threads and cloth, or of the cloth and its colour.

Answer.—This cannot be, for in the absence of (previous) uncorrelated existence, disunion is not possible. For, there is no unrelated existence or colour and that which possesses the colour, or of the parts and the whole, that there may be a disunion between them.

Objection.—But their uncorrelated existence may be brought to pass.

Answer.—It cannot, for the effectuation is contravened by being never so experienced.

The followers of *Prabhâkara* hold that Combination is manifold and also non-eternal. But this is not a reasonable view to take, for the intuition of "Colour is destroyed," whereas it is the intuition of no body that the Combination of colour is destroyed.

The view of the school of Nyâya that Combination is perceptible to the sense is also not valid. Combination is supersensuous, for being different from the Soul, it is at the same time in a state of being uncombined, like the Mind, or like Time, etc.—28.

Bhâṣya :—Combination is proved to be an attribute in the same way as is existence, and further, like existence, Combination also is produced by itself, *i. e.*, does not depend upon any other Combiuation for its production.

Here ends the second chapter in the seventh book of Śaṇkara's Commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK EIGHTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Cognition explained by allusion to III. i. 2, 18.

Upaskâra.—The order of enumeration was violated in favour of the curiosity of the disciples. The author now adopts the order of enumeration. Therein the examination of understanding is the subject of the eighth book. Understanding has been already mentioned for the purpose of proof of the Soul. By recalling it, he says :

द्रव्येषु ज्ञानं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ८ । १ । १ ॥

द्रव्येषु Dravyeṣu, among substances. ज्ञानं Jñânaṃ, knowledge. Cognition. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtaṃ, explained.

1. Cognition (has been) explained among Substance.—310.

By the term, " Among substances," the auther implies the third book, as the the container by the contained. The meaning is that cognition, *jñânaṃ,* has been explained by the two aphorisms, namely, " The universal experience of the objects of the senses is the mark of (the existence of) an object different from the senses and their objects" (III. i. 2), and " That (*i. e.*, knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense, and the object, is other (than a false mark)" (III. i. 18).

Now in the kindred system (*i. e.*, the *Nyâya-Sûtraṃ* of Gautama), under the defination of understanding, there has been made a declaration of synonyms, namely, " Understanding, Apprehension, Cognition, Intuition—these are synonyms," (*Nyâyâ-Sûtraṃ*, I. i. 15), for the purpose of demolishing the Sâṅkhya doctrine. For the Sâṅkhyas maintain a difference in meaning of the terms, Understanding, etc. Thus *Prakṛiti,* Matter, is the state of equilibrium of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*, the principles of purity, passion and darkness, or the principles of illumination, evolution, and involution, respectively. *Prakṛiti* is one, and one only, while *Puruṣas*, Spirits, are divided to infinity. They are seated in the cave (*i. e.*, retired, unaffected, indifferent spectators), eternal, immutable, and characterised, by eternal consciousness. They are called lame, as it is not their nature to undergo modification or transformation, while *Prakṛiti* is said to be blind, being stupid or insensate. When there arises in *Prakṛiti* a desire for fhe enjoyment of sensuous objects, or a desire to see the difference between *Prakṛiti* and *Puruṣa*, at that moment *Prakṛiti* is modified, or transforms, under the influence or osculation of *Puruṣa.* And its first transformations Buddhi, Understanding, a particular form of the inner sense. Understanding it is that is called the principle of *Mahat*, the great one ; accordingly it has been said, " The great one evolves from *Prakṛiti*." And this understanding is pure or stainless like a mirror. And that particular transformation of it, which takes the form of an object in such shapes as " It is a water-pot," " It is a cloth," etc., through the channel of the external senses, is called cognition, *jñânaṃ*, and faculty, *vṛitti.* Apprehension, *upalabdhi,* is the same as a kind of *abhimâna,* egoity or self-consciousness, in the form of " I know," which arises in consequence of the non-perception or non-apprehension of the distinctness or difference of *Puruṣa* which is consciousness, by cognition present in transparent or pure understanding. *Pratyaya,* Intuition, is that particular

transformation of understanding itself, which takes the form of pleasure, pain, etc., through the channel of the senses alone, in consequence of the contact of garland, sandalwood, and other objects of sense. Hence it is that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, reminiscence, virtue, and vice are, all of them, particular transformations of understanding, and being present in *Prakṛiti* itself, in subtle forms or in minute proportions, appear and disappear, according to difference of circumstances; while *Puruṣa* is as free from adhesion or affinity or attachment as a lotus-leaf, but casts its shadow in the understanding. This theory which the Sâṅkhyas hold is thrown away by the proof indicated in the above declaration of (these terms as) synonyms. Thus, if the term, understanding, be derived in the instrumental sense, *viz.*, as that *by* which a thing is understood, then it comes to be nothing else than the mind. Nor is the mind an object of perception, whereas understanding is surely cognizable by perception in the form of "I understand." Nor are cognition, etc., the properties of the internal sense, inasmuch as they are proved to exist only as being the properties of an agent. For the manifestation of "I know," "I intuit," "I apprehend," takes place as having community of substratum with I-ness or egoity. If they reply that this phenomenon is *abhimâna* or conceit, we rejoin that it cannot be so, since there is no obstruction to its being real. It cannot be contended that such obstruction is supplied by the very characteristic of the *Puruṣa* as being seated in the cave, that is to say, by its not being the receptacle of adventitious properties or changes; for, we would then reply that eternality is compatible with the nature of being the substratum of adventitious modes. For that which possesses a property and the property are not one and the same reality, so that the production and destruction of the property should themselves be the production and destruction of the substratum of the property. It is only he, then, who is conscious, that also understands, cognises, apprehends, and intuits. Hence the hypothesis of distinct entities (*e. g.*, Soul and understanding) is not reasonable. This is the point.—1.

Soul, Mind, Ether, Time, Space Air and Ultimate Atoms are not (ordinarily) perceptible.

Upaskâra.—This cognition, again, is two-fold, *Vidyâ*, Science or true knowledge and A-*vidyâ*, Nescience or false knowledge. *Vidyâ* is of four kinds, characterised by perception, inference, memory and testimony. *A-Vidyâ* also has four kinds characterised by doubt, error or mistake, dream, and uncertainty or indecision or non-finality. Among the above four kinds of true knowledge, that which is inferential, is not produced by the senses. Why this is so, is explained here.

तत्रात्मा मनश्चाप्रत्यक्षे ॥ ८ । १ । २ ॥

तत्र Tatra, therein, among substances. आत्मा Âtmâ, soul. मनः Manas, mind. च Cha, and others, *e. g.*, Ether, Time, Space, Air and Ultimate Atoms. अप्रत्यक्षे A-pratyakṣe, non-perceptible, not objects of perception.

2. Among Substances, the Soul, the Mind and other ara not objects of perception.—311.

The word, soul, in the aphorism denotes the soul of another or one's own soul. That even one's own soul is not an object of perception, has been already declared, inasmuch as the casual mental intuition of the I, *ahaṃ*, in one's own soul, is repudiated by such intuitions "I am fair," "I am thin," "I have long arms, etc. (where the I has reference to the body). The word, "cha," extends the application of the predicate to the substances, namely, ether, time, space, air, and ultimate atoms. Sense-born cognition again is of two degrees, being that of the omniscient and that of the non-omniscient. That of the omniscient is the cognition of such and such complements of objects by means of the proximity or presentation (or reaching upto ordinarily supersensuous objects) characterised by virtue or merit springing from *Yoga* (*i. e.*, inhibition of the activity of the internal organ, the mind, and consequent freedom of the all-pervading soul, in other words, the steadiness of the mind in the soul. *Vide* v. ii. *16 above*.) Thus ultimate atoms fall within its sphere, (or are objects of perception), being demonstrable, nameable, and existent.

Objection.—Since there is no material or data of such cognition, how can this be the case ? Magnitude also is a cause of sense-perception, but ultimate atoms do not possess magnitude. The possession of colour, again is the cause of visual perception, but sapce, etc., do not possess colour. How then can there be perception in these cases ?

Answer.—The objection does not stand, for such omniscience is possible by means of the mind alone as an auxiliary to the virtue or merit born of *Yoga*, or by means of the eye and other senses under the favourable influence of such mind. For the virtue or merit produced by *Yoga* is of inconceivable efficacy, and does not stand in need of any other auxiliary.

"The man whose omniscience is the subject of controversy, is not omniscient, because he is a man like myself,"—such reasonings, however, are inapplicable, since they are void of argument which would render impossible the proposition of the other side (maintaining the existence of omniscience in the man in question), as is the case with the reasoning, "A follower of *Prabhâkara* (a writer of the Mîmâmsâ school) is not versed in Mîmâṃsâ, because he is a man like myself."

Perception of the non-omniscient, again, is two-fold, discriminative and non-discriminative. Discriminative cognition, according to *Dharmakîrti* and *Diṅnâga* and others of the *Bauddha* school, is not certain knowledge or proof. Thus they argue : Such cognition owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words. But the connection of an object with a word, a name, is not possible, that there should be such intuition, coloured with a name, as it were, as "A water-pot," or "A piece of cloth." Nor is *jâti*, the universal, really existent or objectively real, that the being distinguished with the possession of it should be apprehended in objects by the sense. Nor is possible connection of the existent characterised by itself with that which is non-existent. Nor is the non-existent within the cognizance of senses. Therefore, discrimination (âlochanam) is produced by the senses, and while in the process of being produced, and leading to

corresponding objects, by the power of the discrimination, discriminative cognition is called perception and also proof. (To this the commentator gives the reply.) Now, while discriminative cognition may be objectively unreal, because it owes its manifestation or apparent reality to connection with words, it may be at the same time real, because it is the product of contact of sense and object. Hence it is doubtful that discriminative cognition is unreal. Moreover, the being distinguished with the possession of a name may very well be a possible object in visual cognition, its appearance in consciousness being possible form presentation by memory, as is the case with the perception "Fragrant sandalwood." Or, it may be, the being distinguished with the possession of a name does not come to light in perceptual cognition, and there is only recollection of the name, which as soon as it is recollected serves to distinguish its corresponding object, like the recollection of the counter-opposite in the case of the cognition of non-existence. Also it has been proved that *jâti*, the universal or class, ect., are immanent in objects or entities, Hence, discriminative or modified cognition also is perception, inasmuch as it is produced from contact of senses and objects.

Objection.—Non-discriminative, or unmodified, cognition neither excites to activity, nor is an object of current use. What then is the proof of its existence ?

Answer.—The proof is discriminative, or modified, cognition itself, for, this is a specialized cognition, or the cognition of a thing as possessing, and being accordingly distinguished by, something else. Nor can it be produced without the cognition of that which is possessed and serves to distinguish or individualize, that is the distinctive element. For it has been ascertained above that the cause of specialized cognition is cognition of that which serves to specialize, contact of sense and that which is going to be specialized, and non-apprehension of non-connection of both.—2.

Bhâṣya: Among substances, Self, Mind, and Ether are not objects of perception.

Cognition, how produced.

Upaskâra.—In order to elucidate how Cognition is produced, in what circumstances, and from what causes, he says :

ज्ञाननिर्द्देशे ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविधिरुक्तः ॥ ८ । १ । ३ ॥

ज्ञाननिर्द्देशे Jnâna-nirddeśe, in the differentiation of a particular cognition. ज्ञाननिष्पत्तिविधिः Jñâna-niṣpatti-vidhiḥ, mode or process of production of cognition. उक्तः Uktaḥ, stated, described.

3. The mode of the production of Cognition is being described, in connection with the differentiation of a particular Cognition. —312.

A cognition should be marked off or distinguished from other cognitions, in respect of the mode of its production, in respect of its subject matter, and in respect of its property. Now, differentiation of

cognition having to be made, the process of the production of cognition is going to be described. This is the meaning. In 'uktaḥ,' the past participle affix *kta* is used in the sense of incipient action.—3.

Vivṛiti.—What is the cause of cognition ? There being this expectancy, he says :

'Jñâna-nirddeśe,' *i. e.*, in the third book, where enunciation of cognition has been made. There too the process of the production of cognition has been described. The meaning is that the causes of cognition have been mentioned in the aphorism, "That (*i.e.*, knowledge) which is produced from the contact of the soul, the sense and the object is other (than a false mark)" (III. i. 18.) Thus, the soul is the combinative cause of cognition, conjunction of the soul and the mind is the non-combinative cause, and contact or contiguity of the object is the efficient cause. This has been mentioned in that very aphorism. It should be observed that the causality of contact has been stated under the topic of perception.

Substance is the cause of cognition of Attributes and Actions.

Upaskâra.—He describes the mode of production (of cognition) :

गुणकर्म्मसु सन्निकृष्टेषु ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेर्द्रव्यं कारणम् ॥ ८ । १ । ४ ॥

गुणकर्म्मसु Guṇa-karmmasu, Attributes and Actions. सन्निकृष्टेषु Sannikriṣṭeṣu, being in contact. ज्ञाननिष्पत्तेः Jñâna-niṣpatteḥ, of the production of cognition. द्रव्यं, dravyaṃ, substance. कारणम् Kâraṇaṃ, cause.

4. Substance is the cause of the production of cognition, where Attributes and Actions are in contact (with the senses).—313.

Substance is the cause of the cognition which is produced in respect of attributes, *e. g.*, colour, etc., and in respect of actions, *e. g.*, throwing upwards, etc., Both of them are apprehended only in so far as they inhere in substances appropriate or perceptible to the senses. Hence it is the appropriateness or perceptibility of the substances which determines their perceptibility. It is by substance, moreover, that their contact with the senses is constituted, they being apprehended by means of their combination with the conjunct (*i. e.*, Substance which is conjunct with the sense). Althogh there is apprehended the odour of dispersed particles of *champaka* flower, and of portions of camphor, which are all imperceptible, yet it is substance, imperceptible though it be, which effects their contacts. Although perceptibility of substance is not a requisite in the apprehension of sound, yet sound is apprehneded only as it is combined or inherent, therein and hence this itself is the requisite. If it be asked, why is made this supposition of contact which is invisible ? we reply that the production of cognition, being an effect, necessitates the supposition of a cause. This is the import.—4.

Snbstance is the cause of cognition of Genus and Species also.

***Upaskâra*.—He describes another mode of the production of knowledge :**

सामान्यविशेषेषु सामान्यविशेषाभावात्तत एव ज्ञानम् ॥ ८ । १ । ५ ॥

सामान्यविशेषेषु Sâmânya-viśeṣeṣu, in genera and species. सामान्यविशेषाभावात् Sâmânya-viśeṣa-abhâvât, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and species. ततः Tataḥ, thence, from substrata. एव Eva, alone. ज्ञानम् Jñânam, cognition.

5. In consequence of the non-existence of Genus and Species in genera and species, cognition (of them) is due to that alone.—314.

Existence is the (*summum*) genus, its species are substanceness, attribute-ness and action-ness. These again are genera, and their species are earth-ness, etc., colour-ness, etc., throwing-upward-ness, etc. Among these, omnisensuous cognition of the genera inhering in substance is due to that only, that is, due only to appropriate or perceptible, particular substratum, and also to combination with the conjunct, combination with the combined with the conjunct, and combination with the combined, all these combinations being related to that substratum. Omnisensuous cognition, again, is produced, in the case of attribute, from combination with the combined with the conjunct; in the case of sound-ness, *ka*-ness, etc., from combination with the combined; in the case of existence, from combination with the conjunct, from combination with the combined with the conjunct, and from combination with the combined. In the case of attribute, the proximity or contiguity which is the condition of perceptibility, is not constituted by combination with the conjunct, or combination.

It may be objected: 'Tataḥ, eva,' *i. e.*, from contact with or contiguity to their substrata alone—such delimitation or exclusion is not valid. Because in genus and in species also there do exist other genus and species. Contact with, or contiguity to, them also is a cause of cognition. In anticipation of this objection, he says, 'In consequence of the non-existence of genus and species.' For genus and species do not exist in genus and species, since that would entail infinite regression. The intuition of their mutual distinctions arises from their own forms or natures alone, or in this way, for instance, that the genus, bovine-ness, is cognised from the distinctness of the *upâdhi*, adjunct or external condition, characterised by being present-in-all-bovine animials; while being absent from other than bovine animials. Similarly with regard to pot-ness, etc., also.—5.

Genus and Species are causes of cognition of Substance, Attribute and Action.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked: As, in consequence of the non-existence of genus and species, cognition of genus and species is absolutely independent of them, is it likewise absolutely independent of them in the case of substance, attribute and action also? He says, No:

सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसु ॥ ८ । १ । ६ ॥

सामान्यविशेषापेक्षं Sâmânya-viśeṣa-apekṣaṁ, dependent upon genus and species द्रव्यगुणकर्मसु Dravya-guṇa-karmmaṅasu, in respect of substance, attribute and action.

6. (Cognition which is produced) in respect of Substance, Attributes and Action, (is) dependent upon genus and species. —315.

"Cognition is produced"—this is the subject in discourse. In respect of substance, attribute and action, there is no doubt cognition specialized with the content of substance-ness, attribute-ness and action-ness. Such specialized cognition, again, cannot be produced without the contact of the subject specified, that which serves to specify, and the sense. Hence dependence upon genus and species is there necessary. For there is such specialized cognition as "This is substance," "This is attribute," "This is action." This is the import.—6.

Substance, Attiribute and Action are causes of cognition of Substance.

Upaskâra.—Is, then, in the case of substance also, cognition dependent only upon genus and species ? To remove this curiosity, he says :

द्रव्ये द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मापेक्षम् ॥ ८ । १ । ७ ॥

द्रव्ये Dravye ,in substance. द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मापेक्षम् Dravya-guṇa-karmma-apekṣaṁ, dependent upon substance, attribute and action.

7. (Cognition), in the case of Substance, (is) dependent upon Substance, Attribute and Action.—316.

"Cognition is produced"—this is the subject in discourse. "A white cow, possessing a bell, is going,"—this is a cognition. Here substance, the bell, is the distinction or that which serves to specify ; 'white' denotes an attribute ; 'is going' denotes action. Thus in specialized cognition or intuition of a thing distinguished with the possession of something else, there cannot be non-apprehension of the distinction or that which serves to specify, nor can such specialized intuition take place without relation to that which serves to specify. Hence in the cognition of substance there is dependence upon substance, attribute and action. Such is the import.—7.

Attribute and Action are not causes of cognition of Attribute and Action.

Upaskâra.—Is there, then, dependence upon attribute and action, also in the case of attribute and action ? He says, No :

गुणकर्मसु गुणकर्म्माभावाद् गुणकर्म्मापेक्षं न विद्यते ॥ ८ । १ । ८ ॥

गुणकर्म्मसु Guṇa-karmmasu, attribntes and actions. गुणकर्म्माभावात् Guṇa-kârmma-abhâvât, in consequence of the non-existence of attribute and action. गुणकर्म्मापेक्षं Guṇa-karmma-apekṣaṁ, dependent upon attribute and ction . न Na, not. विद्यते Vidyate, exists.

8. (Cognition), dependent upon Attribute and Action, does not exist in the case of Attributes and Actions, inasmuch as Attribute and Action do not exist in Attribute and Action.—317.

" Cognition " is the complement of the aphorism. Since there is no cognition of attribute as distinguished with the possession of another attribute, and since there is no cognition of action as distinguished with the possession of another action, there is no cognition thereof, which is dependent upon attribute and action. For there exists no attribute in an attribute nor action in actions, whereby they might appear as distinctions in them. This is the import.—8.

Combination (as well as Attribute) is a cause of Cognition.

Upaskâra.—Lest it might be asked that since there is manifestation of attribute and action (in the cognitions thereof), why there should not be dependence upon attribute and action in the cognition of attribute and in the cognition of action, so he begins another topic in reply to that :

समवायिनः श्वैत्याच्छ्वैत्यबुद्धेश्च श्वेते बुद्धिस्त एते कार्य्यकारणभूते ॥ ८ । १ । ९ ॥

समवायिनः Samavâyinaḥ, of that in which combination exists, the substratum. श्वैत्यात् Śvaityât, from whiteness. श्वैत्यबुद्धेः Śvaitya-buddheḥ, from cognition of whiteness. च Cha, and. श्वेते Śveto, in a white object. बुद्धिः Buddhiḥ, cognition, ते Te, they. एते Ete, those. कार्य्यकारणभूते Kâryya-kâraṇa-bhûte, related as effect and cause.

9. The cognition, (' It is white ') in respect of a white object, (results) from whiteness of the substance in which combination of whiteness exists, and from the cognition of whiteness. These two, (cognition of white object, and cognition of whiteness), are related as effect and cause.—318.

By using the term 'Samavâyinaḥ' he states the causality of relation. Thus, inasmuch as combination of attribute does not exist in attribute, and inasmuch as combination of action does not exist in action, in their respective cognitions there is no dependence upon attribute and action as distinguishing marks or qualifications ; but there does exist dependence upon attribute and action as subject-matter or objects of cognition. This being so, it is stated that in the case of such intuitions as " A white conch shell," the combination of whiteness, the attribute whiteness, and the cognition of whiteness as a distinction or that which serves to specify, are the causes. So that relation with the distinction, the distinction, and cognition of them are the causes of specialized perceptual cognition. Hereby is proved all that has been stated before.—9.

Bhaṣya.—reads VIII. i. 9 as two aphorisms, *viz., Samavâyinaḥ Śvaityâchchhaiiya buddheścha śvete buddhiḥ,* and *Ta ete kâryakâraṇa-bhûte.*

Exception to the above. In the case of Substances, Cognition is not a cause of cognition.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected. As in the case of "possessing a bell," cognition of substance (*e. g.*, the cow possessing the bell) is dependent upon substance (*e. g.*, the bell), so also in the case of (the serial cognitions of) "It is a pillar," It is a jar," etc., where the the cognition does not embrace another substance as a distinction, cognition of (the first) substance, (the pillar), is the cause (of the cognition of the second substance, jar), (and so on). Thus nowhere can there be cognition of substance in the first instance or at first hand.

द्रव्येष्वनितरेतरकारणाः ॥ ८ । १ । १० ॥

द्रव्येषु Dravyeṣu, in substances. अनितरेतरकारणाः An-itara-itara-kâraṇâḥ, not causes, one of another.

10. In the case of Substances, (cognitions are) not causes of one another.—319.

Accoodingly he says.

"Cognitions" is the complement of the aphorism. Cognition of the jar, even though it takes place immediately after the cognition of the pillar, is yet not the effect of the cognition of the pillar, inasmuch as the pillar cannot properly be the distinction of, or that which serves to specify, by being contained in, the jar.—10.

The exception explained.

Upaskâra.—It may be urged that the sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is observed, and that that sequence is due only to the relation of effect and cause. So he says :

कारणायौगपद्यात् कारणक्रमाच्च घटपटादिबुद्धीनां क्रमो न हेतुफलभावात् ॥ ८ । १ । ११॥

कारणायौगपद्यात् Kâraṇa-ayaugapadyât, from non-simultaneity of causes. कारणक्रमात् Kâraṇa-Kramât, from succession of causes. च Cha, and. घटपटादिबुद्धीनां Ghaṭa-paṭa-âdi-buddhînâṃ of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc. क्रमः Kramaḥ, succession. न Na, not. हेतुफलभावात् Hetu-phala-bhâvât, in consequence of the relation of cause and effect.

11. The sequence of the cognition of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., (results) from the sequence of their causes, due to the non-simultaneity of the causes, and not in consequence of the relation of cause and effect (amongs the cognitions.)—320.

The sequence of the cognitions of the water-pot, the cloth, etc., is dependent upon the sequence of their causes, and not dependent upon the relation of cause and effect. If it be asked, where the sequence of causes itself comes from, so he says, 'from the non-simultaneity of the causes.' Simultaneity of cognitions has been denied or disproved. Hence there is not simultaneity also of diverse causes of cognition. If,

on the other hand, there were simultaneity of causes, it would entail simultaneity also of effect, and thus the argument that non-production of simultaneous cognitions is the mark of the existence of the mind, would be shattered. This is the import.—11.

Here ends the first chapter of the eighth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Vivṛiti.—The sequence or order, in the form of antecedence and subsequence, of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., arises, not from the relation of cause and effect amongst them, but from the order, or the antecedence and subsequence, of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot, cloth, etc., (with the senses), which contacts are the causes of those cognitions. The word 'cha,' and, implies the addition of non-simultaneity which is not mentioned here, and this word is to be construed after the word sequence or order. The meaning, therefore, is this that the non-simultaneity of the cognitions of the water-pot, cloth, etc., is due to the non-simultaneity of their causes, *e. g.*, contacts with senses, etc. Where, however, simultaneity of the contacts, etc., of the water-pot and the cloth exists, there is simultaneously produced a collective cognition of all the objects in contact with the senses for the time being. Hence it is also to be understood that simultaneity of effects follows from simultaneity of causes, and non-sequence of effects from non-sequence of causes.

Understanding or Intelligence, *buddhi*, is primarily divided into presentation, *anubhûti*, and representation, *smṛiti*. Presentation, according to the doctrine of Kaṇâda, is again two-fold, being divided into perception *pratyakṣa* and inference, *anumâna*. Perception is of six kinds, as derived from smelling, etc., (*i. e.*, from the five external, and the internal, senses); and is two-fold, as discirminative, *savikalpaka*, and non-discriminative, *nirvikalpaka*; and two-fold, as ordinary or popular, *laukika*, and super-ordinary or hyper-popular, *alaukika*. Inference, again, is three-fold, as produced by illation from only positive conditions, *kevala-anvayi*, or purely agreemental; from only negative conditions *kevala-vyatireki* or differential; and from both positive and negative conditions *Sâmânyato-driṣta*, or inference from commonly observed marks. For example, "This is expressible by words, inasmuch as it is knowable," etc., are illations from purely positive condition (or by Mill's method of agreement). "Earth differs from other substances, inasmuch as it is possessed of odour," and the like are illations from purely negative conditions, (or by Mill's method of difference); and "The mountain is fiery, inasmuch as it smokes," and the like are illations from both positive and negative conditions (or by Mill's method of agreement and difference.) Representation, reproduction or memory, on the other hand, is uniform, dependent on that form of *Saṃskâra* which is called *Bhâvanâ* or permanent mental impression, having the same form as the original presentation and dependent upon certain cognition in which inattention played no part. In another point of view also, understanding is two-fold, science or correct knowledge, *pramâ*, and nescience or incorrect knowledge, *apramâ*. Science is cognition a certain form of that which has that form. Nescience is cognition in certain form of that in which there is non-existence

of that form. Understanding or Intelligence is also two-fold accordingly as it is divided into doubt, *saṁśaya*, and certitude, *niśchaya*. Doubt is a cognition whereof the form is (mutually) repugnant existence and non-existence in one and the same object; certitude in regard to a thing is cognition in the form thereof, and not in the form of the non-existence thereof. In this doctrine, in the case of cognition of similarity, and in that of knowledge of terms, an inference takes place by the production of a judgment respecting the inferential mark, subsequently thereto. Evidence or proof, *pramâṇa*, is of two kinds, perception and inference; and science is exact experience or correct presentation or presentation in accordance with reality. This will be explained by the author of the aphorisms himself in the sequel.

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BOOK EIGHTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Cognition of a doubly specialized nâture, illustrated.

Upaskâra.—Having described the mode of production of perceptual cognition, both discriminative and non-discriminative, now the author, with a view to describe the perception of (a doubly specialized nature, or) the being specialized in the specialized, gives a few examples:

अयमेष त्वया कृतं भोजयैनमिति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् ॥ ८ । २ । १ ॥

अयम् Ayaṃ this. एषः Eṣaḥ that. त्वया Tvayâ, by you. कृतं Kritaṃ, done. भोजय Bhojaya, feed एनम् Enaṃ, him. इति Iti, such. बुद्ध्यपेक्षम् Buddhi-apekṣaṁ, dependent uponunderstanding or cognition.

1. 'This,' 'That,' 'Done by you,' 'Feed him'—such (cognitions are) dependent upon Understanding.—321.

The cognition, 'this,' arises in respect of an object which is near, and, 'that,' in respect of an object which is distant. 'By you'—such cognition, coloured with the characteristic of being an agent, presupposes or depends upon the cognition that he is independent in the action. The cognition of the act, namely, 'done,' depends upon the cognition that it is the subject of the operation of the instrument of action. The cognition, 'feed,' depends upon the cognition that he is the agent in the act of feeding, and also the employer of the instrument. The cognition, 'him,' depends upon the cognition that he is the subject of the operation or relation of the fed and the feeder. Similar other instances of cognition, dependent upon cognition, should be understood.—

Dependence of cognition upon cognition,explained.

Upaskâra.—He says that this (*i.e.*, dependence of cognition upon cognition in some cases) is proved by induction from agreement and difference:

दृष्टेषु भावाददृष्टेष्वभावात् ॥ ८ । २ । २ ॥

दृष्टेषु Dṛiṣṭeṣu, in the case of objects seen. भावात् Bhâvât, from their existence or appearance. अदृष्टेषु A-dṛiṣṭeṣu, in the case of objects unseen. अभावात् Abhâvât, from their non-existence or non-appearance.

2. (Such cognitions depend upon previous other cognitions), inasmuch as they appear in respect of objects seen, and do not appear in respect of objects unseen.—322.

When the contiguous object of the cognition 'This;' the object, though distant yet presented in consciousness, of the cognition 'That;' the object, *i.e.*, the contiguous agent, of the cognition 'By you;' the object, *i. e.*, the action, of the cognition 'done;' the object, *i.e.*, the employer and the employed, of the cognition 'Feed;' the object, *i. e.*, the occupation of both of them, of the cognition 'Him;'—when these objects come into contact with the senses, then such cognition is produced. Whereas with reference to unseen objects these cognitions do not

appear. Hence this (*i.e.*, the dependence of cognition upon cognition can be inferred from agreement and difference. This is the meaning.—2.

Substance, Attribute and Action are called artha or object.

Upaskâra.—He now begins another topic :

अर्थ इति द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसु ॥ ८ । २ । ३ ॥

अर्थ: Arthaḥ object. इति Iti, such. द्रव्यगुणकर्म्मसु Dravya-guṇa-karmmasu, in respect of substance, attribute, and action.

3. (The Vaiseṣikas apply) the term, object, to Substance, Attribute and Action.—323

Of these, *i. e.*, Substance, Attribute and Action, the characteristic of being sought after or apprehended (by the senses) or objectified in such and such ways. has been stated. Hence, '(It is) an object,'—such is the terminology of the Vaiśeṣika thinkers with regard to them, inasmuch as as they are presented by the term, object. Accordingly it has been said by Professor *Prasastadeva*, "The characteristic of being denoted by the term, object, belongs to the three."—3.

IV. ii. 2, re-called.

Upaskâra.—He introduces another topic.

द्रव्येषु पञ्चात्मकत्वं प्रतिषिद्धम् ॥ ८ । २ । ४ ॥

द्रव्येषु, Dravyesu, under substances. पञ्चात्मकत्वं. Pañcha-âtmakatvaṁ, penta-substantiality, the characteristic of being a compound of five substances. प्रतिषिद्धम् Pratiṣiddhaṁ, denied, contravened.

4. In (the topic dealing with the ascertainment of) Substances, (the theory) that bodies, etc., are a compound of five elements, has been refuted.—324.

'Under substances'—the term indicates the topic of the determination of the predicable, substance. By the aphorism (IV. ii. 2, *supra*)", "Of things perceptible and imperceptible, etc.," the penta-substantiality of the body, etc., that is to say, (the theory) that they are compounds of five elements, 'pratiṣiddhaṃ,' has been refuted. As a variety of constituent causes does not belong to the body, so also it does not belong to the senses of smell, etc., which are going to be described, It, therefore, becomes proved that the senses are uniformly percipient of their corresponding attributes. This is the import.—4.

The Sense of Smell is constituted by the element of Earth.

Upaskâra.—He states the proposition for which the topic was begun :

भूयस्त्वाद्गन्धवत्त्वाच्च पृथिवी गन्धज्ञाने प्रकृतिः ॥ ८ । २ । ५ ॥

भूयस्त्वात् Bhûyastvât, by reason of preponderance or predominance. गन्धवत्त्वात् Gândha-vatvât, by reason of possession of smell. च Cha, and. पृथिवी Prithivî; earth. गन्धज्ञाने Gandha-jñâne, in (the constitution of) that by which smell is perceived, *i. e.*, the olfactory sense. प्रकृतिः Prakṛitiḥ, matter, material cause, essence.

5. By reason of (its) predominance, and of possession of Smell, Earth is the material cause of the olfactory sense.—325.

That by which smell is cognised, is 'gandha-jñânaṁ,' that is, the olfactory sense. Therein 'prithivi,' Earth, alone is 'prakṛitiḥ,' the material cause. It may be asked, why is it so? Accordingly he says 'gandha-vatvât;' for it has been said already that that which possesses smell cannot be originated by that which is void of smell. The possession of smell (by the olfactory sense) or its odorousness is proved from the rule or well-known uniformity of nature that the external senses themselves possess attributes similar in kind to those which are apprehensible by them. If it be urged, how then can there be such uniformity that the characteristic of being the revealer of smell does not belong to the other members of the body but only to the olfactory sense-organ, even when terrene-ness belongs to all of them without distinction? So he says 'bhûyastvât.' It is the being constituted or originated by terrene particles uninfluenced by other substances, which is called 'bhûyastvâṁ,' 'predominance.' This, 'bhûyastvaṁ,' is a technical term, and has been so used in the kindred system (*i. e.*, the *Nyâya-Sûtraṃ*) also.—5.

Similarly the Senses of Taste, Colour and Touch are respectively constituted by the Elements of Water, Fire and Air.

Upaskâra.—He extends the argument to the other senses :

तथापस्तेजोवायुश्च रसरूपस्पर्शाविशेषात् ॥ ८ । २ । ६ ॥

तथा Tathâ, in like manner. आपः Âpaḥ, waters. तेजः Tejaḥ, fire वायुः Vâyuḥ, air. च Cha, and. रसरूपस्पर्शाविशेषात् Rasa-rûpa-sparśa-aviśeṣât because of the non-difference of taste, colour and touch.

6. In like manner, Water, Fire and Air (are the material causes of the sense-organs of Taste, Colour and Touch), inasmuch as there is no difference in the Taste, Colour and Touch (which they respectively possess, from what they respectively apprehend).—326.

'The material causes of the organs of the tongue, the eye, and the skin'—this is the complement of the aphorism. Water, etc., are then respectively the material causes of the tongue, etc., inasmuch as the latter respectively apprehend the objects with which they are uniformly related. Here too it is 'bhûyastvaṁ,' 'predominance,' which governs the uniformity (that the characteristics of being the revealer of taste, etc., belong respectively to the tongue, etc.) It has been declared that

it is the rule or uniformity that the tongue, etc., possess particular attributes of the same kind as are apprehensible by them, that is the proof of the possession of taste, etc., by the tongue, etc. Likewise the organ of hearing is only a portion or division of Ether confined within the hollow of the ear and favourably influenced by particular *adṛiṣṭaṃ* or destiny.—6.

Here ends the second chpater of the eighth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.



BOOK NINTH.—CHAPTER FIRST.

Perception, e. g., of antecedent non-existence is produced by other means than conjunction or combination.

Upaskâra.—After the determination of popular or ordinary perception produced from contact or contiguity in the form of either conjunction or combination, the author begins the ninth book of which the object is to demonstrate ordinary or popular and super-ordinary or hyper-popular perception produced from proximity or presentation due to other causes:

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् प्रागसत् ॥ ९ । १ । १ ॥

क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् Kriyâ-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhâvât, in consequence of the non-existence of application or predication of action and attribute. प्राक् prâk, prior, antecedently. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

1. In consequence of the non-application of Action and Attribute (to it), (an effect is) non-existent prior (to its produtcion.) —227.

'An effect,'—such is the complement of the aphorism. 'Prak,' *i. e.*, prior to the production of the effect, 'an effect,' *e. g.*, a water-pot, cloth, etc., 'a-sat,' (*i. e.*, non-existent), that is to say, the counter-opposite or contradictory of the contemporaneous non-existence of its own producer. Here the reason is the impossibility of the application of action and attribute. If the effect, *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., were really existent during that time also, then it would be affirmed to possess action and attribute. As in the case of a water-pot already produced reference can be made to it in such forms as "The water-pot is at rest," "The water-pot is in motion," "The water-pot is seen to possess colour," etc., there can be no reference made to it in like manner also prior to its production. It is therefore inferred that the water-pot is during that time, non-existent, And this, antecedent non-existence; in such cases as while straws are in the course of weaving or threads in the course of joining, or when clay is placed on the potter's wheel, while the activity of the potter, etc., is yet going on, is the universally experienced perceptual cognition that there will be in that place a mat, or a piece of cloth, or a water-pot, inasmuch as such cognition takes place as soon as the eyes are opened. Here proximity or presentation constituted either by conjunction or by combination cannot be the cause of the cognition. Hence proximity or presentation in which the thing in itself or the qualification or distinction of that which is connected with the sense, (indriya samboddha viśeṣanatâ) is here the necessary condition of perception. It cannot be said that in this explanation there is mutual dependence (of cause and effect) in as much as the distinction of antecedent non-existence being existent, there is perception of it and the perception being existent, there exists the distinction for the characteristic of being the distinction is here really the proper or essential form of both the cause and the effect and it is capable of producing perception in which both are mutually involved and that is really existent even prior to the perception so it has been declared in

the *Nyâya-Vârtika*, "In the case of combination as well as of Non-existence, the relation of *viśeṣna* that which serves to specify and *viśeṣya* that which is specified, (is the proximity between the sense and the object)."

This same antecedent non-existence is productive of its counter-opposite (that is, the object not yet existent). For when a water-pot is produced, it is not produced just at that very moment. Even though the other (partial) causes existed at the time, the imperfectness of the cause, being pursued, should pursue only the imperfectness consisting of the antecedent non-existence of the water-pot itself. If it be objected that the (antecedently non-existent) water-pot itself would then be an impediment to its own production; our reply is that since, by its non-existence at the time, it constitutes the absence of impediment, its causality should not be thrown away. Nor can it be objected that the water-pot itself constituting the non-existence of its antecedent non-existence, it would follow that its antecedent non-existence will again appear when the water-pot is destroyed; for, the destruction of the water-pot also is repugnant to its antecedent non-existence, so that there can be no appearance of a contradictory also during the existence of another contradictory. For the contradiction between them is not merely spatial, so that they might be simultaneous like (the genera of) bovine-ness and horse-ness. The contradiction is temporal also, and therefore how can they be existent at one and the same time?—1.

Note.—In this and the few following aphorisms, the author deals with the topic of *non-existence.* Now, non-existence is primarily divided into two kinds, *saṃsarga-abhâva* and *anyonya-abhâva. Anyonya-abhâva* or reciprocal non-existence is characterised as non-existence of which the counter-opposite (*i. e.*, the object non-existent) is determined by the relation of identity; in other words, it is equivalent to absence of identity, that is, difference. *Saṃsarga-abhâva* or relational non-existence is non-existence other than reciprocal non-existence, and it is sub-divided as antecedent, consequent, and absolute non-existences.

Bhâṣya.—Non-Existence is not the seventh predicable inasmuch as absolute non-existence, *e. g.*, a castle in the air, is not a predicable at all, while non-existence of the existent, in the forms of non-production, destruction, and absence of identity, cannot exceed the number of the six-predicables.

Consequent non-existence also is proved by perception and inference.

Upaskâra.—He states that another (form of) non-existence is established by the force of cognition.

सदसत् ॥ ९ । १ । २ ॥

सत् Sat, existent. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

2. The existent (becomes) non-existent.—328.

As the non-existence of the effect, prior to the operation of the cause, is proved by perception and inference, so is it proved by perception and inference, after the operation of a club, etc., which destroys it, that a really existent effect, *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., is now non-existent. And this same non-existence is commonly described as

annihilation or destruction (or consequent or emergent non-existence.) For there arise such cognitions as that the water-pot is now destroyed, annihilated, that the letter *ga* which was heard before, no longer exists, etc. This is the import.—2.

The existent is a different thing from the non-existent, so that after annihilation there can be no continuation of existence.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected : It is the same water-pot that under a particular condition gives rise to the idea, or conventional use, of annihilation ; and not that the annihilation of the water-pot is different from the water-pot :

असतः क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावादर्थान्तरम् ॥ ९ । १ । ३ ॥

असतः A-sataḥ, from the non-existent. क्रियागुणव्यपदेशाभावात् Kraiyâ-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhâvât, in consequence of the non-existence of reference by, or predication of, action and attribute. अर्थान्तरम् Artha-antaram, a different object.

3. (The existent is) a different object (from the non-existent), inasmuch as Action and Attribute cannot be predicated of the non-existent.—329.

Accordingly he says :

" The existent "—such is the complement of the aphorism. The existent is a different object from the non-existent. If it be asked, How ? So he says, 'kriyâ-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhâvât.' For there can be no such predication, during the period of annihilation also, as " The water-pot remains," " The water-pot exists at this moment," " The water-pot possesses colour," " Bring the water-pot," etc. In consequence of this difference, therefore, the existent is a different thing from the non-existent.—3.

Bhâṣya.—Whatrver is non-existent prior to its apperance as an effect, is non-existent only by the nature of an effect, but is really existent at the time by the nature of a cause, and that, therefore, it is essentially different from absolute non-existences.

Reciprocal non.existence or absence of identity, explained.

Upaskâra.—Antecedent and consequent non-existences being proved, the p resent aphorism is laid down with the purpose of proving mutual or reciprocal non-existence :

सच्चासत् ॥ ९ । १ । ४ ॥

सत् Sat, the existent. च Cha, and, also. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

4. The existent also is non-existent.—330.

Where a really existent water-pot etc., are spoken of as being non-existent, there non-existence of identity is perceived. For there arise such cognitions " The horse is non-existent by the nature of the cow," " The cow is non-existent by the nature of the horse," " A piece of cloth

is non-existent by the nature of a water-pot," "A piece of cloth is a not-water-pot," "A cow is a not-horse," " A horse is a not-cow," etc. Now, " A cow possesses reciprocal non-existence with a horse," " A water-pot possesses reciprocal non-existence with a piece of cloth,"—it is this reciprocal non-existence, otherwise called absence of identity, that appears in the above cognitions. Here identity is that which determines the counter-oppositeness or contrariety (of absence of identity). And this (reciprocal) non-existence has the same substratum or denotation or extension as its counter-opposite (*i. e.*, identity); for there is such cognition as that the water-pot is not the ground (on which it lies). It is also eternal, for it is impossible that there should be at any time identity between a water-pot and a piece of cloth.—4.

In addition to antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existence, there is absolute non-existence.

Upaskâra.—Now he describes the fourth (kind of) non-existence called absolute non-existence.

यच्चान्यदसदतस्तदसत् ॥ ९ । १ । ५ ॥

यत् Yat, that, which. च Cha, and. अन्यत् Anyat, different. असत् A-sat, non-existent. अत: Ataḥ, from these, *i. e.*, antecedent, consequent, and reciprocal, non-existents. तत् Tat, that. असत् A-sat, non-existent.

5. And that which is a different non-existent from these, is (absolutely) non-existent.—331.

' Ataḥ,' from the three forementioned non-existences, 'yat anyat a-sat tat a-sat,' (that which is a different non-existent is non-existent) *i. e.*, that is absolute non-existence. The word 'a-sat' (non-existent) is in both the places used in a substantive sense. Of these, one 'a-sat,' is the subject and the other ' a-sat' is the predicate in apposition with the subject. The meaning of the aphorism, therefore, comes to be this that non-existence which is different from the three fore-mentioned non-existences, is absolute non-existence. Amongst these, antecedent non-existence is limited in the future or at the end, consequent non-existence is limited in the past or at the beginning, and reciprocal non-existence has the same substratum or extension as its counter-opposite ; but absolute non-existence differs from all the three. Hence it is the fourth (kind of) non-existence.—5.

Vivṛiti.—There are three things repugnant to absolute non-existence, *viz.*, the counter-opposite or the object non-existent, its antecedent non-existence, and its consequent non-existence. The ancients teach that the cognitions that dark colour does not exist (after baking) in a red water-pot, and that red colour does not exist (before baking) in a dark water-pot, are conversant about consequent and antecedent non-existences, but not absolute non-existence. The moderns, on the other hand, maintain that consequent and antecedent non-existences are not repugnant to absolute non-existence and hence that there certainly is absolute non-existence also by reference to annihilation, production, etc. They hold that when a water-pot, etc., previously removed, are brought back to a place, there is no cognition of the absolute non-existence of the water-pot, so

long as the water-pot exists, inasmuch as the time during which the water-pot is existent does not constitute connection with non-existence. Some, again, teach that when there has formerly stood in any place a water-pot, and this has been removed and brought back again, there arises in this case cognition of a fourth kind of non-existence under the aspect of connection (*Saṃsarga-abhâva*), called temporary non-existence, and not of absolute non-existence.

Causes of the perception consequent non-existence.

Upaskâra.—He now begins another section and therein states the causes of the perception of consequent non-existence :

असदिति भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावात् भूतस्मृतेर्विरोधि
प्रत्यक्षवत् ॥ ९ । १ । ६ ॥

असत् A-sat, non-existent. इति Iti, such. भूतप्रत्यक्षाभावात् Bhûta-pratyakṣa-abhâvât, because of the non-existence of the perception of a past object. भूतस्मृतेः Bhûta-smriteḥ, because of the recollection of a past object. विरोधिप्रत्यक्षवत् Virodhi-pratyakṣa-vat, similar to the perception of the contradictory or opposite.

6. "(It is) non-existent"—such (perceptual cognition) is similar to the perception of the counter-opposite (of non-existence), because (in both cases) there is non-existence of the perception of that which is past and gone, and there is recollection of the past.—332.

'A-sat iti'; By the word, 'iti,' he indicates cognition in the form of perception. Thereby (it is obtained that) there is such perceptual cognition as "The water-pot is non-existent," "The water-pot has been destroyed," "The water-pot is now in a state of annihilation." An example of this cognition is given by 'virodhi-pratyakṣa-vat'; as there is clear perception of the counter-opposite (of existence) *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., so there is of its annihilation or consequent non-existence also. The reason of this stated as 'bhûta-pratyakṣa-abhâvât,' which means, because there is non-existence of the perception of 'bhûta,' *i. e.*, a water-pot, etc., which having been first produced have been subsequently destroyed. Hereby the non-apprehension of the (once) apprehensible is stated. There, again, the following argument is confirmatory (of the perceptual cognition): If there were a water-pot here, it would be seen, as the place is seen; but it is not visible; therefore there is none. He mentions another auxiliary cause: 'bhûta-smriteḥ,' which means, because there is recollection of the counter-opposite, *e. g.*, a water-pot, etc., which is past and gone. Hereby recollection of the counter-opposite is stated.—6.

Vivṛiti.—The four kinds of non-existence being explained, the perception of consequent non-existence is explained.

'A-sat, iti,' "The water-pot is non-existent," The water-pot is destroyed," "The water-pot is annihilated,"—such perception, 'virodhi-pratyakṣavat,' is similar to the perception of the water-pot which is the

counter-opposite (of its non-existence), that is to say, is proved by sense-experience and produced from the ordinary or popularly understood contact (of sense and object). Between them there is, however, this difference that the perception of the counter-opposite is produced from the conjunction of the eye, etc., (with their objects), while the perception of consequent non-existence is produced from there being a modification or qualification (*e. g.*, non-existence of water-pot in ("place possessing non-existence of water-pot") conjoint with the eye, etc. He mentions another point of difference, *viz.*, 'bhûta-pratyakṣa-abhâvât.' The meaning is that perception of consequent non-existence is produced from a cause in the form of the non-apprehension of the apprehensible consequent on the non-existence of the perception of the past, *i. e.*, the counter-opposite, *e. g.*, the water-pot, etc., and also from the recollection of the past water-pot etc., in other words, from cognition of the counter-opposite, which cognition is here identical with recollection. Thus the perception of consequent non-existence is produced from the non-perception of its counter-opposite as well as from the cognition of the counter-opposite, whereas the perception of the counter-opposite is not so produced. There is, therefore, difference between them in this respect also. This is the import. 'It should be observed that recollection as such is not intended (in this aphorism, though the word has been used), but mere cognition is intended. That being so, the idea is this that as the water-pot, etc., are proved by perception, so also are their consequent non-existences.

Causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.

Upaskâra.—Extending to antecedent non-existence the mode in which consequent non-existence is an object of perception, he says :

तथाऽभावे भावप्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च ॥ ९ । १ । ७ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similarly. अभावे A-bhâve, in the case of (antecedent) non-existence. भावप्रत्यक्षत्वात् Bhâva-pratyakṣa-tvât, in consequence of the perceptibility of the existent. च Cha, also.

7. Similarly (there is perceptual cognition) of (antecedent) non-existence, in consequence also of the perceptibility of the existent.—333.

Although this word, non-existence is a general term, still from the context it signifies antecedent non-existence. As there is perceptual cognition in the case of consequent non-existence, so also in the case of antecedent non-existence. *Q.*—How? *A.*—'Bhâva-pratykṣatvât' : 'pratyakṣatvât,' in consequence of the characteristic of being made an object of cognition by perception, 'bhâvasya,' of straws, etc., while these are in the course of weaving (for a mat which is then antecedently non-existent). Or, the meaning is this: 'pratyakṣatvât,' in consequence of the 'fitness' (for the senses) or apprehensibility, 'bhâvasya,' of the substratum as well as of the counter-opposite (*i. e.*, the mat after production) ; inasmuch as the apprehensibility of the substratum as well as the apprehensibility of the counter-opposite govern the apprehension of *Saṃsarga-abhâva* or relational non-existence. The word 'cha,' also, brings

forward the recollection of the counter-opposite and the argument already stated (in the preceding aphorism, as contributory causes of the perception of antecedent non-existence.) (It is to be observed that), although antecedent non-existence has no beginning, and although consequent non-existence has no end, yet they are preceptible under particular conditions only.—7.

Vivṛiti.—It may be asked, inasmuch as antecedent non-existence has no beginning, how is it that there is no perception of it long before the production of the conjunction of the two halves of a water-pot, etc., the fore-mentioned causes (of such perception) being possible at that time also? Hence the author adds, 'bhâva-pratyakṣatvât.' ' Bhâva ' means the final collocation of causes, according to its derivation from the root *bhû*, 'to be' by the affix *ghañ*, in the ablative sense that it springs from this. ' Bhâvapratyakṣatvât ' means the state or condition of that whereof perception takes place by means of ' bhâva.' The resultant meaning of the term, therefore, is, because it must be manifested by the final collocation of causes. Thus, the import is, in the instance in question, there can be no perception of antecedent non-existence in consequence of the non-existence of the final collocation of cause.

Causes af the perception of reciprocal non-existence.

Upaskâra.—He shows that reciprocal non-existence is an object of perception :

एतेनघटोऽगौरधर्म्मश्च व्याख्यातः ॥ ६ । १ । ८ ॥

एतेन Etena, hereby. अघटः A-ghaṭaḥ, not-water-pot. अगौः A-gauḥ, not-cow. अधर्म्मः A-dharmaḥ, not-*dharma*. च Cha, and, also. व्याख्यातः Vyâkhyâtaḥ, explained.

8. Hereby also are explained ' not-water-pot,' ' not-cow,' not-*dharma*.'334.

' Etena'—by this term he extends (the causality of) the recollection of the counter-opposite, apprehension of the substratum, and the argument stated before. Non-apprehension of the apprehensible is the same in all cases. The word, 'cha,' also, has the object of bringing forward what has been stated before. ' A-dharmaḥ' : By saying that the reciprocal non-existence of *dharma*, merit, though it is supersensible, is an object of perception in its substratum, *e. g.*, pleasure, knowledge, etc., he suggests that in the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence, apprehensibility of the counter-opposite is not the governing condition, but that only the apprehensibility of the substratum is the governing condition. How otherwise could the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend, in the form that the pillar is not a fiend, be apprehended in the pillar? For, the non-apprehension of a fiend as being coincident or identical with the pillar is the cause of the apprehension of the reciprocal non-existence of a fiend (in the pillar), and, it is again impossible, were the pillar identical with a fiend, that there should be such non-apprehension (of a fiend in the pillar), since such non-apprehension is contradictory to, or contravened by, the existence of the entity (*e. g.*, a fiend) which is the counter-opposite (of its non-existence.)

Objection.—Identity with a fiend is not in this instance the counter-opposite. Is it then a fiend? But it may be that though it is present in the pillar, yet, like its gravity, it is not apprehended. Hence its non-apprehension would not be contradictory to the existence of the entity which is the counter-opposite, (*viz.*, a fiend.)

Answer.—It is not so, for, like the non-apprehension of the counter-opposite, the non-apprehension of that which determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, also causes the apprehension of non-existence.

Objection.—The apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is dependent upon the apprehension of counter-opposite-ness, and counter-oppositeness is of the nature of the absence of reciprocal non-existence; and hence it follows that the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence is really dependent upon the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.

Answer.—This is not the case; for, as has been already stated, it is a property which is cognised as being not present in any given substratum, that determines the characteristic of being the counter-opposite, but the apprehension of that property also as that which determines counter-opposite-ness, is not the governing condition (of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence.)—8.

Vivṛiti.—The causes of the apprehension of reciprocal non-existence are determination (or possession of attribution, or intrinsic form) in relation to the senses,—*indriya-sambaddha-viśeṣaṇatâ*,—non-apprehension of the counter-opposite, and cognition of the counter-opposite. The difference, however, is this that the perceptibility of the counter-opposite is the condition of apprehension of *Saṃsarga-abhâva* or relational non-existence, whereas it is the perceptibility of the substratum that is the condition of apprehension of reciprocal non-existence. Thus, in spite of the super-sensibility of *dharma* or merit, there is no impediment to the perception of its reciprocal non-existence in the sensible substratum thereof, *e. g.*, pleasure and the like. Whereas some have taught that perceptibility of both the counter-opposite and the substratum is the condition of apprehension of relational non-existence, this is inaccurate; for, were this the case, since the perception of non-existence of fragrance in a stone, of non-existence of bitterness in treacle, of non-existence of colour in air, and of non-existence of touch as well as sound in ether would be impossible their respective substrata would not be perceptible to the several senses cognisant thereof respectively. It is from this consideration that *Pakṣadhara Miśra* has maintained that the perception of the destruction (or cessation) of the touch of air is produced by the determination or qualification thereof by time conjoint with the skin.

Perception of absolute non-existence, how produced.

Upaskâra.—Now in this aphorism he says that absolute non-existence is an object of perception:

अभूतं नास्तीत्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ ९ । १ । ९ ॥

अभूतं A-bhutam, not produced. न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, exists. इति Iti, this. अनर्थान्तरम् An-artha-antaram, not different objects.

9. That which has not been produced, does not exist;—this is an identical proposition.—335.

That which was produced, at present does not exist—such cognition rests upon annihilation, and is not conversant about, or does not bring out, the having been produced; whereas perceptual cognition which embraces simply this that it does not exist, reposes upon absolute non-existence. 'A-bhûtam,' (that which has not been produced), denotes non-cognizance of production and destruction. The being 'an-artha-antaram,' not different objects, also has the same purport only. For example, Earth-ness does not exist in Water, and Water-ness does not exist in Earth. For, were there Earth-ness in watery wholes, it would be perceived, but it is not perceived, therefore it does not exist;—a reference to such argument is to be observed in this case also. We must, in like manner, hold that there is absolute non-existence of a thing where such a thing will never be, nor even has been, produced. The cognition, on the other hand, in the form that it does not exist, of the non-existence in their substratum, of that which has been, and that which will be, depends upon consequent non-existence and antecedent non-existence. Hence it is that this (absolute non-existence) is designated as absolute or illimitable and as of trinal time or eternal.—9.

Vivṛiti.—'Na asti iti,' perception in the form that something does not exist, which is 'abhûtam,' not conversant about the past, 'an-artha-antaram,' that is, has for its object nothing but absolute non-existence, such as consequent non-existence etc. * * * *. The word 'bhûta' or past includes the future also.

The perception, "The water-pot does not (now) exist in the room," explained.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected: The non-existence of the water-pot in the room is not absolute non-existence, because of the existence of the water-pot there at some time or other. Nor is it either antecedent non-existence or consequent non-existence, for they appear only in combinative causes. Nor is it absolute non-existence undergoing production and destruction, for the expression 'absolute non-existence undergoing prodcution and destruction' involves a contradiction in terms. Nor is it a fourth kind of *saṁsarga-abhâva* or non-existence of association, since in that case the three-fold division of the non-existence of association would be disproved.

To meet this objection, he says :

नास्ति घटो गेहे इति सतोघटस्य गेह संसर्गप्रतिषेधः ॥ ९ । १ । १० ॥

न Na, not. अस्ति Asti, exists. घट: Ghaṭaḥ, water-pot. गेहे Gehe, in the room. इति Iti, such. सत: Sataḥ, existent. घटस्य Ghaṭasya, of water-pot. गेहसंसर्गप्रतिषेध: Geha-saṃsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ, negation of association with the room.

10. The water-pot does not exist in the room—such is (the form of) the negation of association of the existent water-pot with the room.—336.

('Geha-saṁsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ' means) the negation or privation of the association or conjunction of the water-pot with the room. And it would be simply absolute non-existence, if the water-pot do not exist

at any time whatever ; antecedent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which will exist ; and consequent non-existence, in the case of the water-pot which had its existence in the past.

Objection.—That being so, the cognition should have been in this form that connection of the water-pot does not exist in the room.

Answer.—What is meant by ' the cognition should have been ' ? If it means ' the cognition of which the actual object or content is the connection of the water-pot, should have been,' and so conveys the sense of inclusion, then what is desired is obtained. If, on the other hand, it means '(the cognition) which refers to or suggests that (*i. e.*, connection of the warer-pot),' then (we reply that), it is the reference to the substratum, *viz.*, in the room, which leads to, and results in, the reference to the connection, inasmuch as it is the being the substratum that appears in the form of connection of the property (or conjunction of the contained.)

Objection.—Does then the water-pot really exist there ?

Answer.—What do you mean by ' really exist '? Is it combined or conjunct ? It cannot be the first since there is in the room non-existence, of the water-pot as combined with it (that is, since the room is not the material cause of the water-pot). Nor the latter, since there is denial of conjunction.

Objection.—It would then follow that the water-pot, etc., are always present, inasmuch as there is everywhere denial only of the one or the other of their conjunction and combination.

Answer.—This would not follow, since the denial itself of both of them is idential with the denial of the water-pot. Are then the water-pot and its conjunction one and the same thing, whereby denial of conjunction of the water-pot would be the denial of the water-pot ? Are then the water-pot and its combination one and the same thing, whereby the admission itself of its combination would be the admission of the water-pot ? For, there is not presence of the water-pot there where both of them (conjunction and combination) are denied, whereby the water-pot might be in constant agreement. Thus it is the denial or negations of the admission or affirmation of something, that constitutes the denial or negation of that thing.

Or, it may be that there is really absolute non-existence of the water-pot in the room in the relation of being in combination, and that it is this (absolute non-existence) that is the object of the cognition that the water-pot does not exist in the room ; as for example, (there is absolute non-existence of the water-pot) in the potsherd in the relation of being in conjunction.

Objection.—Such being the case, the water-pot would be non-existent, being the counter-opposite of the constantly present absolute non-existence.

Answer.—It would be so, were it everywhere non-existent under the joint characteristics of being in conjunction and being in combination.—10.

Perception of the Soul, how produced, in the yogins *who are (called)* united.

Upaskâra.—Having thus ascertained popular perception having for its object existence and non-existence, he begins a new section in order to ascertain the perception of the *yogins* :

आत्मन्यात्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषादात्मप्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ९ । १ । ११ ।

आत्मनि Âtmani, in the soul. आत्ममनसोः Âtma-manasoḥ, of soul and mind. संयोगविशेषात् Saṁyoga-viśeṣât, from a particular conjunction. आत्मप्रत्यक्षम् Âtma-pratyakṣam, perception of the soul.

11. Perceptual cognition of the Soul (results) from a particular conjunction of the Soul and the Mind in the Soul.—337.

"Knowledge is produced"—such is the complement (of the aphorism.) Now, the *yogins* or ascetics are divided into two classes ; those whose internal organs have been steadied in *samâdhi* or deep meditation, and they are called *united* ; and those whose internal organs are no longer steadied in *samâdhi*, and they are called *disunited*. Therein those who are *united*, having with eagerness fixed their mind on the object to be presented to it, are engaged in constant meditation ; and in them cognition of the soul, of their own souls as well as of the souls of others, is produced. 'Âtma-pratyakṣaṁ' means in the manner of the cognition in which the soul is the percept or object of immediate presentation or intuition. Although in ourselves and others also, cognition of the soul sometimes exists or appears, yet, as it is obscured by *avidyâ* or nescience, it has been declared to be virtually non-existent. 'Âtma-manasoḥ samyoga-viśeṣât' means from particular contiguity between the soul and the mind, namely, a favourable influence by virtue born of *yoga* or holy communion.—11.

Vivṛiti.—Having examined perception produced through ordinary or physical presentation or contiguity, he now explains perception produced through super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or contiguity.

'Âtma-manasoḥ saṃyoga-viśeṣât,' from the conjunction of the soul and mind, accompanied by the power or virtue born of *yoga*, or holy communion ; 'Âtmani,' there being effort or volition towards the origination of understanding, (*âtmâ* meaning volition) on the authority of the lexicography : "Soul or *Âtmâ*, Volition, Patience or Contience, Understanding (are synonymous),"—that is to say, when there arises the thought produced by volition towards the origination of understanding ; 'Âtma-pratyakṣaṃ,' perception of one's own soul as well as of the souls of others ; "takes place," this is the complement of the aphorism.

Now, super-ordinary or hypher-physical presentation or contiguity is three-fold, according to its division as *Sâmânya-lakṣaṇâ*, having the form of the genus, *jñâna-lakṣaṇâ*, having the form of cognition, and *yogaja-dharma*, virtue or power born of holy communion. Therein *yogaja-dharma* is a particular merit or virtue produced by the practice

of *yoga* or holy communion, and to the existence of which the Vedas, Purâṇâs, etc., testify. It is again two-fold according to the two-foldness of the *yogins* as those who are *united* or have attained to holy communion and those who are *in the process of being united* or are in the course of attaining to holy communion. Among them those are called the *united*, who have subdued their mind or inner sense by the practice of *yoga* and have achieved the *siddhis* or 'powers,' perfection or attainments by means of *Samâdhi* or meditation. It is they that are also called the specially united, on account of their possessing conspicuous or advanced *yoga*. Those who are *in the process of being united* are they whose minds are turned away from objects of the senses and who are immediate beholders of all objects through the accompaniment of contemplation. The present aphorism has been laid down with reference to such *yogins* only.

Note.—It would seem that the word *viyukta* has been differently used by *Śaṅkara Miśra* and *Jayanârâyaṇa*; by the former in the sense of the *disunited*, and by the latter as denoting those who are *specially united* through the possession of highly advanced *yoga* Vide *IX. i. 13 infra*, *Upaskâra*. *Śaṅkara Miśra* obviously does not recognise the distinction, made by *Jayanârâyaṇa*, of the *united* and *those in the process of being united*. According to him, *yogins* are of two classes, namely, the *united* and the *ultra-united* or *dis-united*.

Omniscience of the united yogins, *how possible.*

Upaskâra.—Do then the *united* have cognition in respect of the soul only? How therefore can they possess omniscience? In reply to those possible queries, he says:

तथा द्रव्यान्तरेषु प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ ९ । १ । १२ ॥

तथा Tathâ, similarly. द्रव्यान्तरेषु Dravya-antareṣu, in the case of other substances. प्रत्यक्षम् Pratyakṣaṁ, perceptual.

12. Perceptual (cognition is) similarly (produced) in the case of the other substances.—338.

"Cognition is produced"—this is implied by the context. 'Tathâ' means by the mind, only as favourably influenced by, or accompained with, the virtue or power, born of *yoga* or holy communion. 'Dravya-antareṣu' means in respect of the four kinds of ultimate atoms, the mind, air, space, time and ether. By the term, substance, are included attribute, action and genus inhering in substance; the predicable, species, combination; also gravity, elasticity, etc., appertaining to things which are not objects of perception; and also volition, the source of vitality (or spontaneity), non-discriminative thought, *dharma*, *adharma*, etc., residing in the soul. For the favourable influence of the virtue or power born of *yoga* is equivalent to a perceptive apparatus; otherwise omniscience would not be affirmed (of those who are *united*.)—12.

Omniscience belong also to those yogins *who are (called)* dis-united.

Upaskâra.—Having described the perceptual cognition of the *united*, he now describes that of the *disunited*.

असमाहितान्तःकरणा उपसंहृतसमाधयस्तेषाञ्च ॥ ९ । १ । १३ ॥

असमाहितान्तःकरणाः Â-samâhita-antaḥkaraṇâḥ, whose internal organs are not attached to meditation. उपसंहृतसमाधयः Upsaṁhrita-samâdhayaḥ, who have given up meditation. तेषां Teṣâṃ, their. च Cha, also.

13. They whose internal sense-organs are not attached to meditation, are those by whom meditation has been given up. They too (have perception of hidden and distant objects.)—339.

'Upasaṃhrita-samâdhayaḥ' is simply an explication of 'asamâhita-antaḥkaraṇâḥ.' Or, to the question, why they are called 'asmâhita-antaḥkaraṇâḥ'? the reply is given by 'upasaṃhrita-samâdnayaḥ,' meaning, because they are those by whom 'Samâdhi' of which the essence is constant meditation, 'upasaṃhrita,' has been thrown away. For they, being able to transced the senses through the influence of *Samâdhi*, absorption or intentness of mind on one acquiring *Śarira-Siddhi*, powers over, or perfection of, the physical object only, and, organism, *e. g.*, the power of attenuation, etc., and *Indriya-Siddhi*, powers over, perfection of, the senses, *e. g.*, the power of hearing at a distance, *i. e.*, clair-audience, etc., and then feeling the insufficiency of *Samâdhi* itself, realise the need of other parctices as referred to in following and other texts of the Veda: तावदेवास्य चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये अथ सम्पत्स्ये, There is need for it so long as I am not freed and fulfilled. They learn that every form of *bhoga* or experience whether agreeable or disagreeable, must be undergone, and that they will undoubtedly reach firm ground from which there is no fall, only after experiencing *Karma-âśaya*, vehicles of *karma*, *i. e.*, physical organisms, previously merited or acquired, in different countries, divisions of the land, peninsulas, etc., by different births as horses, elephant, birds, serpents, etc., as well as by existence as celestials, sages, or men. They, therefore, make the whole universe of things, hidden and distant, the objects of their perception, the powers of their senses having been enlarged or heightened by the force of the virtue or power born of *Yoga*.—13.

Vivṛiti.—After describing the perception of the *yogin* who is in course of union, he describes that of the *yogin* who has attained union.

'Asamâhita-antaḥkaraṇâḥ,' those whose internal sense is destitute of *Samâdhi* or meditation; 'upasaṃhrita-samâdhayaḥ,' those by whom *samâdhi* or deep meditation has been consummated, that is, carried to fruition, in whom are produced the various *siddhis*, perfections or attainments which are the fruit of *samâdhi* or deep meditation;—such *united yogins* attain perception of souls and other substances. Such is the sense to be gathered from the aphorism. In fine, in the perception of the *yogin* who is in course of union, there is need for *dhyâna*, thought or contemplation, while in the perception of the *yogin* who is united, there is no need of *samâdhi* or meditation involving thought or contemplation.

Note.—According to the *vivṛiti*, 'the word 'asamâhita-antaḥkaraṇaḥ' would seem not to have syntactical connection in the approhism. The classification of *yogins*, made by *Jayanarâyaṇa*, is, therefore, so far unsatisfactory.

The Yogin's perception of Substance, Attribute and Action, popularly explained.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected: In them (*i.e.*, substances, etc.) cognition (of the Yogins) is not mental, inasmuch as the mind is not self-dependent outside its sphere. Nor is it a product of the external senses; for, they apprehend objects present as being connected with them, depend upon the development of colour, etc., as the case may be, to the degree of perceptibility, and particularly depend also upon light, etc.

In anticipation of this objection, he proves 'proximity' (*i. e.*, the medium of cognition) in the case of certain predicables, and says:

तत्समवायात् कर्म्मगुणेषु ॥ ९ । १ । १४ ॥

तत्समवायात् Tat-samavâyât, from combination with that, *i.e.*, substance. कर्म्मगुणेषु karmma-guṇeṣu, in respect of actions and attributes.

14. (Perception) of Actions and Attributes (arises) from (their) combination with Substance.—340.

"Perceptual cognition is produced"—this is the complement (of the aphorism.) If the elemental senses are dependent upon some presentation or contiguity (of objects to them for the apprehension of those objects by them), then from the combination in that which is in conjunction with the mind of the perceiver, cognition of the genera of attributes combined or inhering in the ultimate atoms, ether, space and time, is produced and in the case of other substances, since there is conjunction with them of various sterile (seed-less ?) minds, favourably directed towards, or taken over for, the experience of mortal coils, cognition is produced in respect of the attributes, etc., of those substances through their combination in those substances which are thus conjoint with those minds. This is declared here, regard being had to, or in view of easy demonstration. In fact, in the case of the external senses as well as of the mind, it is the virtue or power born of *yoga* that constitutes the 'proximity' or presentation to the senses, inasmuch as all uncertainty or impossibility of proof is set at rest by it alone. The drinking up of the ocean by *Agastya* (the sage), and the conversion of the kingdom of *Daṇḍaka* into a forest are examples in point. —14.

Vivṛiti.—It may be urged that omniscience is not possible or proved in the *Yogin*, for though there be perception of substances, there is no such cognition of attributes, etc. Accordingly he says :

The meaning is that from combination of 'that,' *i. e.*, conjunction of mind facilitated by the power or virtue born of *Yoga* or holy communion, there is produced in the *Yogin*, whether united or in course of union, perception of attributes and actions.

* * * The term ' of actions and attributes ' is indicative, and genus, etc., also are to be understood. In a like manner, should be understood perception produced from super-ordinary or hyper-physical presentation or contiguity in the form of *Sâmânya-lakṣaṇa* or general implication, and *jñâna-lakṣaṇa* or implication of cognition.

The Yogins *perceive the attributes of their own souls in the popular way.*

Upaskâra.—Is it then, it may be asked, combination with that which is conjoint with some other substance, that constitutes the presentation or ' proximity ' to the mind, even in the case of one's own understanding, etc. ? He replies, No :

आत्मसमवायादात्मगुणेषु ॥ ६ । १ । १५ ॥

आत्मसमवायात् Âtma-Samavâyât, from combination in the soul. आत्मगुणेषु Atma-Guṇeṣu, in respect of the attributes of the soul.

15. (Perceptual cognition) of the attributes of the Soul (results) from (their) combination in the Soul.—341.

" Perceptual cognition of the *yogins* is produced"—this is the topic. Perceptual cognition of understanding, etc., combined in the soul is on the other hand, produced simply from combination in the conjoint, (*i. e* , the soul which is conjoint with the mind), as it is with ourselves and others. The meaning, therefore, is that in such cognition there is no dependence upon any other form of contiguity or presentation. Now, ordinary or popular perception is cognition, which is never changing, produced from the contact of the senses and objects. It may be said to be produced by objects. Perception is connected with the genus of presentation (that is, without some form of immediate presentation, there can be no perception). And this is common to ordinary or popular and to super-ordinary or hyper-popular cognitions.—15.

Here ends the first chapter in the ninth book of the Commentary of Śaṅkara on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

Bhâṣya.—In the view of *Kaṇâda,* there are only three independent and ultimate predicables, namely, Substance, Attribute, and Action, for, while describing the process of *yogic* cognition of all realities, he deals with these three predicables only and is entirely silent with regard to the other so-called predicables.

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BOOK NINTH.—CHAPTER SECOND.

Marks of inference enumerated.

Upaskâra.—Thus in the preceding chapter the perception of *yogins* and non-*yogins* has been determined according to its cause, its nature, and its characteristic. Of the two kinds into which *pramâṇa* or proof has been divided, *viz.*, perceptual or sensuous and inferential or produced by marks, the author now commences to determine that which is produced by means of marks :

अस्येदं कार्य्यं कारणं संयोगि विरोधि समवायि चेति लैङ्गिकम् ॥ ९ । २ । १ ॥

अस्य Asya, of this. इदं Idam, it. कार्य्यं Kâryyam, effect. कारणं Kâraṇam, cause. संयोगि Saṃyogi, conjunct. विरोधि Virodhi, contradictory. समवायि Samavâyi, combined. च Cha, or. इति Iti, such. लैङ्गिकम् Laiṅgikam, produced by the mark of inference, mediate.

1. "It is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, contradictory to, or combined in, this,"—such is (cognition) produced by the mark of inference.—342.

'Cognition'—this is the topic in hand. 'Laiṅgikaṃ' means produced from *liṅgaṃ* or mark. *Liṅgaṃ* is a property of the *pakṣa*, possessing *vyâpti*, pervasion or invariable concomitance with the major term. Therein *vyâpti* has been already declared. (*Vide* III. i. 14, *supra.*) One thing is *pakṣa* in relation to another, when there is in the former non-existence of proof or evidence repugnant to the desire for proving the latter. Such evidence includes proof and disproof, or is demonstrative as well as obstructive, for a *pakṣa* or minor term is that which contains non-existence of both of them. For, there existing either demonstrative or obstructive evidence, no one feels doubt or desire of demonstration. It is for this reason that the ancients defined the *pakṣa* to be an object wherein the existence of the *sâdhya*, that which has to be established, the major term, is doubtful, or an object wherein the existence of the *sâdhya*, is desired to be demonstrated. According to *Jîvanâtha Miśra*, a *pakṣa* is that in which there is non-existence determined by the being evidence preventive of the appearance of doubt terminable by the ascertainment of the possession of producible *sâdhya*. Some others say that that is a *pakṣa* in which there is non-existence of demonstrative evidence accompained with absence of desire of proof. In this view, the nature of the *pakṣa* will exist even in the case of obstruction (*i. e.*, even where obstructive evidence, in other words evidence which disproves the existence of the major term in the minor, exists.) This then may be seen in the *Anumâna-Mayûkha*.

It then becomes apparent that the property or characteristic of this *pakṣa* is the *liṅga* or mark of inference. And the cognition, in the form of a presentative state of consciousness, which the mark, whether it be a visible, an inferred, or a heard one, produces, is 'laiṅgikaṃ' or that which is produced from a mark. Accordingly it has been said.

अनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धञ्च तदन्विते । ॥
तदभावे तु नास्त्येव तल्लिङ्गमनुमापकम्

That mark is the medium of inference, which is connected with that which is to be inferred, is known to exist in that which is accompanied with that which is to be inferred, and does not exist at all where that does not exist.

If is, therefore, the mark which is the instrument of inferential cognition, and not its *parâmarśa*, subsumption, inasmuch as subsumption, being destitute of function, lacks causality whereas lit is the same (*i. e.*, to cause inference) that is the function of the mark.

Objection.—How can there be illation or inferential cognition, where the smoke, etc., (*i. e.*, marks) are either past or future ?

Answer.—This is not a valid objection, as in this case the *sâdhya* or that which is to be proved, is also inferred as past or future.

Objection.—How can there be illation where, in consequence of an impediment in the case, it is not ascertained whether the smoke, etc., be past, future or present ?

Answer.—There can be by no means, since in such an instance there is uncertainty also as to the *sâdhya*, that which is to be proved.

Objection.—How can an illation take place where there is certainty as to the existence (of the mark) on a previous and a following day, and uncertainty as to the intermediate day ?

Answer.—In such a case, the inferential cognition results from the inference of fire, etc., limited to those days, by means of smoke, etc., limited to those days, such having been ascertained to be the causality of *vyâpti*, pervasion or the universal concomitance of the major and minor terms, (in the process of inference.)

Objection.—How does inferential cognition arise from a cloud of dust mistaken for smoke ?

Answer.—It is because that which is understood to be pervaded (*i. e.*, the cloud of dust, supposed to be smoke, and therefore pervaded by fire), is the mark of inference, and because the inference is correct or incorrect according to the correctness or incorrectness of such understanding ; else how should your own *parâmarśa* or subsumption be the instrument (of inferential cognition) in such a case ?

Objection.—In the case of a supersensible mark, *parâmarśa* or subsumption not being producible thereby, how can the mark have the function (of being the means of inference) ?

Answer.—Such function is effected by there being a practical or saving argument demonstrative of existence (kṣaimika sâdhanatâ), for, otherwise, the function of combination in the case of hearing, etc., would not be possible.

Inference results from a mark which is an effect, as the inference of fire, etc., from smoke, light, etc. ; also from (a mark which is) a cause, as the inference of sound by a deaf man from a particular conjunction of the drum and the drumstick, or the inference of *dharma* or merit, heaven, etc., by a pious man from the due performance of

sacrifice, ablution, etc., or the inference of rain from the due performance of *kârîrî* or Sacrifice for rain, or the inference of the efflux of water from a channel which men are digging out from a river, etc., full of water, or the inference of the rising of a stream from the observation of rain overhead. This is, then, a single connection, characterised as the relation of effect and cause, which has been stated in two ways. Inference from a conjunct object is such as the inference of the sense-organ of the skin from the observation of the physical organism which is in conjunction with it. Inference from a contradictory or repugnant object is such as the inference of an ichneumon concealed by bushes, etc., from the observation of an excited snake which is its natural antagonist. Inference from a combined object is such as the inference of fire connected with water by means of the warmth of the water.—1.

Vivṛiti—* * * * Cognition by means of marks is of three kinds, according as it contains a cause, or an effect or a co-existent thing as the mark, and is called *pûrva-vat, śeṣa-vat*, or *sâmânyato-dristam*. *Pûrva-vat* means that which contains as the mark the antecedent, that is, the cause. *Śeṣa-vat* means that which contains as the mark the consequent, that is, the effect. *Sâmânyato-dristam* means that which contains as the mark something other than a cause or an effect. The author explains these forms of inference, which have been also explained in the aphorisms of *Gautama (i. e., the Nyâya-Sûtram).* 'Asya idaṃ kâryyaṃ'; 'Asya,' of this, *i. e.*, of the *sâdhya* or that which is to be proved, 'idaṃ,' this the *sâdhana* or that which will prove the *sâdhya*, is 'kâryyaṃ,' *i.e.*, the effect—where such usage arises, there it is the case of inference by means of an effect as the inferential mark, *e. g.*, the inference of fire and the like, by the mark of the smoke and the like 'Asya idaṃ kâraṇaṃ': that is inference of which the mark is a cause is as, *e. g.*, the inference of a shower by means of a particular ascent of clouds. *Sâmânyato-dristam* or that which appears in the form of that of which the inferential mark is something other than a cause or an effect, is manifold; as, for example, the inference of the iron ring as being in conjunction with the mortar and the like, by means of the mark of a particular pestle which is conjoint with the iron ring (at its end); so also is the inference of an ichneumon concealed behind bushes and the like, by the sight of a particular excited snake which is the enemy of the ichneumon; and also the inference of fire and the like (as existing) in a frying pan and the like, by means of the hot touch combining in fire, in the form of the counter-opposite of combination favourable to fire.

Inference and the Law of Cause and Effect, how related.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected that this enumeration (of marks) is inadequate, since it does not include the inference of the heaving of the ocean from the rising of the moon, of the rise of Canopus (a bright star in the southern constellation *Argo navis*) from the tranquility or clearness of the waters of the rising of the moon from the expansion of the Nymphæa, of the setting of the fourteen lunar mansions or *nakṣatras* from the rising of the other fourteen, of colour from taste, or of a particular taste from a particular colour.

अस्येदं कार्य्यकारणसम्बन्धश्चावयवाद् भवति ॥ ६ । २ । २ ॥

अस्य Asya, its, to it. इदं Idaṃ, it. कार्य्यकारणसम्बन्धः Kâryya-kâraṇa-sambandhaḥ, (The suggestion or introduction of the relation of effect and

cause.) च Cha, and, whereas. अवयवात् Avayavât, from a member of the argument or syllogism. भवति Bhavati, arises.

2. 'It is its' (—this cognition is sufficient to cause an illation to be made); whereas (the introduction of) the relation of effect and cause arises from a (particular) member (of the argument). —343.

In anticipation of this objection, he says.

'It is its'—this much only becomes the instrument of illation. 'Asya,' *i. e.*, of the means of illation, *e. g.*, smoke, etc., 'idaṃ,' *i. e.*, (it is) that which is to be established, *e. g.*, fire, etc.; or, 'asya,' *i. e.*, of the pervader, *e. g.*, fire, etc., 'idaṃ,' *i. e.*, (it is) that which can be pervaded, *e. g.*, smoke, etc. It is, therefore, only the apprehension of the being that which can be pervaded, that governs (the process of illation), and not also the relation of effect and cause, etc. Lest it might be objected that the enumeration (of marks of inference) in the preceding aphorism is consequently futile, he adds 'the relation of effect and cause.' Other relation (*i. e.*, of the conjunct, the contradictory, and the combined), mentioned above, are also hereby implied. In the word 'relation,' there is the tropical suggestion of that in which relation is the thing contained. 'Relation' accordingly means the introduction or talk of relation. Whence does the introduction or talk or relation arise? He gives the reply by saying 'avayavât, *i. e.*, from a part or member (of the argument), that is to say, only from the *udâharaṇa* or example or illustration. The fifth case-ending or the ablative inflection (in 'avayavât') bears the sense of the infinite. The meaning, therefore, is that, in this *Darśana* or philosophy as well as in the Sâṃkhya and other *Darśanas* the introduction of the relation of effect and cause, etc., has been made in conformity with, or regard being had to, the *udâharaṇa* or illustration (*q. v.*, further below).

Thus, then, *vyâpyatva*, the being that which can be pervaded (as the mark, by that of which it is the mark) denotes the possession of a natural connection, the natural being that which is not accidental or adventitions. This quality of being non-accidental is in the case of perceptive object, known simply from its being ascertained, in some cases that they do not pervade (or are not invariably concomitant with) that which is to be proved (or that which is denoted by the major term), and from the certainty, in other cases that they pervade the instrument of inference or inferential mark. Of supersensible objects established by proof, some are pervasive of both (that which is to be proved, and the instrument of inference), or non-pervasive only of the instrument of inference, or non-pervasive only of that which is to be proved. Amongst these, the quality of being non-accidental is to be ascertained, in tho first case, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference; in the second case, from their being non-pervasive of that which is to be proved; and in the fourth case also, from their being pervasive of the instrument of inference. In the third case also, there being room for the further inquiry that while it is not possible or proved why that which pervades, should pervade only this much (*i. e.*, the instrumeut of inference) and not more, how it is at the same time possible for that

which does not pervade, to pervade even so much (*i. e.*, the instrument of inference), and thus acquisition and preservation (or loss and gain) being counter-balanced, and from other considerations, the quality of being non-accidental should be determined. The attitude of mind that the demon of apprehension that some *upādhi*, accident, adjunct, or external condition, may exist is these cases, attacks all rules of conduct, prescriptive and prohibitive, should be rejected, inasmuch as there is possibility of certainty of non-accidental nature. The definitions of *upādhi* nnd *vyāpti* (pervasion) have been already stated.

This inference is of two kinds self-satisfying or logical, and other-satisfying or rhetorical. Therein inference for the sake of, or originating from, oneself, arises from the investigation by a person himself of *vyāpti*, pervasion or universal concomitance of the major and middle terms, and *pakṣadharmatā*, the being a property or characteristic of the minor term or the existence of the middle in the minor term ; and inference for the sake of, or originating from, another, results from the knowledge of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* produced from an argument (*nyāya*,) enunciated by another.

A *nyāya* argument or syllogism is a proposition productive of verbal cognition which leads to the recognition or sub-sumption of the mark of illation in the third member of the syllogism. The members thereof are five ; and membership here denotes the being a proposition productive of verbal cognition, which again is productive of another verbal cognition leading to the recognition or sub-sumption of the inferential mark in the third member. Such propositions are : *pratijñā*, enunciation ; *hetu*, mark or reason ; *udāharaṇa*, illustration ; *upanaya*, application, ratiocination, or deduction ; and *nigamana*, conclusion. Of these the *pratijñā*, enunciation, is a proposition which is a member of the argument or syllogism, conveying verbal cognition the object whereof is neither less nor greater than that of the inferential cognition desired ; the *hetu*, mark or reason, is that member of the syllogism, ending with the ablative inflection, which is applied to the instrument of inference or the middle term under consideration ; the *udāharaṇa*, illustration, is that member of the syllogism which is declaratory or demonstrative of the inseparable existence of the given major and middle terms ; the *upanaya*, application or deduction, is that member of the syllogism which establishes that the *hetu* which is so distinguished by the possession of inseparable existence, is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the *pakṣa*, the subject of the conclusion, *i. e.*, the minor term ; and the *nigamana*, conclusion, is that member of the syllogism which declares that the object denoted by the given major term is a distinguishing characteristic or content of the *pakṣa*. Thus the syllogism proceeds as follows :—

Sound is non-eternal,—*pratijñā*,

Because it is an effect,—*hetu*.

Whatever is an effect or producible is non-eternal,—*udāharaṇa*,

It (sound) possesses effectness or producibility pervaded by non-eternality,—*upanaya*,

Thorefore, (it is) non-eternal,—*nigamana.*

The significant appellations given by the *Vaiśeṣikas* to these very members are *pratijñâ* (enunciation of that which is to be proved), *apadeśa* (reason), *nidarśana* (instance), *anusandhâna* (investigation), and *pratyâmnâya* (re-statement of the *pratijñâ*). In this connection, the mode of the application of *vâda,* theory or discourse, *jalpa,* disputation or demolition of the argument of the opponent and establishment of one's own theory, and *vitaṇḍâ,* controversion or only destructive criticism, and the characteristics of *chhala,* misconstruction, *jâti,* futile or adverse reply, and *nigraha-sthâna,* ground of defeat, *i. e.,* misapplication or non-application of the argument advanced, may be sought in the *Vâdi-vinoda.*—2.

Inferential Cognition includes Verbal Cognition.

Upaskâra.—With the purpose of including other forms of proof into the inferential, he commences another topic.

एतेन शाब्दं व्याख्यातम् ॥ ९ । २ । ३ ॥

एतेन Etena, hereby. शाब्दं Śâbdam, verbal. व्याख्यातम् Vyâkhyâtam, explained.

3. Hereby verbal (cognition is) explained.—344.

This cognition is 'Śâbdam' (verbal), produced by the instrumentality of sound or word—this doctrine, maintained by the *Nyâya* school, is also, '*vyâkhyâtam,*' explained, '*etena*' (by this), by the characteristic of being inferential, that is to say, simply as being produced from marks (of inference). As inferential cognition depends upon *vyâpti,* pervasion, *pakṣadharmatâ,* the existence of the middle in the minor term, and recollection, so does verbal cognition also. Thus, *e. g.,* "These objects denoted words, or meanings of words, are mutually connected, since they are represented in memory by words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one another, etc., as are the meanings of words in 'Drive away the cow.'" Here it is by observing or apprehending the characteristic of being represented in, or called to, memory by a number of words possessing expectancy for, or dependence upon, one another, which characteristic is pervaded by the possession of mutual connection by these meanings of, or objects denoted by, those words, that one infers the possession of connection. What then is the use of the supposition of sound or word or language as a form of proof ?

Objection.—There can be no inference in cognition produced by words, inasmuch as such inference fails where the words are spoken by an untrustworthy person, *e. g.,* that there are fivs fruits on the river bank.

Answer.—The objection does not arise, as the words must have the qualification of coming from the mouth of an *âpta* or trustworthy person. For trustworthiness denotes the possession of knowledge of the meaning of the statement corresponding to objective reality within the reach of the meaning of the given statement, and not merely that a person is not a deceiver.

Objection.—But this is hard to apprehend, prior to the intuition of the meaning of the statement.

Answer.—Not so, for even those who hold the theory of the autho ritativeness of word or language, admit the apprehensibility of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, which serves to differentiate fallible or false language.

Objection.—They depend upon that (*i. e.*, the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person) for the apprehension of authoritativeness, whereas verbal cognition is produced even without the apprehension of that quality. In your case also the apprehension or inference must needs be in accordance with nature of the inferential mark. And that which is pervaded (*i. e.*, the middle term), is qualified with the possession of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person.

Answer.—The objection is not successful, since it is possible to have such general apprehension as " He is here infallible."

Objection—But the term ' here ' ultimately means the same thing as the term 'the connection under consideration.' So that to apprehend that (*i. e.*, the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person), previously, is simply impossible.

Answer.—It is not, in consequence of the possibility of ascertainment of the inferential mark by means of the possibility of ascertainment in a general way of the quality of being spoken by a trustworthy person, from the force of association with the topic and other circumstances. If even then discrepancy sometimes appears the inferential process proceeds as by the property of smoke (mistaken) in vapour, etc.

Objection.—What is in this case the *sâdhya* or the major term ? Is it that the meanings of words are in fact connected, or that their connection is something possible ? It cannot be the first, as it is not the case with the statement of an untrustworthy person. Nor can it be the second, for, even though mere connectibility or coherence of words be proved, still inference cannot proceed unshaken, in consequence of the uncertainty of actual connection. Moreover, coherence being previously known as the qualification of the inferential mark, what is the use of inference ?

Answer.—This is not a valid objection, inasmuch as it is the general proposition or uniformity which is the *sâdhya* or the thing to be proved, and, there can be no violation of the rule in consequence of the qualification, as has been already stated, by the characteristic of being spoken by a trustworthy person.

Objection.—Expectancy or interdependence of the words of a sentence is equivalent to antecedent non-existence in the hearer of the cognition of connection (of the meanings of words) producible by it. It is only so long as it exists as such that it can be the inferential mark. The futility of inference (in verbal cognition), therefore, follows from this that in order to the cognition of expectancy, the cognition of connection must take place beforehand, and not at any other time.

Answer.—This is not the case, for we do not say that expectancy is merely antecedent non-existence of the cognition of connection. On the other hand, expectancy is distinguished with the possession of inseparable existence or universal agreement of what is presented to consciousness by the words and what is represented in memory, as it is from the cognition of this adjective element that the cognition of expectancy results.

Objection.—Let then inseparable existence itself constitute expectancy.

Answer.—By no means. For, "The water of the river is pure," "The buffalo grazes in the basin of the river"—in these cases also it would entail the consciousness of the connection of the river and the basin by means of their inseparable existence in the form of the cognition that the buffalo grazes in the basin of the river of pure water. And in such instances as "The water-lily is blue," in the presence of inseparable existence of the water-lily and blueness even in particular cases, would make the inseparable existence of the substance and attribute presented to consciousness by the words, possible (that is, that all water-liles were blue.)

Or, it may be that expectancy is nothing but the desire to know or enquiry with reference to the object recalled by words, or that it is the complement of the connotation. Still the cognition of it is necessary, inasmuch as in a cause which is being known, there must appear divergence in characteristic from what is not a cause, appropriate to such cognition, as is the case with pervasion or universal concomitance. It is for the very same reason, whether connectibility or coherence of the words of a sentence mean the absence of certainty of non-agreement, or the non-existence of contradictory evidence, or the observation of agreement with similar other words, or that in the connection of the meaning of the one word (*e.g.*, fire) with that of another (*e.g.*, wets), there exists as something contained therein, certain knowledge that the one (*e. g.*, fire) is not the counter-opposite of absolute non-existence inherent in the other (*e. g.*, wets), that cognition of coherence is necessary. Cognition of adjacency of the words of a sentence, in the form of recollection without interval of the objects denoted by them, is also a condition. It may be that differences or peculiarities of connection of words result only from the peculiarities of differences of the words which are going to be connected ; and the proof of the peculiarity or difference in this way, is not undesired. Or, the desired peculiarity may be proved by the characteristic of its so determining cognition, inasmuch as the inference takes place that these words, being a collection of words possessing expectancy, co-herence, and adjacency, are preceded by, or have for their antecedent, cognition of the connection of the ideas or manings represented in memory, as is the case with the group of the words "Drive away the cow." The opposition that the *sâdhya* or thing to be proved is that these words have the connection of the meanings recalled, and that the possession by words of connection with the meanings of those words, is impeded, is better left unnoticed. Nor is it the being expressive of, or the means of making known, connection, by

being the inferential mark, that is the possession of connection by the words, since the mark not being proved to exist prior to the inference, there can be no apprehension or cognition of the pervasion thereof.

Some say that expressive movement or gesture is a new form of proof. To this it is replied: Gesture is of two kinds, conventional, and non-con-ventional. Therein that which is conventional, calls back to mind the sound or word lying in the understanding or intent or common consent, but does not also produce certain cognition of connection (between gesture and its significance), as letters do. It is sound or word, rising up in memory, that is the means of proof there, and it has been already declared that the chracteristic of being a mark of illation belongs to sound or word. Nor is recollection of the word a collateral or secondary function of gesture, inasmuch as, in order to exercise such function, gesture would have to be uniformly present in all cases, whereas there takes place intuition of meanings from words even without the intervention of gesture.

Objection.—This being so, how does the conduct of a deaf person come to depend upon, or spring from, gesture? For, it is impossible for him to have knowledge of the convention in a given instance.

Answer.—The objection cannot prevail, for it is to be considered how he derives certain knowledge of the meaning or idea even, from gesture, when it is impossible for him to grasp the sense or connection of the meaning or idea also. His conduct, again, springs from the apprehension of inseparable existence (or serviceable associated (habit), in the same way as particular adaptations of conduct are possible in the case of the elephant and the horse in accordance with the pricks of the goad and strokes of the whip.

On the other hand, non-conventional gesture,—that kind of it which, further, is in agreement or association with action,—causes activity in the employee by reminding him of the intention of the employer, but does not produce sure cognition in any case. For example, as according to the instruction "You should come on the blowing of the conch-shell," the man turns up on hearing the blowing of the conch-shell, so a man strikes another at the proper time according to the pre-ordination "You should strike him when I shall raise my forefinger," but this does not prove anything. Non-conventional gesture, again, which is in agreement with cognition, is either prominent on its subjective side, as in "By the raising of the ten fingers, it should be understood by you that the number of coins, (or contortions of the limbs in ascetic posture), or of the *purāṇas* is ten;" or it is prominent on its verb or predicate side, as in "You should come up, after seeing contraction of the hand." Thus, by this form of gesture the meanings of words are no doubt recalled, but only severally or each independently of the rest; but their mutual association or connection also is not illuminated by it, as it is by nominative, objective, and other case-endings which explain that inter-relation, inasmuch as in the case under consideration, invariable or constant components of gesture do not exist.

Objection.—How do then activity and inactivity proceed from gesture in the absence of cognition of connection?

Answer.—You may take it that these follow from either the one or the other of doubt or uncertainty and *pratibhâ* or inventive genius or instinct. Gesture also is, therefore, no proof.—3.

Sound or word cannot produce cognition of its sense or meaning.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked, how sound (or word) could be a mark of illation, when its difference from the mark appears from its possessing the nature of an *apadeśa* or a description. Anticipating this, he says :

हेतुरपदेशो लिङ्गं प्रमाणं करणमित्यनर्थान्तरम् ॥ ९ । २ । ४ ॥

हेतुः Hetuḥ, reason. अपदेशः Apadeśaḥ, description. Sound. लिङ्गं Liṅgaṃ, mark. प्रमाणं Pramâṇam, proof. करणं Karaṇam, instrument. इति Iti, these. अनर्थान्तरम् An-artha-antaram, not different things.

4. Reason, Description, Mark, Proof, Instrument—these are not antonyms.—345.

'Apadeśaḥ' means sound (or word), according to its derivation that by it objects are referred to, *i. e.*, affirmed or described. And it is really a synonym of *hetu*, reason, and *linga*, mark. 'Pramâṇam' means the instrument of true cognition in the manner of the inferential mark. In like manner, the word 'karaṇam' also is equivalent to the mark itself which is the instrument (*karaṇa*) of inferntial cognition. For the operation of *karaṇa* or the instrument is two-fold : Some *karaṇa* operates or exercises its function under or subject to contact or contiguity, and some *karaṇa* exercises its function on the strength of inseparable existence. Sound (or word), on the contrary, has neither contact nor inseperable existence with the object or meaning ; hence, how can it lead to the object ?

Objection.—It leads to the object with the help of arbitrament or according to direction.

Answer.—It cannot do so, for arbitrament or direction is with reference to the meaning of words, and not to their connection.

Objection.—There may be arbitrament or direction with reference to that also.

Answer.—No, for that connection being of a manifold nature, it is impossible that it could be the object of reference by arbitrament or direction.

Objection.—But it is from the force of arbitrament or direction in the case of (words and) meaning that the meaning of a sentence also becomes manifest.

Answer.—This is not the case, as there would be then over extension or undue application of the principle, if something is brought forward or called up by arbitrament or direction with regard to something else.

Objection.—Invariable antecedence or pervasion of connection in this case will be that of connection as recalled by sound.

Answer.—If it be so, then, by that admission, inference itself finds admittance on the strength of invariable antecedence or pervasion. Arbitrament or direction also, if it implied mere intention or desire, would be unduly applied or too wide.

Objection.—But the desire of Îśvara, God, cannot be said to be too wide.

Answer.—Yes, it may be so, inasmuch as even in the absence of divine will, the words, river or Gaṅgâ (Ganges), etc., suggest or call up the ideas of the bank, etc.

This is enough of over-forwardness in a logician.—4.

Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference.

Upaskâra.—For the purpose of showing that comparison, etc., also, recognised of others (as so many independent means of proof) and which proceed on the strength of inseparable existence or universal concomitance, are merely different forms of inferential cognition, he says :

अस्येदमिति बुद्ध्यपेक्षितत्वात् ॥ ९ । २ । ५ ॥

अस्य Asya, its. इदं Idaṃ, it. इति Iti, such. This. बुद्ध्यपेक्षितत्वात् Buddhi-apekṣitevât, because of the cognition or notion being needed.

5. (Comparison, Presumption, Sub-sumption, Privation, and Tradition are all included in Inference by marks), because they depend, for their origin, upon the cognition, namely, " It is its." —346.

The words " of comparison, presumption, comprehension or sub-sumption and privation " complete the aphorism. ' Asya,' of the pervader, ' idaṃ ' (it is) the pervaded,—the cognition is in this form. They are dependent upon it, by which it is depended upon as their originator. ' Buddhi-apekṣitatva ' means the state of being so dependent. In consequence of such dependence,—this is the meaning of the term, it being a relative compound formed similarly to *âhita-âgniḥ* (by whom fire has been deposited), or formed with the affix *ita* (which signifies that something, *e. g.*, dependence upon the cognition, has been produced in the something else, *e. g.*, comparison, etc.), according to the rule that it is applied to the words star, etc., (so that *târakâ* + *ita* = *târakita* = starry, heaven).

Upamâna, comparison or analogy, is in every respect nothing but *anumâna*, or inference, by means of words. Now the sentence, " A gavæus or gayal looks like a cow," is spoken by a forester in reply to the enquiry by a twonsman, *viz.*, " What does a gayal look like to ? " Here immediately after hearing the above sentence at distant place, the townsman determines the meaning of the name, gayal, of the strength of the community of substratum, namely that which is like a cow is the object of reference by, or designate of, the word, gayal. Then when he goes to the forest and meets an animal body of that description, he recognises that that is that which is the designate of the word, gayal.

Objection.—At the time of hearing the sentence at a distant place, the generic nature of the gayal, which is condition or occasion of the recognition or application of the name, is not known. How then can there be such determination by, or application of, the name?

Answer.—There can be such determination, as the cognition thereof (*i. e.*, of the generic nature) is possible by means of suggestion or metaphorically.

Objection.—But where is the room for suggestion, when in the sentence, "A gayal looks like a cow," there is no want of proof of the agreement or position of the subject and predicate?

Answer.—There is room for suggestion, inasmuch as complete equivalence of the two terms still remains to be proved. For it is not proper to hold up before one, who desires to be enlightened in the matter, likeness to a cow as the condition or occasion of partial application of the name. Therefore, it (the name) refers to a particular genus or class in its entirety. Hence arises the possibility of suggestion. Or, the word, gayal, is denotative of the animal, gayal, being applied thereto by the elect, and there existing no other application of it. Other applications being non-existent, whatever word is applied by the elect to a certain object, the same is denotative of that, as the word, cow, is of the cow. It is from this inference that the application of the name, gayal, comes to be determined.

And the reasoning which you may set forth as being auxiliary to *upamâna*, comparison, would better go with *anumâna*, inference, which has been established as a method of proof. What is the use of *upamâna* which, as a method of proof, is yet to be supposed?

More detailed consideration on this subject may be sought in the *Anumâna-Mayûkha.*

Arthâpatti, Presumption or Explanation, also is nothing but inference. Thus, (1) presumption from the observed, arises where by means of the non-existence of Chaitra who is living, in the house, ascertained by stronger evidence, (*e. g.*, perception), his existence outside it is presumed. Here the cognition of Chaitra's existence outside the house is wholly dependent upon the ascertainment of the relation of the pervader between the demonstrable and the demonstrator. For, as a matter of fact, the non-existence of a living person in the house is accompanied with this existence outside it, or there arises the cognition that the non-existence of a living person in the house is impossible without his existence outside it. In the first case, there is apprehension of positive pervasion or concomitance, and, in the last, of negative pervasion.

Objection.—Pervasion does exist, but the apprehension thereof does not here take place.

Answer.—Were this the case, then, in the absence of the apprehension of pervasion, there would be no scope or occasion for the manifestation of presumption, and there would consequently be supposition of only that which, as an entity, would demonstrate pervasion existing in its proper form or as such. This is the direction or point.

The inclusion of presumption due to the instrumentality of doubt or uncertainty as well as of that due to the instrumentality contradiction or contrast or opposition, in inference, should be also understood or inferred ; for contrast or opposition, characterised as uniformity of non-co-existence, also is constituted by pervasion or (negative) concomitance.

(2) Presumption from what is heard, is also inference by means of the inferred. " Deva-datta, who is stout, does not eat by day"—By this proposition, stoutness is inferred, and, by means of that stoutness, there takes place inference of eating at night in this way that Deva-datta eats at night, because, as he does not eat by day, stoutness cannot otherwise appear in him.

Sambhava, Comprehension or Sub-sumption, also is merely a form of inference. For, the examples of it are : A *droṇa* (a standard measure). does not exceed a *khâri* (one *khâri*=4 *droṇas*) ; an *âḍhaka* does not exceed a *droṇa* (one *droṇa*=4 *âḍhakas*) ; a hundred does not not exceed a thousand ; etc. Here a *khâri* contains a *droṇa*, being constituted by it. One thing being constituted by another thing, the former is possessed of the latter by means of the latter, as a water-pot is possessed of its components. Other instances should be similarly understood. That learning is probable in a *Brâhmaṇa* (because *Brâhmaṇas* as a class are learned), that valour is probable in a *Kṣatriya* (because *Kṣatriyas* as a class are valiant), etc., on the other hand, do not at all become means of proof, inasmuch as they do not produce certainty.

Abhâva, Non-existence or Privation, also is not a different form of evidence ; for, being similar to the inference of the cause by means of the effect, the inference of the non-existence of the cause by means of the non-existence of the effect, is included within inference itself, as pervasion or universal concomitance is the ground of such inference by means of non-existence.

The *Bhaṭṭas* (*Prabhâkara* and other *Mîmâṃsakas*), however, maintain that the evidence which causes the apprehension of non-existence in the ground, etc., (*e.g.*, The water-pot does not exist on the ground), is called non perception. Now, this evidence or proof is in some cases included in perception, and in other cases, inference, inasmuch as non-existence is apprehended by the eye, etc., themselves. For, it cannot be said that the senses are exhausted just in the apprehension of the substratum (of non-existence, *e. g.*, the ground), since their function continues up to the apprehension of non-existence.

Aitihya, Tradition, is a succession of sayings of which the authors are not known. *Itiha*—this collection of expletives appears in the narration of past events. The state of being such narration of past events is called *aitihya*, traditional saying. If it is not impeded in its meaning, then, coming under the class of verbal cognition, it is a made of inference. For example, In this Banyan tree there dwells a *Yakṣa* There is a *Gaurî* (a Buddhistic Spirit) in the *madhûka* tree (*Bassia latifolia*) etc. Now, if the traditional sayings come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are as has been already declared ; if they do not come from the mouth of trustworthy persons, then they are no evidence at all.

Accordingly it is established that proof or evidence is of two kinds only, perception and inference.—5.

Vivṛiti.—*Sambhava* or Probability is cognition dependent upon a plurality of concomitances ; *e. g.*, learning is probable in a *Brâhmaṇa* ; a hundred is probably contained in a thousand.

Note.—The construction put by *Jayanârâyaṇa* upon the word, *Sambhava* is explicitly rejected by *Śaṅkara Miśra*. In the lexicon *Medinî* also we find that the meaning of the word is *Âdheyasya âdhârânatiriktatvâm*, *i. e.*, the state of what is contained not exceeding that which contains it, or, simply, the relation of the part not being greater than the whole.

Reminiscence, how produced.

Upaskâra.—Inferential cognition having been explained, he now begins another topic.

आत्ममनसोः संयोगविशेषात् संस्काराच्च स्मृतिः ॥ ९ । २ । ६ ॥

आत्ममनसोः Âtma-manasoḥ, between the soul and the mind. संयोगविशेषात् Saṃyoga-viśeṣat, from a particular conjunction. संस्कारात् Saṃskârât, from impression or retention or latency. च Cha, and. स्मृतिः Smṛitiḥ, Reminiscence.

6. Reminiscence (results) from a particular conjunction between the Soul and the Mind and also from Impression or latency.—347.

" Results"—This is the complement of the aphorism. 'Saṃyoga-viśeṣaḥ' means contact or contiguity such as reflection or meditation or inter-penetration, etc. From this as the non-combinative cause, in the soul as the combinative cause, 'Smṛitiḥ,' (reminiscence), a particular kind of cognition or knowledge, is produced, He states the efficient cause by 'Saṃskârât.' By the word 'cha' he implies past experience which too is operative here as the object recalled. Reminiscence or recollection imitates the correctness of the previous experience, such alone being the recollection of him who has mistaken a rope for a snake and has consequently fled from it. It does not, moreover, follow that reminiscence should take place at all times or continually, since it depends on the resuscitation of the mental impression. Accordingly it has been said by the revered *Praśastadeva*, " Reminiscence, caused by the inferential process (as in inferring fire from smoke there is recollection of the universal concomitance of fire and smoke), desire, re-production (or suggestion of one idea by another), and aversion, and having for its content the past, among objects seen, heard, and otherwise experienced, (results) from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind, due to the observation of a suggestive mark, voluntary attempt at recollection, etc., and from impression or latency produced by intuitions constantly repeated and attended to with interest."

The cognition of highly advanced sages, or their intellectual intuition has not been separately noticed by the author of the aphorisms. It is included within perception by *Yogins* or ascetics (See IX. ii. 13 below). In the treatise, called the *Padârtha-Pradeśa*, an account of it has been given, which is as follows : " Prescient or inventive cognition which is produced from conjunction between the soul and the mind, and also from a particular *dharma*, virtue or merit, independently of inferential marks, etc., in advanced sages, the promulgators of the Vedas, in respect of objects, supersensible, or past, present, and future, or in respect of *dharma*, etc., as preserved in books,—that is called sagely cognition." This form of cognition at times arises in ordinary or wordly people also ; as when a young maiden says, " My heart assures me my brother will depart to morrow."—6.

Dream, how produced.

Upaskâra.—Thus four-fold *vidyâ*, or true cognition, or knowledge, having been explained, it now becomes proper to explain *avidyâ* or false cognition or knowledge. Therein doubt or uncertainty and error have been incidentally ascertained before. For the purpose of ascertaining dreaming, he says :

तथाः स्वप्न : ॥ ९ । २ । ७ ॥

तथा, Tathâ, so. स्वप्नः Svapnaḥ, dreaming.

7. So (also is) dreaming.—348.

The meaning is that as reminiscence results from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind, and from impression or latency, so also does cognition in dreaming. Cognition in dreaming is the mental experience, through the channels of the senses, belonging to one, when one's senses have ceased to be active and one's mind is in a quiescent state. And this is of three kinds (1) It partly arises from acuteness of impression or facility of reproductiveness ; as in a man who, in love or in anger, thinks intently on some object, when he goes to sleep, in that state, cognition resembling perception, in the form, " This is the contest between *Karṇa* and *Arjuna* " (two heroes of the *Mahâbhârata*), is produced, through the influence of impression, reproductiveness or latency, produced by previous hearing of the *Purâṇas*, etc. (2) It arises partly from derangement of the humours or affections of the body, *viz.*, wind, bile, and phlegm. Therein, in consequence of disorder of the wind, one dreams of moving about in the sky, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers, etc., and the like ; under the influence of an unwholesome excess of the bile, one dreams of entering into fire, embracing flames of fire, golden mountains, corruscations of flashing lightning, sudden extensive conflagrations, etc. ; while, through predominance of phlegmatic deragement, one dreams of swimming upon the sea, immersions in rivers, sprinklings with showers of rain, silver mountains, etc., (3) Dreams appear also under the influence of *adṛṣṭaṃ* (the invisible after-effects of past acts) or deserts. These are cognitions, produced in one whose internal sense has been lulled to sleep or overpowered with sleep, in respect of the experiences of the present or previous states of existence. Therein somnial cognition, signifying good, results from *dharma* or merit, and has for its object the riding upon elephants, ascending on mountains, acquistion of the royal

umbrella, feasting upon pudding, interview with the sovereign, and the like; whereas somnial cognition, signifying evil, arises from *adharma* or demerit, and has its object unction with oil, falling into blind wells, riding upon camels, immersion in mire, the seeing of one's own nuptials, and the like.

The above three, only as jointly operating, have causality here (*i.e.*, in the production of dreams). It should be further observed that this division of causes, is based on the predominance of one or another of the qualities of these causes in their effects.—7.

Cognition accompanying dreaming, how produced.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected :—The cognition which springs up in the midst of a dream, in the form of recollection of the very same object which is experienced in somnial cognition, does not possess the nature of dreaming inasmuch as dreaming takes the form of perceptual experience. From what cause, then, does it arise ?

To this he gives the reply :

स्वप्नान्तिकम् ॥ ९ । २ । ८ ॥

स्वप्नान्तिकम् Svapna-antikaṃ, that which intervenes in, or lies near to, or accompanies, dream.

8. (So is) consciousness accompanying dreams.—349.

The word 'so' comes in from the preceding aphorism. The meaning, therefore, is that as dreaming, so also consciousness accompanying dreaming arises from a particular conjunction between the soul and the mind and also from impression or retention. The difference between the two cases extends only thus far that somnial cognition results from impression or retention produced by former experience, while consciousness accompanying dreaming results from impression or retention produced by experience arising at the very time (of dreaming.) It has been accordingly stated by Professor *Parśastadeva*, "Somnial cognition is merely recollection, inasmuch as it results from looking back upon past cognitions." The writer of the *vṛitti* also says, "Somnial cognition, its function being the illumination of experienced objects, is not a different thing from recollection."

Some teach that 'consciousness accompanying dreaming' is cognition amounting to certitude, in the midst of dreams, as, for example, "I am in a state of lying on the bed," etc.—8.

Another cause of dreaming and of cognition in dreaming.

Upaskâra.—He adds another cause of dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming.

धर्माच्च ॥ ९ । २ । ९ ॥

धर्मात् Dharmât from *dharma* or merit. च Cha, also.

9. (Dreaming and consciousness accompanying dreaming result) from *dharma* also.—350.

The word 'cha' is used with the purpose of adding *adharma*, demerit. This has been already explained.—9.

Vivṛiti.—* * * * Some think that this aphorism has been laid down for the purpose of showing that in some cases dreaming, etc., are also produced from *dharma*, etc., alone, even without the action of *Saṃskâra* or impression, and that the poetic observation of *Śriharṣa* that the maid Sleep brings before the vision of man, through the all-pervading efficacy of *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, even objects which have not been observed before, accordingly becomes explained.

Causes of Avidyâ *or Incertitude.*

Upaskâra.—Now, referring to the series (of doubt, dream, incertitude) he says :—

इन्द्रियदोषात् संस्कारदोषाच्चाविद्या ॥ ९ । २ । १० ॥

इन्द्रियदोषात् Indriya-doṣât, from imperfection of the senses. संस्कारदोषात् Saṃskâra-doṣât, from imperfection of impression. च Cha, and. अविद्या A-vidyâ, false knowledge. Incertitude.

10. False knowledge (arises) from imperfection of the Senses and from imperfection of Impression.—351.

The word 'A-vidyâ,' though a general term, applies to incertitude, according to the context, doubt, dream, and incertitude having been mentioned. Therein imperfection of the senses is inefficiency caused by predominance of the bile, etc. Imperfection of impression is the being accompanied with non-observation of distinctions ; for under such non-observation, false cognition is produced.—10.

Vivṛiti.—Understanding according to another mode is divided into two kinds, certitude and incertitude. Of these, he states the cause of incertitude.

'Indriya-doṣaḥ,' is such as opthalmia, etc. 'Saṃskâra-doṣaḥ' is the being the effect of erroneous experience, etc. The word 'and' implies the addition of such imperfections as remoteness, etc., and also sub-sumptions of false marks or middle-terms, etc. The cause, then, of false knowledge or incertitude is imperfection ; and imperfection, as consisting of biliousness, remoteness, etc., is of diverse kinds.

The characteristic of Avidyâ.

Upaskâra.—He states the characteristic or definition of *avidyâ* in general :

तद्दुष्टज्ञानम् ॥ ९ । २ । ११ ॥

तत् Tat, that. *Avidyâ*. false knowledge. दुष्टज्ञानम् Duṣṭa-jñânaṃ, imperfect cognition.

11. That (*i. e.*, *Avidyâ*) is imperfect knowledge.—352.

'Tat,' an indeclinable word, conveying the sense of a pronoun, alludes to *avidyâ*. That, *avidyâ*, is 'duṣṭajñânaṃ', *i.e.*, cognition which is unduly applied, cognition that a thing is what in fact it is not, in other words, cognition determined in the manner of a divergent object, and

having the mode which does not reside in the object in question. Imperfection consists also of cognition taking the form of uncertainty. Doubt, therefore, even where there is only one alternative, is vicious, being identical with non-assurance or non ascertainment.

The four (forms of *avidyâ*), therefore, namely, Doubt, Error, Dream, and Regression or Indecision are included in this aphorism.—11.

The characteristic of Vidyâ.

Upaskâra.—(He declares what scientific cognition is :)

अदुष्टं विद्या ॥ ९ । २ । १२ ॥

अदुष्टं Aduṣṭaṃ, not imperfect. Free from imperfection. विद्या Vidyâ, true knowledge, *Vidyâ.*

12. (Cognition) free from imperfection, is (called) *Vidyâ* or scientific knowledge.—353.

The word " Cognition " comes in (from the preceding aphorism). ' Aduṣṭaṃ ' means produced by organs of sense which are not inefficient or defective (in consequence of any derangement mentioned above). The meaning, therefore, is that *vidyâ* is the experience of a thing in its proper place, or the experience of a thing in the same manner in which another thing having a common substratum with the former is experienced, or experience of a thing not having the mode which does not reside in the thing in question. It is of two kinds, immediate or sensuous, and mediate or inferential.—12.

Cognition by Sages Siddhas, *how produced.*

Upaskâra.—It may be objected : The cognition (of objects beyond the reach of senses), by advanced sages, also appears in the very same form in which other cognitions, having a common substratum with the former, take place. It is again not produced by the senses, inasmuch as it cognizes objects which are not in contact with them. Nor is it produced by means of inferential marks, as it is produced in the absence of any investigation of such marks. Hence it follows that there is a third form of proof (besides perception and inference) which is the instrument of such cognition.
In view of this objection, he says :

आर्षं सिद्धदर्शनञ्च धर्म्मेभ्यः ॥ ९ । २ । १३ ॥

आर्षं Ârṣaṃ, sagely. Of advanced sages. सिद्धदर्शनं Siddha-darśanaṃ, vision of the Perfected Ones. च Cha, and. धर्म्मेभ्यः Dharmmebhyaḥ, from *dharma* or merits.

13. Cognition of advanced sages, as also vision of the Perfected Ones, (results) from *dharma* or merits.—354.

' Ârṣṃ ' or sagely cognition is the cognition of sages such as *Gâlava*, etc., having for its object things past and yet to come. 'Siddha-darśanaṃ' means the vision by those who have attained success in the direction of cognition apprehensive of objects remote as well as screened from view, by means of *mantra* or incantation, herbs, eye-salve prepared from cocoon, etc. Both of them arise from *dharma* or merit, such that there is cognition of objects in their true light. The author of the *Vṛitti*

observes that this cognition is not a different kind of *vidyâ* or scientific knowledge, as it is included in *Yogic* or ascetic perception. Sagely cognition is really the fourth kind of *vidyâ*, and it occurs to sages as well as to worldly people. And it is simply a form of mental perception, being produced by the mind accompanied with inattention (to internal and external objects), or produced by inferential marks such as faithful observances of the rules of conduct. The cognition of pervasion which is the ground of inference is here solely dependent upon or due to *Saṃskâra*, or impression having its origin in a former state of existence *i. e*., in the same way as is the pervasion or universal concomitance of sucking the breast and the cognition that this is the means of securing what is desired, (in the case of the instinctive application of the baby to sucking the breast.)

The revered Professor *Praśastadeva*, however, says that 'Siddhadarśanam,' cognition of the Perfected Ones, is not a different form of cognition. His reasoning is as follows: If it is said that cognition, by the Perfected Ones, of objects remote and hidden from view, takes its rise from conditions brought about by means of eye-salve prepared from cocoon, and the like, then it is nothing but perception. If it be, on the other hand, cognition which apprehends objects beloging to the earth, the region lying between the earth and the vault of heaven, and the space beyond it, and which is dependent upon the conditions or inferential marks such as the movements, etc., of planets and the lunar mansions (*nakṣatras*), then it is nothing but inferential cognition, inasmuch as pervasion, or universal concomitance of the thing to be inferred and the mark of inference, is determined by the observation of such accompaniment.—13.

Here ends the second chapter of the ninth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

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BOOK TENTH—CHAPTER FIRST.

Pleasnre and Pain are two different things.

Upaskâra.—The purpose of the tenth book is the exposition of the differences of the attributes of the soul according to their causes. Now, in the aphorism of *Gautama*, which enumerates or classifies the provables or objects of certitude. *viz.*, "Soul, Body, Sense, Object, Understanding, Mind, Activity, Fault, Metempsychosis, Desert, Pain, and Emancipation are the provable" *Nyâya-Sûtram*, I. i. 9.), there being no mention of pleasure, the error may arise that pleasure is really not different from pain. With the purpose of dispelling this possible error, the author first of all points out the difference of pleasure and pain themselves.

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषाद्विरोधाच्च मिथः सुखदुःखयो-
रर्थान्तरभावः ॥ १० । १ । १ ॥

इष्टानिष्टकारणविशेषात् Iṣta-aniṣta-kârana-viśeṣât, in consequence of the differrence of causes, (in the forms of) desirables. and undesirable विरोधात् Virodhât on account of opposition. च Cha, and. मिथः Mithaḥ, between them, towards each other, mutual. सुखदुःखयोः Sukha-duḥkhayoḥ, between plasure and pain. अर्थान्तरभावः Artha-antara-bhâvaḥ, relation of different objects.

1. In consequence of the difference of (their) causes, in the form of desirables and undesirables, and on account of (their) mutual opposition, Pleasure and Pain stand in the relation of objects different from each other.—355.

'Sukha-duḥkahayoḥ,' (between pleasure and pain there exists) 'mithaḥ,' mutual, 'artha-antara-bhâvaḥ,' distinction that is to say heterogeneity. Whence (does this distinction arise)? To this quention the author replies, 'iṣta-aniṣta-kârana-viṣeśât' *i. e.*, in consequence of 'viśeṣaḥ,' distinction or difference, of their causes which have, in the one case, the form of 'iṣtam,' desirable objects such as garlands, sandal-paste, women, etc., and, in the other case, the form of 'aniṣtam,' undesirable objects such as snakes, thorns, etc. For heterogeneity of effect necessarily follows from heterogeneity of cause. He lays down another principle of distinction, *viz.*, 'virodhât,' on account of opposition characterised by non-dwelling together. For pleasnre, and pain are not experienced in one and the same soul at one and the same time. The word, 'cha,' and, brings forward the difference of the effect of pleasure and pain as a further means of distinguishing betwean them. Thus, graciousness, the embrace, clearnesss of the eyes, etc., are the effects of pleasure, while despondency, a sullied countenance, etc., are the effects of pain; hence on this ground also pleasure and pain must differ from each other. Accordingly it has been stated by Professor *Praśasta-deva*, "Pleasure has the characteristic of agreeable feeling. In the presence of garlands and other desirable objects, from the contact of the senses and objects in the recognition of something desirable being produced, and from the conjunction of the soul and the mind and dependent upon *dharma* or merit and the like, that which is produced and is the cause of complacence, embrace, and kindliness of the eyes, etc., is pleasure."

In the case of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., enjoyed in the past, plearure arises from *smṛiti*, reminiscence, and, in the case future objects, it arises from *Saṅkalpa*, desire or appeteney or imagination or will.

The non-enumeration of pleasure in the aphorism of *Gautama* is in order to promote indifference or dispassion, in other words, to teach that dispassion would arise in one who should account even pleasure as pain. (*Cf. Nyâya Sûtram*, IV. i. 58, दुःखविकल्पसुखाभिमानाच्च, The idea of pleasure takes place in an alternative form of pain).—

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.

Upaskâra.—It may be urged : Let pleasure and pain be mutually distinct. But they may be non-different from cognition, like recollection and perception of sensation.

Accordingly the author says :

संशयनिर्णयान्तराभावश्च ज्ञानान्तरत्वे हेतुः ॥ १० । १ । २ ॥

संशयनिर्णयान्तराभावः Saṃśaya-nirṇaya-antara-abhâva, non-inclusion in doubt and certainty. च Cha, and. ज्ञानान्तरत्वे Jñâna-antaratve, in the matter of being different from cognition. हेतुः Hetuḥ, reason, mark.

2. And the non-inclusion (of Pleasure and Pain) either in Doubt or in Certainty, is the mark that they are other than cognition.—356.

The meaning is that non-inclusion either in doubt or in certainty is the mark of inference that pleasure and pain are other than, *i. e.*, different from, cognition. The idea is this ; Were pleasure or pain a kind of cognition, it would either have the form of doubt, or have the form of certainty. It cannot be the first, as the two alternatives (which must be present in doubt) do not exist ; nor can it be the second, as the single alternative does not exist (see Vivṛiti—below). And the species or parts being thus excluded, the geuns or whole is necessarily excluded. For the species of cognition, are two only, the characteristic of doubt and the characteristic of certainty. And both of them are excluded from pleasure as well as from pain ; hence the characteristic ofcognition also finds no place in them.

The word, ' cha ' and, adds on the exclusion of external sensation or perception. The perception of pleasure and pain is mental *i. e.*, by the inner sense, in the forme, " I feel pleasure," " I feel pain " ; whereas perception of them does not take such shape of form as in " I know," " I and doubtful," " I am certain."—2.

Vivṛiti.—* * * Neither pleasure nor pain has the form in which two repugnant alternatives are present together, that it should be probable that they have the nature of doudt, nor has either possession of a given form together with absence of negation of that form, that it should be likely that they have the nature if certainty. The supposition of a third form of cognition is chimerical like the horn of a hare. Conequently neither pleasure nor pain can come under knowledge.

Pleasure and Pain are not form cognition—continued.

Upaskâra.—He lays down another principle of differentiation.

तयोर्निष्पत्तिः प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकाभ्याम् ॥ १० । १ । ३ ॥

तयोः Tayoḥ, their, of doubt and certainty. निष्पत्तिः Niṣpattiḥ, production. प्रत्यक्षलैङ्गिकाभ्याम् Pratyakṣa-laiṅgikâbhyâm, by means of perception and inference.

3. The production thereof (*i.e.*, of Doubt and Certainty) is by means of perception and inference.—357.

'Tayoḥ,' of doubt and certainty, 'niṣpattiḥ,' production, (is) from perception and from inferential marks. Neither pleasure nor pain is produced by the perceptive apparatus or by inferential marks. For, pleasure is four-fold, being objective, subjective, imaginative or sympathetic, or habitual. Of these, the last three by no means possess the characteristic of taking their origin from the contact of the (outer) senses (with their objects). Should it be contended that the first is cognition, inasmuch as it is generated by contact of the senses and their objects, we reply that it is not so, for a part only of the whole cause, (being the same), cannot entail homogeneity in the effect ; else all and sundry effects would come to be homogeneous as they must have space and time as their common antecedents. Moreover, (if pleasure were cognition), the pleasure which is not produced through contact of the senses and their objects, would be either non-discriminative or indefinite, or discriminative or definite. But it cannot be the first, for then it would be supersensible ; nor can it be the second, inasmuch as it does not consist of a judgment respecting two objects in the relation of subject and predicate. Again, pleasure and pain are necessarily accompanied with sensibility ; (were they forms of cognition), there would be involved in the (consequent) notion of a sensibility of cognition a regression to infinity. 'Laiṅgikaṃ' (the adjective) means merely 'liṅgaṃ' (the noun), mark, as the word, objective, (means an object).

The author of the *Vṛitti*, on the other hand, explains the aphorism thus, that the origin thereof, *i. e.*, of cognition and pleasure, is explained, 'pratykṣa-laiṅgikâṃ,' *i. e.*, by the explanations of perceptual and inferential cognitions, that is to say, that whereas perceptual cognition is produced by the senses, and inferential by marks of illation, it is not so with pleasure, etc.—3.

Vivṛiti.—It may be urged that as non-discriminative cognition is neither doubt nor certitude, so too may be pleasure and pain. Accordingly he says :

The proof of pleasure and pain is furnished by perception and inference. In one's own soul, pleasure and pain are proved by perception ; in other souls, pleasure is inferred by brightness of the eyes, etc., and pain by paleness of the face, etc. So that, had they the form of non-discriminative cognition, there could be no perception, nor could it be possible for them to be the subject of inference by such marks as brightness or paleness of the face, and the like. Hence, the import is, they are not included in cognition.

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition.—continued.

Upaskâra.—He points out the difference of pleasure, etc., from inferential cognition depending upon a difference of their modes or appearance.

अभूदित्यपि ॥ १० । १ । ४ ॥

अभूत् Abhût, (it) was. इति Iti, such modal distinction. अपि Api, also.

4. "(It) was"—such (modal distinction) also (establishes the difference between pleasure or pain and cognition.)—358.

The word 'iti' indicates the form. The word 'api' implies another form, *viz.*, "(It) will be." Thus, in inferential cognition, *e. g.*, "There was or will be fire in the mountain," the modal distinction of the past, etc., is observed; but pleasure or, pain, produced under this form, has never been observed.—4

Vivṛiti—* * * * Cognition is conversant about objects past, future, and present. But of other pleasure or pain, no object whatever exists. Therefore, by the application of contradictory properties, *viz.*, objectivity and non-objectivity, it follows that pleasure and pain are not identical with cognition.

Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition—continued.

Upaskâra.—He brings forward a further ground of differentiation:

सति च कार्य्यादर्शनात् ॥ १० । १ । ५ ॥

सति Sati, existing. च Cha, also. कार्य्यादर्शनात् Kâryya-adarśanât, because of the non-observation of the effect.

5. Also (Pleasure and Pain are not forms of cognition), inasmuch as the effect, (pleasure or pain), is not observed, where (the antecedents of cognition) are present.—359.

Pleasure or pain is not merely perception or merely inferential cognition, since the effect, pleasure or pain, is not observed, where contact of the senses and objects exists, or where there is recognition of the universal concomitance (which is the ground of inference), of the mark of inference being a property of the minor term, etc. The meaning, therefore, is as follows: It has been already stated that pleasure and pain are not cognition in general, (*i. e.*, non-discriminative cognition). Should they be cognition in particular (or discriminative cognition), they would be either perceptual cognition or cognition in the form of inference. (Pleasure and pain cannot be the former), inasmuch as the experience of the element of pleasure does not take place during the perception of garlands, sandal-paste, etc., on the contact of the senses and their object; nor can they be the latter, since there is no experience of the pleasurable or the painful, as the case may be, where there exists an inference respecting sandal-paste, etc., or an inference respecting fire, etc. In like manner, pleasure and pain being

not experienced in any particular act of perception or in particular act of inference, they are also not the particulars of that perception or that inference.—5.

Bhâṣya reads Saticha of X i. 5 as a separate aphorism, and *explains* it thus : Cognition arises, *Sati, i. e.*, in respect of objects actually existing at the moment. Cognition accordingly relates to past, present, and future objects. But this is not the case with pleasure and pain. Herein also, therefore, there is difference between cognition, on the one hand, and pleasure and pain, on the other.

Above continued : Causes of Pleasure and Pain.

Upaskâra.—He mentions anothers differentiating characteristic.

एकार्थसमवायिकारणान्तरेषु दृष्टत्वात् ॥ १० । १ । ६ ॥

एकार्थसमवायिकारणान्तरेषु Eka-artha-samavâyi-kârana-antareṣu, there existing other causes co-inherent in one and the same object. दृष्टत्वात् Driṣṭatvât, from the being observed. Because they are observed.

6. (Pleasure and Pain are not form of cognition), because they are observed, when there exist other causes co-inherent in one and the same object, (*i. e.*, the soul).—360.

" Of pleasure and pain "—such is the complement (of the aphorism). In relation to pleasure, uncommon or specific causes co-inherent in one and the same object are *dharma* or merit, attachment to, or attraction for, pleasure, desire for the cause of pleasure, volition or striving to secure the material (cause) of pleasure, and cognition of garlands, sandle-paste, etc.; while in relation to pain, they are *adharma* or demerit, and cognition of thorns and other undesirable object. The meaning is that (pleasure and pain differ from cognition), inasmuch as they are observed on the co-inherence of these causes in one and the same object. But cognition which is non-discriminative, does not at all stand in need of an uncommon cause co-inherent in the same object (with it). Discriminative cognition, of course, depends upon a cognition of predication or attribution (or judgment), but this is not another cause, that is, a cause heterogeneous to the cause of the cognition itself. Conjunction of the mind, as being a cause common (to pleasure and pain with cognition), does not require mention. Though reminiscence requires *saṁskâra*, impression or reproductiveness, as its specific or uncommon cause, yet the difference therefrom is quite obvious, as it is for this reason that the difference (of pleasure and pain) has been investigated with reference only to cognition or perceptual experience. Although in inferential cognition there is dependence upon the recollection of pervasion or universal concomitance, the cognition that the mark is a property of the minor term, etc., yet it is thrown overboard by the very word ' antara,' other, (in the aphorism). The probative sense (of the aphorism) is, therefore, that pleasure and pain are different from cognition, inasmuch as they are the products of uncommon or particular causes, of their own kind, co-existing in the same substratum with them, as is the case with reminiscence, and with the first sound (in a series of sounds).—6.

An objection answered.

Upaskâra.—It may be objected; If the difference of pleasure and pain from cognition depend on the difference of their causes, and if the difference of pleasure and pain from each other be just like the mutual difference between a pillar and a water-pot, etc., then there can be no mutual difference between the body and its parts such as the head, the feet, the back, the stomach, etc., there being, in regard to these, no difference in their causes, whether they be the ultimate atoms, binary atomic aggregates, etc., or blood and semen.

To meet this objection, he says:

एकदेश इत्येकास्मिन् शिरः पृष्ठमुदरं मर्म्माणि तद्विशेषस्तद्विशेवेभ्यः ॥ १० । १ । ७ ॥

एकदेश Eka-deśe, in the part. इति Iti, such. This. एकस्मिन् Ekasmin, in one (body). शिरः Śiraḥ, the head. पृष्ठं Priṣṭham, the back. उदरं Udaraṃ, the stomach. मर्म्माणि Marmmâṇi, the vitals. तद्विशेषः Tat-viśesaḥ, their distinction. तद्विशेषेभ्यः Tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ, from the distinctions or their causes.)

7. The head, the back, the stomach, the vitals are in the parts of one and same (body) ; this their difference (results) from the differences thereof (*i. e.*, of their causes).—361.

'Eka-deśa iti' means, in the part. 'Ekasmin' means, in the body ; 'Śiraḥ'—this is one part ; 'udaraṃ' ; 'priṣṭhaṃ' ; and 'marmmâṇi,' *i. e.*, the sinews, etc. ; their 'viśeṣaḥ,' difference in kind, (results). 'tat-viśeṣebhyaḥ,' from the difference in kind of their causes. There, again, (*i. e.*, in the case of the heterogeneity of the causes), heterogeneity results only from the heterogeneity of the causes (of those causes) ; for, the combinative causes of the stomach, the back etc., also are not just of the same kind as that of the head ; just as the heterogeneity of a spiece of cloth, a water-pot, etc., results from the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, and other material causes ; heterogeneity being possible, in them also, the heterogeneity of threads, postherds, etc., also, results from the heterogeneity of fibres, dust, etc. Heterogeneity is, in like manner, to be sought in the successive material causes ; for, while the ultimate atoms may be common, the heterogeneity of the respective material causes universally gives rise to heterogeneity (in their respective effects) ; whereas homogeneity of the material causes, constituted by their substanceness, does not cause such heterogeneity. This is the point.—7.

Bhâṣya :—*read Ekadeśe iti* of X. i. 7 with X. i. 6, and *explains* it as giving an additional reason why pleasure and pain cannot be forms of cognition, the meaning being that pleasure and pain are localised in the body, whereas cognition is not so localised.

Here ends the first chapter of the tenth book in the Commentary of Śaṅkara upon the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms.

BOOK TENTH—CHAPTER SECOND.

Substance is the only combinative cause.

Upaskâra.—As a collatoral topic, the author now commences a special discrimination of the three causes :

कारणमिति द्रव्ये कार्य्यसमवायात् ॥ १० । २ । १ ॥

कारणं Kâraṇaṃ, causo. इति Iti, such. द्रव्ये Dravye, in substance. कार्य्यसमवायात् Kâryya-samavâyât, from the combination of effect.

1. "(It is the combinative) cause"—such (intuition and usage), with regard to Substance, (arise) from the combination of effect (in it).—362.

'Kâraṇaṃ,' that is, that it is the combinative cause ; 'iti,' such intuition and usage, are to be observed, 'dravye,' with regard to substance. Why so ? He gives the reply : 'kâryya-samavâyât,' because effect, *viz.*, substance, attribute, and action, combine in it alone.—1.

Vivṛiti.— * * * * The definition of a cause in general is that causality consists in constant antecedence, there existing at the same time voidness of failure to produce the effect (that is to say, in Mill's phraseology, causality consists in invariable and unconditional antecedence). There are three kinds of causes, according to their division into the combinative or material, non-combinative or formal, and instrumental or efficient. * * * *

Substance is effcient cause also.

Upaskâra.—It may be asked : Do then substances possess only combinative causality ?

So he says :

संयोगाद्वा १० । २ । २ ॥

संयोगात् Saṃyogat, from conjunction. वा Vâ, or, and.

2. And, through conjunction, (Substance becomes the efficient or conditional cause also).—363.

As combinative causality, so also efficient causality, belongs to the threads, in the production of a piece of cloth. Inasmuch as conjunction of the shuttle and the threads is also a cause of the cloth, the shuttle and the thread, are, mediately through that conjunction, also efficient cause of the cloth. The word 'vâ' is used in a collective sense, inasmuch as, though the thread possesses combinative causality towards the conjuction of the shuttle and the thread, yet it possesses efficient causality towards the cloth, mediately through such conjunction.—2.

Vivṛiti.—He says that combinative causality belongs to substances, not only because effects combine in them, but also because they are fields for the operation of non-combinative causes.

'Saṃyogât' means because they are the support or substratum wherein takes place cônjunction which is the non-combinative cause.* *

Actions are non-combinative causes.

Upaskâra.—He explains what causality resides in Action :

कारणे समवायात् कर्म्माणि ॥ १० । २ । ३ ॥

कारणे Kâraṇe in the cause. समवायात् Samavâyât, from combination. कर्म्माणि Karmmâṇi, actions.

3. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Actions (are non-combinarive causes).—364.

"Non-combinative causes"—such is the complement (of the aphorism.) Non-combinative causality is causality combined or co-inherent in one and the same object connected with the state of effect and cause. Such causality results either from combination in the same object with the effect, or from combination in the same object with the cause. Of these the former is called, in the terminology of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the slighter or minor, and the latter, the greater or major, proximity. If it be asked by means of which proximity, then, actions possess non-combinative causality towards disjunction, and *saṃskâra* or impression ; it is here replied, 'kâraṇe samavâyât,' (that it is) through combination in the combinative cause of conjunction, etc. The meaning, therefore, is that non-combinative causality is exercised by action in (the production of) conjunction, etc., by means of the minor proximity characterised as combination in the same object with the effect.—3.

Certain Attributes are non-combinative causes, and occasionally efficient causes also.

Upaskâra.—In anticipation of the question as to what kind of causality pertains to colour and other attributes residing in the (conssituent) parts, in relation to the attributes of the wholes, he says :

तथा रूपे कारणैकार्थसमवायाच्च ॥ १० । २ । ४ ॥

तथा Tathâ, so. रूपे Rûpe, in colour. कारणैकार्थसमवायात् Kâraṇa-eka-artha-samavâyât, through combination in the same object with the cause. च Cha, and, also.

4. So also in Colour (there is non-combinative causality) through combination in the same object with the cause.—365.

The expression 'colour' indicates colour, taste, smell, touch, number, magnitude or quantity, separateness, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, etc. The term 'so' extends (the application of) non-combinative causality. 'Kâraṇa-eka-artha-samavâyât': (This non-combinative causality of colour, etc.) originates the colour, etc., of the wholes, by means of the major proximity (constituted) by (their) combination in the same object with the whole, which is the combinative cause of the colour, etc., of that whole ; as, for instance, the colour, etc., of the potsherds originate the

colour, etc., in the water-pot, and similarly it should be observed in all other cases. The word 'cha' implies that occasionally colour, etc., possess efficient causality also.—4.

Bhāṣya.—reads X. ii. 4 as two aphorisms, *viz.*, *Tathā rūpe*, and *Kāraṇai-kārtha-Samavāyāt-cheha.*

Conjunction is a non-combinative cause.

Upaskāra.—He states that the minor proximity belongs to conjunction while it is a non-combinative cause in the origination of substances :

कारणसमवायात् संयोगः पटस्य ॥ १० । २ । ५ ॥

कारणसमवायात् Kâraṇa-samavâyât, through combination in the cause. संयोगः Saṃyogaḥ, conjunction. पटस्य Paṭasya, of the cloth.

5. Through combination in the (combinative) cause, Conjunction (is a non-combinative cause) of the cloth.—366.

The meaning is that, through combination in the combinative cause, conjunction also is a non-combinative cause, in the production of effects such as a piece of cloth, etc., by means of the proximity characterised as combination in the same object with the effect. The word ' cloth ' indicates product substance in general.

A certain author maintains that if, on the other hand, conjunction of part with part be also a non-combinative cause of a piece of cloth and the like, then combination in the same object with the cause is also (a non-combinative cause).—5.

Above continued.

Upaskāra.—He says that causality sometimes pertains to conjunction by means of the major proximity :

कारणकारणसमवायच्च ॥ १० । २ । ६ ॥

कारणकारणसमवायात् Kâraṇa-kâraṇa-samavâyât, through combination in the cause of the cause. च Cha, and, also.

6. And, through combination in the cause of the cause, (conjunction becomes a non-combinative cause by means of the major proximity) also.—367.

The conjunction, technically termed *prachaya*, (loose) coalition aggregation, and residing in the constituent parts of a bale of cotton, originates magnitude in the bale of cotton. Here the proximity is constituted by combination in the same object with the cause. This is the meaning.—6.

Efficient causes declared.

Upaskāra.—Having thus ascertained causality determined by the combinative cause, he begins a new section for ascertaining efficient causality.

संयुक्तसमवायदग्नेर्वैशेषिकम् ॥ १० । २ । ७ ॥

संयुक्तसमवायात् Saṃyukta-samavâyât, through combination in the conjunct. अग्नेः Agneḥ, of fire. वैशेषिकम् Vaiśeṣikaṃ, distinctive attribute.

7. The distinctive attribute of Fire, (*i. e.*, heat), (becomes an efficient cause), through combination in the conjunct.—368.

'Vaiśeṣikaṃ,' distinctive attribute, 'agneḥ,' of fire, in other word, heat, becomes an efficient cause in relation to the effects (colour, etc.,) produced by burning or baking, through combination (of colour, etc.,) in the conjunct, (*i. e.*, the water-pot placed in fire.) This is indicative; in relation to cognition everything possesses efficient causality. Understanding, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression possess efficient causality only. It should be observed that this system or elaboration of thought has the purposes of establishing the mutual differences of pleasure, etc.—7.

Vivṛiti—* * * * The general definition of an efficient cause is to be understood to be a cause other than the combinative and non-combinative causes. * * * *

Observances produce adṛiṣṭaṃ *as their fruit, on the authority of the Veda.*

Upaskira.—Now, in order to confirm the authoritativeness of the Vedas, he repeats the very same statement which has been made by him before :

दृष्टानां दृष्टप्रयोजनानां दृष्टाभावे प्रयोगोऽ

भ्युदयाय ॥ १० २ । ८ ॥

दृष्टानां Driṣṭânâṃ, of acts observed or known to be productive of good. दृष्टप्रयोजनानां Driṣṭa-prayojanânâṃ, of acts the purpose of which has been taught. दृष्टाभावे Driṣṭa-abhâve, in the absence of visible or observed faults or defects. प्रयोग : Prayogaḥ, performance. अभ्युदयाय Abhyudayâya, for the production of exaltation or *adṛiṣṭaṃ.*

8. The performance of acts of observed utility and of acts the purpose whereof has been taught (in the sacred writings), is, for the production of *adriṣṭaṃ*, (as these teachings are authoritatarie being the word of God in whom) the defects found in ordinary speakers do not exist.—369.

'Driṣṭânâṃ' means, of acts which have been proved to be useful by the evidence of experience, *e.g.*, sacrifices, almsgivings, ablution, and the like. Driṣṭa-prayojanâṇâṃ' means, of acts the purpose whereof has been taught. For, thus, in such precepts as " He who desires heaven, shall perform sacrifice," " He who desires heaven, shall offer oblation in the *agnihotra* sacrifice," etc., the fruit or purpose is mentioned at once along with the injunction ; in some cases, the purpose is given out by way of a recommendation, as in " The *pitris* or departed ancestors of him who studies during these nights, pour down upon, or send down to,

him streams of clarified butter and streams of honey," etc.; in other cases, the purpose is left to be imagined, as in "He shall perform the *Viśvajit* sacrifice," etc., for, here the purpose is neither mentioned along with the injunction nor presented by way of a recommendation, and is therefore, suppositional, and (it cannot be any thing but heaven), for heaven alone should be supposed as the purpose or fruit which is charming in itself. That being so, it does not stand to reason that these acts which so shortly come to their end, should have causality towards the production of fruits or results in the distant future. Hence, the meaning is, 'prayogaḥ, the performance, of these acts, is 'abhyudayāya, for the purpose of *apûrvaṃ,* that is, *adṛiṣṭaṃ*, or deserts. It might be objected as follows: This would have been the case, were the authoritativeness of the Vedas a fact. But that is hard to maintain. For the authoritativeness of the Vedas as being eternally free from faults or defects in themselves, is not desired by you, (*i. e.*, the *Vaiśeṣika*), as it is by the *Mimâṃsâ* school, inasmuch as you recognise them as the production of a person, and in that case, it is possible that mistake, absence of mind, intention to mislead, and other defects existed in the person. To this the reply is given by the phrase, 'dṛiṣṭa-abhâve' which means, there being non-existence of personal defects such as error, absence of mind, desire to mislead, and the like, which are found in other persons, namely, in ourselves and others; inasmuch as the Supreme Person, inferred whether as the Creator of the earth or as the Speaker of the Vedas, is presented to us entirely under the characteristic of freedom from faults or defects. So that His words can neither have no meaning, nor convey a contrary meaning, nor convey a useless meaning. It is only impurities caused by error, absence of mind, inefficiency of the senses, and the like, due to defectiveness of the elements constituting the physical organism, the external senses, and the mind, that may possibly vitiate speech. But they cannot possibly lurk in the word of Îśvara. It has been accordingly declared:—

रागाज्ञानादिभिर्वक्ता ग्रस्तत्वादनृतं वदेत् ।
ते चेश्वरे न विद्यन्ते सब्रूयात् कथमन्यथा ॥

—Being influenced by passion, ignorance, and the like, a speaker may tell untruths. But these do not exist in Îśvara. How can He speak otherewise (than truthfully)?—8.

Note—Cf. VI. ii. 1, *supra.*

Vivṛiti.—Thus the Predicables have been ascertained, as also Resemblance and Difference. This *Śâstra* or System of Self-culture facilitates *manana*, intellection or thinking about things, in them only whose *chitta*, or inner sense or mind, has been purified by the performance of acts, and not in them whose *chitta* has not been so purified. Observances are productive of purity of *chitta*, as declared by such text of the Veda as "They desire to know," etc. The same has been mentioned before. He repeats it for further confirmation.

* * * * Observances, * * * when performed disinterestedly, do not produce elysian bliss, etc., as their fruit, but produce as their result purity of *chitta* or intellect, etc., according to the text of

the of Veda, "They desire to know," and the *Smṛiti*, "When worldly attachment has, by observances, borne its fruits, knowledge is afterwards produced."

Authoritativeness of the Veda established.

Upaskâra—It may be urged : The Veda has been revealed by God,—it is here that there is conflict of opinions.

Accordingly he says :

तद्वचनादाम्नायस्य प्रामाण्यमिति ॥ १० । २ । ९ ॥

तद्वचनात् Tat-vachanât, from being the word of Him, God. आम्नायस्य Âmnâyasya, of the Vedas, प्रामाण्यं Prâmâṇyaṃ, authoritativeness इतिIti, *finis*. According to Śridhara, author of Nyâya kandati, " " tat refers to Riṣis.

9. The authoritativeness of the Veda (follows) from its being the Word of God.—370.

'iti' indicates the conclusion of the *Śâstra* or system. The authoritativeness, 'âmnâyasya,' of the Veda, (is derived), 'vachanât,' from its being the composition, 'tena,' by Îsvara. For, thus, we have already proved that the Vedas have a personal author, inasmuch as they are a collection of sentences or declarations. Nor can we and others possibly be the speakers of them, divided and sub-divided as they are in a thousand branches, for they treat of objects which transcend the senses, and beings of our nature cannot behold objects which transcend the senses. Moreover, the Vedas must have been spoken by a trustworthy person, in asmuch as they are accepted by men of light and leading. That which is not spoken by a trustworthy person, is not accepted by men of light and leading, the Vedas are accepted by men of light and leading, therefore they have been spoken by a trustworthy person. To be spoken by a trustworthy person is to be declared by a self-governed or independent person ; and to be accepted by men of light and leading is to be believed in, and acted upon, by persons attached to all the systems of thought. It has been stated before that non-appearance of the fruit or result, which occasionally happens, is due to defect or flaw in the act or performance, the agent, and the means or requisites. If it be denied that this is so, there being no recollection on the part of the agent ; we reply that the denial has no value, it having been already proved that there is recollection on the part of the agent. The composition thereof by Him is proved, inasmuch as they could be declared only by an independent person, while such independent power to declare the Vedas in their thousand branches is as has been said, impossible for beings of our nature. Moreover, since certitude must be the product of excellence or superiority, the certitude derived from the Vedas must also have excellence for its condition, and excellence must in this case be pronounced to be only the speaker's accurate knowledge of the true meaning of the sentences. The speaker of the Veda must, therefore,

be one of that description, one who has immediate cognition of heaven, *adriṣṭam* and like other objects; and there is none such but Îśvara alone. This is well said.—9.

Note.—*Cf.* I. i. 3, *supra*.

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The fortunate *Saṅkara*, who is the son of *Bhavanâtha* by *Bhavâni*, and who is devoted to the worship of Śiva, has written this commentary on the Aphorisms of *Kaṇâda*.

Even though this production of mine may not find favour with others, nay, may be an object of ridicule with them, yet, (it is hoped), it will be adored a thousand times and over by my pupils, out of respect for their teacher.

—+—

Here ends the second chapter of the tenth book in the commentary on the Vaiśeṣika Aphorisms by Śrî Śaṅkara Miśra, son of Mahâmahopâdhyâya Bhavanâtha Miśra.

And complete is also this treatise.



APPENDIX I.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

(Compiled from the Viśvakoṣa and Hall's Catalogue).

	Names of Works.	*Names of Authors.*
1	Apaśabda-khaṇḍana ...	Kaṇâda Muni.
2	Ahetu-sama-prakaraṇa ...	*Anonymous.*
3	Âtma-tattva-viveka ...	Udayana Âcharya.
4	...... —kalpalatâ ...	Śankara Miśra.
5	...... —dîdhiti ...	Raghunâtha Bhattâchârya.
6	Kaṇâda-rahasya ...	Padmanâbha Miśra.
7	....	Śankara Miśra.
8	Kaṇâda-rahasya-saṁgraha ...	*Anonymous.*
9	Kaṇâda-saṁgrahavyâkhyâ ...	*Anonymaus.*
10	Kaṇâda-sûtra-vyâkhyâna ...	Raghudeva Nyayâlankara.
11	Kârikâvali ...	Viśvanâtha.
12	Kirṇâavali ...	Udayana Acharya.
13	...... -ṭikâ ...	Udayana.
14	....	Krisna Bhaṭṭa.
15	...... —ṭippana ...	Bhagiratha Ṭhâkkura.
16	....	Mathurânâtha.
17	...... —prakâśa ...	Vardhamâna Upâdhyâya.
18	.... —kâśikâ ...	Megha Bhâgiratha.
19	.... - vyâkhyâ	*Unknown.*
20	...... -bhâskara ...	Padmanâbha Varadarâja.
21	...... —rahasya ...	Mathurânâtha.
22	Kusumâñjali (-kârikâ) ...	Udayana Âchârya.
23	.... -vyâkhyâ ...	Haridâsa Bhattâchârya.
24	....	Râmabhadra ...
25	....	Rudra Bhattâchârya.
26	...... -ṭîkâ ...	Miśra.
27	...... -prakâśa ...	Vardhamâna Upâdhyâya.
28	.... -makaranda	Ruchidatta.
29	...... -vritti	*Unknown.*
30	...... -vyâkhyâ ...	Nârayaṇa Tirtha Yati.
31	....	Trilochana Deva.
32	Komalâ-ṭîkâ-ṭika ...	Viśvanâtha.
33	Guṇa-kiraṇâvali ...	*Untraced.*
34	...... -ṭîkâ ...	*Untraced.*
35	...... -prakâśa ...	Vardhamâna.
36	Guṇa-dîdhiti-ṭippanî ...	Jayarâma Bhaṭṭâcâhrya.
37	Guṇa-prakâśa-dîdhiti ...	Raghunâtha.
38	.... -mâthurî ...	Mathurânâtha.
39	...... -vivṛiti ...	Raghunâtha.
40	.... -bhâva-prakâśikâ	Rudra Bhattâchârya.
41	Guṇa-rahasya ...	Râmbhadra.
42	...... -prakâśa ...	Madhava Deva.
43	Guṇa-śiramaṇi ...	Raghunâtha.
44	...... -ṭîkâ ...	Râmakrisna Bhattâchârya.
45	Guṇânandî (on No. 22) ...	Guṇananda.
46	Jâti-ṣaṭka-prakaraṇa ...	Viśvanâtha Pañchânana.
47	Tattva-jñâna-vivṛiddhi-prakâśa	... ...
48	Tattvânusandhâna ...	*Unknown.*

49	Tarka-kârikâ ...	Jivarâja Dîkṣita.
50	Tarka-kaumudî ...	Laugâkṣi Bhâskara.
51	Tarka-dîpikâ ...	Annam Bhaṭṭa.
52	... -prakâśa ...	Nilakaṇṭha Śâstri.
53	Tarka-pradîpa ...	Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.
54	Tarka-bhâṣâ ...	Viśvanâtha.
55	Tarka-manjari ...	Jivarâja Dîkṣita.
56	Tarka-ratna ...	Koṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.
57	... ...	Virarâghava Śâstri.
58	Tarka-saṁgraha ...	Annam Bhaṭṭa.
59	... -chandrikâ ...	Mukunda Bhaṭṭa.
60	... -tattva-prakhśa ...	*Unknown*
61	Tarka-saṁgrahopanyâsa ...	Meru Śâstri.
62	Tarkâmṛita ...	Jagadîśa Tarkâlankâra.
63	... -chasaka ...	Gangârâma Jadi.
64	... ... -tâtparya-ṭîkâ	...
65	... -tarangini ...	Mukunda Bhaṭṭa.
66	Dravya-kiraṇâvali-prakâśa ...	Vardhamâna.
67	... -parikṣa ...	Rudra Vâchaspati.
68	... -sabda-vivechana	Chandraśekhara Bhârati.
69	Dravya-guṇa-paryâya ...	Untraced.
70	Dravya-nirûpaṇa ...	Untraced.
71	Dravya-patâkâ ...	Untraced.
72	Dravya-padârtha ...	Pakṣadhara.
73	Dravya-prakâśa-vivâiti ...	Raghunâtha.
74	Dravya-prakâśika ...	Megha Bhâgiratha Ṭhakkura.
75	Dravya-bhâṣya-tîkâ ...	*Anonymous.*
76	Dravya-sâra-saṁgraha ...	Raghudeva.
77	Dvandva-vichâra ...	Gokulanâtha Maithila.
78	Nirukti ...	Paṭṭabhirâma Śâstri.
79	Nyâya-kandalî ...	Śridhara Âchârya.
80	Nyâya-tantra-bodhinî ...	Viśvanâtha.
81	Nyâya-taraṅginî ...	Keśava.
32	Nyâya-bodhinî ...	Govardhana Miśra.
83	Nyâya-lîlâvatî ...	Vallabha Âchârya.
84	... -kaṇṭhâbharaṇa ...	Śankara Miśra.
85	... -prakâśa ...	Vardhamâna Upâdhyâya.
86	... -dîdhiti ...	Raghunâtha Śiromani.
87	... ... -viveka ...	Vidyâvâgiśa Bhaṭṭâcharya.
88	... -bhâva-prakâśa ...	Bhâgiratha.
89	Nyâya-sâra ...	Mâdhava Deva.
90	Nyâya-siddhânâta-muktâvalî ...	Viśvanâtha Pañchânana.
91	Nyâyârtha-laghu-bodhinî ...	Govardhana Ranga Âchârya.
92	Pada-kṛitya ...	Chandrarâja Simha.
93	Pada-saṁgraha ...	Krisṇa Miśra.
94	Padârtha-khaṇḍaṇa ...	Raghunâtha Śiromani.
95	... -ṭîkâ ...	Govinda, Mâdhava, Raghudeva, Ruchi-datta, and Râmabhadra.
96	... -tâtparya-tikâ ...	Krisṇa Miśra.
97	Padârtha-chandrika ...	Misaru Miśra (or Śârngadhara ?)
98	... -vilâsa ...	Krisṇa Bhaṭṭa.
99	Padârtha-tattvâvaloka ...	Viśvanâtha.
100	... -nirṇaya ...	*Anonymous.*

No.	Work		Author
101	Padârtha-dipikâ	...	Konda Bhatta.
102	Padârtha-dharma-saṃgraha	...	Praśastapâda.
103	Padârtha-nirûpaṇa	...	Nyâyavâchaspati.
104	Padârtha-parijâta	...	Krisna Miśra.
105	Padârtha-pradeśa	...	Śankarâchârya.
106	Padârtha-bodha	...	Untraced.
107	Padârtha-maṇi-mâlâ	...	Jayarâma Nyâyapañchânana.
108	... -prakâśa	...	Laugâkṣi Bhâskara.
109	Padârtha-viveka (-siddhânta-tattva)		Untraced.
110	... -tîka	...	Gopinâtha Muni.
111	Paribhâṣâ-viśeṣa		Untraced
112	Pramâṇa mañjarî	...	Sarvadeva Puri.
113	Bâhyârtha-bhaṅga-nirakâraṇa		Viśvanâtha Pañchânana.
114	Bhâṣâ-parichchheda	...	...
115	Bheda-prakâśa	...	Śankara Miśra.
116	Mita-bhaṣiṇî	...	Mâdhava Sarasvati.
117	Mithyâ-tva-vâṇa-rahasya	...	Gokulanâtha.
118	Mukti-vâda-ṭikâ	...	Viśvanâtha.
119	Ratna koṣa	...	Prithvidhara Âchârya.
120	... -kâra-padârtha		
121	... ... -mata-vâda		
122	... -karika-vichara		
123	... -mata-rahasya		
124	... -vâda or -vichâra...		Harirâma.
125	... ... -rahasya	...	Gadâdhara.
126	Rasa sâra	...	Mâdhava Vadindra.
127	Râddhânta-muktâhâra	...	Padmanâbha Miśra.
128	Lakṣaṇâvalî	...	Udayana Âchârya.
129	... -ṭika	...	Śeṣa Śâraṅgadhra.
130	Lilavati-rahasya	...	Mathurânâtha Tarkavâgisa.
131	Vâda-sudhâ-ṭikâ ratnavali	...	Krisṇa Miśra.
132	Vaiśeṣika-ratna-mâla	...	Bhavadeva Paṇdita Kavi.
133	Vaiśeṣika-Sûtra	...	Kaṇâda.
134	... -upaskâra	...	Śankara Miśra.
135	... -ṭîkâ	...	Udayana Âchârya; Chandrânanda.
136	... -bhâṣya	...	Râvaṇa; Raghudeva; Chandrakânta.
137	... -vânṭika	...	Vijñâna Bhikṣu.
138	... -vivṛti	...	Jayanârâyaṇa.
	... -vṛitti	...	Bhoja ?
139	Vyâkhyâ-parimala		
140	Sapta-padârthî	...	Śivâditya Miśra.
141	... -vyâkhyâ	...	Hari.
142	Śabda-prâmâṇy-vada	...	
143	Śabdârtha-tarkâmṛita	...	Jaykrisṇa (or Krisṇa Maunin).
144	Sambandhopadeśa	...	Bangadâsa.
145	... -ṭîkâ	...	Gobardhana.
146	Siddhânta-chandrikâ	...	Krisṇa Dhûrjati Dîkṣita.
147	Siddhânta-tattva-viveka	...	Gokulanâtha.
148	... ... -śarvasva	...	Gopinâtha Mauni.
149	Siddhânta-muktâvali-prakâśa		Bâlakrisṇa.

APPENDIX II.

INDEX OF WORDS.

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APPENDIX—III.

INDEX OF APHORISMS.

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N. B.—*Words left out by some editors are shown within brackets.*

